Download Before Brumaire: Napoleon`s Development as a Ruler 1796-98

Before Brumaire: Napoleon's Development as a Ruler 1796-98
By Tom Miller
I
'Destiny called upon me to change the face of the world', Napoleon once remarked. No one could deny that
Napoleon was a man of destiny. His illustrious career spawned admiration from the world's French government
greatest writers, artists and statesmen; his legacy still leaves its imprint on Europe to this day. When the time came
to change the incompetent Directory, the impetuous Corsican undoubtedly felt touched by the hand of history.
Over the course of the 9th/10th November 1799 an intimately planned coup was staged involving two members of
France's executive directory, a general named Napoleon Bonaparte and several other military and political figures.
For some time now the Directory had failed to govern effectively; there was economic instability, a resurgence of
political radicalism, abroad French armies were being driven back by the determined forces of the Second Coalition
and many favoured a Bourbon restoration. Any doubts the leaders of the coup may have had about the success of the
operation were quickly dispelled by the end of the 9th November.Roger Ducos and Abbe Sieyes (the Trojan horses
on the Directory) had placed their colleagues under house arrest and arrangements had been made for both
parliamentary chambers to assemble at St. Cloud the following day. Events took a dramatic turn on the 10th. The
leaders of the coup had planned to report the unravelling chain of events to the chambers, making clear that this was
the fait accompli, ask for their support and then demand the recognition of a new government. They hoped that any
opposition would be so small it could be brushed aside, thus precluding the use of force. However, they had not
accounted for Napoleon's dogged determination, fiery temper and rapidly diminishing impatience. The Corsican
general, brimming with confidence and assured of his persuasive powers, swept into the room in which the Council
of the Five Hundred were sat and urged them to accept this new government. Alarmed at what they saw as a return
to dictatorship, they swarmed around the general ready to beat him to the ground. Outside the agitated soldiers were
pacified by the intervention of Napoleon's brother Lucien who promised them that he would sooner drive a sword
through his brother's chest if he knew him to be a traitor. With this bold assertion, the troops of the guard marched
into the Palace of St. Cloud.
What followed was the decisive event of Napoleon's career. It was moments like this, Napoleon believed, which
decided the fate of men. Here his fiery personality and ability to lead would propel him to take action. Lesser men
may have been deterred by the initial hostility of the chamber, especially since such hostility had erupted into
physical violence, but Napoleon realised that there was never a better opportunity to enforce his will than now.
Outside he had spurred on the soldiers whose appetite for the coup had visibly waned. However, inspired by
Napoleon's rhetoric, the soldiers moved to enter the building with their general leading and dispersed the hostile
chamber. Virtually all the assembled politicians fled through the windows of St. Cloud symbolising the success of
the coup. Only 60 returned in order to formally recognise the new government.
Ducos and Sieyes had been central to the organisation of the coup since they were members of the Directory and
could in their own words 'bring down the government from within'. However, they had realised that its success
depended on the involvement of a popular general to ensure the support of the army. After a decade of political
instability - the French government had changed on four occasions since 1789 - the army's support was the concrete
guarantee of both the coup's success and the subsequent government's perpetuity. The question then arose of whom
they would choose to front the seizure of power. It is important to note that Napoleon was not their first choice. He
came to be selected more by default and accident than by any genuine desire to acquire his services. Initially the
directors had looked to General Joubert, whose success in the Low Countries had won him command of France's
Army of Italy in the War of the Second Coalition. However, he was killed at the Battle of Novi in August 1799.
Next they looked to General Moreau, a man who'd also enjoyed success in the Low Countries and was commanding
the Army of the North. He was arguably as ambitious as Napoleon but declined to involve himself in a conspiracy
that had an uncertain outcome. And so, having been unsuccessful with their first two choices, it fell on them to
choose Napoleon.
However, far from being a pawn in conspiratorial politics, Napoleon was planning to organise a coup of his own.
While in Egypt he had learned of the directory's many failings and, in particular, the reversal of fortunes in Italy. By
early 1799 most of Northern Italy - the land he had fought so hard to conquer – had been recaptured by Austrian and
Russian forces. Enough was enough. This government had been in power too long. He would leave Egypt; a land
which had promised to be the springboard of Napoleon's oriental ambitions, stretching as far as India, but which
ultimately led to military frustration at the foot of Acre. And once safely returned to France, he could rally support
among the disaffected population and inspire another change of government, with himself at the helm.
