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The Egyptian Opposition: Common Goals and a Fuzzy Future
[Teaser:]
Summary
The pending downfall of Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, marking the end of 60 years
of rule by the National Democratic Party, represents a sea change in Egyptian politics.
Only days after anti-government protests began in Cairo on Jan. 28, it is still too soon to
tell who will come out on top after Mubarak leaves office. But groups are queuing in the
wings, and it is time to take an analytical look at the key players. Following is
STRATFOR’s take on the opposition groups now positioning themselves in preparation
for final negotiations and the move toward a transitional government in Egypt.
Analysis
The Egyptian opposition rising against the regime of President Hosni Mubarak is far
from a united body. Without an overarching leader, it is composed of various political
parties, protest movements, a prominent banned Islamist group and a politician who
belongs to no political party and is better known for his former role as an international
diplomat. Until a group of three legally recognized opposition parties -- New Wafd,
Tagammu and Nasserist -- said Feb. 2 that they would be willing to negotiate with newly
named Vice President Omar Suleiman about a power-sharing deal, all opposition groups
were demanding that Mubarak step down before any talks take place with the military or
the ruling National Democratic Party (NDP).
Still, all opposition forces maintain the professed goal of affecting Mubarak’s departure.
As protests continue for a 10th straight day, what these groups are trying to figure out is
what they want after he does leave and how they can work together to achieve other
common goals, which include the following:

The revolution must be non-violent, since none of opposition groups appears to be
prepared for an armed confrontation with the military or other forces loyal to the
NDP regime. Some of the opposition groups may differ on this point, but if they
do none has acted as if it were ready for a confrontation or intimated that it is
planning one.

Once Mubarak is gone, the NDP-dominated parliament must be dissolved, and a
coalition of opposition forces must form a transitional government at some point.

New elections must eventually be held.

The constitution must be revised, notably the articles that allow for a president to
stay on indefinitely and that apply excessive restrictions on who can run for
[the?] office.
Those are four of their common goals. Following are three points on which the
opposition groups definitely differ (not included here is the position of the three-party
alliance -- New Wafd, Tagammu and Nasserite -- which agreed Feb. 2 to negotiations
with Suleiman that do not require Mubarak’s resignation):

Who will represent the coalition in negotiations that occur after Mubarak’s exit
and who will be part of this coalition going forward. If any prominent opposition
group is left out of the coalition, the prospect of violence will increase.

Who the coalition will negotiate with. This could be members of the military
without ties to the regime, members of the military with ties to the regime [or
some other entity?] (no one has really said who this might be).

Whether the first course of action after Mubarak’s exit should be the formation of
a transitional government or the establishment of a technocratic "council of
elders" model, to serve as a temporary bridge en route to a transitional
government.
Dividing the opposition groups into neat categories is difficult. Alliances seem to shift
not by the day but by the hour. Some groups have different members who contradict each
other, a sign that there is little unanimity within the groups or that the situation on the
ground is incredibly fluid. In an effort to understand the Egyptian opposition better,
STRATFOR has broken them down into five rough categories:

The pro-democracy youth movement, consisting of groups like the April 6
Movement and the Egyptian Movement for Change (Kifaya).

The Muslim Brotherhood (MB), which is believed to be the single largest
opposition group in Egypt.

Former International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director Mohammed
ElBaredei and his umbrella group known as the National Association for Change
(NAC).

The newest addition to the fray, Arab League Chairman Amr Moussa.

The old guard or[and?] marginal opposition parties.
While nothing involving the Egyptian opposition can ever be set in stone, there does
appear to be a[another? We’ve already mentioned one above, the three-party
alliance] coalition slowly forming. This one would pit together the first three categories
in our list -- the pro-democracy youth movements (mainly April 6), the Muslim
Brotherhood (which, despite a range of opinions held by different leading members,
would likely get its house in order and speak with a common voice on an issue of such
magnitude) and the NAC, led by ElBaradei. As things currently stand, all signs point to
ElBaradei being the figurehead leader of this coalition. But at the rate things have been
shifting in the past week, this balance of forces could change in the time it takes you to
finish reading this analysis.
These three groups have good reasons to come together, including:

ElBaradei lacks the grassroots political support that a successful opposition leader
needs, and he can find that in the MB and April 6. An alliance with both groups
would give him the street credibility he lacks as simply the head of the NAC -- the
MB with the religiously conservative sector of society and April 6 with the
secular, pro-democracy youth.

