Dennett and Phenomenology - Center for Subjectivity Research
... is, we should adopt the intentional stance and interpret the emitted noises as speech acts that express the subject’s beliefs, desires and other mental states. If there are any ambiguities, we can always ask for further clarifications by the subject, and through this process, we will eventually be a ...
... is, we should adopt the intentional stance and interpret the emitted noises as speech acts that express the subject’s beliefs, desires and other mental states. If there are any ambiguities, we can always ask for further clarifications by the subject, and through this process, we will eventually be a ...
Kim`s Pairing Problem and the Viability of Substance Dualism
... Kim dismisses the first option as he asserts that the very idea of constructing such a causal chain begs the question. He writes, “the very idea of a causal chain makes sense only if an appropriate notion of causation is already in hand, and this requires a prior solution to the pairing problem” (Ki ...
... Kim dismisses the first option as he asserts that the very idea of constructing such a causal chain begs the question. He writes, “the very idea of a causal chain makes sense only if an appropriate notion of causation is already in hand, and this requires a prior solution to the pairing problem” (Ki ...
Phenomenal consciousness so-called
... how thoughts represent. We would then understand two kinds of transitive state consciousness, or two ways of being conscious of something: by sensing it, or by thinking about it. What other resources do we need to give a full account of conscious mental states? It may seem that the latter question i ...
... how thoughts represent. We would then understand two kinds of transitive state consciousness, or two ways of being conscious of something: by sensing it, or by thinking about it. What other resources do we need to give a full account of conscious mental states? It may seem that the latter question i ...
Theorising Social Constraint: The Concept of
... now. The question is whether supervenience allows for such a role. Let us now adapt our diagram to show Healy’s supervenience relationship between It and DSt (see Figure 3). We can now see that today’s individuals make up today’s demographic structure. But how far does this get us with regard to a d ...
... now. The question is whether supervenience allows for such a role. Let us now adapt our diagram to show Healy’s supervenience relationship between It and DSt (see Figure 3). We can now see that today’s individuals make up today’s demographic structure. But how far does this get us with regard to a d ...
Searle`s Ontology of the Mind and the Universe
... simplified way, solidity occurs when micro-particles stick to each other rigidly, liquidity when they do not, photosynthesis consists of a complicated interaction among light and various particles, etc.). In contrast, the mental with its property of subjectivity and consciousness can never be a feat ...
... simplified way, solidity occurs when micro-particles stick to each other rigidly, liquidity when they do not, photosynthesis consists of a complicated interaction among light and various particles, etc.). In contrast, the mental with its property of subjectivity and consciousness can never be a feat ...
I, Sim - Simulation Argument
... with ‘Sim’. A Sim is a simulated person living in a simulated world, as in the popular computer game The Sims by renowned game designer Will Wright. I.e. if I believe that the simulation argument is sound and give a high credence to SIM, then I will believe that there is a good chance that I might a ...
... with ‘Sim’. A Sim is a simulated person living in a simulated world, as in the popular computer game The Sims by renowned game designer Will Wright. I.e. if I believe that the simulation argument is sound and give a high credence to SIM, then I will believe that there is a good chance that I might a ...
Animal and Machine Consciousness
... senses, and brain, and, perhaps, mind, then we are ready to turn to today’s topic, animal and machine consciousness. Once again I follow the issues as Blackmore sets them out. Once again, remember that Blackmore tries to provoke questions more than answer them. She begins by asking whether human con ...
... senses, and brain, and, perhaps, mind, then we are ready to turn to today’s topic, animal and machine consciousness. Once again I follow the issues as Blackmore sets them out. Once again, remember that Blackmore tries to provoke questions more than answer them. She begins by asking whether human con ...
Commonsense concepts of phenomenal consciousness: Does
... includes a concept of phenomenal consciousness. But, unfortunately, some philosophical blockades stand in the way of an easy deployment of this methodology. To begin with, it has proven difficult to offer a clear account of what distinguishes phenomenal from non-phenomenal states. Ned Block (1995), ...
... includes a concept of phenomenal consciousness. But, unfortunately, some philosophical blockades stand in the way of an easy deployment of this methodology. To begin with, it has proven difficult to offer a clear account of what distinguishes phenomenal from non-phenomenal states. Ned Block (1995), ...
The Meaning of Vijñapti in Vasubandhu`s Concept of Mind
... "aggregate of awareness" (vijnana-skandha). Manas, on the other hand, is the term for "mind" as the sixth of. the six organs or faculties of perception (sensory or mental) in the list of twelve "sense-fields" (dyatana): the six "sense organs" {indriya) and six "sense objects" (vi$aya). Here, "mental ...
... "aggregate of awareness" (vijnana-skandha). Manas, on the other hand, is the term for "mind" as the sixth of. the six organs or faculties of perception (sensory or mental) in the list of twelve "sense-fields" (dyatana): the six "sense organs" {indriya) and six "sense objects" (vi$aya). Here, "mental ...
