The `normativity of content` thesis is not about the normativity of
... The normativity of belief is the first premise in Boghossian’s argument for CUCA. The thesis holds that a condition for grasping belief attribution is to understand that belief formation is subject to the truth norm of belief, namely, (N): For any p: One ought to believe that p only if p (Boghossia ...
... The normativity of belief is the first premise in Boghossian’s argument for CUCA. The thesis holds that a condition for grasping belief attribution is to understand that belief formation is subject to the truth norm of belief, namely, (N): For any p: One ought to believe that p only if p (Boghossia ...
Introduction - davidhume.org
... Book III of the Treatise was delivered from the press, he was already reformulating his approach in the short 1740 Abstract (included in this volume). By 1748 he had produced a second major work, the Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding,1 following the pattern of the Abstract in focusing on his ce ...
... Book III of the Treatise was delivered from the press, he was already reformulating his approach in the short 1740 Abstract (included in this volume). By 1748 he had produced a second major work, the Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding,1 following the pattern of the Abstract in focusing on his ce ...
Creative Reasoning
... nondoxastic states provide proper stopping points in the regress of reasons: they are an epistemological foundation. This way of supplementing finitism goes all the way back to Aristotle, who identified experience and intuition as an “originative source” of “the skill of the craftsman and the knowledg ...
... nondoxastic states provide proper stopping points in the regress of reasons: they are an epistemological foundation. This way of supplementing finitism goes all the way back to Aristotle, who identified experience and intuition as an “originative source” of “the skill of the craftsman and the knowledg ...
roberta de monticelli
... places, the portion of matter that are taken up by its existence. So for example, Socrates is a man, and he necessarily enjoys all properties characteristic of that nature, or implied by that concept. But this represents exactly what Socrates shares with others men, as opposed to the set of his acci ...
... places, the portion of matter that are taken up by its existence. So for example, Socrates is a man, and he necessarily enjoys all properties characteristic of that nature, or implied by that concept. But this represents exactly what Socrates shares with others men, as opposed to the set of his acci ...
Body and Reason – A Short Genealogy of Subjectivity
... philosophical discussion that was to go on for about four centuries – the body/soul dichotomy. In Discourse on the Method and especially in Meditations on First Philosophy he discusses in detail this body/soul dichotomy and he tries to prove, using the method of „free examination”, that subjectivity ...
... philosophical discussion that was to go on for about four centuries – the body/soul dichotomy. In Discourse on the Method and especially in Meditations on First Philosophy he discusses in detail this body/soul dichotomy and he tries to prove, using the method of „free examination”, that subjectivity ...
Deleuze Lecture on Kant 1978 - The Partially Examined Life
... whole appearance/essence duality which in a sense implies a degraded sensible world, which even implies if need be original sin, is substituted a radically new type of thought: something appears, tell me what it signifies or, and this amounts to the same thing, tell me what its condition is. When Fr ...
... whole appearance/essence duality which in a sense implies a degraded sensible world, which even implies if need be original sin, is substituted a radically new type of thought: something appears, tell me what it signifies or, and this amounts to the same thing, tell me what its condition is. When Fr ...
INTELLECTUAL AUTONOMY
... for truth and a natural belief that the natural desire for truth can be satisfied, so basic epistemic self-trust is natural. I think it is natural to have many other beliefs, such as the belief that there are other persons with conscious states similar to mine. Many emotions are no doubt natural as ...
... for truth and a natural belief that the natural desire for truth can be satisfied, so basic epistemic self-trust is natural. I think it is natural to have many other beliefs, such as the belief that there are other persons with conscious states similar to mine. Many emotions are no doubt natural as ...
Contemporary Expressions of Various World Views 1
... viewpoint, even though I take shameless advantage of it when trying to break myself of bad habits. Somehow I've come to associate Skinner with those horrible experiments done on orphaned monkeys, and I probably would have gone on doing so (quite wrongly) if it hadn't been for your bringing him up. T ...
... viewpoint, even though I take shameless advantage of it when trying to break myself of bad habits. Somehow I've come to associate Skinner with those horrible experiments done on orphaned monkeys, and I probably would have gone on doing so (quite wrongly) if it hadn't been for your bringing him up. T ...
"Meat Thinks" Talk Notes
... kinds of being, why does consciousness change when I put LSD into my body? Why do people with brain damage (e.g., people with Alzheimer’s disease) have any loss of normal consciousness? ...