The MB, meanwhile, is perceived by many foreign governments (Israel, the
United States and many Arab states) as an Islamist bogeyman that would, if it
took power, turn Egypt into a Sunni version of Iran and tear up the peace treaty
with Israel. The group has gone out of its way to reassure people that this would
not be the case, and it knows that it would be beneficial to align itself with the
secular April 6 and let ElBaradei do the talking.

April 6 needs ElBaradei less than the MB [does?], since April 6 doesn’t have to
worry about an Islamist reputation, but it is a protest movement and not a welloiled political party. Joining with the MB would be beneficial because it would
tap into the millions of Egyptians who do not seek the sort of liberal democracy
that April 6 advocates.
If ElBaradei is to be the symbolic head of such a coalition, he will not be the true source
of power. This is not just because he lacks the sort of grassroots support that the MB and,
to a lesser extent, April 6 have in abundance. Alternate scenarios put forth by some of the
possible coalition partners have even proposed that some sort of 10-man “council of
elders” be formed to negotiate the transition to an interim government.
Thus, assuming that the protests continue and Mubarak is forced out of office before
September, we are currently faced with two main questions: 1) Will the budding MBApril 6-ElBaradei coalition hold and 2) will they agree to negotiate with Suleiman?
If the answer to No. 1 is no, then the opposition will be weakened and its effectiveness
dulled. If the answer to No. 2 is no, then even though the opposition will be stronger, its
challenge will be much greater, since Suleiman will not be any easier to force out than
Mubarak. The most likely way to minimize the duration of what is likely to be a
protracted crisis, no matter what happens, is for the answers to both questions to be yes.
Following is a more in-depth breakdown of the five opposition categories:
Pro-Democracy Youth Movements
The April 6 Movement and Kifaya are the groups that have led the charge in actually
getting protesters organized and onto the streets. They are protest movements, however,
and not political parties, and both seem to take pride in that. They want a liberal,
democratic society in Egypt and have sought alliances with people like ElBaradei for the
purpose of putting a "face" on the movement, a credible and symbolic player who can
take the reigns of political power when Mubarak leaves. This need has also driven the
youth movement to seek the support of groups like the MB, which helps them secure
popular support by appealing to the large religious sector of Egyptian society that also
wants to see Mubarak’s downfall.
April 6 Movement
Origins: The April 6 Movement, also known as the April 6 Youth Movement, got its
name from the first general strike it ever organized in Egypt, on April 6, 2008, in
Mahalla, an industrial town in the Nile Delta where workers had been striking for over a
year without any organization. Ahmed Maher and Esraa Abdel Fattah Ahmed Rashid
[Copy editor: we need to make sure the spelling of Rashid’s full name here is
consistent with the spelling in Noonan’s security weekly] established the first “April 6
Strike” Facebook group on March 23, 2008, which could be considered the birthday of
the movement. As the group’s membership grew, so did the level of support it received
from already established organizations like labor groups, political parties, student
organizations, the MB and Kifaya. But April 6 also spread the word in the classic
manner, passing out leaflets and tagging graffiti messages on public buildings, to let
people who didn’t have Internet access know about the movement.
Platform: April 6 is the most well known of the pro-democracy youth movements in
Egypt. It acts according to the precedent laid down by the Serbian non-violent
revolutionary group Otpor, which helped trigger the popular uprising that eventually led
to the overthrow of Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic in 2000. April 6 has adopted
many of Otpor’s tactics (as seen by the [Serbian group’s?] 26-page “how to” booklet
that was being passed around in Egypt in advance of the massive Jan. 28 protests). April
6 also has a similar vision, stressing nonviolence and a secular ideology, and is proud to
emphasize that it maintains a purely apolitical stance. It even uses a logo almost identical
[to Otpor’s?], a clinched black fist, which can be seen on banners held high during the
