Equilibria and Efficiency Loss in Games on Networks
... As described in Section I, there has been appreciable work on networked versions of particular games, usually on particular classes of networks, in modeling the diffusion of innovation [5, 15–18, 28, 31–33, 35]. These models typically capture scenarios in which there is incentive towards assortative ...
... As described in Section I, there has been appreciable work on networked versions of particular games, usually on particular classes of networks, in modeling the diffusion of innovation [5, 15–18, 28, 31–33, 35]. These models typically capture scenarios in which there is incentive towards assortative ...
The Complexity of Nash Equilibria in Simple - RWTH
... a player’s expected payoff (i.e. her probability of winning) can be an arbitrary probability. Stochastic games have been successfully applied in the verification and synthesis of reactive systems under the influence of random events. Such a system is usually modelled as a game between the system an ...
... a player’s expected payoff (i.e. her probability of winning) can be an arbitrary probability. Stochastic games have been successfully applied in the verification and synthesis of reactive systems under the influence of random events. Such a system is usually modelled as a game between the system an ...
Algorithmic Problems Related To The Internet
... • Can equilibria (of various sorts: pure Nash, mixed Nash, approximate Nash, correlated, even price equilibria) be found efficiently? • Explicit games vs. succinct games (graphical, strategic form, congestion, network congestion, multimatrix, facility location, etc.) Warwick, March 26 2007 ...
... • Can equilibria (of various sorts: pure Nash, mixed Nash, approximate Nash, correlated, even price equilibria) be found efficiently? • Explicit games vs. succinct games (graphical, strategic form, congestion, network congestion, multimatrix, facility location, etc.) Warwick, March 26 2007 ...
The Law of Supply in Games, Markets and Matching
... [11]) and to matching models. Before discussing markets we summarize a special case of the law of supply for games as derived by Engl and Scotchmer (ES, [3]). Monotonicity and Comparative Statics in Games Monotonicity means that when the relative numbers of players of di®erent types change, the core ...
... [11]) and to matching models. Before discussing markets we summarize a special case of the law of supply for games as derived by Engl and Scotchmer (ES, [3]). Monotonicity and Comparative Statics in Games Monotonicity means that when the relative numbers of players of di®erent types change, the core ...
New complexity results about Nash equilibria
... This has indirect implications for the problem of finding one Nash equilibrium: several recent algorithms for that problem operate by guessing the equilibrium supports and subsequently checking whether the guess is correct (Dickhaut and Kaplan, 1991; Porter et al., 2008; Sandholm et al., 2005). The ...
... This has indirect implications for the problem of finding one Nash equilibrium: several recent algorithms for that problem operate by guessing the equilibrium supports and subsequently checking whether the guess is correct (Dickhaut and Kaplan, 1991; Porter et al., 2008; Sandholm et al., 2005). The ...
Who should be called to the lab?
... contacted dozens of local shops in Oxford, placed advertisements in a local newspaper and local pubs. The advertisement mentioned that we were looking for people from all walks of life to participate in decision-making experiments and surveys in social sciences. We also mentioned that participants s ...
... contacted dozens of local shops in Oxford, placed advertisements in a local newspaper and local pubs. The advertisement mentioned that we were looking for people from all walks of life to participate in decision-making experiments and surveys in social sciences. We also mentioned that participants s ...
Ferguson Part I, PDF
... desired, at least one chip but not the whole pile. Thereafter, the players alternate moving, each player not being allowed to remove more chips than his opponent took on the previous move. What is an optimal move for the first player if n = 44? For what values of n does the second player have a win? ...
... desired, at least one chip but not the whole pile. Thereafter, the players alternate moving, each player not being allowed to remove more chips than his opponent took on the previous move. What is an optimal move for the first player if n = 44? For what values of n does the second player have a win? ...
Behavioral conformity in games with many players
... {1, 2, . . . , C} be a finite set of crowding types.3 We assume that Ω is given by C × [0, 1]F for some finite integer F 1.4 We will typically denote an attribute by ω = (c, t) where c ∈ C and t ∈ [0, 1]F . We use the metric on Ω whereby the distance between two attributes ω = (c, t) and ω = (c ...
... {1, 2, . . . , C} be a finite set of crowding types.3 We assume that Ω is given by C × [0, 1]F for some finite integer F 1.4 We will typically denote an attribute by ω = (c, t) where c ∈ C and t ∈ [0, 1]F . We use the metric on Ω whereby the distance between two attributes ω = (c, t) and ω = (c ...
information independence and common
... One possible explanation for the situation above is that there is a variable that the players cannot observe directly, say, the ozone level, which affects all their moods. When the ozone level is low, the moods are independently drawn to be 2 or 4 each, but when it is high, the moods are independent ...
