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RUSSIAN ELECTION WATCH
SPECIAL PRE-ELECTION GUIDE
December 14, 1999
Graham T. Allison, Director
Strengthening Democratic Institutions (SDI) Project
John F. Kennedy School of Government
Harvard University
Production Team:
Henry E. Hale, Melissa C. Carr,
Ben Dunlap, Emily Van Buskirk,
Emily Goodhue
This Sunday, December 19, Russians will choose their lower house of parliament, the Duma, in
competitive democratic elections. This vote is critical as a test of strength for the high-stakes presidential
election on June 4. It is also important in its own right, as the new Duma will face weighty decisions on
issues such as START II ratification, amending the Constitution, and tax reform. In this pre-election
supplement, Harvard University’s Russian Election Watch summarizes for American observers the basic
information needed to interpret the results of the voting.
DUMA POLLS:
PRESIDENTIAL POLLS:
Dec. Nov. Oct. Sept.
Communist Party
26%
25%
Unity
17
18
5
n.a.
Fatherland-All Russia
10
12
21
22
Yabloko
10
8
11
12
Union of Right-Wing Forces 5
5
4
4
Zhirinovsky Bloc
3
3
4
5
26%
50
32%
Putin
40
30
Zyuganov
20
Primakov
Yavlinsky
Luzhkov
10
VTsIOM Polling Agency, Dec. 3-6; Nov.26-29; Oct. 15-19; Sept. 17-
0
21, 1999. Poll of 1600; percentages are from the total of those who
Sept.
said they would vote.
Oct.
Nov.
Dec.
BEWARE THE POLLS: Fools can figure and figures can fool, the saying goes. Poll results are easily manipulated
or even falsified for political purposes. It therefore pays to look for polling agencies that have earned a reputation for
accuracy: such as VTsIOM (The All-Russian/National Center for the Study of Public Opinion), the Public Opinion
Foundation (POF), ROMIR research agency, and the Institute of Sociology at the Russian Academy of Sciences.
WHAT’S INSIDE
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TOP CAMPAIGN HEADLINES
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A guide to the main contending parties p.2
Polls on Russian voters’ beliefs p.3
Quotes from party leaders p.3
Key campaign background: the momentous
media war, threats to fairness, the district
races, and the Moscow mayoral race p.4
Short Takes: fun campaign facts p.5
Primer on Russian election rules p.6
Experts predict big surprises p.8
So What? Why the Duma vote matters p.9
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1
Communist Party poised to win and lose:
will finish first but have fewer seats and less
influence than in the current Duma
Fatherland-All Russia likely number 2 in
total seats (list and districts combined)
Putin rides “anti-terrorist operation” in
Chechnya to huge lead in presidential race
Media hatchet-man chops September’s
favorites, Luzhkov and Primakov, to singledigit support in presidential polls
Putin endorsement makes new “Unity” party
a serious competitor in Duma race
THE MAIN CONTENDERS
COMMUNIST PARTY. Leaders: Gennady ZYUGANOV (Party leader in Duma,
pictured), Gennady SELEZNEV (Speaker of the Duma). Slogan: “Order in the
Country, Sufficiency in Every Home.” Issue Stands: Anti-Westernism; return to a
state-controlled economy. Campaign Tactics: Grass-roots mobilization; holding on
to loyal voters. Website (Russian and English): www.kprf.ru
FATHERLAND-ALL RUSSIA. Leaders: Yevgeny PRIMAKOV (former Prime
Minister), Yuri LUZHKOV (Mayor of Moscow, pictured), a coalition of governors.
Slogans: “Believe only in deeds,” “We build roads, We build houses, We restore
cathedrals, We build museums…..” Issue Stands: State-managed transition to market;
strong opposition to corruption in Yeltsin Administration; moderately nationalist
foreign policy. Campaign Tactics: stressing concrete results its leaders have already
achieved despite Russia’s chaos; favorable coverage on “own” media; backing of friendly governors’
political machines; grass-roots mobilization. Website (Russian only): www.luzhkov-otechestvo.ru
UNITY. Leaders: Sergei SHOIGU (Minister for Emergency Situations, pictured),
Aleksandr KARELIN (Olympic champion wrestler), Aleksandr GUROV (corruption
fighter). Slogan: “Russia must be honest (Gurov), Russia must be strong (Karelin),
Russia must be saved (Shoigu).” Issue Stands: Intentional vagueness on all major
policy stands other than backing Prime Minister Putin’s actions in Chechnya.