It was fate therefore that he left Egypt at around the same time Joubert was killed and Moreau refused to join Ducos
and Sieyes. It did not take long for the directors to find Napoleon and inform him of their plans. The stage was set
and the actors had received their scripts. However, not all of the actors seemed to be performing the same play.
Napoleon had come to France planning his own coup but in unusually fortuitous circumstances he was now
nominated to join in the coup of Abbe Sieyes and Roger Ducos. They were unaware of the degree of his ambition.
As far as they were concerned Napoleon's role was secondary; he would ensure the coup received the army's support
and upon its success occupy a subordinate position in the new government. In other words he was to be under their
control. Yet Napoleon never intended to hand over the reins of power once seized. It was just fortunate that other
politicians had planned a coup and were soliciting his support. This way Napoleon did not have to concern himself
with any organisation — when the moment came (as it did outside the palace of St. Cloud) he would impose himself
and by the sheer force of his personality they would recognise his leadership. And this is exactly what happened.
What could Sieyes and Ducos possibly do? Napoleon had shown the strength of character to enter the chamber and
speak, he had shown the courage after having been physically assaulted to lead his soldiers into the chamber and
finally he had been responsible for dispersing the intransigent politicians. The army's loyalty had been won long ago
on the battlefields of Northern Italy and it was merely confirmed on the 10th November 1799. With the strength of
force behind him, Ducos and Sieyes had to submit. Although appointed as provisional consuls immediately after the
coup, when they were informed by Napoleon that their responsibilities were inferior to his and that they would in
effect have only consultative powers in the new constitution, they resigned. Napoleon was made First Consul with
an array of executive powers, two new subordinate consuls were appointed and new legislative institutions —
Tribunat, Corps Legislatif & Senate - were created. Napoleon had finally reached the top. However, his emergence
as head of state in France was not his first opportunity to rule a country. What historians often overlook is that
Napoleon, far from being a military commander with no experience as a ruler, was in fact a proven and capable
administrator. It was while in Italy and Egypt that the young general learned about the demands of government,
experimented with reform and experienced real power.
II
It's worth mentioning that during the revolutionary wars (and indeed throughout history) commanders of armies
could become very powerful. By winning a series of battles, which presented soldiers with the chance to loot,
generals had the potential to win their undying loyalty. Yet only the glory associated with winning could cemented
loyalty. When Napoleon came to Italy in the spring of 1796 after his appointment as Commander of the Army of
Italy he found soldiers that were undisciplined, hungry, tired and lacking in confidence. By spring the following
year this situation was completely reversed. Napoleon had won a plethora of superb victories, which had allowed
him to chase the entire Austrian army across the face of Northern Italy. His first victories came soon after his
arrival; at Montenotte and Mondovi he defeated the Piedmontese and forced their King to make terms. These
victories were emulated at Lodi Bridge, Arcola and Rivoli. During these campaigns Napoleon conquered territories
far beyond the Directory's wildest dreams; they had intended the Italian campaign to be a mere sideshow, however,
with the reversal of fortune in the main theatre of war (Germany), Italy became the focus of their attention.
Exploiting the Directory's new-found interest in Italy, Napoleon successfully petitioned the Directory for supplies
essential for ultimate victory. By the spring of 1797, Napoleon was threatening to march on Vienna having lifted the
siege of Mantua. The Austrians sued for an immediate peace at Leoben.
Military success aside, Napoleon was also responsible for reorganising the government of these newly conquered
territories. He had insisted on drilling home to Italians that the French were there as liberators, not conquerors,
emancipating them from the rod of monarchical oppression. Such truths had to be symbolised in the new political
order he would create. Five so-called 'sister republics' were carved out of the rich, fertile Italian plains (Ligurian,
Cispadene, Cisalpine, Roman & Parthenopian). Of the five, the Cisalpine was the most important, comprising the
economic and culturally significant cities of Milan & Mantua as well as the surrounding Lombard lands. Soon after,
the territories of the Cispadene (Bologna & Ferrara) were also incorporated. The Cisalpine's importance laid not
only in its economic resourcefulness, but so too in its strategic position, at the heart of the Italian peninsular, where
it could threaten Hapsburg Austria and more worryingly for the Directory, France. The creation of these republics
was Napoleon's first taste of real power. In the magnificent palaces of deposed Italian potentates, Napoleon gained
real valuable ruling experience. In many ways, his behaviour and style of living foreshadowed the man who in less
than a decade would be Emperor of France and the most powerful man in Europe.
