Download Lincoln and the Outbreak of War, 1861

The Beginning of the Civil War, 1861
A Documentary Source Problem
In March 1861, when Lincoln came to the Presidency, the United States
faced the worst crisis in its history. A number of slave states had
recently “seceded” from the national union, the United States of
America (in order of secession - South Carolina, Mississippi,
Florida, Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, and Texas). Those states had
formed a new government and nation, the Confederate States of America
(CSA), and the leaders of the secession movement now insisted that
the CSA was now a fully independent, autonomous nation, where United
States law and authority could have no force at all! From December
1860 to the day of Abraham Lincoln's Inaugural, March 4, 1861, the
new Confederacy, in an effort to assert its national independence,
and to diminish United States authority, seized numerous Federal
properties and installations in the deep South.
While the majority of white Southerners in eight other slave states –
Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, Kentucky, Tennessee,
Missouri, and Arkansas – opposed secession and disunion, they also
appeared to believe that a state had the rights to secede, if the
public of that state desired to do so.
The outgoing President of the United States, James Buchanan, did not
vigorously resist the secession movement (that began with South
Carolina’s secession from the Union in December, 1860). He stated
that, "The South has no right to secede, but I have no power to
prevent them." Consequently, Buchanan scrupulously avoided force to
restrain the rapidly developing power of the Confederacy. Abraham
Lincoln, the incoming President-elect of the United States, also
insisted that secession was illegal. But Lincoln’s election had
provoked the secession crisis, and the urgent question that absorbed
the nation at that moment was, “what will Lincoln do”?
By Lincoln’s inauguration on March 4, 1861, most federal
installations in the deep South had been seized by Confederate
authorities. Two offshore forts, however, had resisted capture – Fort
Sumter in Charleston Harbor, South Carolina, and Fort Pickens, in
Pensacola Harbor, Florida. Both installations were besieged by
Confederate military forces, and Confederate officials refused to
permit men and supplies to pass in or out of these forts. Confederate
artillery fire had recently driven back a federal vessel that had
attempted to resupply Fort Sumter.
Fort Pickens and Fort Sumter presented a critical problem to both the
Federal and Confederate governments: to the Confederacy the presence
of United States troops in the midst of their new nation seemed a
threat to its autonomy and existence; while to the Union, the
military efforts of the Confederacy to compel withdrawal of Federal
forces from the forts seemed treason against the United States.
After several weeks of tense confrontation, the Confederate Army
opened a bombardment of Fort Sumter on April 12-14, 1861, that
eventually forced U.S. Army personnel to surrender. Lincoln at once
issued a call for 75,000 volunteers to suppress this challenge to
federal authority, and over the next seven weeks, in response to
Lincoln’s action, four more southern states, Virginia, Arkansas,
North Carolina and Tennessee seceded from the Union, and civil war
became a certainty. Four slave states, however, Missouri, Kentucky,
Maryland and Delaware remained in the Union.
This documentary problem addresses the evolution of events and
actions in the late winter and spring of 1861 that led, in six weeks'
time, to the Civil War. In the ultimate sense, deep sectional
tensions created antagonisms that potentially threatened war. But
potentialities are not inevitabilities. They do not determine events;
they may establish the contours within which events occur, but war
crises have often occurred without causing wars. Accordingly, the
events that turned the war crisis of March into the shooting war of
April 1861, and the underlying forces that caused the crisis itself,
require analysis to accurately explain the outbreak of the Civil War.
Lincoln's actions and aims as President, and the actions and aims of
many others during those weeks, were a crucial part of the complex
sequence of events that brought on the war.
Historians of this era have, ever since, struggled to answer a series
of controversial questions. The particular events of 1860 and 1861
were not necessarily inevitable. Why, for instance, did the military
conflict begin at Charleston, South Carolina? Why on April 12? Since
the secession movement had already existed for almost four months
without causing war, why not another eight, or eighteen, months
without war? Furthermore, what was Lincoln's responsibility in this
matter? Did he plan for peace or for war? Did the Confederacy make
war upon the Union, or was it the other way around? If Lincoln
resolutely tried to maintain peace, as he insisted, why did he send a
naval expedition to Fort Sumter? Did his administration ever promise
to evacuate Sumter? If so, why wasn’t the promise kept? A great
majority of ordinary American citizens, North and South, who heard
Lincoln's Inaugural Address on March 4, 1861, wanted the Union saved
without war. They sought clues to his intentions in his address.
Would he compromise his principles, and those of his political party,
to escape the terrifying alternatives of disunion and bloody
fratricidal warfare? Or, did he have some other plan to save the
Union, without either a fatal compromise or war? Finally, would he,
as some Southerners believed, attempt to force the issue and try to
compel the Confederate Government either to submit in humiliation, or
resist, and provoke bloodshed on a scale never before seen in North
America?
The following documents provide the critical reader some basis for
resolving these issues.
INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE ASSIGNMENT-- PAY CAREFUL ATTENTION!!!!!
Prepare for writing the paper by reading (and then rereading) the
documents until you have a knowledgeable command of them. You may
also consult the textbook (and other sources, if you like) for
insight into the events leading up to the Civil War.
Assume that you are writing a history of the American Civil War. You
have allotted yourself a maximum of five double-spaced, typed pages
(1,200-1,500 words) in which to present a valid, plausible, and
readable account of the coming of the Civil War, from the time of
Lincoln’s inaugural as President on March 4, 1861, to the outbreak of
hostilities in mid-April.
In a 5 page, typed essay, double spaced, 1" margins, write an
interpretive account of the origins, events, and consequences of the
beginning of the Civil War, based on your analysis and interpretation
of the documents in this collection. Though you may use other sources
to help you understand what happened in this episode, RELY PRIMARILY
ON THE FOLLOWING DOCUMENTS AS SOURCES TO WRITE YOUR ACCOUNT (You may
also quote from the introduction to this document collection and the
textbook, but no other sources are allowed). Since there are many
more issues and facts in these documents than you can possibly
include in a 5 page paper, do not attempt to discuss all of them.
Concentrate on writing a coherent interpretation of the major
origins, motivations, and events, supporting your conclusions with
relevant facts and examples from the documents.
Begin by reading through the documents several times. After you begin
to get the feeling that you have a good general command of the
documents, you might construct an annotated timeline of the events.
This will help you understand the chronology of events before you
begin writing. Then consider how to reconstruct the crucial sequence
of events in a way that makes the best sense of the diversity of
sources and the chronology of cause and effect. Above all, your paper
should demonstrate a clear understanding of the major sequence of
events immediately leading up to the beginning of the Civil War.
It may help to consider the documents in this packet as a kind of
puzzle. In the broadest sense, your task in this paper assignment is
to arrange the pieces of the puzzle so that they make sense - that
is, so that they help you explain WHAT happened, WHY it happened, WHO
were the important figures in this event, WHERE the events took
place, and WHEN the most significant events occurred. Above all, be
sure to make the SEQUENCE OF MAJOR EVENTS in this incident clear!
Your essay should include numerous examples and evidence drawn
directly from documents provided in this package. ESSAYS MUST CONTAIN
EVIDENCE DRAWN FROM THE DOCUMENTS, THOUGHTFULLY COMPOSED AND
ORGANIZED, IN ORDER TO SUCCESSFULLY COMPLETE THIS ASSIGNMENT!
In short, construct an account that makes the most sense to you based
on the available evidence.
The following questions and problems may help guide your analysis:
- Some Republicans described Lincoln's inaugural address as the "iron
hand in a velvet glove." Is that accurate?
- What do you make of Lincoln's intentions toward the South from his
query to Attorney General Edward Bates on March 18?
- Is there enough evidence to justify the claim that Lincoln, at one
time, conditionally offered to evacuate Sumter?
- What do you think is the significance of Lincoln's reaction to
General Winfield Scott's advice? How did Lincoln react?
- What are we to make of the peculiar relations between Lincoln and
Secretary of State, William Seward, when confronted with the imminent
danger of war?
- How would you characterize the manner and purpose of Seward's
communications with John Campbell and the Confederate Commissioners?
Was any deception or insincerity involved?
- What evidence might suggest that Lincoln attempted to maneuver the
Confederates to attack Sumter?
- What evidence, on the other hand, might suggest that Lincoln sought
to avoid a clash of arms at Sumter?
- What were Lincoln’s aims and what, in the end, was he attempting to
accomplish?
