Download 3301 Lecture 11

Sociology 3301: Sociology of Religion
Lecture 11: Conversion and Switching II
Today, after making a few more supplementary comments about religious
conversion, we will conclude our discussion of this area by reviewing the related
phenomena of switching between religions, de-conversion, and even the extreme practice
of “deprogramming” sometimes applied to members of “cults” at the behest of others.
Conversion: Group and Age Contexts:
The religious conversion does not occur in a vacuum, but involves processes and
behaviors affected by the group in which it occurs. What constitutes conversion, what
one can expect to experience, and even whether one should expect a conversion
“experience” at all are matters defined by the religious group one belongs to or happens
to be under the influence of at the moment (e.g. during a revival meeting). As we will
see, this does not necessarily have to be dramatic.
Zitterberg, in a study of a fundamentalist Christian church, found a number of
group influences on conversion, which he defined as itself a stage in the social role of
membership. In this case, every member had a clear background of being religiously
influenced before the experience: indeed, 80% came from families where at least one
parent was already a member. Second, conversion does not necessarily imply a change in
one’s way of life – the convert may well already have “pious habits and right belief.” In
such cases, conversion is simply a signal of a more conscious acceptance of this life.
Third, a clear majority of conversions occur under conditions that are created and
manipulated by the group (revival meetings, camps, etc.) Fourth, while a sudden change
in lifestyle may be the stereotype of conversion, these are relatively unlikely. Zetterberg
found only 16% of his sample had conversions of this type. Much more likely is a
“sudden role identification” in which a person, who has been undergoing socialization by
the group, suddenly feels certain of their salvation. The other type of conversion is “role
assimilation” in which the person gradually becomes sure of their saved condition over
an extended period of membership.
Borhek and Curtis, similarly unimpressed with the common stereotype of
conversion as a sudden reversal or change of direction, suggest that the actual conversion
(such as might occur at a revival service) is a rite of passage, differing from other such
rituals only in the fact that the participant may be largely unconscious of its ritualized,
conventional character. Indeed, they suggest that conversion experiences are often “so
highly conventionalized that it requires real effort not to view them as rituals learned for
the occasion.”
Turning from group to age, it is also the case that conversion – in its dramatic
form at least – is primarily an adolescent phenomenon. Hence, it is no accident that
Jewish children have their bar and bat mitzvahs in early adolescence, that in most
liturgical churches that confirmation occurs then, and that in non-liturgical churches
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baptism and/or profession of faith occur at this time. Indeed, early studies by Starbuck
(1899) and Clark (1929) found that the most common age for conversion of males to be
age 16 and for females 14-15.
In this respect, Elkind notes that, until adolescence, children know much more
than they understand about their religious identity. Allport describes adolescence as the
time when the person must transform religious attitudes from secondhand to firsthand
fittings of his/her personality.
There is also some indication that sexual guilt feelings and anxieties among
people who have only recently begun to struggle with their sexual development, desires,
and propensities are strongly influential here. The traditional stereotyped conversion in a
revival meeting almost invariably includes a discourse, series of prayers or altar calls that
touch on “sexual sins” more than any others, designed to produce admissions of guilt for
what are essentially universal feelings and urges. Thouless thus states: “the typical
adolescent conversion may be regarded psychologically as the sudden emergence into
consciousness of a previously repressed system of feelings belonging to the sex instinct,
which is now admitted into consciousness because it is sublimated, purified, and directed
to a religious end.”
That conversion most often occurs during adolescence is probably not surprising
given the hormonal changes, opportunities for new experiences, and intellectual
awakening that occur then. Religion may be one among many new ideas and systems to
embrace. Or, religion that began to be internalized many years earlier may have
developed to a peaking point at this time. It is certainly no coincidence that most
followers of NRM’s/cults are young people (e.g. Rockford found that 57% of those who
joined the Hare Krishnas were between 18-23; only 20% were over 25).
Not all conversions occur during adolescence, of course. But something akin to
the psychological and emotional dislocations that occur during adolescence happen at
other points in people’s lives as well. It is common, for example, for some kind of “life
crisis” to precede conversion – as noted by Lofland’s study on converts to the Moonies,
among other works.
Further Comments on the Process Model:
Last class we reviewed Lofland’s (1977) process model of conversion, which has
been very influential in the study of religious conversion. As the result of subsequent
criticisms, we noted that Lofland and his colleague Norman Skonovd (1981) later
modified the process approach, suggesting that not all conversions are alike, and, as such,
the stages in conversion will have greater and lesser importance and visibility, depending
on which type (motif) of conversion is being experienced. While we noted this last class,
I thought it might be useful to describe these six motifs a little further.