Chinese_Room - Lund University Publications
... Dale´s criticisms in his article “Fear and Loathing” picks up where Searle leaves off in his article “Minds, Brains and Programs”. That is he highlights Searle´s perceived gap between syntax and semantics. What Dale seems to want to bring to the table is the possibility that there might be semantics ...
... Dale´s criticisms in his article “Fear and Loathing” picks up where Searle leaves off in his article “Minds, Brains and Programs”. That is he highlights Searle´s perceived gap between syntax and semantics. What Dale seems to want to bring to the table is the possibility that there might be semantics ...
Biological Imitation
... Tongue Protrusion in neonates is motivated by interest in visual display and exploration, Not imitation! • Infants produce tongue protrusion when their interest is aroused by any visual display • Most infants find tongue protrusion more interesting and arousing to watch than mouth openings. • Infant ...
... Tongue Protrusion in neonates is motivated by interest in visual display and exploration, Not imitation! • Infants produce tongue protrusion when their interest is aroused by any visual display • Most infants find tongue protrusion more interesting and arousing to watch than mouth openings. • Infant ...
Paper titles and abstracts Dan Arnold: "Perception and the
... game of inference with his celebrated redefinition of perceptual experience as that which is free from conceptual construction (nirvikalpaka). Bhartṛhari, Dignāga's senior, notoriously defends a precisely contrary thesis about the priority of language, that linguistic and conceptual ability pervade ...
... game of inference with his celebrated redefinition of perceptual experience as that which is free from conceptual construction (nirvikalpaka). Bhartṛhari, Dignāga's senior, notoriously defends a precisely contrary thesis about the priority of language, that linguistic and conceptual ability pervade ...
PDF - Berkeley Buddhist studies
... designed to plumb the depths of consciousness, and that these methodologies can and indeed should be used to augment the third-person methodologies developed in the West. The “laboratory” for Buddhist inner science is the practice of meditation, and the neuroscience and therapeutic effects of Buddhi ...
... designed to plumb the depths of consciousness, and that these methodologies can and indeed should be used to augment the third-person methodologies developed in the West. The “laboratory” for Buddhist inner science is the practice of meditation, and the neuroscience and therapeutic effects of Buddhi ...
"Meat Thinks" Talk Notes
... change when I put LSD into my body? Why do people with brain damage (e.g., people with Alzheimer’s disease) have any loss of normal consciousness? ...
... change when I put LSD into my body? Why do people with brain damage (e.g., people with Alzheimer’s disease) have any loss of normal consciousness? ...
Intentionality
... It seems that these cannot all be true together, so which one should we give up? If you give up (A) you say that intentional states are not relations to their objects. But how can thinking about x fail to be a relation between you and x? Some views think that (A) is a non-negotiable commitment: inte ...
... It seems that these cannot all be true together, so which one should we give up? If you give up (A) you say that intentional states are not relations to their objects. But how can thinking about x fail to be a relation between you and x? Some views think that (A) is a non-negotiable commitment: inte ...
Memento`s Revenge: The Extended Mind
... knowledge and dispositional belief. In the present treatment I revisit this argument, defending our strong conclusion against a variety of subsequent observations and objections. In particular, I look at objections that rely on a contrast between the (putatively) intrinsic content of neural symbols ...
... knowledge and dispositional belief. In the present treatment I revisit this argument, defending our strong conclusion against a variety of subsequent observations and objections. In particular, I look at objections that rely on a contrast between the (putatively) intrinsic content of neural symbols ...
A Critique of Descartes` Mind-Body Dualism
... substance, (mind), which has thinking as its essence and material substance (body), with extension as its essence. Mind and body are therefore, two kinds of substance, each of which is distinctly different, and can exist independent of each other. With Descartes’ establishment of his soul or mind as ...
... substance, (mind), which has thinking as its essence and material substance (body), with extension as its essence. Mind and body are therefore, two kinds of substance, each of which is distinctly different, and can exist independent of each other. With Descartes’ establishment of his soul or mind as ...
Ionian Philosophers
... a. He appears to be aware of the uniqueness of his undertaking for he said: “although all the truths which I class among my principles have been known from all time and by all men, there has been no one up to the present, who, so far as I know, has adopted them as the principles of philosophy…as th ...
... a. He appears to be aware of the uniqueness of his undertaking for he said: “although all the truths which I class among my principles have been known from all time and by all men, there has been no one up to the present, who, so far as I know, has adopted them as the principles of philosophy…as th ...
2011-10-10 Drup.ta /Tenets Geshe Jampa Tenzin Mind Only School
... the image can not withstand destruction. Sutra school:- Conventional truth is all permanent things because they cannot produce an effect/perform a function. An example of ultimate truth is a vase/ a compounded/impermanent/real/functional phenomena (things which perform functions/produce an effect). ...
... the image can not withstand destruction. Sutra school:- Conventional truth is all permanent things because they cannot produce an effect/perform a function. An example of ultimate truth is a vase/ a compounded/impermanent/real/functional phenomena (things which perform functions/produce an effect). ...
