Download 1 - BrainMass

Dear Student As I could not locate all of my notes on these topics and can’t recall everything from
memory, my answers to question 5 & 6 are not quite up to my own standards. Feel
free to adjust the credits paid for this work accordingly.
I hope these notes on the highlights concerned are what you are looking for and I
hope it all helps! (it was quite a bit of work.)
Take care,
Mark Hamilton
-----------------------1.
What common factors influenced or inhibited military change in most
European nations after WWI?
Most European countries assumed that air power – via strategic bombing – would
drastically alter future warfare and enable countries to bomb the home front of
adversaries into capitulation. Various European countries dealt with these assumptions in
various ways, but all faced the recognition that air power was a new factor.
Also, for most of the inter-war period – (Germany in the late 1930s is perhaps a partial
exception), European populations had no real desire for risking conflict war after the
terrible devastation of WWI (human and economic). This seriously constrained military
budgets – and hence the development of new weapons and tactics. Pacifist sentiment and
disarmament inhibited military expenditures in most European countries – certainly the
non-Fascist ones.
Also, the worldwide economic depression affected all countries – although Germany
weathered this much better under National Socialism (although the 1920s had been really
rough for Germany).
The British political system was relatively stable, but the French, Italian, and Weimar
German governments were anything but stable and this certainly had an effect - as did the
Russian civil war and the political struggles that ensued after the death of Lenin in the
Soviet Union.
Here is some other information from notes I made a few years ago when studying
the inter-war years and their implications for the military strategies, etc. of the
various powers.
Germany – The Military lost its former total control over national strategy. It was
recognized that economic resources and the ability to mobilize them were now decisive
factors. Total war calls for unity of nation – which was increasingly seen as an ethnic or
racial unity with protective measures taken against unreliable segments of society. Also
role of propaganda, Still new weapons – tanks & planes – were seen as ways to return to
war of movement and decisive battle, but not appreciated on a strategic level. The aim of
revising Versailles and regaining military sovereignty transcended all ideological,
political, economic, and social divisions.
UNITED KINGDOM –did not seem to learn the appropriate lessons.
Navy: Intensive study of the Battle of Jutland, although such a battle would not occur
again, British naval commanders were more independent and tactically aggressive as a
result. Naval Aircraft – ignored by both navy and air force with critical results (HMS
Repulse and Prince of Wales). Unlike the Japanese/Americans, the Brits fail to appreciate
how aircraft extend the range and fighting power of fleets. Failure to prepare adequately
for anti-sub warfare – general underestimation of sub threat, convoy planning was
underdeveloped as was anti-sub aircraft measures, when war broke out Brits were
unprepared though Germans repeated their old mistakes. Not until 1943, was U-Boat
menace overcome with tactics largely foreseeable in 1918. Overall: Royal Navy still an
effective fighting force with high training and effectiveness of surface fleet. Proved ready
and versatile enough to enforce blockade and safeguard Allied commerce.
Air: like most, overawed with strategic bombing. Belief that enemy morale may collapse
and industry crippled from air. Still not enough done to prepare for strategic bombing –
bad weather navigation, target identification, and bombing accuracy. Neglects air
support, defense, recon, naval support, and paratroops (waste of resources needed for
strategic bombing). Although Hugh Dowding was able to ensure enough support for
radar development and single-seater fighters, plus air defense system design to win the
Battle of Britain. The general myopia of Air Staff hindered a broadly based concept of air
power in the UK. And apart from air defense, was unprepared at the start of war.