First, there is the intellectual motif, where people consciously investigate religious
alternatives and almost “convert themselves” (BTW, this would be most amenable to
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rational choice theory). This is because they consciously and actively put themselves into
interaction with members of a particular group and essentially “ask for” group influence
and socialization to take over. Second is the mystical conversion, the most familiar
conversion motif, where there is a high level of emotional arousal. The person is
conscious of a change coming on with a rush and they claim to be “taken over” by a
particular religion’s God (i.e. the “born again,” Damascus Road conversion). Third, there
is the experimental motif, where a fairly long time of “trying out” the new religion is
involved. There is a gradual learning and familiarization process. Fourth, is the
affectional motif, where positive relations with members of a particular group over an
extended period integrate the newcomer into the group. Fifth is the revivalist motif,
similar to the mystical but that it occurs in public, and dramatically, as the convert in
ecstasy heeds the altar call and publicly demonstrates their rejection of evil and
acceptance of the new way. Lastly, there is the coercive motif , rather rare, but alleged
with some frequency by those opposed to particular religions (along with claims of
“brainwashing” and the like).
Despite further critiques and modifications, as noted last class, there is much
agreement on at least two prerequisites to conversion, namely: (1) the existence of prior
affective bonds between a recruit and one or more members of the group; and (2)
intensive interaction and involvement with the group in order to facilitate conversion. As
such, it is likely that the person converts not for doctrinal reasons (e.g. the group’s
teachings), but because of the supportive acceptance of a group of fellow humans who
express warmth, acceptance, and support.
“Switching” Among Denominations:
Changes in religious affiliation have become fairly common in North America.
Thus, a 2008 survey of 35,000 Americans by the Pew Research Centre found that 28% of
U.S. adults had left the faith they were raised in for another religion, or for none at all. If
change in affiliation between Protestant groups is included, 44% had either switched
religious affiliation, moved from “unaffiliated” to a specific faith, or dropped any
connection to a specific religious tradition altogether.
As suggested by rational choice theorists, the religious marketplace is very open
and dynamic. Some even suggest that these changes are so commonplace as to term them
“everyday conversion” or “mundane conversion.” Yet, it is also the case that
denominational switching does not necessarily involve a conversion (i.e. change in
worldview) so much as it does organizational membership. Hence, in this sense the term
reaffiliation may be more appropriate.
The survey results above indicate that the biggest “winners” in today’s American
switching game are the nondenominational Protestants and the religiously unaffiliated.
The biggest “losers” are Catholics, Baptists, Methodists, and Presbyterian (i.e. mainline
churches). Many other groups essentially break even, with roughly equal numbers
entering and leaving the religion (e.g. Hindu, Eastern Orthodox).
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When the survey results were further examined to show the original religious
tradition of respondents compared to their current one, several interesting items were
noted. For example, Hindus were the least likely to switch faith traditions, while
Protestants more often leave to become Jehovah’s Witnesses (1/3 former Protestants),
Buddhists (32%), or to join another Protestant tradition. It is also interesting that 44% of
all unaffiliated adults were raised Protestant, double the number of unaffiliated who were
raised with no religious identification (21%). Note, however, that being unaffiliated is a
much less stable religious identity than most others.
Switching by Individuals and Families:
What accounts for all of this switching today? Sociologists studying various data
sets have found that the most consistent predictors of religious switching are
intermarriage and education.
Those who marry outside their religious tradition are more likely to switch to
bring their affiliation in line with their spouse’s, comprising a significant proportion of
religious switchers. Hence, the “friendship network” factor is extremely important in this
case as well (the spouse being the “friend.”) One reason that Orthodox Jews and
conservative Protestants tend to have higher retention rates than liberal Protestants is that
they are much more likely to marry within their own denomination.
Education level is also an important factor in predicting religious switching.
People tend to worship with others of a similar socioeconomic class. When they are
upwardly mobile, they more often change their denominational affiliation. While unclear
whether this is planned “image enhancement” or merely joining a group with one’s
friendship network, this move generally tends to be to a group with a more modern or
liberal theology. High-status churches tend to be more modern in theology, and, for
upwardly mobile professionals, this more contemporary, more secular theology may be
appealing (e.g. one that accepts the advances of science may appeal more to a scientist
than a theology that rejects Darwin). Moreover, religions favored by the “have-nots” tend
to condemn materialism and the accumulation of possessions as signs of depravity –
which may cause discomfort for the affluent. Finally, liberal theology tends to embrace
this world more completely than do traditions that stress rewards in the afterlife. Hence,
changes in socioeconomic status seem to be a big source of denominational switching.