The questions above are intended only as a general guide to help you
understand important historical issues; they are not commands to
which you must conform.
Your main concern should be to construct an eloquent, fluid narrative
and interpretation. Do not interrupt the narrative at inappropriate
points merely to answer one of the questions above. Your account
should be as flawlessly and gracefully written as you can make it. Do
not consult secondary accounts until you have written your own.
Composition Rules
Each essay should also possess an introductory paragraph, a body, and
a conclusion.
The introduction should provide just that - an introduction to the
topic you're going to examine. A good introduction provides a thesis
statement (a sentence or sentences that decisively state an argument
or position that you will develop and demonstrate in your essay) and
a brief statement of the main points you intend to develop in your
essay.
The body should be composed of several paragraphs that support your
thesis and main points of your essay. Above all, the body provides
the EVIDENCE that proves your thesis. More than any other single
criteria, your work will be judged on the quantity and quality of the
evidence you provide and your analysis of it. So you should devote
most of your time to assembling and intelligently examining evidence.
Good essays provide numerous pieces of evidence from the documents to
support the argument. Poor essays provide little or no evidence drawn
from the documents.
For the purposes of the essays you will be writing, the term
"evidence" includes examples and major ideas drawn from the
documents. Thus your essays should contain numerous quotations drawn
specifically from the documents.
Also, you should be sure to clearly indicate the chronology of
events. That is, when did the events and actions you’re tracing take
place? Make sure that the chronology makes logical sense.
The conclusion may be constructed in a variety of ways: it may be a
brief summary of the main points of your essay; it may also be a
restatement of your thesis; but the best conclusion is one that
demonstrates the historical significance of the issue at hand and
your analysis of it.
A Warning on Sources
You may consult as many outside sources and texts as you like to help
you understand the beginning of the Civil War, but the introduction
to this document collection, the textbook, and especially these
documents in this collection, are the ONLY sources you may quote when
writing your paper.
Do not write a paper based on sources other than those cited above!
Your grade on this assignment will depend primarily on how well you
analyze and interpret the documents in this collection!
A Warning on Plagiarism
What is plagiarism? Plagiarism is literary thievery. It is the use
of somebody else’s material (as if it were your own) in a paper or an
essay without giving credit to the author. The following are examples
of the criteria that will be used in this class to identify
plagiarism:
Plagiarism is a serious offense (and I treat it seriously). It can
lead to dismissal from the college and severe long-term consequences
for completing a college or university education in the United
States.
DOCUMENT #1
Abraham Lincoln, President of the United States, First Inaugural
Address,
March 4, 1861. (selected excerpts)
… It follows from these views that no State, upon its own mere
motion, can lawfully get out of the Union, -- that resolves and
ordinances to that effect are legally void, and that acts of
violence, within any State or States, against the authority of the
United States, are insurrectionary or revolutionary, according to
circumstances.
I therefore consider that in view of the Constitution and the laws,
the Union is unbroken; and to the extent of my ability I shall take
care, as the Constitution itself expressly enjoins upon me, that the
laws of the Union be faithfully executed in all the States. Doing
this I deem to be only a simple duty on my part; and I shall perform
it, so far as practicable, unless my rightful masters, the American
people, shall withhold the requisite means, or, in some authoritative
manner, direct the contrary. I trust this will not be regarded as a
menace, but only as the declared purpose of the Union that it will
constitutionally defend and maintain itself.
In doing this there needs to be no bloodshed or violence; and there
shall be none, unless it be forced upon the national authority. The
power confided in me will be used to hold, occupy, and possess the
property and places belonging to the government, and to collect the
duties and imposts; but beyond what may be necessary for these
objects, there will be no invasion -- no using of force against or
among the people anywhere. Where hostility to the United States, in
any interior locality, shall be so great and so universal as to
prevent competent resident citizens from holding the Federal offices,
there will be no attempt to force obnoxious strangers among the
people for that object. While the strict legal right may exist in the
government to enforce the exercise of these offices, the attempt to
do go would be so irritating, and so nearly impracticable with all,
that I deem it better to forego, for the time, the uses of such
offices...
I have no purpose directly or indirectly to interfere with... slavery
in the states where it exists...
In your hands, my dissatisfied fellow countrymen, and not in mine, is
the momentous issue of civil war. The government will not assail you.
You can have no conflict, without being yourselves the aggressors.
You have no oath registered in Heaven to destroy the government,
while I have the most solemn one to "preserve, protect, and defend"
it...
DOCUMENT #2
Abraham Lincoln, deleted passages in First Inaugural Address, March
1861.
All the power at my disposal will be used to reclaim the public
property and places which have fallen; to hold, occupy, and possess
these and all other property and places belonging to the Government,
and to collect the duties and imposts; but beyond what may be
necessary for these objects, there will be no invasion of any
State....
[Editor’s Note: the material above was part of an original draft of
the Inaugural Address pertaining to the forts - see third paragraph,
above. Lincoln decided to delete this passage after consulting with
William Seward and Orville Browning.]
DOCUMENT #3
Abraham Lincoln, letter to Edward Bates, United States Attorney
General,
March 18, 1861.
[I should like from you] an opinion in writing whether under the
Constitution and existing laws the Executive has power to collect
duties on shipboard, offshore, in cases where their collection in the
ordinary way is, by any cause, rendered impracticable.
Your obedient servant,
A. Lincoln
DOCUMENT #4
C. S. Morehead, letter to John J. Crittenden (excerpts), Feb. 23,
1862.
[Editor’s Note: Morehead, former governor of Kentucky, was a member
of a peace delegation that met with Lincoln in Washington in Feb.
1861, and this letter is Morehead’s recollection of that meeting,
written one year after the fact.]
Under this painful feeling, when invited to an interview with Mr.
Lincoln, in company with Messrs. Rives and Somers/Summers, of
Virginia, Doniphan, of Missouri, and Guthrie, of Kentucky [other
members of the peace delegation from the South], I ventured to
express to him my sense of the dreadful impending danger, and
entreated and implored him to avert it. I said to him that the true
and wise policy was to withdraw the troops from Fort Sumter, and give
satisfactory guarantees to the eight remaining slave-holding States,
and that the seven seceding States would, not at once, but
ultimately, by the mere force of gravitation, come back, and we
should have a safer and firmer bond of union than ever. Mr. Rives
pressed the same idea, when Mr. Lincoln said he would withdraw the
troops if Virginia would stay in the Union. I took occasion to write
down the entire conversation soon after it occurred. The impression
undoubtedly left upon my mind was, that the new administration would
not resort to coercion. This was still further strengthened by the
voluntary pledge of honor of Mr. Seward, in the presence of Mr.
Taylor, of Washington, and Messrs. Rives and Somers, that there
should be no collision. "Nay," said he to me, "if this whole matter
is not satisfactorily settled within sixty days after I am seated in
the saddle and hold the reins firmly in my hand, I will give you my
head for a football." These were the identical words used, as I put
them on paper in less than two hours after they were uttered.
DOCUMENT #5
Jefferson Davis, President of the Confederate States of America,
letter to Robert A. Toombs, Secretary of State of the Confederacy,
February 27, 1861.
For the purpose of establishing friendly relations between the
Confederate States and the United States, Martin J. Crawford, John
Forsyth and A.B. Roman are appointed special commissioners of the
Confederate States to the United States.
[Editor’s note: Soon after Lincoln's Inaugural on March 4, 1861, the
Confederate States Government sent a “special commission” to
Washington to obtain from the United States Government formal
recognition of the Confederate States of America as an independent
nation, entirely separate from the United States of America. The
commissioners noted above first approached U.S. Secretary of State,
William Seward, but he refused to negotiate with them directly - to
do so would implicitly recognize Confederate independence. However,
Justice John A. Campbell of the United States Supreme Court, a
Southerner, urged Seward to hold conversations with the
commissioners, and Seward consented to communicate with the
Confederate Commission informally, through Campbell, as an
intermediary. In these informal negotiations, the commissioners
issued a veiled threat: if the United States Government refused to
recognize Confederate independence, then Confederate forces would be
compelled to attack Fort Sumter, implying that the South was prepared
to obtain its independence by force, if necessary. The commissioners
insisted on an answer to their demands by March 15.]
DOCUMENT #6
John Hay, Lincoln's personal secretary, diary entry, Oct. 22, 1861.