Campaign Tactics: Tie self firmly to Putin’s coattails, stress personal and professional
qualities of the bloc’s famous leaders; avoid campaigning on issues so as not to alienate voters.
YABLOKO. Leaders: Grigory YAVLINSKY (Party leader in Duma, pictured), Sergei
STEPASHIN (former Prime Minister). Slogan: “Honesty in power, order in the
country;” “Yabloko – for a better life.” Issue Stands: Small state role in the economy,
opposition to “authoritarian” governors, opposition to “incompetent” reforms of GaidarChernomyrdin-Kirienko variety, accelerated integration into Western/international
institutions. Campaign Tactics: Trade on party’s image of honesty, stress personality of
Yavlinsky, use Stepashin (also former Minister of Internal Affairs) for credibility on the
“law and order” issue. Website (Russian and English): www.yabloko.ru
UNION OF RIGHT-WING FORCES. Leaders: Sergei KIRIENKO (former Prime
Minister, pictured), Boris NEMTSOV (former Deputy Prime Minister), Irina
KHAKAMADA (Duma member), Anatoly CHUBAIS (CEO of Russia’s electricity
monopoly), Yegor GAIDAR (former Prime Minister). Slogan: “The Victory of the
Union of Right-Wing Forces is Our Victory.” Issue Stands: Rapid transition to the
market; minimal state role in economy; accelerated integration into Western/international
institutions; opposition to union with Belarus. Campaign Tactics: campaign for
referendum on popular issues like revoking parliament members’ immunity from criminal prosecution;
major TV campaign with person-in-the-street interviews, hide unpopular Chubais and Gaidar in favor of
more popular Kirienko, Nemtsov and Khakamada; attack Yabloko as wishy-washy reformers. Website
(Russian only): www.prav.ru
ZHIRINOVSKY BLOC (former LDPR). Leader: Vladimir ZHIRINOVSKY (Party
leader in Duma, pictured). Slogan: “The Zhirinovsky Bloc is the LDPR.” Issue Stands:
Pay wages on time, sell as many arms abroad as possible, state monopoly on alcohol and
tobacco, radical anti-Westernism. Campaign Tactics: Stress personality of Zhirinovsky
on television, appeal to youth as a hip party, play on law-and-order messages that people
can support, grass-roots activism. Website (Russian and English): www.ldpr.ru
2
ALSO-RANS (20 in all). Our Home is Russia (Victor Chernomyrdin, Vladimir Ryzhkov, Dmitri Ayatskov);
Women of Russia (Alevtiva Fedulova, Galina Karelova, Nina Veselova); Pensioners Party (Yakov Ryabov, Anatoly
Kontashov, Rimma Markova); Russian Party for the Defense of Women (Tatyana Roshchina, Zhanna Makhova, Irina
Kremenets); Congress of Russian Communities and the Movement of Yuri Boldyrev (Boldyrev, Dmitri Rogozin,
Victor Glukhikh); Conservative Movement of Russia (Lev Uboshko, Vladimir Burenin, Andrei Tishkov); Party of
Peace and Unity (Sazhi Umalatova, Victor Stepanov, Nikolai Antoshkin); Russian All-National Union (Sergei
Baburin, Nikolai Leonov, Nikolai Pavlov); Spiritual Heritage (Alexey Podberezkin, Pyotr Proskurin, Valery Vorotnikov);
For Civic Virtue (Ella Pamfilova, Alexander Dondukov, Anatoly Shkirko); Russian Socialist Party (Vladimir
Bryntsalov, Igor Bryntsalov, Yuri Bryntsalov); In Support of the Army (Victor Ilyukhin, Albert Makashov, Yuri Savelev);
Movement of Patriotic Forces–Russian Cause Bloc of General Andrei Nikolaev and Academician
Svyatoslav Fedorov (Nikolaev, Fedorov, Tatyana Malyutina); Peace–Work–May (Alexander Burkov, Valery
Trushnikov, Alexander Tatarkin); Socialist Party of Russia (Ivan Rybkin, Leonid Mayorov, Andrei Belishko); Stalin’s
Bloc – For the USSR (Victor Anpilov, Stanislav Terekhov, Yevgeny Dzhugashvili); All-Russian Political Party of
the Nation (Ansori Aksentev-Kikalishvili, Tatyana Burye, Vladimir Shainsky); Social-Democrats (no federal list
candidates); Communist Workers for the Soviet Union (Victor Tyulkin, Anatoly Kryuchkov, Vladislav Aseyev).