The two main republics — Ligurian & Cisalpine — each received new constitutions largely based on the French
model of 1795. Although on the face of it they appeared democratic the reality was different. The Ligurian Republic
would receive legislative councils chosen by indirect elections. Feudalism was ostensibly abolished and Catholicism
recognised as the chief religion (but with the quid pro quo that the church would have less influence in education).
Similarly in the Cisalpine Republic the press had greater freedom, torture was abolished, education secularised and a
modicum of religious toleration adopted, but political power was concentrated in the hands of traditional feudal
elites whose support Napoleon cultivated.
At the head of all these constitutions was the man responsible for their inception. All new laws required Napoleon's
assent and all matters of state were channelled toward him. Napoleon had the power of a king and he certainly
behaved like one. After the Battle of Rivoli in February 1797, Napoleon took up residence at the ducal palace of
Montebello where he enjoyed all the trappings of royalty; luxurious food, personal servants and a diplomatic
entourage. One diplomat, Count Miot de Melito, described the extent to which Napoleon's behaviour presaged the
Emperor of 1804:
'I was received by Bounaparte [sic] at the magnificent residence of Montebello [on June 1st 1797], in the midst of a
brilliant court, rather than the usual army headquarters I had expected. Strict etiquette already reigned round him.
Even his aides-de-camp and officers were no longer received at this table, for he had become fastidious in the choice
of guests who he admitted to it. An invitation was an honour eagerly sought, and obtained only with great difficulty.
He was in no way embarrassed by these excessive honours, but received them as though he had been accustomed to
them all his life. His reception rooms and an immense tent pitched before the palace were constantly filled with a
crowd of generals, administrators and the most distinguished noblemen of Italy, who came to solicit the favour of a
momentary glance or the briefest interview. In a word all bowed before the glory of his victories and the haughtiness
of his demeanour. He was no longer the general of a triumphant Republic, but a conqueror on his own account,
imposing his own laws on the vanquished.’
This passage from the Count's memoirs reveals a great deal about Napoleon's development as a ruler. Particularly
striking is the fact that high-ranking Italian noblemen paid homage to Napoleon in order to solicit favours. It
conjures up an almost feudal image of obedient vassals showing their loyalty to a new king. The last sentence is
most fitting, describing Napoleon's elevation from Republican general to powerful lawmaker. It echoes an earlier
statement that spoke of the power generals could acquire if they enjoyed military success. With the Directory far
away in Paris, preoccupied with the war on the Rhine and rising domestic instability, with communication between
the government and Italy taking several days, Napoleon was free to do as he pleased. Any doubts the government
had about the practicalities of ruling Italy were removed by the incessant flow of money and valuable artwork
coming direct from Italy to Paris. Napoleon was aware of the financial difficulties the executive had come into —
by 1797 the government was already in debt — so he eased their fears about his growing influence by filling the
coffers!
Already Napoleon had consolidated a power base through his conquest and subsequent political reorganisation of
Northern Italy. The constitutions he designed won him the support of Italy's burgeoning middle-class, avid
supporters of the French Revolution and whose economic prosperity and political influence were a guarantee for
stability. He had begun to govern, removing many features of Italy's archaic feudal system with modern laws that
changed education, taxation and religion. Arguably, these reforms foreshadowed the gargantuan Civil Code that
restructured French law over the course of five years. He had even assisted the Directory in its hour of need,
despatching General Augereau to Paris to remove from parliament royalists who'd won a majority in the recent
election (coup de Fructidor). Napoleon's involvement in this coup showed initiative and was a firm reminder of
those leadership traits he was developing before November 1799. More uncomfortably perhaps for the Directory,
this intervention was an ominous indicator that Napoleon had his eye on political events in Paris as if ready to
pounce at any moment. Another means by which Napoleon consolidated his rule was through the publication of his
own newspapers. They were distributed chiefly amongst his soldiers but many found their way into Italian hands
and more importantly back to France, where a people recently accustomed to failure who now desperately longed
for victory abroad could read of Napoleon's triumphs. Thus, their use lay in the propaganda value. Though he
perhaps did not know it, Napoleon was acquiring hero-status among the French people, which paid enormous
dividends when he called upon their support for the new government in early 1800.