demonstrations.
Additional details: April 6 emphasizes one key point in its official statements about its
nature: It is not a political party but a “movement.” Nevertheless, it certainly has political
goals. The size of April 6 is impossible to determine, since a person cannot officially be a
member of the group, unless he or she is part of the small cadre of hard-core organizers.
There were estimates in 2009 that April 6 had 70,000 people identified as “followers of
the movement,” and its size has grown considerably since then. This has especially been
the case in recent weeks, as April 6 has gained a higher profile for organizing the bulk of
the street protests and received more attention from the international press (and,
significantly, state media, which heretofore has tried to downplay the group’s
significance). Since roughly 90 percent of Egypt’s citizens are Muslim, it goes without
saying that the membership of April 6 is also composed predominately of Muslims, but
the group does not advocate the inclusion of religion in the affairs of the state. In this
sense, April 6 differs sharply from the MB [PLEASE CONFIRM WITH KAMRAN
THAT THIS IS A CORRECT STATEMENT]. Scenes broadcast on television Jan. 28
showing thousands of demonstrators pausing to pray in the middle of the protests were
more likely intended to convey a message of unity among the protesters and were the
product of April 6’s organizational ability and not religious motivation.
Known leaders: One is Mohamed Adel, who was detained by Egyptian security forces on
Jan. 27, according to a STRATFOR source, one day before the protests began on Jan. 28.
Adel’s status is currently unknown. He had been arrested for his political activism in
2008. It is believed that a recent WikiLeaks revelation that the U.S. government had
brought over a leading “revolutionary” youth leader for consultations in 2008 was either
a reference to Adel or Ahmed Maher (see below). This indicates that Washington has
been aware of the group’s existence for some time, though whether it fully grasped the
potential for the organization to have the success it has recently had is another question.
Ahmed Maher, another April 6 leader, is a 29-year-old engineer known as one of the two
founders of the group. Like Esraa Abdel Fattah Ahmed Rashid, he is a former member of
the youth wing of another opposition party known as El Ghad. Maher broke away from
the El Ghad over his frustration that it was not active enough, and [he was?] linked for a
time with the Kifaya movement’s youth wing. He played a large role in orchestrating the
Mahalla strike. Past writings by Maher have emphasized that April 6 must be careful to
differentiate itself from other opposition groups such as the MB. An excellent example of
how April 6 differs from the MB can be seen in Maher’s views on how the group could
exploit popular anger over the Egyptian government’s alliance with Israel during the
2009 Gaza War. Maher advocated that April 6 exploit public anger against the
government for its ties to Israel not by focusing exclusively on that one issue but rather as
a means of[by?] linking it to the larger problems of corruption and the repressive nature
of the NDP regime.
Still another April 6 leaders is Esraa Abdel Fattah Ahmed Rashid, the 31-year-old cofounder of the group. She wears a hijab, signifying that the group may seek a secular,
liberal society but that it is still very much in touch with Egypt’s predominately Islamic
culture. Rashid was well known in Egypt long before the[her?] recent unrest, referred to
as “the Facebook Girl” after she was arrested in connection with the 2008 Mahalla strike.
Rashid also does not speak English well, another sign that the group is not simply an
organization of Western-oriented elites.
Egyptian Movement for Change
Origins: Kifaya, which means “enough” in Arabic, was created in September 2004 as an
alliance of leading opposition figures, some of whom belonged to marginal opposition
parties and some of whom had no particular party affiliation. It is perhaps inaccurate to
label Kifaya as a “youth movement,” in the same sense that April 6 is a youth movement,
though it does operate a youth wing that acts much as April 6 does. Although the core
Kifaya does have elderly members, for the purposes of this analysis, STRATFOR is
grouping it with April 6 by virtue of [why?]. Kifaya’s utility from the beginning has been
in its ability to bring together disparate opponents to the Mubarak regime, including