At Seward's tonight the President talked about secession, compromise,
and other such. He spoke of a committee of Southern pseudo-Unionists
coming to him before Inauguration for guarantees &c. He promised to
evacuate Sumter if they would break up their convention, without any
row or nonsense. They demurred.
Subsequently he renewed [the] proposition to Summers, but without any
result. The President was most anxious to prevent bloodshed.
[Editor’s Note: On March 4, 1861, the out-going Secretary of War,
Joseph Holt, received a dispatch from Major Robert Anderson, United
States Army, Commanding Officer, Fort Sumter, dated Feb. 28. Anderson
declared that supplies were nearly exhausted, that Confederate
officials had refused to grant him further supplies from Charleston,
and, consequently, unless some relief arrived earlier, he estimated
that he could hold out no more than six weeks. On March 21, Anderson
sent a subsequent dispatch in which he maintained that he could not
hold out beyond "April 15." Anderson suggested that the fort might
not be resupplied and reinforced (an implicit suggestion that the
fort be surrendered to Confederate or South Carolina authorities) in
order to preserve peace. This message was relayed to Winfield Scott,
General-in-Chief of the United States Army, and then to Lincoln on
March 5. In the course of the next two weeks, Scott and many other
highly placed officials in Lincoln's administration, advised Lincoln
to evacuate Fort Sumter, because, in their opinion, its defense was
impractical.]
DOCUMENT #7
Gideon Welles, United States Secretary of the Navy, diary entry,
recording events that took place March 7, 1861 (though the entry was
written at a later date, not identified by Welles)
[At the Cabinet meeting] Mr. Seward, who from the first had viewed
with no favor any attempt to relieve Sumter, soon became a very
decisive and emphatic opponent of any proposition that was made; said
he had entertained doubts [about the wisdom of reinforcing Sumter];
and the opinion and arguments of Major Anderson and his officers,
confirmed by the distinguished military officers who were consulted,
had fully convinced him that it would be abortive and useless .... It
was, he was satisfied, impossible to relieve and reinforce the
garrison; the attempt would provoke immediate hostilities, and if
hostilities could not be avoided, he deemed it important that the
Administration should not strike the first blow.
The President, though much distressed with the conclusions of the
military officers, and the decisive concurrence of the Secretary of
State in those conclusions, appeared to acquiesce in what seemed to
be a military necessity, but was not disposed to yield until the last
moment, and when there was no hope of accomplishing the work if
attempted....
DOCUMENT #8
Confederate Commissioners Appointed to meet with the President of the
United States (Martin Crawford, John Forsyth and A.B. Roman), letter
to Robert Toombs, Secretary of State of the Confederate States of
America, March 8, 1861.
... The tenor of his [Seward’s] language is to this effect; I have
built up the Republican party; I have brought it to triumph; but its
advent to power is accompanied by great difficulties and perils, I
must save the party and save the government in its hands. To do this,
war must be averted, the negro question must be dropped; the
'irrepressible conflict' ignored .... Saving the border states to the
Union by moderation and justice, the people of the cotton states,
unwillingly led into secession, will rebel against their leaders, and
reconstruction will follow.
DOCUMENT #9
George Templeton Strong, northern journalist, diary entry, March
1861. (excerpts)
March 4, Monday. Feverish anxiety in Wall Street. News from
Washington awaited impatiently. Everybody longing for the Inaugural.
Natural enough. We are on the edge of the crisis now.
At twelve appeared an Evening Post bulletin. "Great excitement in
Washington. The President up all night. Great efforts to make him
alter his Inaugural. The President firm." That is, Weed [Thurlow Weed
of New York] and perhaps Seward want Lincoln to say nothing about
enforcing law.
March 6. If we drag through the next thirty days without bloodshed at
Fort Sumter or elsewhere, all may be well. Seward's policy has been
to procrastinate, to gain time, to wait and that will be the policy
of this Administration.... Government is weak and must postpone a
trial of strength, in hope that something may turn up.
March 11, Monday. Today's great news is that government contemplates
withdrawing Major Anderson and his command from Fort Sumter! It is
said that they can not maintain themselves there without supplies
more than twenty or thirty days longer, and that the batteries in
Charleston Harbor are now (thanks to old Buchanan's imbecility or
treason) so strong that supplies and reinforcements cannot be thrown
in without some 10,000 men and a strong naval force. We have not got
the men or the ships, and they cannot be got for months. What is to
be done? Withdrawal, surrender, "calm, dishonorable, vile
submission," surrender of Fort Sumter is inevitable.
The surrender may do good at the South, possibly... But it will stir
up corresponding exasperation at the North. ...I recognize it as a
stern necessity, but as a deep humiliation withal…
The political entity known as the United States of America is found
out ... The bird of our country is a debilitated chicken, disguised
in eagle feathers. We have never been a nation; we are only an
aggregate of communities, ready to fall apart at the first serious
shock....
March 12. Nothing definite about Fort Sumter, but the impression
grown stronger that its surrender is unavoidable and that government
has not the means to hold it. ...this is a time of sad humiliation
for the country..
March 21. I see no indication thus far of vigor or sagacity in the
new Administration....
DOCUMENT #10
Lieutenant General Winfield Scott, General-In-Chief, United States
Army, Washington D.C., orders to Captain Israel Vogdes, U.S. Army,
aboard U.S.S. Brooklyn, United States Navy, sloop-of-war, lying off
Fort Pickens, Pensacola Harbor, Florida, March 12, 1861.
SIR: At the first available moment you will land with your company,
reinforce Fort Pickens, and hold the same till further orders. Report
frequently, if opportunities present themselves, on the condition of
the fort and the circumstances around you....
By command of Lt. General Scott.
[Editor’s Note: With the exception of Fort Sumter, Fort Pickens, off
Pensacola, Florida, was, in March 1861, the sole remaining fort
within sight of the Confederate mainland that the Federal forces
continued to occupy. Its symbolic value to the Federal Government
was, therefore, significant and grew more so as the hopes of
retaining Sumter receded. For Lincoln's view of this, see Document
#40 below. In January 1861, while James Buchanan was still President,
a company of U.S. troops were sent to Pensacola aboard the U.S.S.
Brooklyn. But, under a "truce" agreement between Buchanan and the
Confederacy, they remained on board ship and did not reinforce the
fort. There they remained when Lincoln replaced Buchanan in office on
March 4. At that date, it appeared that Fort Pickens could still be
secured, and on March 11 Lincoln ordered the War Department to
reinforce Fort Pickens with the troops that had been sent aboard the
U.S.S. Brooklyn.]
DOCUMENT #11
Martin Crawford, Confederate Commissioner, letter to Robert A.
Toombs, Secretary of State of the Confederacy, March 6, 1861.
I have felt it my duty under instructions from your department, as
well as from my best judgment, to adopt and support Mr. Seward's
policy, upon condition, however, that the present status is to be
rigidly maintained. His reasons and my own, it is proper to say, are
as wide apart as the poles: he is fully persuaded that peace will
bring about a reconstruction of the Union, whilst I feel confident
that it will build up and cement our confederacy and put us beyond
the reach either of his arms or of his diplomacy. It is well that he
should indulge in dreams which we know are not to be realized.
DOCUMENT #12
John A. Campbell, Associate Justice, United States Supreme Court,
summary of his negotiations with Confederate Commissioners, undated
(referring to a meeting on March 15, 1861, between Campbell, Wm.
Seward, and Justice Nelson, a friend of Campbell).
Mr. Seward heard what we said with courtesy and attention, and
replied to it: that not a member of the cabinet, would consent [to
receive the commissioners]. "Talk with Montgomery Blair and Mr.
Bates, with Mr. Lincoln himself, they are Southern men, and see what
they say," said Mr. S [William Seward]. No one of them would agree.
"No," he proceeded, "if Jefferson Davis had known of the state of
things here, he never would have sent those commissioners. It is
enough to deal with one thing at a time. The surrender of Sumter is
enough to deal with....
I had not before this had a hint of the proposed evacuation of
Sumter, and replied to Mr. Seward that I fully agreed with him that
only one matter should be dealt with at a time and that the
evacuation of Sumter was a sufficient burden upon the Administration;
that too much circumspection could not be employed to prevent
agitated excitement of the public mind. I said I would see the
Commissioners on the subject and also write to Mr. Davis. "What shall
I say on the subject of Fort Sumter?" He said: "You may say to him
that before that letter reaches him (how far is it to Montgomery)?"