THROUGH RUSSIAN EYES
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13% expect economic improvement in coming months; 57% expect deterioration (VTsIOM 11/99)
31% want economic reforms to continue, while 29% want them to stop (VTsIOM 11/99)
Only 10% agree Clinton is a real friend of Russia, while 75% disagree (Marttila-ADL 7/99)
77% agree that nothing is stopping NATO from getting involved in Russia as it did in Yugoslavia
(Marttila-ADL 7/99)
53% say their or their loved ones’ lack of money to buy staple goods is among their 3 most disturbing
problems, followed by wage/pension/stipend nonpayment (31%) (POF 10/16-17/99)
61% say Russian troops should continue their advance into Chechnya, but 48% say they would
support an end to the conflict if Putin proposed it (VTsIOM 11/26-29/99)
63% would not fight in Chechnya themselves or send their loved ones there (VTsIOM 11/26-29/99)
49% would tolerate an independent Chechnya; 15% don’t know (VTsIOM 11/5-9/99)
30% agree elections should be set aside until order is restored; 45% disagree (Marttila-ADL 7/99)
85% agree that a majority of Russian officials are corrupt (Marttila-ADL 7/99)
71% say that the last year or two has been the hardest of their life (Marttila-ADL 7/99)
QUOTES FROM PARTY LEADERS
 PRIMAKOV: “All arrows are aimed at us because they know -- if we achieve success we will
properly hit embezzlers of public funds.” (RIA Oreanda, 11/22)
 YAVLINSKY: “If the government has a desire to draw up a new economic package according to the
program we are proposing, then we are ready [to join the government].” (Ekho Moskvy radio, 11/24)
 ZHIRINOVSKY: “It is impossible to end the war [in Chechnya] without a military government.”
(Moskovskaya Pravda, 10/29/99)
 ZYUGANOV: “The savage terrorist acts in which whole buildings full of people are blown up have
shown once again how weak the state machine is and how helpless the current authorities are. But I
do not rule out that this is all being deliberately aggravated, including in the south and in Chechnya,
in order to introduce a state of emergency.” (NTV, 10/2)
RUSSIAN ELECTION WATCH IS AVAILABLE EACH MONTH ON THE WEB AT:
http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/bcsia/russianelectionwatch
3
CAMPAIGN BACKGROUND NOTES
MEDIA WARS
 Russian mass media are extremely politicized, with virtually all major news programs as well as
analytical shows blatantly favoring some parties over others. One expert reported at Harvard’s
November 29 conference on the Duma elections that messages and story lines on the campaign are
bought and sold, giving new meaning to the term “commercial media.”
 The most striking example is Russia’s most popular show anchored by Sergei Dorenko, whose
scandal-mongering has reduced September’s presidential favorites (Primakov and Luzhkov) to singledigit support in presidential polls. Dorenko’s surprisingly sticky clumps of political mud have ranged
from the believable (that there is corruption in the Moscow bureaucracy), to the outrageous (that
Luzhkov was accomplice to murder), to the just plain ridiculous (that Luzhkov has ties to the deadly
Japanese Aum Shrinrikyo cult).
 The Luzhkov-Primakov team called the charges “Goebbels-type slander” and issued
counterevidence, but their efforts have so far proven ineffective. Media allied with Fatherland-All
Russia has recently launched a vigorous counterattack, giving negative coverage to the Putin
government’s war in Chechnya, among other things.
HOW FREE AND HOW FAIR?
 Observers and parties have charged that many abuses have already taken place, including biased
media coverage and the election commissions’ disqualification of disliked candidates and even whole
parties on inconsistent technical grounds.
 Russian election law facilitates these abuses since it is extremely specific about what is illegal in a
campaign, but is not very clear about which violations should disqualify a candidate or party,
allowing ample room for interpretation.