Army: “limited liability” of Liddel Hart used by Chamberlain et al. to justify no
commitment to continent and they ignored his stress on alliances. Not recognized that
failure to provide land support has its own political/diplomatic repercussions (French
policy of appeasement, Belgian neutrality, etc). amphibious ops - against hostile beaches
thought too dangerous in modern war and probably not necessary (even though they
maintained a preference for peripheral strategy). Only small and simple ops studied. It
seemed that the Gallipoli landings were deemed satisfactory enough. No exploration of
combined ops with navy. Despite early experimentation with armor, the Army command
failed to realize its proper role and by and large believed that the pace of warfare was that
of infantry. Army completely unprepared for fluidity of German mobile ops when war
broke out and still somewhat handicapped as war ended – note Montgomery’s sluggish
pace before and after Market Garden. Brits failed to adapt to conditions of modern
mechanized warfare, no tactical doctrine of speed, aggressive exploitation, initiative and
drive.
In general, the Brits repeated their problem from WWI. Sound strategy, miserable tactics
and ops. Did not have an open enough system for self-examination and many
professional military thinkers remained closed minded, even in the face of a vastly
changing tech scene. (note convoys, strategic bombing only, etc)
Strategy: Rejection of balance of power and strategic thinking, growing preference for
moralistic principles in foreign policy (avoid war/alliance with France at all costs).
Growing perception that WWI was not the Germans’ fault, nobody won and that
Versailles was therefore immoral. Also, the Brits were well aware of their own relative
econ/industrial decline. This factor served to make any additional defense spending very
unpopular. Appeasement taken too far. Army not seen as priority, only navy and air force
kept up to speed. Until 1933, only Japan seen as potential enemy. Failure of Brits to fund
rearmament adequately because of its economic costs (business as usual and economic
staying power as UK’s main weapon). Tendency for policy to reflect “worst case”
scenarios in military planning from the Abyssinia Crisis onwards combined with “best
case” scenario in regards to intentions of adversaries. Failure to recognize shared
strategic interests of UK/France not recognized until 1939. As a result, neither in
diplomacy or rearmament did Britain meet challenges of 1930s. Chamberlain rightly
deserves blame, but his policies reflected societal preferences too. And Brit military
planners made a bad strategic situation worse with consistently gloomy assessments.
OVERALL: Nearly every decision made in this period (rearmament, diplomacy and
military doctrine) was disastrous and only contributed to the nightmare scenario of
imperial decline.
Italy – dependent on foreign trade for raw materials. German, Yugo and Hungarian
imports theoretically safe during war, but only coal needs could be totally met that way.
The reality was, Italy was a strategic, economic and military liability for Germany. All
this, despite rearmament exp comparable to Britain/France.
Army – general incompetence at all levels. No medium or heavy tanks. WWI vintage
artillery, inadequate munitions. Underestimation of mechanized warfare.
Navy – the best of all services, but still unable to compete with Brits. Speed over armor
led to problems. Poor training, doctrine and moral. No aircraft carriers. Yet airforce lacks
aerial torpedo and armor piercing bombs. Subs have design flaws and tactics are horrible.
Predictably, navy blows.
Air Force – tactical training is subpar. Neither a threat nor an effective defense force.
-what traditions/forces furthered or retarded learning from the Great War?
US – Congress passes neutrality legislation during interwar years that retard rearmament
of both the US and its would-be Allies. The Navy emerged as a world-class force and
began to make the force structure changes later needed vs. Japan – increasing awareness
of 2 ocean navy, centered on carriers, seizure of island bases, long-range subs to attack
lines of communication, etc. Marines work out techniques for amphibious
landings/logistical problems of far flung fleet supported ops. Army Begins to develop air
wing. Army still somewhat provincially-minded, but greater awareness of need for
mobility. This is partly responsible fro creation of divisions too light for Europe as seen
through greater firepower of equivalent German units. Still US planners, came out of
WWI with a greater appreciation of the logistical, industrial needs of modern warfare and
a determination to field a vast formidable force that will directly and decisively engage
the enemy and push to industrial heartland. As opposed to British predilection for
peripheral strategies and over-reliance on strategic bombing. Also, development of Joint
Board as precursor to J-C of Staff.
