Artificial Intelligence and Artificial Consciousness: Continuum or
... • The gap between cognitive and phenomenal aspects of mind MAY mark a significant watershed, even though most researchers tend to see a continuity; • The watershed may be of ethical significance: • So creating genuine MC will impose strong responsibilities on the researchers involved, as the beings ...
... • The gap between cognitive and phenomenal aspects of mind MAY mark a significant watershed, even though most researchers tend to see a continuity; • The watershed may be of ethical significance: • So creating genuine MC will impose strong responsibilities on the researchers involved, as the beings ...
LaRock
... sense, Armstrong is like Descartes in that he too attributes causal power to the mind itself; rightly so, they have no sympathies with theories that deny the reality of mental causation, such as behaviorism and epiphenomenalism. Despite their allegiance to the reality of mental causation, these two ...
... sense, Armstrong is like Descartes in that he too attributes causal power to the mind itself; rightly so, they have no sympathies with theories that deny the reality of mental causation, such as behaviorism and epiphenomenalism. Despite their allegiance to the reality of mental causation, these two ...
IOSR Journal Of Humanities And Social Science (IOSR-JHSS)
... governed this causal relationship is very strict. His argument is known as „anomalous monism.‟ John Searle is an advocate of distinctive form of physicalism known as biological naturalism. He says that mental states cannot be reduced ontologically to physical states but causally they are reducible. ...
... governed this causal relationship is very strict. His argument is known as „anomalous monism.‟ John Searle is an advocate of distinctive form of physicalism known as biological naturalism. He says that mental states cannot be reduced ontologically to physical states but causally they are reducible. ...
August 1st, 2003 as a rtf file
... • Their reluctance in this regard is harder to justify or motivate. It may be best explained by their commitment to (metaphysical) Materialism or Physicalism. • For example Smart, in his essay, claims that “sensations, states of consciousness, do seem to be the one sort of thing left outside the phy ...
... • Their reluctance in this regard is harder to justify or motivate. It may be best explained by their commitment to (metaphysical) Materialism or Physicalism. • For example Smart, in his essay, claims that “sensations, states of consciousness, do seem to be the one sort of thing left outside the phy ...
The Relationship between Sensory Consciousness and Mind
... but they are used as exact translations. There are often times in English when we might say “unconscious,” but in these cases, the Tibetan notion of she-pa is still there, still relevant. We use different terms of the other. In addition, we often interchange the terms “secondary mind” and “subtle mi ...
... but they are used as exact translations. There are often times in English when we might say “unconscious,” but in these cases, the Tibetan notion of she-pa is still there, still relevant. We use different terms of the other. In addition, we often interchange the terms “secondary mind” and “subtle mi ...
Inferential Knowledge of the Occurrence of Something
... In very few, but significant, passages, Dharmakīrti expressed by the term saṃbhavānumāna an inferential knowledge concerning the occurrence of something. In one passage, in particular, the subject under discussion are the mental qualities. The paper will expose the use of saṃbhavānumāna in Dharmakīr ...
... In very few, but significant, passages, Dharmakīrti expressed by the term saṃbhavānumāna an inferential knowledge concerning the occurrence of something. In one passage, in particular, the subject under discussion are the mental qualities. The paper will expose the use of saṃbhavānumāna in Dharmakīr ...
alphabet of human thought
... your mind (body = from senses, mind = must exist because by thinking you establish its existence) Dualism: mind and body/world are different kinds of entitites ( made of different stuff) o Mind/matter cannot be reduced to one another o No explanation of minds in physical terms o Mental states cannot ...
... your mind (body = from senses, mind = must exist because by thinking you establish its existence) Dualism: mind and body/world are different kinds of entitites ( made of different stuff) o Mind/matter cannot be reduced to one another o No explanation of minds in physical terms o Mental states cannot ...
What Is It Like to Be a Bat?
... us.6 (The problem is not confinedto exotic cases, however,forit exists between one person and another. The subjective character of the experience of a person deaf and blind from birth is not accessible to me, for example, nor presumably is mine to him. This does not prevent us each from believing th ...
... us.6 (The problem is not confinedto exotic cases, however,forit exists between one person and another. The subjective character of the experience of a person deaf and blind from birth is not accessible to me, for example, nor presumably is mine to him. This does not prevent us each from believing th ...
Panpsychism | uboeschenstein.ch
... attributed to matter, but all matter can likewise be attributed to mind". Josiah Royce, the leading American absolute idealist held that reality was a "world self", a conscious being that comprised everything, though he didn't necessarily attribute mental properties to the smallest constituents of m ...
... attributed to matter, but all matter can likewise be attributed to mind". Josiah Royce, the leading American absolute idealist held that reality was a "world self", a conscious being that comprised everything, though he didn't necessarily attribute mental properties to the smallest constituents of m ...
Lecture 6 : The Concept of Mind in Upanisads
... finite. Since the Brahman is atemporal is not bound by time. The knowledge about the world is sense experiential where as the knowledge about the atman is not derived through any sense experience, rather it is immediate knowledge. Nevertheless there must be a desire to know (jiñāsa) who am I? Unless ...