 One specific example: the Central Election Commission disqualified Zhirinovsky’s LDPR (forcing
him to reincarnate his party as the Zhirinovsky Bloc in record short time) on a technical violation but
overlooked a similar violation by Yavlinsky’s Yabloko.
 Abuses to watch out for in the week ahead include fraudulent reporting of results (as in 1996 where
more people “voted” for Yeltsin in Chechnya than actually lived there), ballot-stuffing (especially
using “mobile ballot boxes” intended to allow invalids and other housebound individuals to vote), and
local election commissions declaring that large numbers of opposition ballots are “spoiled.”
 Regional governors have special power to falsify results, since they often control the local election
commissions.
 For good information on procedural issues, see the website of the International Foundation for
Election Systems (IFES), www.ifes.ru
RACES IN THE DISTRICTS
 While the media pay attention almost exclusively to the competition among parties, in fact half
of the Duma is elected when people vote as in US Congressional races for individual candidates
running in territorial districts.
 District elections typically include up to a dozen candidates and the one with the most votes wins.
A candidate with 11 rivals could theoretically win a Duma seat with just 10% of the vote.
 District elections pit national party nominees against a whole host of independents, including
governors’ proteges, representatives of financial-industrial groups, self-financed “oligarchs,” and
even representatives of organized crime.
 Russian law grants immunity from criminal prosecution to all Duma members, and this has
attracted many notables who are either seeking to avoid responsibility for real crimes or who fear
political prosecution should their rivals come to power. Examples include Kremlin insider Boris
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Berezovsky who is hedging his political bets by running in mountainous Karachaevo-Cherkessia, and
his “Family” associate, oil tycoon Roman Abramovich, who is running in remote Chukotka.
Likewise, Luzhkov’s businesswoman-wife, Yelena Baturina, is running in rural Kalmykia.
The districts have also proven popular ways for “fallen figures” to reenter the political limelight,
such as Yeltsin’s former bodyguard, Aleksandr Korzhakov, who is running in Tula and Gorbachev’s
former anti-reform nemesis Yegor Ligachev, who is running in Tomsk.
You can’t win if you don’t run, and some parties have practically ignored the district races. For
example, Unity has nominated candidates in only 33 of the 225 districts. The Communists, on the
other hand, have nominated 135 candidates, Fatherland-All Russia 95, Yabloko 124, the Union of
Right-Wing Forces 67, and the Zhirinovsky Bloc 105.
Big factors determining results in the districts include: governors’ political machines (running and
counting); the Red Belt (the swath of southern Russian territory where the Communists dominate
local politics); other regional strongholds of federal parties (such as St. Petersburg where Yabloko has
a large loyal following); name recognition; and money.
THE MOSCOW MAYORAL RACE
 On December 19, Moscow residents will also elect their mayor.
 Incumbent Luzhkov is the overwhelming favorite. Despite his decline in the presidential polls, he
was polling at 63% for the mayoral race as of November 29 according to the Public Opinion
Foundation, far ahead of his nearest rival, Union of Right-Wing Forces leader Sergei Kirienko, at
12%.
 The ORT network, controlled by Luzhkov enemy Boris Berezovsky, has begun to give a major
push to one of Luzhkov’s opponents, Pavel Borodin, the Russian Presidential Representative in
Moscow. Borodin has been implicated in widely reported Kremlin corruption scandals and had the
support of just 5% in the same poll. This shows that it is easier to campaign negatively against a
candidate than to create positive support for another.
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SHORT TAKES
Gorbachev endorses Fatherland-All Russia, declaring to Luzhkov and Primakov: “There are plans
to cause strife between you, to collapse your bloc, and I call on you: Be real men! In today’s Russia
you are the best choice.” (Kommersant-Daily, 11/20)
Running for immunity: many politicians are running for the Duma in order to escape possible
political prosecution in the event their enemies win the presidential contest.
Kremlin backing for Zhirinovsky evident not only on pro-Kremlin channels giving him extensive
and friendly coverage, but the PR firm that ran Yeltsin’s 1996 campaign, Video International, is now
working for Zhirinovsky (though not exclusively). ( www.rferl.org/elections/russia99report)
Primakov sets the bar for Fatherland-All Russia “success” at 25%, saying: “If Fatherland-All
Russia notches up a quarter of seats, we shall be very satisfied.” (ITAR-TASS, 11/26)
Fatherland-All Russia is polling over 40% in Moscow while Unity has just 3%, according to
VTsIOM, in striking contrast with nationwide polls.