Beyond these factors, there are also aspects of an individual’s personal
background that boost their odds of switching. First, instability in an individual’s
connection to religion makes them more likely to switch. Not formally joining a faith
community and having a lapse in religious practice are both predictors of switching
(Loveland, 2003). Having one’s parents divorce in childhood boosts the odds of religious
reaffiliation (Lawson and Bures, 2001).
It is clear that denominational switching is not the same thing as an internal
conversion experience, but more a matter of changing organizational membership. Yet
the feeling of belonging – because of friendship networks or because of socioeconomic
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homogeneity – seems to be the primary influence in such decisions. Bibby (1987), for
example, in a study of Canadian evangelicals, noted that “If they are serious about
recruiting ‘real live sinners.’ The best approach is either to befriend them or marry them.
For this is how the majority of outsiders are actually recruited.”
Switching and the Growth or Decline of Religious Bodies:
Beyond individual cases of switching, some scholars have looked at the potential
social consequences, thus they try to find out why some groups are growing, others
declining, and the role of switching in both.
Kelly (1972), for example, noted that conservative churches were growing, his
thesis being that people are attracted to groups with strict standards of membership and
that expect members to invest time and resources. Indeed, data on denominational growth
and decline 40 years later show the same pattern: conservative churches are growing
while liberal, mainline churches are on the decline.
Kelly explained this trend by arguing that people are leaving more liberal
denominations and switching to conservative ones. Yet, his interpretation of the data has
not been unchallenged. Most converts to the conservative churches are actually rejoining
after a period of absence or coming from other conservative congregations. Indeed,
conservative churches seem to be growing not so much due to switching as two other
factors: (1) recruits from other evangelical or fundamentalist groups; and (2) a high
fertility rate in conservative churches. Only about 10-15% of new members came from
outside the evangelical community. Conversely, liberal churches seem to be drawing a
larger percentage of their new members from more conservative ones, and some believe
that there is more switching this way than the other (Bibby, 1987).
But, regardless of whether more are switching from conservative to liberal
groups, the fact is that conservative churches are growing in membership, while more
liberal and moderate churches are either declining or remaining stable. One explanation is
that the latter do not retain members as well as most conservative churches, though data
in this respect are inconclusive. Still, regardless of varying retention rates among
differing conservative denominations, the fact is that their membership tends to be
boosted by very high birth rates. Conservative denominations tend to “grow on their
own” demographically because of these higher fertility rates and earlier childbearing
among women in such congregations.
Thus, the growth of conservative religious groups makes sense. They employ
more commitment practices, have higher fertility rates, and have more religious training
in the home. On the other hand, liberal mainline churches are declining, though some
congregations have managed to reverse this trend by implementing emotional and
instrumental commitment mechanisms – small support groups for bonding, eliciting a
commitment of time and energy in the organization by new members, etc.
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This entire area of church growth and decline has been enormously controversial
for some time. Some, such as the rational choice theorists, side with Kelly and his thesis
that conservative churches are growing due to switching, claiming that strictness,
absoluteness, and otherworldliness are powerful attractions that cause growth. They argue
that strict churches force high levels of commitment by everyone, “free riders” are
squeezed out, and thus the “collectively produced commodity” is of high value to all.
Others counter that church members like clergy that are authoritative, confident and firm
in their faith, as opposed to strict and demanding. Still others claim that churches that
combine evangelical theology with modern music, upscale but non-churchy
environments, and non-authoritarian pastors are drawing members from mainline
churches.
Ultimately, there are many trends within trends, but is does seem that in the U.S.
certain conservative groups and congregations are gaining a larger overall proportion of
the active, religiously affiliated population. Still, the category that has grown the most is
believers who have left religious communities entirely and those who have moved to
non-denominational congregations. Indeed, the drop in mainline denominations seems
not to be so much from switching to conservatives as it is to dropping out and becoming
““nones”.”
Religious ““nones””
This focus on denominational winners and losers has obscured the group that has
grown the most in recent decades: those with no expressed religious preference
(““nones””). Compared to the 1950s-60s when they clocked in at around 3-4% of the
population, in 2008 they constituted 16.1% of the U.S. population.