[Montgomery, Alabama, the capital of the Confederacy in early 1861]
"Three days." "You may say to him that before that letter reaches him
the telegraph will have informed him that Fort Sumter will have been
evacuated." "What shall I say as to the Forts in the Gulf of Mexico?"
He said: "We contemplate no action as to them; we are satisfied with
the position of things there." I agreed to see the Commissioners on
that day, and to obtain their consent to a delay of their demand for
an answer to their letter, and would afford him an answer. Mr. S.
said he must have an answer that day, and if I were successful I
might prevent a civil war.
I called upon Mr. Crawford, one of the commissioners, and informed
him... that Judge Nelson was aware of all that I knew and would agree
that I was justified in saying to him what I did. I certified in
writing my confident belief that Sumter would be evacuated in five
days; that no alteration would be made in the condition of affairs in
the Gulf prejudicial to the Confederate States; and that a demand for
[recognition] would be productive of evil. He consented to the
requisite delay.
DOCUMENT #13
Abraham Lincoln, letter to each member of his cabinet, March 15, 1861
(with replies)
Assuming it to be possible to now provision Fort Sumter, under all
the circumstances, is it wise to attempt it? Please give me your
opinion, in writing, on this question.
Your Obt. Servt.,
A. Lincoln
Replies to Lincoln’s letter:
William Seward, Secretary of State (March 15): If it were possible to
peacefully provision Fort Sumter, of course, I should answer, that it
would be both unwise and inhuman not to attempt it. But the facts of
the case are known to be, that the attempts would provoke combat, and
probably initiate a civil war.... I would not provoke war in any way
now....
Simon Cameron, Secretary of War (March 16): It would be unwise now to
make such an attempt.... I am greatly influenced by the opinions of
the Army officers who have expressed themselves on the subject and
who seem to concur that it is, perhaps, now impossible to succor
[resupply] that fort, substantially, if at all....
Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy (March 15): The question has two
aspects, one military, the other political. The military gentlemen...
represent that it would be unwise... and I am not disposed to
controvert their opinions.... In a political view, I entertain doubts
of the wisdom of the measure.... I do not... think it wise....
Salmon Chase, Secretary of the Treasury (March 16): ....I shall
assume... that the attempt to provision is to include an attempt to
reinforce, for it seems to be generally agreed that provisioning
without reinforcements, notwithstanding hostile resistance, will
accomplish no substantially beneficial purpose... If the attempt will
so inflame civil war as to involve an immediate necessity of
armies.... I cannot advise it. But it seems to me highly improbable
that the attempt, especially if accompanied ... by a proclamation
setting forth a liberal and generous yet firm policy toward the
disaffected States, in harmony with the principles of the inaugural
address, will produce such consequences.... I return, therefore, an
affirmative answer to the question submitted to me.
Caleb Smith, Secretary of the Interior (March 16): ...After a careful
consideration of the opinions of Gens. Scott and Totten...I have
arrived at the conclusion that the probabilities are in favor of the
success...so far as to secure the landing of the vessels... but it
would not be wise under all the circumstances...
Montgomery Blair, Postmaster General (March 15): I submit the
following considerations in favor of provisioning the Fort... The
evacuation of Fort Sumter ... will convince the rebels that the
administration lacks firmness and will therefore, so far from tending
to prevent collision, will ensure it....
Edward Bates, Attorney General (March 16): I am willing to evacuate
Fort Sumter, rather than be an Active party in the beginning of civil
war... If Fort Sumter must be evacuated... the more Southern forts...
should, without delay, be put in condition of easy defense.... Upon
the whole, I do not think it wise now to attempt to provision Fort
Sumter.
DOCUMENT #14
Confederate Commissioners (Crawford, Forsyth and Roman), telegrams to
Robert A. Toombs (Secretary of State of the Confederacy).
March 20, 1861. "If there is faith in man, we may rely on the
assurance we have as to the status" [of the proposition to evacuate
Fort Sumter]
March 22. "We have the highest assurances that the delay in the
evacuation of Fort Sumter shows no bad faith, that it will be done as
soon as possible."
March 28. "...There is a dead calm here."
March 30. "...no attempt to reinforce Pickens has been or will be
made without notice."
DOCUMENT #15
Lieutenant General Winfield Scott, General-in-Chief, United States
Army, memorandum to A. Lincoln, undated, received by Lincoln, March
28, 1861.
It seems from the opinions of the Army officers who expressed
themselves on the subject … that it is perhaps now impossible to
succor [resupply] that fort substantially, if at all, without
capturing, by means of a large expedition of ships of war and troops,
all the opposing batteries of South Carolina. In the mean time -- six
or ten months -- Major Anderson would almost certainly have been
obliged to surrender under assault or the approach of starvation ...
An abandonment of the fort in a few weeks, sooner or later, would
appear, therefore, to be a sure necessity, and if so, the sooner the
more graceful on the part of the Government.
It is doubtful, however, according to recent information from the
South, whether the voluntary evacuation of Fort Sumter alone would
have a decisive effect upon the states now wavering between adherence
to the Union and secession. It is known, indeed, that it would be
charged to necessity, and the holding of Fort Pickens would be
adduced in support of that view. Our Southern friends, however, are
clear that the evacuation of both the forts would instantly soothe
and give confidence to the eight remaining slaveholding States, and
render their cordial adherence to this Union perpetual ... The giving
up of Forts Sumter and Pickens may be best justified by the hope that
we should thereby recover the State to which they geographically
belong by the liberality of the act, besides retaining the eight
doubtful States.
DOCUMENT #16
Montgomery Blair, United States Postmaster General, letter to Samuel
Crawford, Confederate Commissioner, May 6. 1882.
[Editor’s note: Years after the fact, Blair described the incident
below that occurred at the White House on the evening of March 28,
1861, following a Cabinet dinner.]
General Scott, in the belief that the surrender of Fort Sumter had
been determined upon, wrote to the President that it was necessary to
surrender Fort Pickens also.
This letter was written on the day fixed for the final action on the
question, whether Sumter should be surrendered. But contrary to the
President's previous intention, he did not decide the question at the
Cabinet meeting that day. After dinner the President called the
members out of the room where he had dined with them, and in an
agitated manner, read Scott's letter, which he seemed just to have
received. An oppressive silence followed. At last I said, "Mr.
President you can now see that General Scott, in advising the
surrender of Fort Sumter, is playing the part of a politician, not of
a general, for as no one pretends that that there is any military
necessity for the surrender of Fort Pickens, which he now says it is
equally necessary to surrender, it is believed that he is governed by
political reasons in both recommendations."
No answer could be made to this point, and the President saw that he
was misled, and immediately ordered the reinforcement of Fort
Sumter.... It is impossible to exaggerate the importance and merit of
this act.... It was (undertaken] by Lincoln with only the support of
a single member of the Cabinet and he represented no State, and was
the youngest and least distinguished member [Blair himself]; and he
was opposed by all the others, who were the leaders of the Republican
Party and the representative men of the great Republican States.
Lincoln himself was inexperienced, and those who opposed the stand he
took had not only great experience in public affairs, but they were
regarded by Lincoln himself as his superiors. [But he resolved] to
stand by his convictions....
DOCUMENT #17
Abraham Lincoln, President of the United States, orders to the United
States Secretary of War, Simon Cameron, March 29, 1861.
SIR: I desire that an expedition, to move by sea, be got ready to
sail as early as the 6th of April next, the whole according to
memorandum attached, and that you cooperate with the Secretary of the
Navy for that object.
Your obedient servant,
A. LINCOLN
[Editor’s note: On March 29, Lincoln polled his Cabinet again on the
issue of Fort Sumter and now found only two members, William Seward
and Caleb Smith, who favored evacuation of Fort Sumter.]
DOCUMENT #17a
Memorandum attached to the letter above (excerpt).
Two hundred men at N. York ready to leave garrison, one year’s stores
to be put in a portable form.
[Editor’s note: And in similar instructions to Gideon Welles,
Secretary of the Navy, Lincoln ordered three ships to be made ready
with one month's stores, and three hundred seamen.]
DOCUMENT #18
Major Montgomery C. Meigs, United States Army, diary entry, 1861.
March 31. I learned from the President himself the other day that he
had verbally directed Gen. Scott to hold all these forts and make
arrangements to reinforce them on the 5th of March.
That about the 10th, finding nothing done, he had thought it best to
put himself on record and had repeated the order in writing.