German military – in both the army and navy, the Germans seemed to ignore their failing
to grasp strategic thought in WWI. This is reflected in the chaotic and service
competitive atmosphere during rearmament that left their air/naval force structure
woefully inadequate to confront the UK. And in the war in general, after December 1941,
where the Germans substituted tactical/operational success for the loss of the strategic
initiative. Even after the war, German General memoirs focus on how Hitler wouldn’t
allow them enough tactical/operational freedom to win battles – rather than calling into
question issues of grand strategy itself.
2.
After establishing an early lead in the theory of mechanized warfare, why
were the British unable to put theory into practice?
As you’ll see from the notes below (repeated from above), British strategy focused
excessively on naval and airpower, to the detriment of ground warfare. It was widely
assumed that any British commitment to continental defense would be small in terms of
land forces (a practice that had served Britain well in past wars). A preference for
appeasement to preserve the empire and prevent costly and unaffordable wars inhibited
dynamism in offensive military strategy (mechanized warfare).
In other words, the British were looking to preserve an Empire with limited resources –
not to acquire new territories/resources through aggressive warfare. They were trying to
maintain the status quo and that is what appeasement was all about. The political and
economic situation facing Britain in the interwar years, simply did not encourage
improvisation/theorizing regarding mechanized warfare as was the case in Germany.
UNITED KINGDOM –did not seem to learn the appropriate lessons from WWI.
Navy: Intensive study of Jutland, although such a battle would occur again, British naval
commanders were more independent and tactical aggressive as a result. Naval Aircraft –
ignored by both navy and air force with critical results (HMS Repulse and Prince of
Wales). Unlike the Japanese/Americans, the Brits fail to appreciate how aircraft extend
the range and fighting power of fleets. Failure to prepare adequately for anti-sub warfare
– general underestimation of sub threat, convoy planning was underdeveloped as was
anti-sub aircraft measures, when war broke out Brits were unprepared though Germans
repeated their old mistakes. Not until 1943, was U-Boat menace overcome with tactics
largely foreseeable in 1918. Overall: Royal Navy still an effective fighting force with
high training and effectiveness of surface fleet. Proved ready and versatile enough to
enforce blockade and safeguard Allied commerce.
Air: like most, overawed with strategic bombing. Belief that enemy morale may collapse
and industry crippled from air. Still not enough done to prepare for strategic bombing –
bad weather navigation, target identification, and bombing accuracy. Neglects air
support, defense, recon, naval support, and paratroops (waste of resources needed for
strategic bombing). Although Hugh Dowding was able to ensure enough support for
radar development and single-seater fighters, plus air defense system design to win the
Battle of Britain. The general myopia of Air Staff hindered a broadly based concept of air
power in the UK. And apart from air defense, was unprepared at the start of war.
Army: “limited liability” of Liddel Hart used by Chamberlain et al. to justify no
commitment to continent and they ignored his stress on alliances. Not recognized that
failure to provide land support has its own political/diplomatic repercussions (French
policy of appeasement, Belgian neutrality, etc). amphibious ops - against hostile beaches
thought too dangerous in modern war and probably not necessary (even though they
maintained a preference for peripheral strategy). Only small and simple ops studied. It
seemed that the Gallipoli landings were deemed satisfactory enough. No exploration of
combined ops with navy. Despite early experimentation with armor, the Army command
failed to realize its proper role and by and large believed that the pace of warfare was that
of infantry. Army completely unprepared for fluidity of German mobile ops when war
broke out and still somewhat handicapped as war ended – note Montgomery’s sluggish
pace before and after Market Garden. Brits failed to adapt to conditions of modern
mechanized warfare, no tactical doctrine of speed, aggressive exploitation, initiative and
drive.
In general, the Brits repeated their problem from WWI. Sound strategy, miserable tactics
and ops. Did not have an open enough system for self-examination and many
professional military thinkers remained closed minded, even in the face of a vastly
changing tech scene. (note convoys, strategic bombing only, etc)
Strategy: Rejection of balance of power and strategic thinking, growing preference for
moralistic principles in foreign policy (avoid war/alliance with France at all costs).