Islamists, secularists, Marxists, Nasserites and people of other ideological persuasions.
Unlike April 6, however, Kifaya has been led by Islamists at times, but that does not
mean Kifaya itself ever advocated the creation of an Islamist state in Egypt. Rather,
Kifaya’s raison d’etre has always been simply to force the ouster of Hosni Mubarak from
power. The group gained prominence in December 2004 by holding the first-ever public
demonstration in Egypt that expressly advocated the end of Mubarak’s reign. Kifaya was
thus the trailblazer of the current anti-Mubarak protest movement that has taken Egypt by
storm in recent weeks. Kifaya predated the April 6 Movement by four years, and was the
first to capture the power of text messaging and social media to spread the word of its
activities.
Platform: Since its early years, Kifaya has been overtaken [by April 6?] as the leading
force in organizing activists and putting them on the streets. This is largely because of the
difficulties Kifaya has faced in keeping its disparate elements united. Unlike April 6,
which is largely a youth movement that strives for a liberal, democratic society, Kifaya is
an umbrella group that seeks to hold together numerous political strands with the
common thread of opposition to the Mubaraks, both Hosni and son Gamal, against whom
the group has rallied to prevent from ascending to the presidency after his father exits the
scene. As April 6 does, Kifaya takes pride in being a “movement” rather than a party and
is committed to non-violent protests. Its youth wing, which operates almost
independently at this point, has ties to the April 6 leadership.
Kifaya also was one of the first groups to realize the value of sending mass text messages
to organize rallies, and it has benefitted greatly from anti-government bloggers who help
it get its message out in the absence of state-media coverage.
Known leaders: George Ishaq, co-founder and the first “general coordinator” of Kifaya, is
actually a Coptic Christian and a staunch secularist who has been in and out of the
movement since the early years but is currently identified as its spokesman. An article
written by Ishaq in 2007 in which he supported a ban on women wearing the veil in
Egypt exposed the internal political differences within the Kifaya coalition, which
brought together groups from both sides of Egypt’s religious-secular divide. Ishaq’s age
(he is in his 70s) underscores a difference between Kifaya and April 6, a movement
consisting almost entirely of people in their 20s and early 30s. Though he appears to have
faded from the scene in terms of day-to-day organizational responsibilities, Ishaq is still
identified with the group, making sure to reiterate its platform of being against the
continued rule of the Mubarak family.
The Muslim Brotherhood
With Egypt’s nearly 60-year-old government collapsing, many are asking whether the
world’s single-largest Islamist movement, the Muslim Brotherhood, will soon benefit
from the demand for democracy in Egypt, a most pivotal Arab state. Western fears to the
contrary, the MB is probably incapable of dominating Egypt. At best, it can realistically
hope to be the largest political force in a future government, one in which the military
would have a huge say. For more on this key opposition player, see our <link
nid="182563">“Egypt and the Muslim Brotherhood: A Special Report”</link>.
Mohammed ElBaradei and the National Association for Change
Mohammed ElBaradei returned to Egypt with much fanfare in February 2010, and was
immediately pegged as the most likely candidate to gain the most support from the
various opposition forces in Egypt. Until his homecoming, ElBaradei had lived abroad
for the most part since 1980, and even now he maintains a home in Vienna, where he
worked for years as the head of the IAEA. He is not a member of a political party but has
emerged as the figurehead of a broad coalition of small parties known as the National
Association for Change, a body that is united -- as all opposition forces in Egypt seem to
be -- by a desire to oust the ruling NDP regime. Personally, ElBaradei is an advocate for
a democratic system of government, but he has been adept at appealing to all sides of the
political spectrum in Egypt, from the pro-democracy youth groups to the Islamist Muslim
Brotherhood. Indeed, since the protests began gaining steam, the one person most often
cited as the man likely to lead any coalition negotiations with the Egyptian army is
Mohammed ElBaradei.