... finite. Since the Brahman is atemporal is not bound by time. The knowledge about the world is sense experiential where as the knowledge about the atman is not derived through any sense experience, rather it is immediate knowledge. Nevertheless there must be a desire to know (jiñāsa) who am I? Unless ...
Topic 2b: What is conceptualization? Jerry Fodor (2008): LOT2 The
... intentionality that makes the philosophy of mind so hard; consciousness is what makes it impossible” RTM: compositionality – the content of a thought is determined by its structure and the content of its constituent concepts. Compositionality explains productivity and systematicity. concepts are c ...
... intentionality that makes the philosophy of mind so hard; consciousness is what makes it impossible” RTM: compositionality – the content of a thought is determined by its structure and the content of its constituent concepts. Compositionality explains productivity and systematicity. concepts are c ...
Velasquez, Philosophy TRACK 1: CHAPTER REVIEW CHAPTER 2
... The most influential version of the traditional view sees humans primarily as thinkers capable of reasoning. This view is represented in the work of Plato, who believed that humans consisted of appetite, reason, and a spirited element. Reason seeks what is good and right, the spirited element seeks ...
... The most influential version of the traditional view sees humans primarily as thinkers capable of reasoning. This view is represented in the work of Plato, who believed that humans consisted of appetite, reason, and a spirited element. Reason seeks what is good and right, the spirited element seeks ...
Philosophy 100 Lecture 12 Minds and bodies
... – something is clear when it is “present and apparent to an attentive mind, in the same way as we assert that we see objects clearly when, being present to the regarding eye, they operate upon it with sufficient strength.” (Principles of Philosophy, 1.45) – Example: ...
... – something is clear when it is “present and apparent to an attentive mind, in the same way as we assert that we see objects clearly when, being present to the regarding eye, they operate upon it with sufficient strength.” (Principles of Philosophy, 1.45) – Example: ...
The thesis at issue here is this: whether or not the Argument from
... Premise 4, I hope, is uncontroversial – if it were false, then computer scientists would have a lot more to worry about than the veracity of Computationalism! I believe Premise 1 is obvious given the arguments in the paper [1], but it still warrants some recap and explanation. The Argument from Irre ...
... Premise 4, I hope, is uncontroversial – if it were false, then computer scientists would have a lot more to worry about than the veracity of Computationalism! I believe Premise 1 is obvious given the arguments in the paper [1], but it still warrants some recap and explanation. The Argument from Irre ...
Functionalism According to functionalism, the essential or defining
... kind described is ruled out by definition. But such inversions are entirely conceivable, concludes the objection, and if functionalism entails that they are not conceivable, then functionalism is false. Another qualia-related worry for functionalism is the so-called "absent qualia problem". The func ...
... kind described is ruled out by definition. But such inversions are entirely conceivable, concludes the objection, and if functionalism entails that they are not conceivable, then functionalism is false. Another qualia-related worry for functionalism is the so-called "absent qualia problem". The func ...
LECTURE 24
... ORDINARY INDIVIDUAL THINGS ARE MADE UP OF PHYSICAL PARTS. A PHYSICAL PART OF SOMETHING IS AN INDIVIDUAL THING OF THE SORT STUDIED BY PHYSICS. AT PRESENT (ACCORDING TO VAN INWAGEN) THE MOST BASIC SORTS OF PHYSICAL THINGS ARE THOUGHT TO BE QUARKS AND ELECTRONS (AND CERTAIN OTHER PARTICLES). ...
... ORDINARY INDIVIDUAL THINGS ARE MADE UP OF PHYSICAL PARTS. A PHYSICAL PART OF SOMETHING IS AN INDIVIDUAL THING OF THE SORT STUDIED BY PHYSICS. AT PRESENT (ACCORDING TO VAN INWAGEN) THE MOST BASIC SORTS OF PHYSICAL THINGS ARE THOUGHT TO BE QUARKS AND ELECTRONS (AND CERTAIN OTHER PARTICLES). ...
Chapter 5. The Sensual and Perceptual Theories of Visual
... The viewer constructs the scene with short-lived eye fixations that the mind combines into a whole picture Researchers found that the content, size, and placement of photos on a newspaper page are more important than whether the image is printed in ...
... The viewer constructs the scene with short-lived eye fixations that the mind combines into a whole picture Researchers found that the content, size, and placement of photos on a newspaper page are more important than whether the image is printed in ...
EMOTION: Information as Subjective Feeling
... What could help? • Better affect and arousal regulation • Better understanding of stress and distress and how it affects us • Better awareness of Self and how I function and see the world • What am I not thinking about? • Could I change the way I see myself? Others? • Is there another way to think ...
... What could help? • Better affect and arousal regulation • Better understanding of stress and distress and how it affects us • Better awareness of Self and how I function and see the world • What am I not thinking about? • Could I change the way I see myself? Others? • Is there another way to think ...
The Life of the Body-Heart-Mind-Spirit: Cross
... philosophers usually take for granted. Specifically, as the title of my talk suggests, I want to advance a more holistic view of education. Modern academic philosophers have tended to forget that philosophy was for the ancient Greeks, not just an intellectual exercise, but a transformative way of l ...
