Revising the AGM Postulates
... about Juan and Jose. Suppose that we receive the following piece of new information: \Juan and Jose are compatriots" (). If we add the new information to our corpus of beliefs we obtain a new set of beliefs that contains the sentences , , and . We can dene an addition operation as an opera ...
... about Juan and Jose. Suppose that we receive the following piece of new information: \Juan and Jose are compatriots" (). If we add the new information to our corpus of beliefs we obtain a new set of beliefs that contains the sentences , , and . We can dene an addition operation as an opera ...
Ascribing beliefs to resource bounded agents
... the principled design of agent systems. A common approach is to model the agent in some logic and prove theorems about the agent’s behaviour in that logic. It is perhaps most natural to reason about the behaviour of the agent in an epistemic logic, and there has been a considerable amount of work in ...
... the principled design of agent systems. A common approach is to model the agent in some logic and prove theorems about the agent’s behaviour in that logic. It is perhaps most natural to reason about the behaviour of the agent in an epistemic logic, and there has been a considerable amount of work in ...
Horn Belief Contraction: Remainders, Envelopes and Complexity
... such truth assignments produce a remainder set, only those which, when intersected componentwise with the truth assignments satisfying K, do not produce any other truth assignments falsifying ϕ. Weak remainder sets are defined in (Delgrande and Wassermann 2010) similarly to remainder sets, except th ...
... such truth assignments produce a remainder set, only those which, when intersected componentwise with the truth assignments satisfying K, do not produce any other truth assignments falsifying ϕ. Weak remainder sets are defined in (Delgrande and Wassermann 2010) similarly to remainder sets, except th ...
Characteristics of Demagoguery
... binaries, it assumes that either things (ideas, perceptions, values, illnesses, identities, personalities) are either entirely subjective (that is, def ined by idiosyncratic belief , transient, and essentially unreal) or entirely objective (that is, eternal, Real, and existing entirely outside indiv ...
... binaries, it assumes that either things (ideas, perceptions, values, illnesses, identities, personalities) are either entirely subjective (that is, def ined by idiosyncratic belief , transient, and essentially unreal) or entirely objective (that is, eternal, Real, and existing entirely outside indiv ...
Horn Belief Contraction: Remainders, Envelopes and Complexity
... show that such a phenomenon does indeed occur. Given a Horn belief set K and a Horn formula ϕ to be contracted, remainder sets can be formed by enlarging the set of truth assignments satisfying K by a single truth assignment falsifying ϕ. However, as noted in (Delgrande and Wassermann 2010), not all ...
... show that such a phenomenon does indeed occur. Given a Horn belief set K and a Horn formula ϕ to be contracted, remainder sets can be formed by enlarging the set of truth assignments satisfying K by a single truth assignment falsifying ϕ. However, as noted in (Delgrande and Wassermann 2010), not all ...
Towards an Epistemic Logic of Grounded Belief
... one may know a falsehood in that situation. The principle that in any situation if one knows some proposition φ, then φ is true goes back to at least Plato (1999a) and possibly Parmenides. However, sometimes one hears certain people talk about knowledge and belief interchangeably; depending on the c ...
... one may know a falsehood in that situation. The principle that in any situation if one knows some proposition φ, then φ is true goes back to at least Plato (1999a) and possibly Parmenides. However, sometimes one hears certain people talk about knowledge and belief interchangeably; depending on the c ...
1992-Ideal Introspective Belief
... > q,p V q}. We would like since there is no reasonable way of to conclude ‘Lp, coming to believe p. But an inference rule that would allow us to conclude 1Lp would have to take into account all possible derivations, including the results of its own conclusion. This type of circular reasoning can be ...
... > q,p V q}. We would like since there is no reasonable way of to conclude ‘Lp, coming to believe p. But an inference rule that would allow us to conclude 1Lp would have to take into account all possible derivations, including the results of its own conclusion. This type of circular reasoning can be ...
Patients With Ventromedial Frontal Damage Have Moral Beliefs
... understand the moral concepts contained in their moral beliefs’’ (p. 613). However, if understanding moral concepts is moral knowledge, since knowledge is (with the appropriate caveats) justified belief, that entails that at least some moral beliefs are intact. Moreover, Cholbi does not offer a syst ...
... understand the moral concepts contained in their moral beliefs’’ (p. 613). However, if understanding moral concepts is moral knowledge, since knowledge is (with the appropriate caveats) justified belief, that entails that at least some moral beliefs are intact. Moreover, Cholbi does not offer a syst ...
A Qualitative Theory of Dynamic Interactive Belief Revision
... well fit to deal with complex multi-agent learning actions by which groups of interactive agents update their beliefs (including higher-level beliefs about the others’ beliefs), as long as the newly received information is consistent with the agents’ prior beliefs. On the other hand, the classical A ...
... well fit to deal with complex multi-agent learning actions by which groups of interactive agents update their beliefs (including higher-level beliefs about the others’ beliefs), as long as the newly received information is consistent with the agents’ prior beliefs. On the other hand, the classical A ...
Reply to Fumerton, Huemer, and McGrath
... Downgrade principle, perhaps with the idea that if evidentialists appreciated just how much the “checkering” process is like a poor inference, they would agree that those experiences fail to provide evidence for believing their contents (or contents that are suitably related). His account thus chall ...
... Downgrade principle, perhaps with the idea that if evidentialists appreciated just how much the “checkering” process is like a poor inference, they would agree that those experiences fail to provide evidence for believing their contents (or contents that are suitably related). His account thus chall ...