Not all of the opposition supports him, however. Most prominent among his opponents is
the New Wafd Party. And he has had tensions with Ayman Nour of the El-Ghad Party,
most likely because ElBaradei has usurped Nour’s role as the most well known
opposition figure in Egypt. As such, ElBaradei does not necessarily command much
political support himself, but instead appears to be the most popular of several weak
candidates.
Following ElBaradei’s return to Egypt, dissident Egyptian editor and ElBaradei
confidante Ibrahim Issa said ElBaradei is quite content with his role as a symbol of the
opposition to Mubarak’s rule. He is the most amenable public face of a diverse
movement that shares little in common aside from an urgent desire to get rid of Mubarak.
Being out of Egypt for so long also lends ElBaradei the air of having avoided the taint of
corruption that covers other leading opposition leaders in Egypt. In some respects,
however, being out of Egypt for so long has also hurt ElBaradei. The main criticism of
him is that he is not a “real” Egyptian any more because he has lived in the United States
and Europe for so long. One prominent Egyptian cleric made fun of his alleged inability
to speak proper Arabic during the first week of the protests.
ElBaradei finds himself in a unique position. Like the pro-democracy youth movements,
he represents a movement, not a party. Unlike the youth groups, however, he is seen as
more of a classic politician than a true revolutionary leader with a deep level of real
grassroots support. ElBaradei’s main value to the various opposition forces that have
genuine bases of support bases throughout Egypt is that he is an “acceptable”
representative of the Egyptian people in the eyes of Western governments, something that
that Islamist MB cannot claim on its own. The Western fear is that the brotherhood would
try to turn Egypt into a Sunni version of Iran, and the youth movements cannot alleviate
Western concerns because they don’t have any well known leaders.
Arab League Chairman Amr Moussa
The most recent addition to the list of possible successors to Mubarak to come from the
opposition is Amr Moussa, a 74-year-old Egyptian who once served as the Egyptian
foreign minister but is best known for his current position as secretary general of the
Arab League. Moussa said in a media interview Feb. 1 that he will seriously consider
entering the race over the next few weeks, the most serious indication yet that he might
join the political fray.
Like ElBaradei, Moussa has been an international diplomat for the past several years. The
main difference between the two is that ElBaradei’s tenure took him to the United States
and Europe, while Moussa has been able to remain in Cairo, where the Arab League’s
headquarters are. Moussa does maintain a busy travel schedule, but he has remained
closer to events on the ground in Egypt [than ElBaradei has?], giving him more
credibility among large segments of the population and thereby deeper grassroots
support.
Like ElBaradei, Moussa is not affiliated with any political party. His weakness may be
that he has entered the fray too late. Even now, he has not given any firm indication that
he intends to run [for president?], while ElBaradei has been busy networking with the
youth movements and the Muslim Brotherhood, which has indicated that ElBaradei will
be their man to represent the opposition [in upcoming negotiations?].
Aside from the grassroots support, it is hard to envision how Moussa would provide a
group like the Muslim Brotherhood any greater benefit than ElBaradei would, in terms of
who to back in any coalition that could negotiate effectively with the military. Both
would present a respectable face to foreign governments (mainly Israel and the United
States), who are uncomfortable with the visage of the MB, while groups like April 6
simply need a well-known political figure who is capable of garnering a following.
Moussa would do the job just as well as ElBaradei, but it remains to be seen what
Moussa’s decision will finally be.
The Old Guard or[and?] Marginal Opposition Parties
Origins: The first of these groups is El-Ghad, which means “tomorrow” in Arabic. ElGhad was founded in October 2004 by Ayman Nour, after his defection from the New
Wafd Party as the result of a power struggle with New Wafd leader Norman Gomaa.
Nour, a wealthy lawyer and former member of parliament (MP), is currently the party
chairman. Nour was embroiled in a scandal shortly after forming El-Ghad and was