... kinds of being, why does consciousness change when I put LSD into my body? Why do people with brain damage (e.g., people with Alzheimer’s disease) have any loss of normal consciousness? ...
The Implications for the Principle of Bivalence of Accepting Truth as
... can happily conclude that, for instance, moral propositions are false. The reason is, quite simply, according to Error theorists, that the world is such that it does not accommodate some of our propositions (in the sense of providing something like truth conditions or verification conditions). If it ...
... can happily conclude that, for instance, moral propositions are false. The reason is, quite simply, according to Error theorists, that the world is such that it does not accommodate some of our propositions (in the sense of providing something like truth conditions or verification conditions). If it ...
Groundwork for the Metaphysic of Morals
... to something that perhaps is valid only under contingent human conditions? And how could laws for •our will be held to be laws for •the will of any rational being (and valid for us only because we are such beings), if they were merely empirical and didn’t arise a priori from pure though practical re ...
... to something that perhaps is valid only under contingent human conditions? And how could laws for •our will be held to be laws for •the will of any rational being (and valid for us only because we are such beings), if they were merely empirical and didn’t arise a priori from pure though practical re ...
Entitlement, Justification, and the Bootstrapping
... formed belief within the track-record argument is produced by a reliable process: B3 is deduced from B1 and B2, B4 is the result of induction from the conjunction of numerous B3-like beliefs, and B5 is deduced from B4. The trouble is that the track-record argument enables Reggie to bootstrap his way ...
... formed belief within the track-record argument is produced by a reliable process: B3 is deduced from B1 and B2, B4 is the result of induction from the conjunction of numerous B3-like beliefs, and B5 is deduced from B4. The trouble is that the track-record argument enables Reggie to bootstrap his way ...
Epistemic Error and Experiential Evidence
... between colors and color appearances. Their move is to simply deny that there can be knowledge of appearances, categorizing such phenomena as rainbows, prismatic refractions, and afterimages, which are uncontroversially referred to as color appearances, as color illusions, not genuine or real instan ...
... between colors and color appearances. Their move is to simply deny that there can be knowledge of appearances, categorizing such phenomena as rainbows, prismatic refractions, and afterimages, which are uncontroversially referred to as color appearances, as color illusions, not genuine or real instan ...
Schopenhauer and Buddhism - What-Buddha
... causality. In his extensive Criticism of the Kantian Philosophy, at the end of WWR I, Schopenhauer pointed out that Kant’s conception of the whole problem still remained too strongly influenced by the typically European, Aristotelian and Scholastic tradition, and that he was unable to renounce the i ...
... causality. In his extensive Criticism of the Kantian Philosophy, at the end of WWR I, Schopenhauer pointed out that Kant’s conception of the whole problem still remained too strongly influenced by the typically European, Aristotelian and Scholastic tradition, and that he was unable to renounce the i ...
Lecture Introduction to John Locke
... through the visual apparatus of a different animal. I believe the photographer may have been Lennart Nilsson, or at least was a photographer who used lasers in his photography, and the photographer was able to somehow get the camera to "see" the daisy through the visual apparatus of several differen ...
... through the visual apparatus of a different animal. I believe the photographer may have been Lennart Nilsson, or at least was a photographer who used lasers in his photography, and the photographer was able to somehow get the camera to "see" the daisy through the visual apparatus of several differen ...
LANGUAGE AND TRUTH: A STUDY OF NIETZSCHE`S THEORY OF
... physiological demands, for the maintenance of definite mode of life.”10 Conceptualization is done largely under the instinctive drives, and even philosophical understanding is not an exception. Nietzsche writes: “…the great part of conscious thinking must be counted amongst the instinctive functions ...
... physiological demands, for the maintenance of definite mode of life.”10 Conceptualization is done largely under the instinctive drives, and even philosophical understanding is not an exception. Nietzsche writes: “…the great part of conscious thinking must be counted amongst the instinctive functions ...
1 "Plato on Akrasia and Knowing Your Own Mind" Section 1
... doing, or omitting the thing propounded, come successively into our thoughts, so that sometimes we have an appetite to it, sometimes an aversion from it, sometimes hope to be able to do it, sometimes despair or fear to attempt it, the whole sum of desires, aversions, hopes and fears, continued till ...
