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Field: Social Sciences Session Topic: Acceptance of New Technologies Speaker: Takashi Kurosaki, Hitotsubashi University Title: Producers' Adoption of New Technologies in Developing Countries 1. Introduction Technical change is regarded as one of the engines of growth in development economics. A number of macroeconomic empirical studies have shown that the technical change has indeed contributed to economic growth. For instance, the US economy grew at an annual rate of 2.7% in real GDP per capita during 1929-66, of which 78% can be attributed to technical change, while the Japanese economy grew at an annual rate of 8.2% during 1958-70, of which 54% can be attributed to technical change (Hayami and Godo 2005, Table 5.2). However, the macro growth rate has been below the level required for a rapid poverty reduction at the global level; at the microeconomic level, we often observe instances where seemingly-superior new technologies have not been accepted by producers so that the adoption rate of such technologies has been less than expected. In other words, there exists a huge technology gap in developing countries between the potential and the actual level of productivity. This gap is a potential source of growth, if we can correctly understand the reason for low adoption. Applying the modeling approach in development microeconometrics to semi-arid tropics of rural South Asia, the author explains this observation not as an irrational behavior of poor and illiterate producers, but as an outcome of rational response of poor and risk-averse producers to incomplete markets and asymmetric information. 2. Analytical Framework: Risk, asymmetric information, and households' technology adoption in development microeconomics Based on the theoretical framework of Kurosaki (2001), the analytical framework of this paper maintains a hypothesis that a firm/farm in a developing country is rational and adopts a new technology if it improves the welfare/utility of the firm/farm, but it faces several constraints such as high risk in production and marketing, less availability of insurance services and low self-insurance ability due to low income, and high degree of asymmetric information regarding the technology and markets. A related literature can be found in Evenson and Westphal (1995) and Sunding and Zilberman (2001). 3. Case Studies on Poverty and Households' Risk-Coping Measures in South Asia Main example is taken from Kurosaki and Fafchamps (2002). This study examines how Pakistani farmers' production mix (technology adoption) is different from the profit maximizing pattern under the latest technology, given negative correlation between crop and livestock profits. Structural estimation of risk and consumption preferences based on a non-separable agricultural household model yields the following results: (1) Farmers' technology choice is consistent with a risk-averse behavior, with respect to both total income and consumption prices. (2) The extent of risk aversion varies systematically among farmers. Especially, livestock reduce risk aversion (households with more liquid assets and more access to credit are better able to bear risk). (3) Our model of technology adoption by a risk-averse farmer with respect to both total income and consumption prices performed much better than alternative models. (4) Income loss due to risk consideration is simulated at 9.4% of the total household income (higher for land-poor households), indicating social inefficiency due to less development of credit and insurance markets. Extension of this framework is applied to fodder crop choice in India (Kurosaki 2005), labor portfolio in India (Ito and Kurosaki 2006), and employment institutions in Myanmar (Kurosaki 2006). All these cases supported the view that producers' technology choice is affected by risk aversion and asymmetric information. 4. Conclusion This paper investigates the underlying reasons why seemingly-superior new technologies have not been accepted by producers so that the adoption rate of such technologies has been low. The author's evidence from semi-arid tropics of rural South Asia explains this observation not as an irrational behavior of poor and illiterate producers, but as an outcome of rational response of poor and risk-averse producers to incomplete markets and asymmetric information. An important implication of this explanation is that faster economic growth and more poverty reduction is possible with the available set of technologies if the constraints of market incompleteness and information asymmetry are reduced (e.g., through the provision of more efficient credit access to the poor by micro finance institutions). Another implications is that a new technology should take into consideration these constraints faced by producers in developing countries (e.g., developing a sorghum variety that meets farmers' demand both for fodder and grains). References Evenson, R. E., and L E. Westphal (1995) ``Technological Change and Technology Strategy," in Behrmand and Srinivasan (eds.) Behrman, Jere, and Srinivasan, T. N. (eds.), Handbook of Development Economics, Volume IIIA. Amsterdam: North Holland, pp.2209-2299. Hayami, Y. and Y. Godo (2005) Development Economics: From the Poverty to the Wealth of Nations. Third Edition. New York: Oxford University Press. Ito, T. and T. Kurosaki (2006) "Weather Risk and the Off-Farm Labor Supply of Agricultural Households in India," contributed paper at the International Association of Agricultural Economists Conference, Gold Coast, Australia, August 12-18, 2006. Kurosaki, T. (2001) Kaihatsu no Mikuro Keizaigaku: Riron to Ouyou (Development Microeconomics: Theory and Application), Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten (in Japanese). ----- (2005) "Dynamics of Livelihood Structure and Assets in Village India, 1975-2004: Literature Survey and Research Agendas." In Seiro Ito (ed.), Agricultural Production, Household Behavior, and Child Labor in Andhra Pradesh. Joint Research Program Series No. 135, IDE, March 2005: 53-104. ----- (2006) "Labor Contracts, Incentives, and Food Security in Rural Myanmar," COE Discussion Paper no.134, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University, Tokyo. January 2006. Kurosaki, T. and M. Fafchamps (2002) "Insurance Market Efficiency and Crop Choices in Pakistan." Journal of Development Economics, vol.67, no.2. Sunding, D. and D. Zilberman (2001) "The Agricultural Innovation Process: Research and Technology Adoption in a Changing Agricultural Sector," in B.L. Gardner and G.C. Rausser (eds.) Handbook of Agricultural Economics, Volume 1. Amsterdam: Elsevier, North-Holland. pp.207-261.