... One possible explanation for the situation above is that there is a variable that the players cannot observe directly, say, the ozone level, which affects all their moods. When the ozone level is low, the moods are independently drawn to be 2 or 4 each, but when it is high, the moods are independent ...
TGD3351 Game Algorithms Tutorial 5 Briefly describe how a finite
... TGD3351 Game Algorithms Tutorial 5 1. Briefly describe how a finite state machine (FSM) is used for decision-making in games. ...
... TGD3351 Game Algorithms Tutorial 5 1. Briefly describe how a finite state machine (FSM) is used for decision-making in games. ...
Delegating Decisions in Strategic Settings Sarit Kraus and Michael Wooldridge
... assumed to have a goal, represented as a propositional formula γi over some set of Boolean variables Φ. In addition, each agent i is allocated some subset Φi of the variables Φ, with the idea being that the variables Φi are under the unique control of agent i . The choices, or strategies, available ...
... assumed to have a goal, represented as a propositional formula γi over some set of Boolean variables Φ. In addition, each agent i is allocated some subset Φi of the variables Φ, with the idea being that the variables Φi are under the unique control of agent i . The choices, or strategies, available ...
Coordination and Higher Order Uncertainty
... Note one difference between this game and the first one is that this has “private values” while the other game had “common values”. This distinction is not so important, however. Suppose payoffs in the more general case were u(a, θ), rather than u(a, x). We could simply define ∆(aj , x) as the expecte ...
... Note one difference between this game and the first one is that this has “private values” while the other game had “common values”. This distinction is not so important, however. Suppose payoffs in the more general case were u(a, θ), rather than u(a, x). We could simply define ∆(aj , x) as the expecte ...
Manipulating Boolean Games Through Communication
... beliefs of players in the game, and hence, potentially, their preferences over possible outcomes. By choosing announcements appropriately, the principal can perturb the game away from some possible outcomes and towards others. We focus particularly on the issue of stabilisation: making announcements ...
... beliefs of players in the game, and hence, potentially, their preferences over possible outcomes. By choosing announcements appropriately, the principal can perturb the game away from some possible outcomes and towards others. We focus particularly on the issue of stabilisation: making announcements ...
Probability Search - Lamsade - Université Paris
... Instead of setting PPN to 1/2 as described in Table 1, we use an initial value that depends on the number of legal moves and on the type of node. Let c be the number of legal moves at a leaf, the PPN of which we want to initialize. If the leaf is a Max -node, then we set PPN = 1 − 1/2c . If the leaf ...
... Instead of setting PPN to 1/2 as described in Table 1, we use an initial value that depends on the number of legal moves and on the type of node. Let c be the number of legal moves at a leaf, the PPN of which we want to initialize. If the leaf is a Max -node, then we set PPN = 1 − 1/2c . If the leaf ...
Psychophysiological Inference and Physiological Computer Games
... [21]. This pattern of linkage is reversed in the one-to-many relationship; for example, systolic blood pressure may increase when a person is excited, frustrated or stressed [22]. In the manyto-many case, a mixture of increased mental effort and stress may combine to exert a multiple, overlapping pa ...
... [21]. This pattern of linkage is reversed in the one-to-many relationship; for example, systolic blood pressure may increase when a person is excited, frustrated or stressed [22]. In the manyto-many case, a mixture of increased mental effort and stress may combine to exert a multiple, overlapping pa ...
Existence of stationary equilibrium for mixtures of discounted
... a stationary equilibrium pair in stochastic games have been added following the suggestions of one of the referees. Pollatschek and Avi-Itzhak27 propose a Newton– Raphson type iterative algorithm to solve two-person zero-sum discounted games. In general, this algorithm can be used to find only appro ...
... a stationary equilibrium pair in stochastic games have been added following the suggestions of one of the referees. Pollatschek and Avi-Itzhak27 propose a Newton– Raphson type iterative algorithm to solve two-person zero-sum discounted games. In general, this algorithm can be used to find only appro ...
Comparing the Notions of Optimality in Strategic Games and Soft... Krzysztof R. Apt F. Rossi and K. B. Venable
... Given a c-semiring S = hA, +, ×, 0, 1i, and a set of variables V , each variable x with a domain D(x), a soft constraint is a pair hdef, coni, where con ⊆ V and def : ×y∈con D(y) → A. So a constraint specifies a set of variables (the ones in con), and assigns to each tuple of values from ×y∈con D(y) ...