That he learned that the Brooklyn had gone to Key West [from its
station off Pensacola and Fort Pickens] and as she had the troops for
Pickens on board, he supposed that his orders had fizzled out.
That Gen. Scott had told him he did not think that Pickens ought to
be held and this had given him a cold shock. He had not slept the
night before he saw me... Felt much relieved at my assurance that the
place could be held against all opposition by proper arrangements.
[Editor’s note: Before sailing to Key West from its station off
Pensacola, the USS Brooklyn had transferred her Fort Pickens-bound
troops to the USS Sabine, but this was not yet known in Washington
when Major Meigs wrote this entry.]
DOCUMENT #19
William Seward, memorandum entitled "Some thoughts for the
President's consideration," to A. Lincoln, April 1. 1861.
We are at the end of a month's administration and yet without a
policy either domestic or foreign.... This, however, is not culpable,
and it has been unavoidable.... But further delay to adopt and
prosecute our policies for both domestic and foreign affairs would
not only bring scandal on the Administration, but danger upon the
country....
The policy -- at home:
I am aware that my views are singular, and perhaps not sufficiently
explained. My system is built upon this idea as a ruling one, namely
that we must change the question before the Public from one upon
Slavery, or about Slavery for a question upon Union or Disunion. In
other words, from what would be regarded as a Party question to one
of Patriotism or Union.
The occupation or evacuation of Fort Sumter, although not in fact a
slavery, or a party question, is so regarded. Witness, the temper
manifested by the Republicans in the Free States, and even by Union
men in the South.
I would therefore terminate it as a safe means for changing the
issue....
For the rest, I would simultaneously defend and reinforce all the
Forts in the Gulf, and have the Navy recalled from foreign stations
to be prepared for a blockade. Put the Island of Key West under
Martial Law.This will raise distinctly the question of Union or
Disunion. I would maintain every fort and possession in the South.
For Foreign Nations:
I would demand explanations from Spain and France, categorically, at
once. I would seek explanations from Great Britain and Russia, and
send agents into Canada, Mexico and Central America.... And if
satisfactory explanations are not received from Spain and France,
would convene Congress and declare war against them.
But whatever policy we adopt, there must be an energetic prosecution
of it....
Either the President must do it himself, and be all the while active
in it; or devolve it on some member of his Cabinet....
It is not in my especial province. But I neither seek to evade nor
assume responsibility.
Wm. Seward, Sec’y of State
DOCUMENT #20
Lincoln’s reply to Seward’s memorandum above, April 1, 1861.
My Dear Sir: Since parting with you I have been considering your
paper dated this day.... The first proposition in it is, "1st. We are
at the end of a month's administration, and yet without a policy,
either domestic or foreign."
At the beginning, of that month, in the inaugural, I said "The power
confided in me will be used to hold, occupy, and possess the property
and places belonging to the government, and to collect the duties,
and imposts." This had your distinct approval at the time; and, taken
in connection with the order I immediately gave General Scott,
directing him to employ every means in his power to strengthen and
hold the forts, comprises the exact domestic policy you now urge,
with the single exception, that it does not propose to abandon Fort
Sumter.
Again, I do not perceive how the reinforcement of Fort Sumter would
be done on a slavery or party, issue, while that of Fort Pickens
would be on a more national, and patriotic one....
Upon your closing propositions ... I remark that if this must be
done, I must do it. When a general line of policy is adopted, I
apprehend there is no danger of its being changed without good
reason, or continuing to be a subject of unnecessary debate; still,
upon points arising in its progress, I wish, and suppose I am
entitled to have the advice of all the cabinet.
Your obt. Servt.
A. LINCOLN
[Editor’s note: Throughout March, and into April, 1861, Lincoln came
under acute criticism, from a variety of sources within the
Republican Party, because of the expected evacuation of Fort Sumter.
Letters from friends, resolutions passed in Congress, adverse results
to his party in an Ohio election, and vigorous pleas from the
extremely powerful Blair family - influential in border-state
politics - all provided clear evidence of wide-spread popular
indignation and anger, on the part of those devoted to the Union,
that it appeared the Federal government intended to surrender Fort
Sumter to Confederate forces. The President, many critics began to
charge, appeared to be weak and indecisive.]
DOCUMENT #21
Major Robert Anderson, U.S. Army, Commanding Officer, Fort Sumter,
South Carolina, dispatch to the United States Department of War,
Washington D.C., April 1, 1861.
...If I placed the command on short allowance, I could make the
provisions last until after the 10th of the month; but as I have
received no instructions from the Department that it was desirable I
should do so, it has not been done.... We will have rations enough to
last us about one week longer.
DOCUMENT #22
Captain Israel Vogdes, U.S. Army, letter to Captain H.A. Adams
(aboard U.S.S Sabine), U.S. Navy, Commanding Officer, U.S. Naval
Forces off Pensacola and Fort Pickens, Florida, April 1, 1861.
SIR: Herewith I send you a copy of an order received by me [from
Gen’l Scott and the War Department] last night. You will see by it
that I am directed to land my command [at Fort Pickens] at the
earliest opportunity. I have therefore to request that you will place
at my disposal such boats and other means as will enable me to carry
into effect the enclosed orders.
Yours, etc.
I. Vogdes
DOCUMENT #23
Captain H.A. Adams, Commanding Officer, U.S. Naval Forces (including
vessels USS Brooklyn and USS Sabine) off Pensacola and Fort Pickens,
Florida, letter to Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy, April 1,
1861.
SIR: I have the honor to enclose a copy of a letter addressed to me
by Captain Vogdes, U.S. Army, who is here in command of some troops
sent out in January last to reinforce the garrison of Fort Pickens. I
have declined to land the men as Captain Vogdes requests, as it would
be in direct violation of the orders from the Navy Department under
which I am acting.
The instructions from General Scott to Captain Vogdes are of old
date, (March 12) and may have been given without a full knowledge of
the condition of affairs here. They would be no justification to me.
Such a step is too important to be taken without the clearest orders
from proper authority. It would most certainly be viewed as a hostile
act, and would be resisted to the utmost. No one acquainted with the
feelings of the [Confederate] Military assembled under General Bragg
can doubt that it would be considered not only a declaration but an
act of war. It would be a serious thing to bring on, by any
precipitation, a collision, which may be entirely against the wishes
of the Administration.
At present both sides are faithfully observing the agreement...
[Which] binds us not to reinforce Fort Pickens unless it shall be
attacked or threatened. It binds them not to attack it unless we
should attempt to reinforce it. I saw General Bragg on the 30th
ultimo, who reassured me the conditions on their part should not be
violated. While I cannot take on myself, under such insufficient
authority as General Scott's order, the fearful responsibility of an
act which seems to render civil war inevitable, I am ready at all
times to carry out whatever orders I may receive from the Honorable
Secretary of the Navy.
In conclusion, I beg you will please send me instructions as soon as
possible that I may be relieved from a painful embarrassment.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
H. A. Adams, Senior Officer, Present
DOCUMENT #24
Abraham Lincoln, President of the United States, orders to Major
Robert Anderson, U.S. Army, Commanding Officer, Fort Sumter, South
Carolina, Letter, April 4, 1861.
(arrived Fort Sumter, April 7).
SIR: Your letter of the 1st instant occasions some anxiety to the
President. On the information of Captain Fox, he had supposed you
could hold out till the 15th instant without any great inconvenience
and had prepared an expedition to relieve you before that period.
Hoping still that you will be able to sustain yourself till the 11th
or 12th instant, the expedition will go forward, and, finding your
flag flying, will attempt to provision you, and in case the effort is
resisted, will endeavor also to reinforce you.
You will therefore hold out, if possible, till the arrival of the
expedition.
It is not, however, the intention of the President to subject your
command to any danger or hardship beyond what, in your judgment,
would be usual in military life; and he has entire confidence that
you will act as becomes a patriot and a soldier under all
circumstances.
Whenever, if at all, in your judgment, to save yourself and command,
a capitulation becomes a necessity, you are authorized to make it.
A. Lincoln
DOCUMENT #25
Simon Cameron, United States Secretary of War, orders to Captain
Gustavus Fox, U.S. Navy, Commanding Officer, Transport force sent to
resupply and reinforce Fort Sumter, South Carolina, April 4, 1861.