accused of forging documents in an attempt to speed up the licensing his party so that he
could participate in the 2005 presidential elections. The government eventually delayed
his trial date and allowed him to run, but (unsurprisingly) he lost to Mubarak by a
landslide, garnering just over 7 percent of the vote.
Platform: El-Ghad is often described as a liberal democratic party and has no Islamist
connections. The party is essentially one in the same with Nour, Egypt’s best known
opposition figure after ElBaradei. Following his failed run at the presidency, Nour was
imprisoned from January 2005 to February 2009, released early from a five-year sentence
on medical grounds (he is a diabetic). Today Nour is one of Mubarak’s biggest critics and
has participated in the recent street protests, even getting injured during one on Jan. 28.
Much of the current leadership of the April 6 Movement actually came from the youth
wing of the El-Ghad party, which campaigned on Nour’s behalf in the 2005 elections.
“Facebook Girl” Esraa Abdel Fattah Ahmed Rashid was one of these youth-group
proponents, as was April 6 leader Ahmed Maher. They were reportedly frustrated with
Nour’s cautious political approach. El-Ghad leaders have been described as very
bureaucratic people who like to carefully plot each and every move, weighing the
potential consequences on the group’s relationship with the NDP.
The Al[El?]-Ghad party headquarters doubles as the site of Egypt’s so-called “shadow
parliament” (El-Ghad prefers the term “People’s Parliament”), which held its first official
meeting on Jan. 30. Twelve opposition parties -- including the MB, which controls 15
percent of the shadow parliament -- have MPs in the body. It is but one of many dry runs
by opposition members to come together and decide how they are going to organize
themselves in preparation for the negotiations to come, which will likely be with the
Egyptian military.
Known members: Ayman Nour is not legally eligible at the moment to run for president
due to his political problems with the NDP (a ban that will likely be rendered moot in the
event the ruling party further disintegrates). Nour said recently that he would give his
support to ElBaradei as part of future opposition coalition negotiations with the Egyptian
military, but he has had a tense relationship with ElBaradei and will probably try to break
away and run on his own if he senses the opportunity. Other known El-Ghad members
are Gamela Nour, Ayman’s wife, who has been actively involved in the protests, and
Wael Nawara, co-founder of the party, who is currently its secretary general.
Another old-guard group is the New Wafd Party (“Wafd” means “delegation” in Arabic).
The original Wafd Party arose during World War I and was dismantled after the 1952
revolution. The New Wafd Party was reestablished in 1974. Its leader, El-Sayyed ElBadawi, ran for Egyptian president in 2005 and lost by a landslide. He even lost by a
landslide to Nour, carrying less than three percent of the vote.
Platform: The New Wafd Party is a secular, liberal group that has sung the standard
reform refrain until recently, when it became vogue to push for radical change, which the
New Wafd had not been pushing for nearly as hard almost all the other groups. The
“New” Wafd, ironically, is really the “old guard” of the opposition, and it invited
ElBaradei, a newcomer to Egyptian politics, to join the party. ElBaradei declined, which
explains the New Wafd’s current hostility toward him. The New Wafd did not boycott
the first round of elections in November 2010, and after it got trounced, it decided to
boycott the rest.
In the past few months, the New Wafd Party has become increasingly more brazen in its
public opposition to the Mubarak regime. This process began with the election boycott
and has recently been seen in al-Badawi’s labeling of Mubarak’s attempt to form a new
government as an “unacceptable” concession to the opposition. Although the New Wafd
has considerable historical legitimacy in Egypt due to its connection with the original
Wafd Party, it does not have an especially strong following on the street. Nour’s
defection in 2004 took about 25 percent of the party with him, and it can be said that, in a
way, the April 6 Movement is a cousin twice removed from New Wafd.
Its known leader is Sayyad al-Badawi, who took over from Gomaa in an internal party
election in May 2010 and vowed to return New Wafd to its former status. Al-Badawi, a
wealthy businessman, is the owner of Hayat TV Network and Sigma Pharmaceuticals.