... philosophers usually take for granted. Specifically, as the title of my talk suggests, I want to advance a more holistic view of education. Modern academic philosophers have tended to forget that philosophy was for the ancient Greeks, not just an intellectual exercise, but a transformative way of l ...
Emotions, attitudes and communication
... “I think, therefore I am" The building block upon which he constructed his philosophy of Dualism. In Descartes' approach, thought is the proof of existence; it is the basic truth. Damasio argues that the body is the genesis of thought, that thinking is inherent to a body in which no spirit exists. T ...
... “I think, therefore I am" The building block upon which he constructed his philosophy of Dualism. In Descartes' approach, thought is the proof of existence; it is the basic truth. Damasio argues that the body is the genesis of thought, that thinking is inherent to a body in which no spirit exists. T ...
Tree of Knowledge
... Tree of Knowledge In one way, the Tree of Knowledge (ToK) System reflects a fairly common hierarchy of nature and of the sciences that has been represented in one way or another since the time of Augusta Comte, who in the seventeenth century used a hierarchical conception of nature to argue for the ...
... Tree of Knowledge In one way, the Tree of Knowledge (ToK) System reflects a fairly common hierarchy of nature and of the sciences that has been represented in one way or another since the time of Augusta Comte, who in the seventeenth century used a hierarchical conception of nature to argue for the ...
File
... The hypothetic-deductive method - This method will be explained throughout this example. When the teacher gives the learner a question. The learner tries to think and get some suggestions. His/her suggestions may be right or wrong. These suggestions are known as deductions. When these deductions ar ...
... The hypothetic-deductive method - This method will be explained throughout this example. When the teacher gives the learner a question. The learner tries to think and get some suggestions. His/her suggestions may be right or wrong. These suggestions are known as deductions. When these deductions ar ...
CHAPTER 4
... • Tom, Boris, and Jacques might all have the belief that a Frenchman committed murder in Trafalgar square, though their brains are in different states, they make different inferences from that belief due to varying backgrounds, and the like. • Nonetheless certain acts are predictable from the “virtu ...
... • Tom, Boris, and Jacques might all have the belief that a Frenchman committed murder in Trafalgar square, though their brains are in different states, they make different inferences from that belief due to varying backgrounds, and the like. • Nonetheless certain acts are predictable from the “virtu ...
Philosophy of mind
Philosophy of mind is a branch of philosophy that studies the nature of the mind, mental events, mental functions, mental properties, consciousness, and their relationship to the physical body, particularly the brain. The mind–body problem, i.e. the relationship of the mind to the body, is commonly seen as one key issue in philosophy of mind, although there are other issues concerning the nature of the mind that do not involve its relation to the physical body, such as how consciousness is possible and the nature of particular mental states.Dualism and monism are the two major schools of thought that attempt to resolve the mind–body problem. Dualism can be traced back to Plato, and the Sankhya and Yoga schools of Hindu philosophy, but it was most precisely formulated by René Descartes in the 17th century. Substance dualists argue that the mind is an independently existing substance, whereas property dualists maintain that the mind is a group of independent properties that emerge from and cannot be reduced to the brain, but that it is not a distinct substance.Monism is the position that mind and body are not ontologically distinct kinds of entities (independent substances). This view was first advocated in Western philosophy by Parmenides in the 5th century BC and was later espoused by the 17th century rationalist Baruch Spinoza. Physicalists argue that only entities postulated by physical theory exist, and that mental processes will eventually be explained in terms of these entities as physical theory continues to evolve. Physicalists maintain various positions on the prospects of reducing mental properties to physical properties (many of whom adopt compatible forms of property dualism), and the ontological status of such mental properties remains unclear. Idealists maintain that the mind is all that exists and that the external world is either mental itself, or an illusion created by the mind. Neutral monists such as Ernst Mach and William James argue that events in the world can be thought of as either mental (psychological) or physical depending on the network of relationships into which they enter, and dual-aspect monists such as Spinoza adhere to the position that there is some other, neutral substance, and that both matter and mind are properties of this unknown substance. The most common monisms in the 20th and 21st centuries have all been variations of physicalism; these positions include behaviorism, the type identity theory, anomalous monism and functionalism.Most modern philosophers of mind adopt either a reductive or non-reductive physicalist position, maintaining in their different ways that the mind is not something separate from the body. These approaches have been particularly influential in the sciences, especially in the fields of sociobiology, computer science, evolutionary psychology and the various neurosciences. Other philosophers, however, adopt a non-physicalist position that challenges the notion that the mind is a purely physical construct. Reductive physicalists assert that all mental states and properties will eventually be explained by scientific accounts of physiological processes and states. Non-reductive physicalists argue that although the mind is not a separate substance, mental properties supervene on physical properties, or that the predicates and vocabulary used in mental descriptions and explanations are indispensable, and cannot be reduced to the language and lower-level explanations of physical science. Continued neuroscientific progress has helped to clarify some of these issues; however, they are far from being resolved. Modern philosophers of mind continue to ask how the subjective qualities and the intentionality of mental states and properties can be explained in naturalistic terms.