An Infinitely Farsighted Stable Set

... to be a promising (and perhaps the only) solution concept for games with empty cores, since they are generally larger than the core and can be nonempty even if the core is empty. However, with the publication of Ray and Vohra (2014), interest in stable sets seems to have revived. Following Harsanyi’ ...

... to be a promising (and perhaps the only) solution concept for games with empty cores, since they are generally larger than the core and can be nonempty even if the core is empty. However, with the publication of Ray and Vohra (2014), interest in stable sets seems to have revived. Following Harsanyi’ ...

Graphs, games and propagation

... You may see this as the problem of assigning jobs to parallel processors, or frequencies to communicating devices, or classes to teachers, etc... The objective in these settings is to determine the minimum number of independent sets/colors for which this is possible, i.e. the chromatic number of the ...

... You may see this as the problem of assigning jobs to parallel processors, or frequencies to communicating devices, or classes to teachers, etc... The objective in these settings is to determine the minimum number of independent sets/colors for which this is possible, i.e. the chromatic number of the ...

Branches of imperfect information - Institute for Logic, Language and

... also the realm of parlor games comes to mind as one of the many areas in which imperfect information plays a key role. To appreciate the different possible origins of imperfect information in parlor games, I will set out a number of ways in which imperfect information concerning previous moves can b ...

... also the realm of parlor games comes to mind as one of the many areas in which imperfect information plays a key role. To appreciate the different possible origins of imperfect information in parlor games, I will set out a number of ways in which imperfect information concerning previous moves can b ...

Stochastic Learning Dynamics and Speed of Convergence in

... learning dynamics do not converge to Nash equilibrium without imposing strong conditions on the structure of the game and/or the players’ level of rationality. Even in those situations where the learning dynamics do eventually lead to Nash equilibrium, the process may take so long that equilibrium i ...

... learning dynamics do not converge to Nash equilibrium without imposing strong conditions on the structure of the game and/or the players’ level of rationality. Even in those situations where the learning dynamics do eventually lead to Nash equilibrium, the process may take so long that equilibrium i ...

A Consistent Bargaining Set

... justified objection. But is an imputation in the latter set a reasonable or allowable allocation? An affirmative answer clearly presumes that the counterobjection is always “justilied” so that if it exists, the original objection is nut justified. But any notion of consistency would demand that the ...

... justified objection. But is an imputation in the latter set a reasonable or allowable allocation? An affirmative answer clearly presumes that the counterobjection is always “justilied” so that if it exists, the original objection is nut justified. But any notion of consistency would demand that the ...

Computing the Nondominated Nash Points of a Normal Form Game

... a finite number of Nash equilibria, or even an infinite number of Nash equilibria. When a normal form game has an infinite number of Nash equilibria, the set of all Nash equilibria can still be completely described by finitely many Nash equilibria, namely by all extreme Nash equilibria. Not surprisi ...

... a finite number of Nash equilibria, or even an infinite number of Nash equilibria. When a normal form game has an infinite number of Nash equilibria, the set of all Nash equilibria can still be completely described by finitely many Nash equilibria, namely by all extreme Nash equilibria. Not surprisi ...

The Stochastic Response Dynamic: A New Approach to Learning

... assured to uniquely converge. The convergence however is no longer to a single state of the game, but rather to a probability distribution over the possible states of the game. In the language of Markov chains, the stochastic response dynamic is uniquely ergodic and converges strongly (in total var ...

... assured to uniquely converge. The convergence however is no longer to a single state of the game, but rather to a probability distribution over the possible states of the game. In the language of Markov chains, the stochastic response dynamic is uniquely ergodic and converges strongly (in total var ...

Gambit Documentation

... Gambit is for noncooperative game theory only. Gambit focuses on the branch of game theory in which the rules of the game are written down explicitly, and in which players choose their actions independently. Gambit’s analytical tools center primarily around Nash equilibrium, and related concepts of ...

... Gambit is for noncooperative game theory only. Gambit focuses on the branch of game theory in which the rules of the game are written down explicitly, and in which players choose their actions independently. Gambit’s analytical tools center primarily around Nash equilibrium, and related concepts of ...

coalitions

... • How to measure the power of different voters in a given procedure? • The measurement of voting power is done “à priori”, before preferences of voters on the alternatives are known. • However, ex post, the probability to win will depend on the interest groups. • In a simple game (or voting game), ...

... • How to measure the power of different voters in a given procedure? • The measurement of voting power is done “à priori”, before preferences of voters on the alternatives are known. • However, ex post, the probability to win will depend on the interest groups. • In a simple game (or voting game), ...

... Gambit is for noncooperative game theory only. Gambit focuses on the branch of game theory in which the rules of the game are written down explicitly, and in which players choose their actions independently. Gambit’s analytical tools center primarily around Nash equilibrium, and related concepts of ...

Context$Dependent Forward Induction Reasoning

... her information set is reached. As a result, the RCSBR analysis based on this smaller structure can lead to an outcome that is precluded by the RCSBR analysis on a larger structure. This shows that the RCSBR analysis of the largest structure does not su¢ ce to capture the predictions of forward indu ...

... her information set is reached. As a result, the RCSBR analysis based on this smaller structure can lead to an outcome that is precluded by the RCSBR analysis on a larger structure. This shows that the RCSBR analysis of the largest structure does not su¢ ce to capture the predictions of forward indu ...

Coalition Formation and Price of Anarchy in

... latency functions [23]. This can be viewed as a positive result. However, many settings have a drastically large price of anarchy, e.g., Cournot oligopoly games, which model competition between firms, have a linear price of anarchy for certain production functions [16]. The pursuit of self-interest ...