Growing perception that WWI was not the Germans’ fault, nobody won and that
Versailles was therefore immoral. Also, the Brits were well aware of their own relative
econ/industrial decline. This factor served to make any additional defense spending very
unpopular. Appeasement taken too far. Army not seen as priority, only navy and air force
kept up to speed. Until 1933, only Japan seen as potential enemy. Failure of Brits to fund
rearmament adequately because of its economic costs (business as usual and economic
staying power as UK’s main weapon). Tendency for policy to reflect “worst case”
scenarios in military planning from the Abyssinia Crisis onwards combined with “best
case” scenario in regards to intentions of adversaries. Failure to recognize shared
strategic interests of UK/France not recognized until 1939. As a result, neither in
diplomacy or rearmament did Britain meet challenges of 1930s. Chamberlain rightly
deserves blame, but his policies reflected societal preferences too. And Brit military
planners made a bad strategic situation worse with consistently gloomy assessments.
OVERALL: Nearly every decision made in this period (rearmament, diplomacy and
military doctrine) was disastrous and only contributed to the nightmare scenario of
imperial decline.
3.
Of all the armies in the world, how is it that the German Army, disarmed in
1919, emerged with the most potent doctrine for mechanized warfare in the
1930s?
I’m not going to get into how Hitler went about rearming Germany in open violation of
the Treaty of Versailles – although the various steps taken are interesting (reoccupation
of the Rhineland, etc.). That seems to be beyond the basic scope of the question, but I’ll
provide a brief chronological outline of the main events and then focus instead on the
doctrinal changes and culture of the German military.
March 1935 – the announcement of military conscription in Germany in defiance of
Versailles
April 1935 – Stresa Front – short-lived anti-German agmt btwn Italy, UK and France
June 1935 – Anglo-German Naval Pact fixes relative strength 100/35. De facto British
recognition of German rearmament plus Hitler’s concession toward improved relations
with GB – coupled with colonial demands as a tactical ploy towards revisionism on
the European continent. This agreement was a British betrayal of Stresa and the
Versailles Treaty itself.
March 7,1936 – Reoccupation of Rhineland during estrangement between Italy and West
over Abyssinian Crisis (during which Germany supplied Italy with raw materials and
prepares way for Rome-Berlin Axis) and France helplessly appeals to the League.
British file a written protest. Hitler takes advantage of increased Brit commitments to
Med and wants to kill Locarno Treaty. Soon the Belgians abandon alliance w/ France
and go neutral, while Poland is more dependent on Germany.
August 1936 – memorandum of the Four Year Plan – within 4 years the Wehrmacht
must be ready for action and the German economy prepared for war, total
subordination to demands of rearmament. Designed to give war economy just enough
strength to resist immediate effects of blockade while the army conquers a larger
economic/raw material base (from which to launch bigger war).
October 1936 – Rome-Berlin Axis
November 1936 – Anti-Comintern Pact of Germany and Japan
Jan 1937- Goring gets greenlight on Anschluss while in Rome
May 1937 – Neville Chamberlain becomes British Prime Minister
November 1937 – Italy joins Anti-Comintern Pact giving overt anti-Brit tinge.
December 1937 – Italy withdraws from the League of Nations
February – Hitler purges War Minister Blomberg and C-C Armed Forces? Fritsch, takes
over personal command of armed forces (OKW)
March 1938 – Anschluss
---------------Blitzkrieg – German military (esp. Army) was quite tolerant and open-minded for views
contrary to established conventional wisdom on doctrine/force structure than their
counterparts at the time. In WWI, the army had developed concepts of both defense in
depth and tactics of breakthrough operations and so the army learned to emphasize
mobility. In general, German doctrine stressed speed, surprise, mobility, decentralization
and exploitation (not the case with Brits/French), so switch to armor more natural. There
were various studies and maneuvers on armored warfare and study of British exercises.