The war in Chechnya has shifted people’s priorities from “social guarantees” (now cited by 28%
of the population in a VTsIOM poll listing priorities) to “personal security” (now cited by 40%).
“Crime” and “instability” occupy the first two positions in the list of “irritators” in the same poll
(47% and 46% respectively), according to Russian analysts Igor Bunin and Boris Makarenko.
(Russian Election Watch 12/99)
Losers may have bills to pay. Under a new election law, blocs that fail to get more than 2% of the
vote, and single-member district candidates with less than 3% of the vote will have to return any state
funding that they received for their campaigns. If this had been the law in 1995, then 32 out of the 43
blocs on the ballot would have had to foot some large bills. (www.rferl.org/elections/russia99report)
5
PRIMER ON RUSSIAN ELECTORAL RULES
The Russian Parliament consists of two houses: the lower house called the State Duma consisting of 450
deputies; and the upper house known as the Federation Council, which is made up of 178 representatives, two
from each of Russia's 89 regions. The Federation Council is composed of governors and speakers of regional
legislatures who are elected in their local constituencies on dates set locally. The parliamentary elections on
December 19th will only be for the State Duma.
The 450 seats in the Russian State Duma will be divided between 225 deputies from single-member districts
and 225 party list deputies. When Russian voters go into the election booth, they will vote for both a party
and an individual candidate.
Single-Member Districts
The single-member district part of the election will be much like the US Congressional elections. A
candidate will win with a plurality of the votes in his or her district no matter how small that may be.
Party List Competition
The party list election is more complicated. Each party submits to the Central Election Commission (CEC)
an election list of up to 270 candidates. The list contains 18 candidates on the “federal list.” These 18 spots
are the first places to be allocated. The rest of the list is not in a numerical order such as 18  270. Instead,
the candidates are listed by region. The purpose of the regional lists is to avoid having a Moscow-centric
Duma. A candidate may run on a party list and in a district race simultaneously. If that candidate wins the
district race, his/her spot on the party list will go to another party member. If any of the top three candidates
on an election bloc’s federal list withdraws from the election, the entire bloc is disqualified from running in
the election.
How Seats Are Allocated in the Party List Election
After the election, the list vote will be tabulated nationally. Any party clearing the 5% hurdle will gain
list seats in the new Duma. The number of seats will be divided proportionally among the parties. For
example, if a party gets 20% of the national popular vote, it will get 20% of the 225 party list seats. The
number of seats might be exaggerated if only a few parties clear the 5% barrier. Small parties would
effectively give their seats to the larger parties, who would divide up these seats.
In our example, a party gaining 20% of the vote would receive 45 seats (20% of 225 = 45). The party
would distribute the first 18 seats to its federal list, leaving 27 seats to distribute among the regional party
lists. The regional list seats are distributed to those regions where the party campaigned with a regional
list of candidates, and where the party performed best according to a mathematical formula found in the
election law.
The election law formula is:
Total # of votes polled by the party in regions where it ran list candidates
.
Number of seats awarded minus the 18 federal seats (in our example this would be 27)
This number is then divided into the number of votes the parties received in each region. This will show
where the party did best and determine where the seats should be awarded.
An example will help: Suppose Fatherland-All Russia ran list candidates in three regions: A, B, and C.
Fatherland-All Russia gained the following number of votes in each region:
Region A: 300,000
Region B: 150,050
Region C: 731,200
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Adding up all numbers, Fatherland-All Russia received 1,181,250 votes. Continuing our example, we’ll
assume this was 20%of the total vote and therefore enough for 45 seats. The party gives 18 to the federal list
and the remaining 27 are to be divided among regions A, B, and C, where Fatherland-All Russia ran a federal
list. Using the above formula:
A+B+C = 1,181,250
27 seats to be distributed
This equals 43,750. Each time Fatherland-All Russia receives 43,750 votes in a region, that region will
acquire a Fatherland-All Russia seat from the Fatherland-All Russia regional list.