SIR: It having been determined to succor [resupply] Fort Sumter, you
have been selected for this important duty. Accordingly, you will
take charge of the transport provided in New York, having the troops
and supplies on board, to the entrance of Charleston Harbor, and
endeavor, in the first instance, to deliver the subsistence. If you
are opposed in this, you are directed to report the fact to the
senior naval officer of the harbor, who will be instructed by the
Secretary of the Navy to use his entire force to open a passage, when
you will, if possible, effect an entrance and place both the troops
and supplies in Fort Sumter.
I am, sir, very respectfully, Your obedient servant,
SIMON CAMERON, Sec'y of War
DOCUMENT #26
The Great Rebellion: Its Secret History, John Minor Botts (Virginia
Unionist), 1866 (excerpts).
About this time (March, 1861) Mr. Lincoln sent a messenger to
Richmond, inviting a distinguished member of the Union party to come
immediately to Washington, and if he could not come himself, to send
some other, prominent Union man.... The gentlemen thus addressed, Mr.
Summers, did not go, but sent another, Mr. J. B. Baldwin, who had
distinguished himself by his zeal in the Union cause during the
session of the Convention; but this gentleman was slow in getting to
Washington.... He reached Washington on Friday the 5th of April, and,
on calling on Mr. Lincoln, the following conversation in substance
took place, as I learned from Mr. Lincoln himself. After expressing
some regret that he had not come sooner, Mr. Lincoln said, "My object
. . . was to submit a proposition by which I think the peace of the
country can be preserved; but I fear you are almost too late.
However, I will make it yet.
"This Afternoon," said he, "a fleet is to sail from the harbor of New
York for Charleston; your Convention has been in ... session for
nearly two months, and you have done nothing but hold and shake the
rod over my head. You have just taken a vote, by which it appears you
have a majority of two to one against secession. Now, so great is my
desire to preserve the peace of the country, and to save the Border
States to the Union, that if you gentlemen of the Union party will
adjourn without passing an ordinance of secession, I will telegraph
at once to New York, arrest the sailing of the fleet, and take the
responsibility of EVACUATING FORT SUMTER!" The proposition was
declined. I inquired, "Well, Mr. Lincoln, what reply did Baldwin
make?" "Oh." said he, throwing up his hands, "he wouldn't listen to
it at all, scarcely treated me with civility; asked me what I meant
by an adjournment, was it an adjournment 'sine die?'" [adjournment
sine die, which means the matter is stayed permanently] "Of course,"
said Mr. Lincoln [to Baldwin], "I don't want you to adjourn, and
after I have evacuated the fort, you meet again to adopt an ordinance
of secession." I, then said, "Mr. Lincoln, will you authorize me to
make that proposition? for I will start tomorrow morning, and have a
meeting of the Union men to-morrow night. To which he replied, "It is
too late now; the fleet sailed on Friday evening."
[Editor’s note: Through the late winter and early spring of 1861, the
state of Virginia, the most populous and most influential slave
state, delayed secession from the Union and joining the Confederacy.
A convention of delegates from across the state, called by the state
legislature, had been in session since January debating whether
Virginia should secede from the Union and join the Confederacy.
Lincoln was extraordinarily anxious to prevent Virginia’s secession,
which would boost the prestige and power of the Confederacy.]
DOCUMENT #27
Gideon Welles, United States Secretary of the Navy, orders to Captain
Samuel Mercer, U.S. Navy, Commanding Officer, U.S. Naval Combat Force
sent to protect Fort Sumter resupply force, April 5, 1861.
SIR: The U.S. Steamers Powhatan, Pawnee, Pocahontas, and Harriet Lane
will compose a naval force, under your command, to be sent to the
vicinity of Charleston, S.C., for the purpose of carrying out the
objects of an expedition of which the War Department has charge.
The primary object of the expedition is to provision Fort Sumter, for
which purpose the War Department will furnish the necessary
transports. Should the authorities at Charleston permit the fort, to
be supplied, no further particular service will be required of the
force under your command, and after being satisfied that supplies
have been received at the fort [your force] will return to New York
and ... to Washington.
Should the authorities at Charleston, however, refuse to permit or
attempt to prevent the vessels having supplies on board from entering
the harbor or from peaceably proceeding to Fort Sumter, you will
protect, the transports or boats of the expedition in the object of
their mission . . . and repelling by force, if necessary, all
obstructions toward provisioning the fort and reinforcing it; for in
case of resistance to the peaceable primary object of the expedition
on a reinforcement of the garrison will also be attempted . . . .
You will leave New York with the Powhatan in time to be off
Charleston bar, 10 miles distant from and due east of the lighthouse, on the morning of the 11th instant, there to await the arrival
of the transport or transports with troops and stores....
I am, respectfully, your obedient, servant,
GIDEON WELLES, Sec'y.
DOCUMENT #28
Captain Gustavus Fox, U.S. Navy, Commanding Officer, Transports sent
to resupply and reinforce Fort Sumter, South Carolina, report on his
mission, May 5, 1861.
On the 30th of March the President sent me to New York with verbal
instructions to prepare for the voyage, but to make no binding
engagements …
On the 2nd of April I had not received the written authority which I
expected from the Government; therefore I returned to Washington.
Delays which belong to the secret history of this period prevented a
decision until the afternoon of the 4th of April, when the President
sent for me and said that he had decided to let the expedition go,
and that a messenger from himself would be sent to the authorities of
Charleston before I could possibly get there, to notify them that no
troops would be thrown into Sumter if provisions were allowed
peacefully to be sent to the garrison. I mentioned to the President
that by the time I should arrive at New York I would have but nine
days in which to charter and provision the vessels and reach the
destined point, 632 miles distant.
We answered that I should best fulfill my duty to my country to make
the attempt….
The frigate Powhatan, Captain Mercer, sailed on the 6th of April,
1861; the Pawnee, Captain Rowan, on the 9th; the Pocahontas, Captain
Gillis, on the 10th; the Harriet Lane, Captain Faunce, on the 8th....
Soon after leaving Sandy Hook a heavy gale of wind set in, which
continued during the whole passage. At 3 a.m. of the 12th we reached
the rendezvous off Charleston and communicated with the Harriet Lane,
the only vessel which had arrived; at 6 a.m.... then stood in toward
the bar, followed by the Harriet Lane, Captain Faunce, who
cheerfully, accompanied me. As we neared the land, heavy guns were
heard and the smoke and shells from the batteries, which had just
opened fire upon Sumter, were distinctly visible.... The weather
continued very bad, with a heavy sea....
DOCUMENT #29
Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy, Message, orders marked
“Confidential,” to Captain H.A. Adams, U.S. Navy, Commanding Officer,
U.S. Naval Forces off Pensacola and Fort Pickens, Florida, April 6,
1861.
SIR: Your dispatch of April 1 is received. The Department regrets
that you did not comply with the request of Captain Vogdes to carry
into effect the orders of General Scott sent out by the Crusader
[U.S.S. Crusader, a U.S. Naval vessel] under the orders of the
Department.
You will immediately, on the first favorable opportunity after
receipt of this order, afford every facility to Captain Vogdes by
boats and other means, to enable him to land the troops under his
command, it being the wish and intention of the Navy Department to
cooperate with the War Department in that object.
I am, sir, respectfully, etc.,
GIDEON WELLES, Secretary of the Navy
DOCUMENT #30
Abraham Lincoln, letter to Robert S. Chew, Special Messenger, State
Department, April 6, 1861.
[Editor’s note: Lincoln may have sent the letter below primarily to
fulfill a pledge to Seward that the Government would, in effect, warn
the Governor of South Carolina in advance whether Fort Sumter was to
be supplied. Seward had promised Justice John A. Campbell on April 4
that "the Government will not undertake to supply Fort Sumter without
giving notice to Governor Pickens"].
SIR: You will proceed directly to Charleston, South Carolina, and if,
on your arrival there, the flag of the United States shall be flying
over Fort Sumter and the fort shall not have been attacked, you will
procure an interview with Governor Pickens, and read to him as
follows: "I am directed by the President of the United States to
notify you to expect an attempt will be made to supply Fort Sumter
with provisions only; and that, if such attempt be not resisted, no
effort to throw in men, arms, or ammunition will be made without
further notice, or in case of an attack upon the fort."
After you shall have read this to Governor Pickens, deliver to him
the copy of it herein enclosed, and retain this letter yourself.