Crucial to Napoleon's development as a ruler in these years was his diplomatic dealings with the Pope and Austria.
The French had entered Rome in 1797 and proclaimed a Republic but the Pope brought them to the negotiating
table. Here Napoleon was able to win for France the Adriatic port of Ancona — of immense strategic value — the
lands of Ferrara & Bologna and a sizeable sum of money for the Directory. In the spring of that same year, as a
result of Napoleon's victory at Rivoli, the relief of Mantua and his advance toward Vienna, Austria made peace. A
provisional treaty was signed at Leoben. Here differences arose between the Directory and Napoleon. The Directory
wanted to secure Austrian recognition of France's possessions in the Low Countries and the cession of the
Rhineland in return for renouncing the Italian conquests. This was unacceptable to Napoleon. To relinquish the
territory that his soldiers had fought so hard to conquer was an abomination in Napoleon's eyes. In complete
defiance of the Directory, Napoleon obtained Austrian recognition of the Italian satellite states and forced her to
cede Belgium to France. There was a vague promise to discuss the Rhineland at a later date. These terms were
ratified at Campo Formio later in the year with certain additions; Venice was partitioned between France, the
Cisalpine Republic and Austria (who received the lion's share) and France received the Ionian Islands, an important
strategic possession in the Mediterranean. Domestic troubles obliged the Directory to accept the terms and Napoleon
concentrated on administering the new realms. Napoleon's diplomatic activity during 1797 was important for two
reasons. Firstly, it provides more evidence of his development as a ruler. It equipped him with negotiating skills
invaluable to any head of state and also gave him an insight into the Austrian psyche, which would be useful when
dealing with her in the future. From the Austrian perspective, these talks at Leoben and Campo Formio gave a useful
insight into Napoleon's personality, which they noted well for the future. Diplomacy was perhaps a misleading term
of description for these meetings. For example, on one occasion Napoleon was so infuriated that he destroyed a
priceless set of china in front of the Austrians. However, the second major development to emerge from diplomatic
talks was Napoleon's rebellious streak and his early opposition to the Directory, which came to a head when he
joined the coup of 1799. General Pichegru, writing in 1797, commented quite prophetically that:
The directors believe that they are using him, but one fine morning he is going to gobble them up, without their
being able to do anything about it.
He had specifically disobeyed the orders received from Paris urging him to press for Austria's cession of the
Rhineland and renounce claims to territory in Italy. Instead he had negotiated on his own terms as if he were a head
of state with his own government. In fact it would not be too bold to suggest that Napoleon already conceived of
himself as a legitimate head of state representing an independent Italian republic, though simultaneously honouring
the interests of France. Learning very early on that he could exploit the distance between Paris and Milan, Napoleon
took full advantage of the power this distance established. Above all else, the Italian episode reveals Napoleon's love
of power. Years later when he was Emperor and the time spent in Italy seemed a faint memory, Napoleon remarked:
'power, she is my mistress!' This was certainly true at the very start of his astonishing career.
III
With the signing of a treaty at Campo Formio, Austria left the First Coalition. This allowed the Directory to
concentrate its efforts against Great Britain. Straight of the back of his success in Italy, Napoleon was recalled to
Paris in order to help organise the invasion of England. Proposals were put forward for a landing in Ireland where
rebellion was imminent. A joint French and Irish force would then land on the west coast of England. However,
Napoleon informed the Directory that such a plan was too ambitious. The French navy was too weak and the
weather too detrimental. Alternatively Napoleon presented the Directory with another option - the conquest of
Egypt. When Napoleon returned to Paris in early 1798, he had discussed the 'Egyptian' plan with the foreign
minister Talleyrand who had been instantly won over by its logic. By conquering Egypt, France would establish a
very potent power base in the Middle East to disrupt the British trade routes with India. Once consolidated, France
could use Egypt as a base to launch an invasion of British India. With the help of the influential Talleyrand, the
government approved the operation and approved Napoleon's command.