Keep Changing Your Beliefs, Aiming for the Truth
... observed). This is a problem of prediction, which connects to one of our results (Corollary 6). But, in Learning Theory terms, our focus is rather on the so-called set learning (or ‘‘language learning’’): the problem of learning the set of data that are true (in the ‘‘real world’’, or in a given lan ...
... observed). This is a problem of prediction, which connects to one of our results (Corollary 6). But, in Learning Theory terms, our focus is rather on the so-called set learning (or ‘‘language learning’’): the problem of learning the set of data that are true (in the ‘‘real world’’, or in a given lan ...
On Perfect Introspection with Quantifying-in
... knowledge about themselves. In other words, while such agents may have incomplete beliefs about the world, they always have complete knowledge about their own beliefs by way of their ability to introspect. Thus it seems that the beliefs of a perfectly introspective agent should be completely determi ...
... knowledge about themselves. In other words, while such agents may have incomplete beliefs about the world, they always have complete knowledge about their own beliefs by way of their ability to introspect. Thus it seems that the beliefs of a perfectly introspective agent should be completely determi ...
beliefrevision , epistemicconditionals andtheramseytest
... But even if we restrict our attention to epistemic conditionals, the Ramsey test turns out to be problematic. Gärdenfors (1988) shows that this test, despite its initial attractiveness, is incompatible with certain plausible conditions on belief revision — at least as long as belief states are viewe ...
... But even if we restrict our attention to epistemic conditionals, the Ramsey test turns out to be problematic. Gärdenfors (1988) shows that this test, despite its initial attractiveness, is incompatible with certain plausible conditions on belief revision — at least as long as belief states are viewe ...
An Abridged Report - Association for the Advancement of Artificial
... is the application of logics of knowledge and belief [Halpern and to appear, 1987].3 Although Moses, 19851 and [McArthur, 1This research was made possible in part by a grant from the Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada. Thanks also to Gerhard Lakemeyer, Ray Reiter, Jim des Ri ...
... is the application of logics of knowledge and belief [Halpern and to appear, 1987].3 Although Moses, 19851 and [McArthur, 1This research was made possible in part by a grant from the Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada. Thanks also to Gerhard Lakemeyer, Ray Reiter, Jim des Ri ...
Bayesianism without learning
... carried out without such events? What would be the meaning of Bayesianism without conditioning one’s belief on what has been learned? This paper suggests that Bayesianism can be interpreted in a way that does not require that beliefs change as a result of learning. This interpretation is made possib ...
... carried out without such events? What would be the meaning of Bayesianism without conditioning one’s belief on what has been learned? This paper suggests that Bayesianism can be interpreted in a way that does not require that beliefs change as a result of learning. This interpretation is made possib ...
Belief closure: A semantics of common knowledge for
... (3) The last semantics to be considered does not fit easily within the iterate/ fixed-point classification. Essentially, it amounts to interpreting the syntactical common knowledge operator in terms of the existing interpretations of the syntactical individual knowledge operators. In the context of ...
... (3) The last semantics to be considered does not fit easily within the iterate/ fixed-point classification. Essentially, it amounts to interpreting the syntactical common knowledge operator in terms of the existing interpretations of the syntactical individual knowledge operators. In the context of ...
1 TRUTH AND MEANING Ian Rumfitt C.E.M. Joad`s catchphrase—`It
... renders illegitimate the quantified form ‘ P(B is a belief that P P)’. Reply: Even on a Fregean view of attitude reports, there need be no shift in meaning. Second problem (Davidson): Intensional notions such as ‘believes that’, ‘says that’ or ‘means that’ are ‘obscure’, so we shou ...
... renders illegitimate the quantified form ‘ P(B is a belief that P P)’. Reply: Even on a Fregean view of attitude reports, there need be no shift in meaning. Second problem (Davidson): Intensional notions such as ‘believes that’, ‘says that’ or ‘means that’ are ‘obscure’, so we shou ...
Summer
... tend to favor and give benefits to people who belong to the same groups as they do. Those groups can ...
... tend to favor and give benefits to people who belong to the same groups as they do. Those groups can ...
Reason, Passion, and the possibility of objective ethics
... and desires in the light of new evidence Claim: if is rational so is
...
... and desires in the light of new evidence Claim: if
KNOWLEDGE
... that they are supposed to correspond to, and if so, how?’ ie. How do we get outside of our language? cf. Wittgenstein. ...
... that they are supposed to correspond to, and if so, how?’ ie. How do we get outside of our language? cf. Wittgenstein. ...
Aim: To understand the Hindu belief in ahimsa (L4).
... because we can taste it, no matter how small or large the amount of water. This helps us to understand a key Hindu belief about Brahman… ...
... because we can taste it, no matter how small or large the amount of water. This helps us to understand a key Hindu belief about Brahman… ...
The Four Big C`s
... having the compulsion to do right. • It is having the moral judgment that opposes the violation of a previously recognized ethical principle • It leads to feelings of guilt if one violates such a principle. ...
... having the compulsion to do right. • It is having the moral judgment that opposes the violation of a previously recognized ethical principle • It leads to feelings of guilt if one violates such a principle. ...
A Logic of Belief with the Complexity Measure
... B r = {ir , sr }, where ir is an initial belief set – beliefs that are initially actively hold by the agent, and sr = {α | c(α | ir ) ≤ r} is a potential belief set – beliefs for which an agent has a resource to infer them from his initial beliefs. In the logic of belief with complexity (lbc), the k ...
... B r = {ir , sr }, where ir is an initial belief set – beliefs that are initially actively hold by the agent, and sr = {α | c(α | ir ) ≤ r} is a potential belief set – beliefs for which an agent has a resource to infer them from his initial beliefs. In the logic of belief with complexity (lbc), the k ...