But if, on your arrival at Charleston, you shall ascertain that Fort
Sumter shall have been already evacuated, or surrendered by the
United States force, or shall have been attacked by an opposing
force, you will seek no interview with Governor Pickens, but return
here forthwith.
DOCUMENT #31
John A. Campbell, Associate Justice, United States Supreme Court,
personal notes, (see above, Document #11) undated, but refers to
events late March, early April 1861.
[Editor’s note: When Fort Sumter had not been evacuated by the
beginning of April, as Seward had indicated to Confederate
negotiators, Justice Campbell wanted an explanation].
Mr. Seward said he must be particular in his intercourse with men,
and that he would go to see the President. He left me in his office
and was absent some minutes. When he returned he wrote for the answer
to Governor Pickens, "I am satisfied that the Government will not
undertake to supply Fort Sumter without giving notice to Governor
Pickens." It was understood between us that the import of the
conversations previously had, was not affected by what had taken
place.
During the first week in April it became apparent to persons in
Washington City that some important decision in regard to the
questions relative to the seceding States had taken place. The troops
which had been collected there were removed; rumors among naval
officers of movements of vessels of war were current. There had been
an unusual concourse of politicians there, and the tone of one party
became more menacing and of the other more anxious and despondent. I
recollect to have heard that an expedition for the relief of Sumter
had been resolved on, and also threatening speeches of President
Lincoln were quoted. Mr. Crawford [Confederate Commissioner with whom
Campbell had been negotiating] applied to me for a fulfillment of the
pledge for the evacuation of Sumter or for explanations. On the
seventh of April I addressed Mr. Seward a letter, reciting what had
taken place, the anxiety of the Commissioners, and asked explanation.
I expressed to him an apprehension that a collision might arise, and
. . . referred to the condition both of Sumter and Pickens. His
reply: "Faithfully kept as to Sumter, wait and see; other suggestions
received and will be respectfully considered."
This note left unsigned.…
DOCUMENT #32
Confederate Commissioners in Washington D.C., excerpts from telegrams
to Robert A. Toombs, Secretary of State, Confederate States of
America, Montgomery, Alabama, April 1861.
April 2. "The war wing presses on the President; he vibrates to that
side.
April 3. "Much activity today in the War and Navy Departments."
April 5. The movement of troops and preparations on board vessels of
war ... are continued with the great activity.... Having no
confidence in the administration, we say, be ever on your guard.
April 8. "This Government politely declines in a written paper to
recognize our official character or the power we represent."
April 10. "Our mission is closed."
DOCUMENT #33
Captain Theodore Talbot, U.S. Army, letter to Simon Cameron, U.S.
Secretary of War, April 12, 1861.
SIR: I have the honor to report that in obedience to your
instructions, dated April 6, 1861, I left Washington on the evening
of the same day in company with Mr. R. S. Chew, and arrived at
Charleston, S.C., on the evening of the 8th instant. Immediately
after my arrival I visited Governor Pickens, and, having informed him
of the nature of my written instructions, stated that Mr. Chew had
requested me to ask his excellency [Governor Pickens] for an
interview at his earliest convenience. The governor replied that he
would receive Mr. Chew at once, and, shortly after, I accompanied Mr.
Chew to the governor's quarters. Mr. Chew read to the governor, in my
presence, a message from the President of the United States, handing
him a copy of the same, which was compared by the governor. The
governor stated to Mr. Chew that, South Carolina having ratified the
constitution of the Confederate States, General Beauregard now had
charge of military affairs in the vicinity of Charleston, and that,
as General Beauregard was near at hand, he would desire to have him
present at the interview. To this Mr. Chew assented, and General
Beauregard having been called into the room the governor read and
banded to him the copy of the message, which he had just received.
DOCUMENT #34
Brigadier General P.G.T. Beauregard, Confederate States Army, letter
to Major Robert Anderson, U.S. Army, Commanding Officer, Fort Sumter,
April 11, 1861.
SIR: The Government of the Confederate States has hitherto forborne
from any hostile demonstrations against Fort Sumter, in the hope that
the Government of the United States ... to avert the calamity of war,
would voluntarily evacuate it.
There was reason at one time to believe that such would be the course
pursued by the Government of the United States, and under that
impression my Government has refrained from making any demands for
the surrender of the fort. But the Confederate States can no longer
delay.…
I am ordered by the Government of the Confederate States to demand
the evacuation of Fort Sumter. My aides, Colonel Chesnut and Captain
Lee, are authorized to make such demand of you. All proper facilities
will be afforded for the removal of yourself and command, together
with company arms and property, and all private property, to any post
in the United States which you may select. The flag which you have
upheld so long and with so much fortitude, under the most trying
circumstances, may be saluted by you on taking it down.
Colonel Chesnut and Captain Lee will, for a reasonable time, await
your answer. I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant.
P. G. T. BEAUREGARD
DOCUMENT #35
Major Robert Anderson’s reply to General Beauregard, April 11, 1861.
General: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your
communication demanding the evacuation of this fort, and to say, in
reply thereto, that it is a demand with which I regret that my sense
of honor, and of my obligations to my Government, prevent my
compliance. Thanking you for the fair, manly, and courteous terms
proposed, and for the high compliment paid me,
I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
ROBERT ANDERSON
DOCUMENT #36
Beauregard to Anderson, Second letter, April 11, 1861.
Major: In consequence of the verbal observation made by you to my
aides, Messrs. Chesnut and Lee, in relation to the condition of your
supplies, and that you would in a few days be starved out if our guns
did not batter you to pieces, or words to that effect, and desiring
no useless effusion of blood, I communicated both the verbal
observations and your written answer to my communications to my
Government.
If you will state the time at which you will evacuate Fort Sumter,
and agree that in the meantime you will not use your guns against us
unless ours shall be employed against Fort Sumter, we will abstain
from opening fire upon you. Colonel Chesnut and Captain Lee are
authorized by me to enter into such an agreement with you. You are,
therefore, requested to communicate to them an open answer.
I remain, major, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
P. G. T. BEAUREGARD
DOCUMENT #37
Anderson’s reply to Beauregard’s second letter, April 12, 1861,
approximately 2 a.m.
General: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt by Colonel
Chesnut of your second communication of the 11th instant, and to
state in reply that, cordially uniting with you in the desire to
avoid the useless effusion of blood, I will, if provided with the
proper and necessary means of transportation, evacuate Fort Sumter by
noon on the 15th instant, and that I will not in the meantime open
fire upon your forces unless compelled to do so by some hostile act
against this fort or the flag of my Government by the forces under
your command, or by some portion of them, or by the perpetration of
some act showing hostile intention on your part against this fort or
the flag it bears, should I not receive prior to that time
controlling instructions from my Government or additional supplies.
I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
ROBERT ANDERSON
DOCUMENT #38
Colonel James Chesnut, Jr., and Captain Stephen D. Lee, Confederate
States Army (aides to General Beauregard), letter to Major Robert
Anderson, United States Army. Composed at Fort Sumter, 3:20 a.m.,
April 12, 1861.
Sir: By authority of Brigadier General Beauregard, commanding the
Provisional Forces of the Confederate States, we have the honor to
notify you that he will open fire of his batteries on Fort Sumter in
one hour from this time.
We have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servants,
JAMES CHESNUT, JR., Aide-de-Camp. STEPHEN D. LEE, Captain, C.S. Army
DOCUMENT #39
Orville H. Browning, United States Senator from Illinois and a friend
of Lincoln, Diary entry, July 3, 1861. (Browning spent that evening
with Lincoln at the White House.)
He [Lincoln] told me that the very first thing placed in his hands
after his inauguration was a letter from Major Anderson announcing
the impossibility of defending or relieving Sumter. That he called
the cabinet together and consulted General Scott -- that Scott
concurred with Anderson, and the cabinet, with the exception of P.M.
Genl. Blair were for evacuating the Fort, and all the troubles and
anxieties of his life had not equaled those which intervened between
this time and the fall of Sumter. He himself conceived the idea, and
proposed sending supplies, without an attempt to reinforce, giving
notice of the fact to Gov. Pickens of S.C. The plan succeeded. They
attacked Sumter, it fell, and thus, did more service than it
otherwise could.