Region A:
300,000 divided by 43,750 = 6.86 or 7 seats
Region B:
150,050 divided by 43,750 = 3.43 or 3 seats.
Region C:
731,200 divided by 43,750 = 16.71 or 17 seats.
Total = 27 seats
Thus, the 27 available list seats have been allocated to the regional Fatherland-All Russia lists. The first three
of Fatherland-All Russia's regional “troika” (that is, a party's top three list candidates in the regions) plus four
more, will go to the Duma from Region A, only the troika in Region B, and the entire troika plus 14
additional Fatherland-All Russia regional list members will go from Region C.
According to the election law, regions do not have a set number of guaranteed federal list candidates.
Suppose that two parties are well organized in one region, say Volgograd, while no party is organized in
Stavropol. This will indicate Stavropol will have no one representing it from federal lists, while
Volgograd might have eight or nine list candidates plus their single member district representatives.
Turnout Requirement
In order for the election to be valid, 25% of the Russian electorate must turn out to vote. If at least 25% of the
electorate turns out nation-wide, but certain regions do not clear the 25% requirement, single members
district elections in those regions will be invalid and another election for that district will be held. However,
the party list votes in that region are still legitimate and parties may take members off that region's party list.
In sum, the single member district seats are vulnerable to regional 25% turnout requirements, while the party
list seats are available nationwide once the national 25% requirement is met.
7
ELECTION SURPRISES
Leading experts on Russia predict the unpredictable
Russian Election Watch asked leading experts on Russia to go out on a limb and give their best guess as
to the big surprises (relative to the predictions implied by current polls) of the Duma elections. The brave
responded in various ways:
“If there is a surprise, it would be a good performance by the radical communist coalition movement,
Ilyukhin’s Movement in Support of the Army. It might clear the 5% barrier.”
-Sergei Markov, Director, Institute of Political Studies, Moscow
“Two dark horse parties with a chance to overcome the 5% barrier are Women of Russia and Communists
and Workers of Russia for the Soviet Union (Tyulkin’s bloc).”
-Henry Hale, Research Associate, SDI Project, Harvard University
“I suspect that the Communists will do better than expected if there is no massive fraud and if one counts
single-member legislators who call themselves independents, but are really allied with the Communists.”
-Jerry F. Hough, James B. Duke Professor of Political Science Duke University
“Fatherland-All Russia may not clear the 5% barrier.”
-Vladimir Gelman, Professor, European University at St. Petersburg, Fulbright Scholar, Davis
Center for Russian Studies, Harvard University
“I have a hunch that both Fatherland-All Russia and the Zhirinovsky Bloc will do better than the polls
have been saying. However, this doesn't qualify as a big surprise. The big surprise in '99 is still about the
meteoric rise of Putin, and the biggest question about the election is surely how the results will affect the
presidential contest later on.”
-Timothy Colton, Director, Davis Center for Russian Studies, Harvard University
“The most surprising aspect of the upcoming elections is the very fact of its predictability. The top five or
six parties should overcome the 5% barrier. The Communists will come in first, followed by Unity,
Fatherland-All Russia, Yabloko (although Yabloko may come in ahead of FAR), Union of Right-Wing
Forces, and Zhirinovsky’s Bloc.”
-Vladimir Boxer, Fellow, SDI Project, Harvard University
“My bet is that Fatherland-All Russia will be a surprise winner, finishing second—ahead of Unity in total
number of seats in the new Duma. Single-member districts will make the difference.”
-Graham Allison, Director of the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, and of the
SDI Project
8
SO WHAT?
Graham Allison explains why the Duma vote matters
Graham Allison, Director of the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs and of the
Strengthening Democratic Institutions Project
The most difficult question about any election is so
what? Why does it matter? Assessments of
developments in Russia divide sharply between
pessimists and optimists.
Since pessimistic
prognoses predominate, let us consider events
through an optimist’s lens.
power between the center and other power
sources in the society.
3. Marginalization of extremists. Duma elections
put ideas and slogans to a market test. With 26
parties registered, essentially any group that
could rally 200,000 signatures around any
cause or raise $80,000 can join the fray.
