Download Aristotle: On Greek Governance

Survey
yes no Was this document useful for you?
   Thank you for your participation!

* Your assessment is very important for improving the workof artificial intelligence, which forms the content of this project

Document related concepts

Direct democracy wikipedia , lookup

Epikleros wikipedia , lookup

Ancient Greek literature wikipedia , lookup

Theorica wikipedia , lookup

Tyrant wikipedia , lookup

Ancient Greek philosophy wikipedia , lookup

Theophrastus wikipedia , lookup

Ancient Greek medicine wikipedia , lookup

Athenian democracy wikipedia , lookup

Ancient economic thought wikipedia , lookup

Aristotle's biology wikipedia , lookup

History of science in classical antiquity wikipedia , lookup

Transcript
PKU3 GOVERNANCE 1 Aristotle on Greek Governance
Aristotle: On Greek Governance
To keep in mind as you read: Athens is conventionally cited in the modern
West as the ancestral authorization for modern forms of democracy [link:
democracy]. If Athenian democracy was all that admirable, why did it not survive
beyond a century or two?
Introduction:
Athens, where Aristotle (384-322 BCE) spent most of his adult life teaching and writing
philosophy, provided a real-life laboratory for anyone who sought to compare different
systems of government. Aristotle sets out to weigh the advantages and disadvantages
of each of the three basic modes of government Athens had known. Note the
importance of justice as a principle often referred to in his arguments.
The origins of the word “democracy” are clearly Greek (demos, the people; kratia, rule).
But, as a matter of practice, any group of humans that exceeds a few dozen will need to
identify some as leaders and a larger number as followers. As soon as that happens,
the legitimacy of the leaders [link: overview E5.1] may be called into question if their
authority seems uncertain from the point of view of their followers (“the people”).
Unhappiness may surface whenever leaders become unpopular, and at that point
different versions of democracy may surface, all based on one or another idea of how
“the people” are to be defined and how their views are to be taken into account.
In ancient Athens – where Western-style democratic practices first emerged –
Aristotle saw that no political system is ideal. But he believed that, when large numbers
of citizens share in decision making, there are fewer chances for abuses of power.
In Athens all adult free-born males were citizens with the right to participate in
debates in the assembly. As a practical matter, since the assembly was awkward to call
into session, 500 men were chosen by lot to make day-to-day decisions during a fixed
period of time. This practice did not guarantee that their decisions would be wise:
Socrates was condemned to death by a vote of 280 to 220, a judgment that the
Athenians later deeply regretted [link: Socrates’ death thoughts]. The key to the Athenian
system was that those who voted, for example on whether or not to go to war, were the
same individuals who would serve in the army. Therefore, they had reasons to take their
responsibilities seriously.
Aristotle (384-322 BCE)
[Source: http://www.kidspast.com/images/aristotle.jpg,
111229]
Text (about 350 BCE):
Rule by the Poor or the Rich
There is also a doubt as to what is to be the supreme power in the state: Is it the
multitude? Or the wealthy? Or the good? Or the one best man (Plato’s idea)? Or a tyrant
(one who gained power illegitimately)? Any of these alternatives seems to involve
disagreeable consequences.
If the poor, for example, because they are more in number, divide among
themselves the property of the rich – is not this unjust? No, by heaven (will be the reply),
for the supreme authority (in this case, the poor) justly willed it. But if this is not injustice,
pray what is? Again, when . . . the majority divide anew the property of the minority, is it
not evident, if this goes on, that they will ruin the state?
Yet surely, virtue is not the ruin of those who possess her, nor is justice destructive
of a state; and therefore this law of confiscation clearly cannot be just. If it were, all the
acts of a tyrant must of necessity be just; for he only coerces other men by superior
power, just as the multitude coerce the rich.
But is it just, then, that the few and the wealthy should be the rulers? And what if
they, in like manner, rob and plunder the people – is this just? If so, the other case will
likewise be just. There can be no doubt that all these things are wrong and unjust.
Rule by the Good
Then ought the good to rule and have supreme power? But in that case everybody
else, being excluded from power, will be dishonored. For the offices of a state are posts
of honor; and if one set of men always holds them, the rest must be deprived of them.
Then will it be well that the one best man should rule? Nay, that is still more oligarchical
(Greek, olig, “few”; arches, “ruler”), for the number of those who are dishonored is thereby