DOCUMENT #40
Abraham Lincoln, “BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, A
PROCLAMATION”,
April 15, 1861. (Excerpts)
Whereas the laws of the United States have been for some time past,
and now are opposed, and the execution thereof obstructed, in the
States of South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, Florida, Mississippi,
Louisiana and Texas, by combinations too powerful to be suppressed by
the ordinary course of judicial proceedings, or by the powers vested
in Marshals by law,
Now therefore, I, Abraham Lincoln, President of the United States, in
virtue of the power in me vested by the Constitution, and the laws,
have thought fit to call forth, and hereby do call forth, the militia
of the several States of the Union, to the aggregate number of
seventy-five thousand, in order to suppress said combinations, and to
cause the laws to be duly executed….
…the first service assigned to the forces hereby called forth will
probably be to re-possess the forts, places, and property which have
been seized from the Union; and in every event, the utmost care will
be observed, consistently with the objects aforesaid, to avoid any
devastation, any destruction of, or interference with, property, or
any disturbance of peaceful citizens in any part of the country.
And I hereby command the persons composing the combinations aforesaid
to disperse, and retire peaceably to their respective abodes within
twenty days from this date….
Abraham Lincoln
DOCUMENT #41
Stephen B. Oates (academic historian), With Malice Toward None: The
Life of Abraham Lincoln, 1977. (excerpt)
On April 15 Lincoln’s proclamation for 75,000 militiamen went out to
the states, and it forced vacillating men in both North and South to
choose their sides. In the border South, secession conventions sprang
into action, for the specter of federal troops invading the deep
South, shooting at rebel Southerners and [perhaps] liberating slaves
was more than even Southern Unionists could bear. On April 17 the
Virginia convention adopted a secession ordinance which the voters
eventually ratified. Virginia joined the Confederacy, and the rebels
moved their national capital to Richmond. Within the next two months,
Arkansas, North Carolina, and Tennessee also seceded and became
Confederate states, with Maryland, Missouri, and Kentucky threatening
to go out as well.
DOCUMENT #42
Abraham Lincoln, Message to Congress (called into Special Session to
deal with the war crisis), excerpts, July 4, 1861.
[Editor’s Note: One of the purposes of the President’s Message below
was to review the action taken by the administration during the
crisis.]
At the beginning of the present presidential term, four months ago,
the functions of the Federal Government were found to be generally
suspended within the several States of South Carolina, Georgia,
Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, and Florida, excepting only those of
the Post-office Department.
Within these States all the forts, arsenals, dockyards, customhouses, and the like, including the movable and stationary property
in and about them, had been seized, and were held in open hostility
to this Government, excepting only Fort Pickens, Taylor, and
Jefferson, on and near the Florida coast, and Fort Sumter in
Charleston Harbor....
The forts remaining in the possession of the Federal Government in
and near these States were either besieged or menaced by warlike
preparations, and especially Fort Sumter was nearly surrounded by
well-protected hostile batteries with guns equal in quality to the
best of its own, and outnumbering the latter as perhaps ten to one .
. . simultaneously, and in connection with all this, the purpose to
sever the Federal Union was openly avowed . . . and this illegal
organization in the character of confederate States, was already
invoking recognition, aid, and intervention, from foreign powers.
Finding this condition of things, and believing it to be an
imperative duty upon the incoming Executive to prevent, if possible,
the consummation of such attempt to destroy the Federal Union, a
choice of means to that end became indispensable. The choice was
made, and was declared in the inaugural address. The policy chosen
looked to the exhaustion of all peaceful measures, before a resort to
any stronger ones. It sought only to hold the public places and
property not already wrested from the Government, and to collect the
revenue, relying for the rest on time, discussion, and the ballotbox. It promised a continuance of the mails, at Government expense,
to the very people who were resisting the Government; and it gave
repeated pledges against any disturbance to any of the people, or any
of their rights. Of all that which a President might constitutionally
and justifiably do in such a case, everything was forborne, without
which it was believed possible to keep the government on foot.
On the 5th of March, (the present incumbent's first full day in
office) a letter of Major Anderson, commanding at Fort Sumter,
written on the 28th of February, and received at the War Department
on the 4th of March, was, by that Department placed in his hands.
This letter expressed the professional opinion of the writer, that
reinforcements could not be thrown into that fort within the time for
his relief, rendered necessary by the limited supply of provisions,
and with a view of holding possession of the same, with a force of
less than twenty thousand good and well disciplined men. This opinion
was concurred in by all the officers of his command, and their
memoranda on the subject were made enclosures of Major Anderson's
letter.
The whole was immediately laid before Lieutenant General Scott, who
at once concurred with Major Anderson in opinion. On reflection,
however, he took full time, consulting with other officers, both of
the Army and the Navy; and, at the end of four days came reluctantly,
but decidedly, to the same conclusion as before. He also stated at
the same time that no such sufficient force was then at the control
of the Government, or could be raised, and brought to the ground,
within the time when the provisions in the Fort would be exhausted.
In a purely military point of view, this reduced the duty of the
administration in the case, to the mere matter of getting the
garrison safely out of the Fort.
It was believed, however, that to so abandon that position, under the
circumstances, would be utterly ruinous; that the necessity under
which it was done would not be fully understood-- that, by many, it
would be construed as a part of a voluntary policy -- that, at home,
it would discourage the friends of the Union, embolden its
adversaries, and go far to insure to the latter a recognition abroad
-- that in fact it would be our national destruction consummated.
This could not be allowed. Starvation was not yet upon the garrison;
and ere it would be reached, Fort Pickens might be reinforced. This
last would be a clear indication of policy, and would better enable
the country to accept the evacuation of Fort Sumter as a military
necessity. An order was at once directed to be sent for the landing
of the troops from the Steamship Brooklyn, into Fort Pickens. This
order could not go by land, but must take the longer and slower route
by sea. The first return news from the order was received just one
week before the fall of Fort Sumter. The news itself was that the
officer commanding the Sabine, acting upon some quasi-armistice of
the late administration (and of the existence of which the present
administration, up to the time the order was dispatched, had only,
too vague and uncertain rumors to fix attention), had refused to land
the troops. To now reinforce Fort Pickens, before a crisis would be
reached at Fort Sumter was impossible -- rendered so by the near
exhaustion of provisions in the latter-named Fort. In precaution
against such a conjuncture, the government had, a few days before,
commenced preparing an expedition, as well adapted as might be, to
relieve Fort Sumter which expedition was intended to be ultimately
used or not, according to circumstances. The strongest anticipated
case for using it was now presented; and it was resolved to send it
forward. As had been intended in this contingency, it was also
resolved to notify the Governor of South Carolina that he might
expect an attempt would be made to provision the Fort; and that, if
the attempt should not be resisted, there would be no effort to throw
in men, arms, or ammunition without further notice or in case of an
attack upon the Fort. This notice was accordingly given; whereupon
the Fort was attacked and bombarded to its fall, without even
awaiting the arrival of the provisioning expedition.
It was thus seen that the assault upon and reduction of Fort Sumter
was in no sense a matter of self-defense on the part of the
assailants. They well knew that the garrison in the Fort could by no
possibility commit aggression upon them. They knew -- they were
expressly notified -- that the giving of bread to the few brave and
hungry men of the garrison was all which would on that occasion be
attempted, unless themselves, by resisting so much, should provoke
more. They knew that this Government desired to keep the garrison in
the Fort, not to assail them, but merely to maintain visible
possession and thus to preserve the Union from actual and immediate
dissolution -- trusting, as herein-before stated, to time,
discussion, and the ballot-box, for final adjustment; and they
assailed and reduced the Fort for precisely the reverse object -- to
drive out the visible authority of the Federal Union and thus force
it to immediate dissolution....
Then and thereby the assailants of the Government began the conflict
of arms.
.... So viewing the issue, no choice was left but to call out the war
power of the Government; and so to resist force employed for its
destruction, by force for its preservation.
DOCUMENT #43
The Order of Secession of Southern Slave States, 1860-1861:
Southern Slave States That Seceded Prior to the Bombardment of Fort
Sumter
South Carolina
Mississippi
Florida
Alabama
Georgia
Louisiana
Texas
December 20,
January
January
10,
January
11,
January
19,
January
26,
February
1861
9, 1861
1861
1861
1861
1861
1, 1861
Southern Slave States That Seceded After the Bombardment of Fort
Sumter
Virginia
Arkansas
April
May
17, 1861
6, 1861
Tennessee
North Carolina
May
May
7, 1861
20, 1861
Southern Slave States That Did Not Seceded from The Union
Missouri
Kentucky
Maryland
Delaware