By July Napoleon had seized control of Malta, landed on the Egyptian coast, taken Alexandria and was marching
towards Cairo. He defeated the Mameluke army sent to oppose him at the Battle of the Pyramids, giving him control
of Cairo and the entire Lower Nile region. That same year, a new coalition was formed consisting of Austria,
Russia, Great Britain, Naples and the Ottoman Empire. While the Austrians and Russians overran Northern Italy,
the Ottomans sent an army to recapture Egypt (nominally under the Sultan's suzerainty). This despite frantic
diplomatic efforts by Napoleon to persuade them to ally with France. Napoleon marched into Palestine, capturing
Jerusalem before reaching Acre. A lengthy siege began, which was totally unsuited to Napoleon's mobile style of
warfare, until his soldiers, dying from disease and thirst, necessitated a withdrawal. Although Turkish armies were
defeated at Mount Tabor and Aboukir Bay, by August 1799 Napoleon had tired of his Egyptian adventure, which
seemed to be heading for disaster since, after the French Navy was destroyed by Nelson at the Battle of the Nile,
insufficient supplies were reaching his armies. Entrusting his men to General Kleber, he left on the 23rd and headed
for France to embark upon the most important adventure of his life!
There was a period, however, between July 1798 and February 1799 when military hostilities ceased. This allowed
Napoleon to implement a reform programme. Once again the Directory was occupied with a new war in Europe and
communiqués could take weeks if not months to travel the vast distance between Cairo and Paris. Once again this
gave Napoleon the freedom to rule as he had in Italy. Egypt in the 18th century was severely underdeveloped by
enlightened European standards; a remote outpost of the declining and ineffectual Ottoman Empire and governed by
a corrupt regime, it was essentially languishing in the Middle Ages. The streets were filthy and unlit as there was no
sewage system and no one knew of gas. A poorly structured and corrupt fiscal system meant no efficient form of
tax-collection existed which might alleviate the problem. There was not even a mint to regulate the flow of
currency. It was similar to the situation the British found when they came to India. Napoleon was determined to
modernise Egypt while making every effort to respect its culture, especially religion. One of the first reforms he
enacted was the establishment of a printing press, which he used to make posters in Arabic proclaiming the good
intentions of the French who had come as liberators and who respected the Muslim faith. Although probably
apocryphal, it was reported that Napoleon even considered following Islam in order to demonstrate his good will. A
tax-collecting bureaucracy was created and within weeks a sizeable revenue had been amassed. A mint was
established to coin money. Napoleon used the generated revenue to install gas lamps for the streets of Cairo and
build a sewage system. In addition he founded Egypt's first Postal Service and Health Department. Virtually nothing
was known of Ancient Egyptian culture so Napoleon established the Egyptian Institute and an accompanying
university to conduct research. The results were published in the multi-volume 'Description de l'Egypte'. French
research led to the discovery of the Rosetta stone, which was the key to deciphering hieroglyphics. The French
mathematician Champollion eventually succeeded in decoding it. Egypt offered Napoleon a greater opportunity to
rule. Further away from Paris than Milan, his time in the land of the pharaohs allowed Napoleon to turn a blind eye
to the Directory. It also afforded a larger breathing space between hostilities during which time the immense
programme of reform could be instituted.
IV
By the time Napoleon decided to leave for France, he had undergone a conversion from Republican General to
Conqueror of Italy and Egypt. With the experience of conquest came the experience of ruling. Napoleon did not
simply enforce an authoritarian martial law, though his soldiers were used to quell popular unrest. Instead he
approached the challenge of governing a country with great relish and responsibility. As a youth he had read some
important classical treatises on government. Between 1796 and 1798 he had the opportunity to put into practice this
acquired knowledge. Once Napoleon had returned to Paris the political landscape of Italy was forever changed. New
republican constitutions were created, ancient feudal laws abolished and religious toleration adopted. Egypt was
reshaped into a more modernised state, as Cairo became equipped with its own tax-collecting bureaucracy, postal
service and health department. And the secrets of its ancient civilisation were unlocked for the first time and made
available to European scholars, as a result of the discovery and decipherment of the Rosetta stone. Napoleon also
had his first taste of power and the experience made him hungry for more.
These years in Napoleon's life are often seen as mere stepping-stones on the path to becoming, in his own words,
'the greatest monarch of the world'. However, this is a fatal misjudgement of history. Far from being just steppingstones in his remarkable career, they were essential to his development as a ruler and were the foundation for his rise
to greatness.
Placed on the Napoleon Series: October 2005