increased. Some one may say that it is bad in any case for a man, subject as he is to all
the accidents of human passion, to have the supreme power, rather than the law. But
what if the law itself be democratical or oligarchical: how will that help us out of our
difficulties? Not at all; the same consequences will follow.
When Laws Are Bad
The best man must legislate, and laws must be passed, but these laws will have no
authority when they miss the mark, though in all other cases retaining their authority.
But when the law cannot determine a point at all, or not well, should the one best man
or should all decide?
The Elusive Principle of Justice as Equality
In all sciences and arts, the end is (by definition) a good, and the greatest good and in
the highest degree a good is the most authoritative of all – this is the political science of
which the good is justice, in other words, the common interest. . . . Equals ought to have
equality. But there still remains a question: equality or inequality of what? Here is a
difficulty which calls for political speculation. For very likely some persons will say that
offices of state ought to be unequally distributed according to superior excellence, in
whatever respect, of the citizen, although there is no other difference between him and
the rest of the community. But, surely, if this is true, the complexion or height of a man,
or any other advantage, may be a reason for his obtaining a greater share of political
rights. The error here lies upon the surface, and may be illustrated from the other arts
and sciences. When a number of flute players are equal in their art, there is no reason
why those of them who are better born should have better flutes given to them; for they
will not play any better on the flute, and the superior instrument should be reserved for
him who is the superior artist. . . . For if some be slow, and others swift, that is no
reason why the one should have little and the others much; it is in gymnastics contests
that such excellence is rewarded. Whereas the rival claims of candidates for office can
only be based on the possession of elements which enter into the composition of a state.
And therefore the noble, or free-born, or rich, may with good reason claim office; for
holders of offices must be freemen (not slaves) and taxpayers. But if wealth and freedom
are necessary elements, justice and valor are equally so; for without the former qualities
a state cannot exist at all, without the latter not well.
Athenian Democracy: Free Adult Men Attend Assemblies and Vote
According to our present practice, assemblies meet, sit in judgment, deliberate, and
decide, and their judgments all relate to individual cases. Now any member of the
assembly, taken separately, is certainly inferior to the wise man. But the state is made
up of many individuals. And as a feast to which all the guests contribute is better than a
banquet furnished by a single man, so a multitude is a better judge of many things than
any individual.
Again, the many are more incorruptible than the few; they are like the greater
quantity of water that is less easily corrupted than a little (water). The individual is liable
to be overcome by anger or by some other passion, and then his judgment is
necessarily perverted; but it is hardly to be supposed that a great number of persons
would all get into a passion and go wrong at the same moment.
[Source: http://etext.library.adelaide.edu.au/a/aristotle/a8po/, 111229, from Politics, Book 3, translated by
Benjamin Jowett, modified]
Study questions:
1. In section 2, Aristotle gives importance to honor. How important do you think this
factor was to the Greeks [link: Argive sons]? How does it relate to East Asian ideas
such as face [link: face]?
2. Many Greek texts are written in the form of a dialogue between two characters [link:
Xenophon]. Here Aristotle incorporates objections into the flow of his own text. Do you
find the objections to be cogent and strong or merely weak counter-arguments? In
other words, to what extent does the form of this text incorporate agon (“contest”)?
3. When he speaks of justice as a good, Aristotle equates it to the common interest
To what extent does such a concept play a part in the Chinese tradition?
4. Aristotle, in section 4, considers the importance of different skills as well as status
at birth. How does he resolve the issues of defining their importance? How does his
position compare with that of Xunzi [link: Xunzi]?
5. Aristotle worries a good deal about how to define equality in a political context.
Does he succeed in doing so? Cite specific evidence from this passage.
6. In “Rule by the Good,” Aristotle may have in mind Plato’s philosopher-king, the
undeniably Good man [link: text]. How could one determine whether or not a potential
ruler represents the Good?
Excerpted from Western Civilization with Chinese Comparisons, 3rd ed,(Shanghai:
Fudan University Press, 2010), pp 369-72