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Strategic Interaction between Fiscal and Monetary Policies in an Export-Oriented Economy Sergey Merzlyakov Junior Research Fellow of the Laboratory for Macroeconomic Analysis National Research University Higher School of Economics, Moscow Contents Motivation Literature on Fiscal and Monetary Policy Interaction Model Strategic Interaction Conclusion Motivation Why strategic interaction? Complementary policy instruments Joint constraint Peculiarity of macroeconomic development in an export-oriented economy Optimal macroeconomic policy design Central bank independence: do we really need it? Literature review Fiscal and monetary policy interaction: Christ (1979), Sargent and Wallace (1981), Blinder (1982) Strategic complementarity instruments: Andersen and Schneider (1986), Dixit and Lambertini (2003) New political economy in macroeconomics setup: Drazen (2000), Persson and Tabellini (2000) Two-period model Key points Fiscal policy Discretionary policy (lump-sum taxes, government expenditure) Automatic stabilizers (taxes that depend on export and output) Stabilization fund (as the sterilization mechanism of excessive money) Monetary policy The only transmission monetary channel is foreign currency operations Exchange rate target Export and import depend on exchange rate By changing the international reserves, the central bank changes the supply of money Endogenous variables: Y1 , 1 , 1 , 1 , M E1 , s1 , z1 Predetermined variables: all variables in period 0 Policy variables: x, e1 Model M E1V x P1Y1 Aggregate Demand 1 0 Y1 Y * 1 0 Phillips Curve s1 s0 E0 Ex0 tY0 x P0 Government Budget Constraint Ex0 Im0 CF0 z1 z0 Balance of Payment M1 M 0 z1 z0 E1 Foreign Exchange Market Operations M1 M 0 s1 s0 M E1 M E 0 Money in Circulation E1 P11 Real Exchange Rate Social Loss Function LS 1 2 2 1 eS e12 YS Y1 Y 2 Forms of strategic interaction Dependent central bank: fiscal and monetary policy coordination Independent central bank: Stackelberg interaction with the government leadership Cournot interaction (central bank and government do not take each others’ actions into account when choosing their policies) The government loss: The central bank loss: 1 2 1 2 2 2 LF 1 xF x x YF Y1 Y 2 LM 2 1 e YM Y1 Y 2 eM 1 2 Coordination: the loss function LF M 1 2 2 2 1 1 YM YF Y1 Y eM e12 XF x x 2 What is the optimal bargaining power of the government relative to the central bank? Coordination: the bargaining power 1,2 0,00020 0,986 1,0 0,00018 0,00016 0,00014 0,8 0,00012 0,6 0,00010 0,00008 0,4 0,00006 0,00004 0,099 0,2 0,000118 0,005045 0,010 0,00002 0,0 0,00000 0,01 0,5 1 10 100 Bargaining power Government and central bank loss Social loss Coordination is effective only if the bargaining power of the central bank is relatively large Central bank independence: agents’ losses 0,00035 0,00030 0,00025 0,00020 0,00015 0,00010 0,00005 0,00000 alphaYF 0 0,05 0,75 1 1,5 2,5 10 Lm 0,000223 0,000195 0,000092 0,000076 0,000062 0,000043 0,000022 Lf 0,000005 0,000012 0,000103 0,000123 0,000154 0,000193 0,000303 Ls 0,000166 0,000146 0,000070 0,000059 0,000048 0,000035 0,000019 Agents’ losses are sensitive to fiscal policy Conclusion In an export-oriented economy the independence of the central bank does not play a significant role Coordination is preferable if the bargaining power of the central bank is relatively large Interaction with the government leadership is preferable if the output is government priority Next: to compare different monetary policy regimes (exchange rate target vs. growth rate of money target), to analyze other forms of strategic interaction (the central bank leadership) Thank you for your attention!