... latency functions [23]. This can be viewed as a positive result. However, many settings have a drastically large price of anarchy, e.g., Cournot oligopoly games, which model competition between firms, have a linear price of anarchy for certain production functions [16]. The pursuit of self-interest ...

Openness of the set of games with a unique correlated equilibrium

... establish such robustness results typically requires proving that some of the properties of the game we initially considered are themselves robust; that is, that the set of games having these properties is open. We investigate here whether the set of finite normal-form games with a unique equilibriu ...

... establish such robustness results typically requires proving that some of the properties of the game we initially considered are themselves robust; that is, that the set of games having these properties is open. We investigate here whether the set of finite normal-form games with a unique equilibriu ...

LEADER-FOLLOWER GAMES - Kyoto University Research

... studies the strategic solutions, where an individual makes a choice by taking into account the others’ choices. Game theory was developed widely in 1950 as John Nash introduced the well-known concept of Nash equilibrium in non-cooperative games [27, 28], which means no player can obtain any more ben ...

... studies the strategic solutions, where an individual makes a choice by taking into account the others’ choices. Game theory was developed widely in 1950 as John Nash introduced the well-known concept of Nash equilibrium in non-cooperative games [27, 28], which means no player can obtain any more ben ...

Potential Games

... Mathematically, there can be various types of potential games. In all these types of games, however, the common thread is the existence of an associated function— the potential function—that maps the game’s strategy space S to the space of real number R. Their classifications depend on the specific ...

... Mathematically, there can be various types of potential games. In all these types of games, however, the common thread is the existence of an associated function— the potential function—that maps the game’s strategy space S to the space of real number R. Their classifications depend on the specific ...

coalitional approaches to collusive agreements in oligopoly games

... In order to examine all these questions, we introduce in Section 2 the notion of core of games with externalities and thus apply it to check the stability of a merger or a cartel made by all …rms in the industry. We show that while the simultaneous approach to the cartel formation described above co ...

... In order to examine all these questions, we introduce in Section 2 the notion of core of games with externalities and thus apply it to check the stability of a merger or a cartel made by all …rms in the industry. We show that while the simultaneous approach to the cartel formation described above co ...

Symmetric Nash equilibria

... of symmetry to concurrent games. We also prove that in our definition of a symmetric concurrent game there does not necessarily exist a symmetric Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies as is the case for normal-form games. In the last part of the report we present a family of games which we call symme ...

... of symmetry to concurrent games. We also prove that in our definition of a symmetric concurrent game there does not necessarily exist a symmetric Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies as is the case for normal-form games. In the last part of the report we present a family of games which we call symme ...

Evolutionary Game Theory and Population Dynamics

... by their opponents. The central concept in game theory is that of a Nash equilibrium. It is an assignment of strategies to players such that no player, for fixed strategies of his opponents, has an incentive to deviate from his current strategy; no change can increase his payoff. In Chapter 3, we pr ...

... by their opponents. The central concept in game theory is that of a Nash equilibrium. It is an assignment of strategies to players such that no player, for fixed strategies of his opponents, has an incentive to deviate from his current strategy; no change can increase his payoff. In Chapter 3, we pr ...

How much would you pay to change a game before

... is unobserved by all other players, DM’s willingness to pay to change the parameter values is given by the sum of two factors. The first factor is how the change directly affects DM’s payoffs, holding the strategies of all players constant (including DM’s). The second factor is how DM optimally adju ...

... is unobserved by all other players, DM’s willingness to pay to change the parameter values is given by the sum of two factors. The first factor is how the change directly affects DM’s payoffs, holding the strategies of all players constant (including DM’s). The second factor is how DM optimally adju ...

Non-Additive Beliefs in Solvable Games

... Keeping 1 and giving up 2 allows for non-linear functionals on lotteries. See Machina (1982), references therein, and followers thereof. See also Quiggin’s (1982) anticipated utility model and its derivatives, known as expected utility models with rank dependent probabilities. Abolishing 1, while ma ...

... Keeping 1 and giving up 2 allows for non-linear functionals on lotteries. See Machina (1982), references therein, and followers thereof. See also Quiggin’s (1982) anticipated utility model and its derivatives, known as expected utility models with rank dependent probabilities. Abolishing 1, while ma ...

iese07 VanZandt 5034778 en

... games that might not have strategic complementarities. In this way, the set of games may be more general. In the most general result, Reny (2006), the assumption on the action set is just slightly stronger than in this paper (the difference is that the lattice is locally complete). Reny’s assumption ...

... games that might not have strategic complementarities. In this way, the set of games may be more general. In the most general result, Reny (2006), the assumption on the action set is just slightly stronger than in this paper (the difference is that the lattice is locally complete). Reny’s assumption ...

How patient the players need to be to obtain all the relevant payoffs

... In pure strategies, Berg and Kitti (2012, 2013) have developed a novel method for producing the equilibrium paths beside the payoffs, i.e., the method also finds the possible action sequences that can be played in the game. However, it faces the same problem as the earlier methods; it is possible to ...

... In pure strategies, Berg and Kitti (2012, 2013) have developed a novel method for producing the equilibrium paths beside the payoffs, i.e., the method also finds the possible action sequences that can be played in the game. However, it faces the same problem as the earlier methods; it is possible to ...

Repeated Games with Differential Time Preferences

... Discounting of future payoffs reflects the players’ tastes. Since people often differ in their time preferences, it is natural to consider the case of different discount factors. However, in cases where payoffs are monetary, one may argue that differential time preferences do not matter. Is it not t ...

... Discounting of future payoffs reflects the players’ tastes. Since people often differ in their time preferences, it is natural to consider the case of different discount factors. However, in cases where payoffs are monetary, one may argue that differential time preferences do not matter. Is it not t ...