German strategists realized the potential for rapid exploitation and breakthrough. Panzer
divisions should be combined-arms – infantry, artillery, engineers, signals and tanks
(close cooperation). Army high command was professionally competent and
intellectually honest enough to recognize flaws/weaknesses and work to overcome them.
By 1939, German armor had operational and strategic freedom; no one else had the
equivalent. After Poland, the army made sure to further appreciate the role of such forces
and also to initiate an intense training regimen all around. Blitzkrieg as mechanized
warfare of cooperation between tanks, planes, dive-bombers, motorized infantry and
artillery was revolutionary.
Much of this doctrinal change was driven by the awareness that Germany faced the
likelihood of a major two-front war in any major future conflict. With reduced landmass
and a lack of vital economic resources to sustain a long struggle, strategic flexibility was
necessary should Germany survive, let alone decisively win against adversaries.
Mechanized warfare offered a realistic way to deliver rapid knock-out blows against
adversaries and acquire needed resources to sustain prolonged conflict.
The Americans on the other hand were not much interested in breakthroughs in
mechanized warfare – the political climate in the US was isolationist and the army was in
anything but expansion mode. What military strategists focused on was airpower.
The Brits saw naval and air power as more important and did not exploit or develop
mechanized warfare doctrine despite being pioneers. British, like other powers, continued
to see tanks in an infantry support role, rather than as independent units for breakthrough.
The French mindset was very defensive – and is often (somewhat unfairly) symbolized
by the Maginot Line. This is an oversimplification, but the French conception was still far
behind the German in terms of operational maneuver and potential for massed attack, etc.
Like the British, tanks were still seen as infantry support and often spread out rather than
concentrated – thus diminishing effectiveness.
In general, there was much less room for experimentation and junior officers were given
much less latitude for theorizing in the non-German militaries. See the experience of
Charles de Gaulle, for instance.
The Soviet Army was the subject of massive political purges on Stalin and this severely
retarded the evolution (and more importantly, its application) of Soviet military doctrine
– although as you’ll see below the Soviets were very active in this sphere.
4.
Was French mechanized doctrine of the 1930s as flawed as subsequent events
would seem to indicate?
That’s an interesting question because the French defense in the summer of 1940 was
nowhere near as pathetic as popular imagination would have it.
That said, the overall French (and allied) strategy was abysmal and this negated any
benefits French mechanized doctrine might have otherwise had.
Overall, however, I’d say my answer would be “YES” due to the basic fact that the
quality of French armor was actually SUPERIOR to the Germans, yet the deployment
and utilization of these resources was definitely inferior.
Charles de Gaulle was more or less a lonely voice in the interwar years and French armor
was spread thin and not used as effectively to counterstrike as they could have been.
I do think that you could definitely make the case that the answer is “NO” – but I can’t
locate my notebooks for some of the details. I seem to remember that there were some
minor armored counterstrokes by the French and British, but they were not very effective
at stemming the tide and were of limited impact. One book I remember that you might
consult was entitled “Strange Victory” and was about the 1940 campaign in France.
France –
[1] French planners saw likelihood of future struggles being long total wars – (and this is
seen as a necessary condition for France to win)
2] need allies to prevail against Germany’s greater industrial/demographical base, it is
necessary to make alliances (bilateral and collective security) and prepare for a long war.
Seek alliances with Poland, CZ, Yugo, and Romania. Strong desire for British Support
(esp after experience of Ruhr occupation – note failure to respond unilaterally to
reoccupation of Rhineland in March 1936).
3] French strategy becomes trapped in a Maginot mentality that keeps it from acting at
Munich or during the phoney war. They must stop German attack, before the successful
counterattack. Failure to support allies and engage Germany in a 2 front war – so its
alliance policies fail and it does not confront Germany directly. (3 bilateral treaties with
CZ, Romania and Yugoslavia make Little Entente) French military/alliance strategy is
severely flawed – designed to protect France from German attack, whereupon Eastern
allies would respond. When Germany went east first, the French “witnessed the
enslavement of Europe from the slits of their trenches” or whatever DeGaulle once said.