We must recognize, however, that these are not necessarily the same thing as
“nonreligious.” Many do believe in God, pray, participate in services, and report religious
experiences. The 16.1% actually breaks down further as: atheists (1.6%); agnostics
(2.4%); secular unaffiliated (6.3%); and religious unaffiliated (5.8%). Thus, only one
tenth do not believe in God and 15% are unsure. The “secular unaffiliated” are simply
those stating that religion is not important to them, while the religious unaffiliated say it
is to some extent, but they are not part of an existing religious community. Religion is
thus actually important in the lives of one third of those who claim no religious
preference.
How are we to understand the rise of this group? As compared to previous
“structural” explanations, such as people being geographically or socially isolated and
having little connection with religious institutions, today “cultural” or ideological reasons
seem more important. Hout and Fischer (2002) argue that the doubling of “nones” had to
do with cohort replacement. That is, the religious generation of the first third of the 20th
century was replaced by the boomers. Also, those raised with no religion tend to be less
likely to affiliate in adulthood than in the past, perhaps because of friendship networks
with other “nones”. Finally, this growth was heavily influenced by individuals with
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liberal political identities becoming alienated from organized religion due to the
alignment of religion with the conservative politics of the “religious right.”
This trend is expected to grow as one of the strongest predictors of being a
religious none is having parents who are religious “nones”. While many will be atheists
or agnostics, others may come to describe themselves as spiritual not religious. In any
event, what this means for the future of religion in our society is likely something that
sociologists will be dealing with for some time.
De-conversion:
Before closing our consideration of conversion and switching, let’s go to the other
extreme and consider de-conversion: when people disaffiliate and repudiate their former
commitment and decide to leave.
Like conversion, this is a process that takes time and often proceeds through
stages rather than come as a sudden, spur of the moment thing. Jacobs, in a study of
people who left cults, for example, found an evolutionary quality to the process of deconversion for 80% of respondents. She speaks of a “multi-stage exit” that involves two
separations. First, one disengages from the social manifestations of the group – group
activities, interactions, and exchanges with the members. Second, one disengages from
the leader and breaks the emotional attachment one has had to that person.
Most often the first step involves conflict over social life, for example conflict
over intimate relations, prescribed sex roles, and personal lifestyle (e.g. restrictions on
one’s freedom and personal life). Often this involves dissatisfaction with mid-level
organizers and not the leader. People can exist at this point for some time, separating the
leader from the restrictive, day to day aspects of the group, though some do leave without
explicitly repudiating the leader (43%). The other 57% ultimately came to reject the
leader as well, and this was often emotionally wrenching for them before they finally left.
In this latter respect, there were four primary areas where the leader came to be defined
as deviant: psychological abuse, emotional rejection, spiritual betrayal, and physical
abuse. Inconsistencies between the leader’s professed ideals and actual behavior played a
large part.
Also important precipitating factors in de-conversion include: (1) a breakdown of
isolation and insulation from the outside world, providing opportunities for comparison;
(2) unregulated development of a strong relationship with another member with whom
one can discuss things candidly; and (3) a perceived lack of success in achieving the
goals of the group to change and improve the world.
Of course, it all takes time for these processes to work themselves out, sometimes
several years, and there is a lot of movement in and out of NRMs, even former members
of one later becoming affiliated with another. In such cases, disillusionment with one
group does not keep people from trying others, often as underlying needs have not been
met by other activities or affiliations in the meantime.
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But not all disaffiliation is from cults. As noted, defections from mainline
religious groups has been rising over recent years and “nones” have been growing. A
profile by Hadaway and Roof suggests that “nones” tend to be “young, single, male,
highly educated, liberal and mobile,” while “apostates” claim that they left because of
“maturation, objections to church teachings, irrelevance, and lifestyle conflicts.”
Deprogramming:
A final – and controversial - means of disaffiliating from NRMs has come to be
known as deprogramming. This involves physical withdrawal from the religious group,
often forcibly by parents and other loved ones who hire self-described deprogrammers to
“rescue” the adherent. They then begin a process of isolating and “cleansing” the psyche
designed to reverse the alleged “brainwashing” that had occurred during the conversion
to and participation in the NRM. Said to be successful in some cases, such practices have
also been regarded as serious violations of human rights and are almost unheard of today.
Next class: Church, sect, denomination, and cult.
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