... Given a c-semiring S = hA, +, ×, 0, 1i, and a set of variables V , each variable x with a domain D(x), a soft constraint is a pair hdef, coni, where con ⊆ V and def : ×y∈con D(y) → A. So a constraint specifies a set of variables (the ones in con), and assigns to each tuple of values from ×y∈con D(y) ...
Extensive Games with Possibly Unaware Players
... game with awareness has a generalized Nash equilibrium by associating with a game with awareness a standard game (where agents are aware of all moves) such that there is a one-to-one correspondence between generalized Nash equilibria of the game with awareness and Nash equilibria of the standard gam ...
... game with awareness has a generalized Nash equilibrium by associating with a game with awareness a standard game (where agents are aware of all moves) such that there is a one-to-one correspondence between generalized Nash equilibria of the game with awareness and Nash equilibria of the standard gam ...
Calibrated Learning and Correlated Equilibrium
... that a CE can be ‘learned’. We do not specify a particular learning rule, rather, we restrict our attention to learning rules that possess an asymptotic property called calibration. The key result is that if players use any forecasting rule with the property of being calibrated, then, in repeated pl ...
... that a CE can be ‘learned’. We do not specify a particular learning rule, rather, we restrict our attention to learning rules that possess an asymptotic property called calibration. The key result is that if players use any forecasting rule with the property of being calibrated, then, in repeated pl ...
locally
... that players are resource bounded.2 Formally, we view players as probabilistic3 polynomial-time Turing machines (PPT TMs). We differ from BC+ in two key respects. First, BC+ implicitly assume that players have no memory: they cannot remember computation from earlier rounds. By way of contrast, we a ...
... that players are resource bounded.2 Formally, we view players as probabilistic3 polynomial-time Turing machines (PPT TMs). We differ from BC+ in two key respects. First, BC+ implicitly assume that players have no memory: they cannot remember computation from earlier rounds. By way of contrast, we a ...
Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection
... BY DAVID G. PEARCE' This paper explores the fundamental problem of what can be inferred about the outcome of a noncooperative game, from the rationality of the players and from the information they possess. The answer is summarized in a solution concept called rationalizability. Strategy profiles th ...
... BY DAVID G. PEARCE' This paper explores the fundamental problem of what can be inferred about the outcome of a noncooperative game, from the rationality of the players and from the information they possess. The answer is summarized in a solution concept called rationalizability. Strategy profiles th ...
Tilburg University Equilibrium selection in team
... each player can be reasonably certain that all other players will opt for this equilibrium { and this makes risk-dominance comparisons irrelevant. It is this argument that leads Harsanyi and Selten to give precedence to payo dominance. Yet, relying on collective rationality is somewhat unsatisfacto ...
... each player can be reasonably certain that all other players will opt for this equilibrium { and this makes risk-dominance comparisons irrelevant. It is this argument that leads Harsanyi and Selten to give precedence to payo dominance. Yet, relying on collective rationality is somewhat unsatisfacto ...
On Equilibrium in Pure Strategies in Games with Many Players∗
... number of types, especially of taste types, may be a strong restriction. It is therefore crucial to consider, as we do in this paper, a framework where the set of taste attributes need not be compact and the set of strategies need not be finite nor compact. It is especially noteworthy that to the b ...
... number of types, especially of taste types, may be a strong restriction. It is therefore crucial to consider, as we do in this paper, a framework where the set of taste attributes need not be compact and the set of strategies need not be finite nor compact. It is especially noteworthy that to the b ...
Games with countably many players
... he should switch to the pure action 1.8 Despite not having a Nash equilibrium, G∗∗ has an equilibrium, for any > 0. Proposition 3. G∗∗ has an equilibrium, for any > 0. Proof. Let > 0. The following is an equilibrium. Let player 1 play the pure action 1. Let N > 2 be an integer, to be def ...
... he should switch to the pure action 1.8 Despite not having a Nash equilibrium, G∗∗ has an equilibrium, for any > 0. Proposition 3. G∗∗ has an equilibrium, for any > 0. Proof. Let > 0. The following is an equilibrium. Let player 1 play the pure action 1. Let N > 2 be an integer, to be def ...
The position value is the Myerson value, in a sense
... player set) (henceforth CF-games and CF-value). Besides the elegant Myerson (1977) axioms, there are alternative axiomatizations of this value for CO-games (Myerson, 1980; Borm et al., 1992; Slikker and van den Nouweland, 2001), both for general games and for the class of cycle-free COgames. The pos ...
... player set) (henceforth CF-games and CF-value). Besides the elegant Myerson (1977) axioms, there are alternative axiomatizations of this value for CO-games (Myerson, 1980; Borm et al., 1992; Slikker and van den Nouweland, 2001), both for general games and for the class of cycle-free COgames. The pos ...