4] avoid fighting on French soil of possible
French Govt: The structure of French government inhibits strong leadership. Premiers
base cabinet on shifting coalition of Chamber of Deputies. Drift and indecision
characterized this “system” (a factor shrewdly taken advantage of by Hitler). This same
problem drastically inhibited French rearmament even in the face of the growing German
threat.
French Army: future offensive operations will be difficult, must follow only after careful
preparation and massive artillery bombardments. This of course eliminated surprise or
deep penetration/exploitation. Based on conserving superior material strength for the
counterattack. They relied on static/massive fortifications and failed to realize the
importance of defense-in-depth and strategic/tactical reserves. Did not foresee the
exploitative capacity for mechanized warfare with disastrous results in May 1940. Their
desire to keep fighting out of France led to commitment of forces (and reserves) to
Belgium at the outset of German attack. Maginot Line stopped at Luxembourg border
due to political considerations such as Belgian neutrality. They had tanks fully equal to
German armor and were not outnumbered. But these tanks were given no
operational role and spread out thinly for infantry support duties. France had 3
armored div, 3 light mech div, 5 light cav div, 7 motorized inf div, 33 independent tank
battalions and no developed doctrine.
Navy/Air Force: French fleet was more than a balance to the Italian and could
complement the Royal Navy well. Air Force inferior to Luftwaffe in quality of machines,
training, doctrine, etc. Until 1938, the air force was inadequately funded and could not
make up the qual/quant difference in time to alter the outcome of May 1940 (nor did the
political system lend itself to massive increase in production when German threat became
apparent). Situation made worse by infatuation with strategic bombing.
5.
What were the major factors of mechanization theory and doctrine in the
Soviet Union?
USSR –
WWI meant less to the Soviets in lessons learned than the Russian Civil War did. The
civil war confirmed Bolshevik conspiratorial view of hostile outside/capitalist world
through Western intervention. Also sowed the seeds of political commissars and
distrust in civil-mil relations that culminated in Stalin’s purge of the military in 1937.
Soviet strategy was within framework of Marxist-Leninist ideology of exploiting
class orientation, and so it was inclined to the offensive. Soviet strategy recognized
the future was would also be total wars involving entire pop/societies, plus maneuver
and attrition. But it also predicted that contradictions of capitalism would cause them
to go to war and so the USSR should have good relations and remain out of the war
for the longest time, so as to decisive intervene when the capitalists are weakest.
Tukhachevsky develops doctrine of large combined arms ops –tanks, planes,
paratroops—that focus on surprise and maneuver to break enemy defenses and
penetrate in depth. Of course, he was purged – as was half (35,000) of the entire
officer corps in 1937-39 along with the vast majority of the senior officers.
Before the outbreak of war, tank corps were broken up, not fixed in time after fall of
France. Political commissars reflected belief that the political orientation of army
itself is an asset. Purge devastated army cohesion/effectiveness. Navy proved to be
ineffective, also hurt by purge. Air force never that great, probably wouldn’t have
done much during CZ crisis either.
6.
What were the major factors of mechanization theory and doctrine in the
United States?
US – many viewed WWI as a terrible mistake in the inter-war period. However, the US
military never reached pre-war levels. Army lowpoint of 132,000. Navy is on par with
the Royal Navy. US now have experience with coalition warfare (leaves ingrained desire
for autonomy and independence) and recognize the need for industrial mobilization to
support mass army (how to convert to war econ studied by army planners). US high
command does not have emotional baggage from WWI slaughter. Military leaders “want
to do it right” in WWII – fight a mobile, aggressive war and draw more thoroughly on
industrial productive capacity, avoid duplicity of European allies. US had first experience
with fighting for principle of democracy and a growing realization that the European
balance of power was a national interest. Begin to see Japan as likely adversary and to
plan accordingly (island hopping – Marine Corps).