... doing, or omitting the thing propounded, come successively into our thoughts, so that sometimes we have an appetite to it, sometimes an aversion from it, sometimes hope to be able to do it, sometimes despair or fear to attempt it, the whole sum of desires, aversions, hopes and fears, continued till ...
Linking Ways of Knowing with Ways of Being Practical Author(s
... practical decisions: What knowledge should be included in the curriculum; why; how should it be taught; and to whom? Schwab stresses that educational decisions are always made for concrete classroom situations, for real schools, and for ever-changing contexts. Furthermore, they are made under the co ...
... practical decisions: What knowledge should be included in the curriculum; why; how should it be taught; and to whom? Schwab stresses that educational decisions are always made for concrete classroom situations, for real schools, and for ever-changing contexts. Furthermore, they are made under the co ...
Socrates - Ms. Clancy`s Social Studies
... about Socrates Rejected the idea of democracy. Believed that Philosopher-kings should rule with logic and wisdom Describes his ideal government in his book Republic ...
... about Socrates Rejected the idea of democracy. Believed that Philosopher-kings should rule with logic and wisdom Describes his ideal government in his book Republic ...
What is Existential-Phenomenology
... reflectively sophisticated exemplification in science." --Maurice Natanson, "Phenomenology and the Social Sciences," In M. Natanson (Ed.), Phenomenology and the Social Sciences, Volume 1, pp. 4-5 "Phenomenology is a science of 'beginnings.' The genuine beginner is an adept, not a novice. To begin, ...
... reflectively sophisticated exemplification in science." --Maurice Natanson, "Phenomenology and the Social Sciences," In M. Natanson (Ed.), Phenomenology and the Social Sciences, Volume 1, pp. 4-5 "Phenomenology is a science of 'beginnings.' The genuine beginner is an adept, not a novice. To begin, ...
Frege`s theory of sense
... the sense, the latter is like the idea or experience. The optical image in the telescope is indeed one-sided and dependent upon the standpoint of observation; but it is still objective, inasmuch as it can be used by several observers. At any rate it could be arranged for several to use it simultaneo ...
... the sense, the latter is like the idea or experience. The optical image in the telescope is indeed one-sided and dependent upon the standpoint of observation; but it is still objective, inasmuch as it can be used by several observers. At any rate it could be arranged for several to use it simultaneo ...
Confucianism as Humanism - University of Central Arkansas
... relationships to the natural world, its inhabitants, and the universe. The main difference is the internal tension of whether to accept or reject the existence of the supernatural; Kongzi (Confucius) himself didn’t reject the supernatural, rather he chose to focus and emphasis the development of the ...
... relationships to the natural world, its inhabitants, and the universe. The main difference is the internal tension of whether to accept or reject the existence of the supernatural; Kongzi (Confucius) himself didn’t reject the supernatural, rather he chose to focus and emphasis the development of the ...
reflective metaphysics: understanding quantum
... unable to provide us with the slightest indication about objects, since they only point towards the operations of our thought (Kant, 2004a, Introduction). The proof that this cognitive use of reason is indeed unwarranted is provided by the so-called “antinomies”, or conflicts of reason with itself d ...
... unable to provide us with the slightest indication about objects, since they only point towards the operations of our thought (Kant, 2004a, Introduction). The proof that this cognitive use of reason is indeed unwarranted is provided by the so-called “antinomies”, or conflicts of reason with itself d ...
reflective metaphysics: understanding quantum
... unable to provide us with the slightest indication about objects, since they only point towards the operations of our thought (Kant, 2004a, Introduction). The proof that this cognitive use of reason is indeed unwarranted is provided by the so-called “antinomies”, or conflicts of reason with itself d ...
... unable to provide us with the slightest indication about objects, since they only point towards the operations of our thought (Kant, 2004a, Introduction). The proof that this cognitive use of reason is indeed unwarranted is provided by the so-called “antinomies”, or conflicts of reason with itself d ...
EXPERIENCE AND PERCEPTUAL BELIEF
... 2. Popper on the ‘empirical basis’ - fallible foundations Popper discussed the relations between perceptual experience and perceptual belief in his Logic of Scientific Discovery, first published in 1934. He called it the ‘problem of the empirical basis’. I think his discussion is a philosophical to ...
... 2. Popper on the ‘empirical basis’ - fallible foundations Popper discussed the relations between perceptual experience and perceptual belief in his Logic of Scientific Discovery, first published in 1934. He called it the ‘problem of the empirical basis’. I think his discussion is a philosophical to ...