Attitudinal Objects and the Distinction between Actions and Products
... Hanks is to identify propositions with types of cognitive acts. There is something fundamentally unsatisfactory about such an identification, however, and that is that cognitive acts do not have the right properties to provide the sort of entity suitable to play the role of propositions. Cognitive a ...
... Hanks is to identify propositions with types of cognitive acts. There is something fundamentally unsatisfactory about such an identification, however, and that is that cognitive acts do not have the right properties to provide the sort of entity suitable to play the role of propositions. Cognitive a ...
Propositional Logic
... Conversely, suppose that we have a set of axioms and we wish to know whether the resulting theory (the set of consequences) is consistent, in the sense that no statement and its negation follow from the axioms. If one discovers a structure in which it can be shown that the axioms and their consequen ...
... Conversely, suppose that we have a set of axioms and we wish to know whether the resulting theory (the set of consequences) is consistent, in the sense that no statement and its negation follow from the axioms. If one discovers a structure in which it can be shown that the axioms and their consequen ...
Essentials Of Symbolic Logic
... special logical notation is not peculiar to modern logic. Aristotle, the ancient founder of the subject, used variables to facilitate his own work. Although the difference in this respect between modern and classical logic is not one of kind but of degree, the difference in degree is tremendous. The ...
... special logical notation is not peculiar to modern logic. Aristotle, the ancient founder of the subject, used variables to facilitate his own work. Although the difference in this respect between modern and classical logic is not one of kind but of degree, the difference in degree is tremendous. The ...
The Project Gutenberg EBook of The Algebra of Logic, by Louis
... ratiocinator. It is essential that the ideography should be complete, that only symbols with a well-dened meaning should be usedto avoid the same sort of ambiguities that words haveand, consequently,that no suppositions should be introduced implicitly, as is commonly the case if the meaning of s ...
... ratiocinator. It is essential that the ideography should be complete, that only symbols with a well-dened meaning should be usedto avoid the same sort of ambiguities that words haveand, consequently,that no suppositions should be introduced implicitly, as is commonly the case if the meaning of s ...
Fichte`s Legacy in Logic
... logic of judgment deals only with general representations (i.e., not with intuitions), any judgment that is recognized in logic requires the synthesis [Synthesis] or combination [Verbindung] of at least two concepts. I shall refer to this as Kant’s synthetic construal of judgment. The traces of the ...
... logic of judgment deals only with general representations (i.e., not with intuitions), any judgment that is recognized in logic requires the synthesis [Synthesis] or combination [Verbindung] of at least two concepts. I shall refer to this as Kant’s synthetic construal of judgment. The traces of the ...
Kripke Semantics for Basic Sequent Systems
... rules of LK impose the usual truth-tables in each world, e.g. v(a, ψ ⊃ ϕ) = t iff either v(a, ψ) = f or v(a, ϕ) = t. Example 6. Assume that G contains the two standard rules for intuitionistic implication. Example 4 (3) and the combination of Example 3 (1) and Example 4 (2) together imply that in G- ...
... rules of LK impose the usual truth-tables in each world, e.g. v(a, ψ ⊃ ϕ) = t iff either v(a, ψ) = f or v(a, ϕ) = t. Example 6. Assume that G contains the two standard rules for intuitionistic implication. Example 4 (3) and the combination of Example 3 (1) and Example 4 (2) together imply that in G- ...
many-valued logics - University of Sydney
... here is that if the consequent is at least as true as the antecedent, then the conditional is completely true, while if the antecedent is truer than the consequent—and the difference between their truth values is k—then the conditional has the value 1 − k, that is, it is k less than fully true. It i ...
... here is that if the consequent is at least as true as the antecedent, then the conditional is completely true, while if the antecedent is truer than the consequent—and the difference between their truth values is k—then the conditional has the value 1 − k, that is, it is k less than fully true. It i ...
Discrete Mathematics
... This can be expressed in predicate logic as: − “For all situations s, if p is true in situation s, then q is also true in situation s” − Formally, we could write: ∀s, P(s) → Q(s) This sentence is logically False in our example, because for me to wear a red shirt and the U.S. not to attack Iraq is a ...
... This can be expressed in predicate logic as: − “For all situations s, if p is true in situation s, then q is also true in situation s” − Formally, we could write: ∀s, P(s) → Q(s) This sentence is logically False in our example, because for me to wear a red shirt and the U.S. not to attack Iraq is a ...
Robot Morality and Review of classical logic.
... A set of premises logically entails a conclusion (written as |= ) if and only if every interpretation that satisfies the premises also satisfies the conclusion and every interpretation that satisfies the conclusion also satisfies the premises. If and only if is in definition, this is equality ...
... A set of premises logically entails a conclusion (written as |= ) if and only if every interpretation that satisfies the premises also satisfies the conclusion and every interpretation that satisfies the conclusion also satisfies the premises. If and only if is in definition, this is equality ...
Chapter 5 Predicate Logic
... We can use this latter interpretation of H to treat another predicate logic formula: (∀x)H(x, x). Here there is still only one quantifier and no connectives, but there is more than one quantified variable. The interpretation is that both arguments must be the same. This expression is true if H can p ...
... We can use this latter interpretation of H to treat another predicate logic formula: (∀x)H(x, x). Here there is still only one quantifier and no connectives, but there is more than one quantified variable. The interpretation is that both arguments must be the same. This expression is true if H can p ...