Conditions of economic depression (double
that of the U.S. Great Depression),
discouragement of an emerging middle class
by the double devaluation and default in
August, 1998, and extraordinary pessimism
about their own lives and Russia — all
approximate conditions in which fascism took
root and thrived in European countries during
the 1930s. Nonetheless, fascists, anti-Semites,
and other extreme groups have attracted little
support.
The fascist party (which was
ultimately disqualified) and the MakashovIlyukhin hard-line Communist party, have less
than 2% of voters between them.
1. Democracy continues taking root in Russia.
Despite history, culture, and recent national
experience that make Russia rocky soil for
democratic
seeds,
Russia’s
fledgling
democratic experiment survives.
With
December 19’s Duma election and the
campaign for June’s presidential transfer of
power, the “democratic presumption” is taking
hold across Russia’s political spectrum. By
“democratic presumption,” we mean the belief
that the “normal” or “civilized” way to answer
the question “who rules?” is to count votes in
an open, competitive election. Consequences
of democracy for Russia’s government, as
elsewhere, include greater attentiveness to
what Russian citizens think, and greater
responsiveness to those who can supply
ingredients essential for electoral victory,
including voters, funders, opinionmakers, and
regional leaders.
4. Moderation of Zhirinovsky. A leading
indicator of what sells with the electorate, the
imaginative, opportunistic, ruthless LDPR
leader, Zhirinovsky, has moderated his
statements and positions during the current
Duma electoral season.
2. Continuing pluralization of power. During the
previous seven decades of totalitarian
government, the Communist party attempted to
control every aspect of Russian citizens’ lives.
With the collapse of Communism, political
power has been radically decentralized.
Today, Russia’s president and government are
weaker and have less control of events in
Russia than any normal Western government
in its own state. Current Duma elections have
enhanced the roles of governors (of the 89
regions) as well as those of funders (oligarchs
and large corporations) in a step-by-step
process that is regularizing a division of
5. The Jewish Question. A Russian quip asks:
after Israel, which state is most likely to elect a
Jewish president?
The answer: Russia.
Leading Jews in Russian politics include
former Prime Minister Primakov (born
Finkelstein), Yavlinsky (who acknowledges
publicly that his mother was Jewish),
Zhirinovsky (whose Jewish roots are well
known despite his repeated answer “my
mother was a Russian and my father was a
lawyer”), former Deputy Prime Minister Boris
Nemtsov, and Former Prime Minister Kirienko
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(whose father was Jewish). Despite a history
in which anti-Semitism has been a powerful
strain, and despite continuing concerns about
resurgent anti-Semitism, the fact that political
leaders of Jewish origin survive and thrive is a
telling commentary on opinions and attitudes
of the Russian population.
Likely Results:
 Emergence of a more centrist, more pragmatic,
more professionalized Duma, a legislature
more likely to work with a centrist Prime
Minister. Mellowed Communists, many
reelected, and rapidly becoming Social
Democrats in Communist clothing; Fatherland,
Unity, Yabloko, and Right Cause — all
represent more centrist, pragmatic, and
professional positions than the Duma elected
in 1995.
A less likely but still plausible scenario would
see Duma elections followed by a sharp
increase in conflict between a CommunistFatherland alliance in the Duma on the one
hand, and the Putin government on the other.
In this scenario, such a coalition would vote no
confidence in Putin in order to undermine his
standing in presidential elections. Absent a
sharp deterioration in the conflict in Chechnya,
this scenario seems less likely than the first.
SPECIAL THANKS TO ANYA SCHMEMANN AND VLADIMIR BOXER
The Strengthening Democratic Institutions Project works to catalyze support for three great transformations
underway in Russia, Ukraine and the other republics of the former Soviet Union: to sustainable democracies,
free market economies, and cooperative international relations. The Project seeks to understand Western stakes
in these transformations, identify strategies for advancing Western interests, and encourage initiatives that
increase the likelihood of success. It provides targeted intellectual and technical assistance to governments,
international agencies, private institutions, and individuals seeking to facilitate these three great transformations.
STRENGTHENING DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS PROJECT
BELFER CENTER FOR SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
JFK SCHOOL OF GOVERNMENT, HARVARD UNIVERSITY
79 JFK STREET CAMBRIDGE, MA 02138
Phone: (617) 496-1565 Fax: (617) 496-8779
http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/bcsia/sdi
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