Donald Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective
... that allows a systematic interpretation of them, which can be captured with a truth theory, meeting appropriate constraints, which provides satisfaction conditions for his words and truth conditions for his sentences. Davidson challenges rather the claim that shared prior knowledge of conventions is ...
... that allows a systematic interpretation of them, which can be captured with a truth theory, meeting appropriate constraints, which provides satisfaction conditions for his words and truth conditions for his sentences. Davidson challenges rather the claim that shared prior knowledge of conventions is ...
Artificial Intelligence and Artificial Consciousness
... • The gap between cognitive and phenomenal aspects of mind MAY mark a significant watershed, even though most researchers tend to see a continuity; • The watershed may be of ethical significance: • So creating genuine MC will impose strong responsibilities on the researchers involved, as the beings ...
... • The gap between cognitive and phenomenal aspects of mind MAY mark a significant watershed, even though most researchers tend to see a continuity; • The watershed may be of ethical significance: • So creating genuine MC will impose strong responsibilities on the researchers involved, as the beings ...
The Inner Life of a Rational Agent
... But Ryle’s main problem with the term ‘behaviourism’ was the risk of guilt by association with earlier avowed behaviourists, who worked with a ‘mechanical’ conception of behaviour, and therefore ended up at best with a mechanical conception of the mind. Ryle thought that these earlier behaviourists ...
... But Ryle’s main problem with the term ‘behaviourism’ was the risk of guilt by association with earlier avowed behaviourists, who worked with a ‘mechanical’ conception of behaviour, and therefore ended up at best with a mechanical conception of the mind. Ryle thought that these earlier behaviourists ...
Here
... resemble anything existing outside the mind or unperceived, they admit; but they insist that our ideas of primary qualities are patterns or images of things that exist outside the mind in an unthinking substance that they call ‘matter’. By ‘matter’, therefore, we are to understand an inert, senseles ...
... resemble anything existing outside the mind or unperceived, they admit; but they insist that our ideas of primary qualities are patterns or images of things that exist outside the mind in an unthinking substance that they call ‘matter’. By ‘matter’, therefore, we are to understand an inert, senseles ...
Philosophy of mind
Philosophy of mind is a branch of philosophy that studies the nature of the mind, mental events, mental functions, mental properties, consciousness, and their relationship to the physical body, particularly the brain. The mind–body problem, i.e. the relationship of the mind to the body, is commonly seen as one key issue in philosophy of mind, although there are other issues concerning the nature of the mind that do not involve its relation to the physical body, such as how consciousness is possible and the nature of particular mental states.Dualism and monism are the two major schools of thought that attempt to resolve the mind–body problem. Dualism can be traced back to Plato, and the Sankhya and Yoga schools of Hindu philosophy, but it was most precisely formulated by René Descartes in the 17th century. Substance dualists argue that the mind is an independently existing substance, whereas property dualists maintain that the mind is a group of independent properties that emerge from and cannot be reduced to the brain, but that it is not a distinct substance.Monism is the position that mind and body are not ontologically distinct kinds of entities (independent substances). This view was first advocated in Western philosophy by Parmenides in the 5th century BC and was later espoused by the 17th century rationalist Baruch Spinoza. Physicalists argue that only entities postulated by physical theory exist, and that mental processes will eventually be explained in terms of these entities as physical theory continues to evolve. Physicalists maintain various positions on the prospects of reducing mental properties to physical properties (many of whom adopt compatible forms of property dualism), and the ontological status of such mental properties remains unclear. Idealists maintain that the mind is all that exists and that the external world is either mental itself, or an illusion created by the mind. Neutral monists such as Ernst Mach and William James argue that events in the world can be thought of as either mental (psychological) or physical depending on the network of relationships into which they enter, and dual-aspect monists such as Spinoza adhere to the position that there is some other, neutral substance, and that both matter and mind are properties of this unknown substance. The most common monisms in the 20th and 21st centuries have all been variations of physicalism; these positions include behaviorism, the type identity theory, anomalous monism and functionalism.Most modern philosophers of mind adopt either a reductive or non-reductive physicalist position, maintaining in their different ways that the mind is not something separate from the body. These approaches have been particularly influential in the sciences, especially in the fields of sociobiology, computer science, evolutionary psychology and the various neurosciences. Other philosophers, however, adopt a non-physicalist position that challenges the notion that the mind is a purely physical construct. Reductive physicalists assert that all mental states and properties will eventually be explained by scientific accounts of physiological processes and states. Non-reductive physicalists argue that although the mind is not a separate substance, mental properties supervene on physical properties, or that the predicates and vocabulary used in mental descriptions and explanations are indispensable, and cannot be reduced to the language and lower-level explanations of physical science. Continued neuroscientific progress has helped to clarify some of these issues; however, they are far from being resolved. Modern philosophers of mind continue to ask how the subjective qualities and the intentionality of mental states and properties can be explained in naturalistic terms.