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Transcript
Kantian Moral Theory
and the Liberal View of Sexual Morality
Kantian Moral Theory


Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) revolutionized
philosophical ethics. Prior to Kant, people
sought the origin of morality in the natural
order, in the ends proper to human beings, or
in feelings. In contrast, Kant seeks the
conditions of the possibility of morality and
locates them in the autonomy, the selflegislation, of the will.
When we think about moral obligation, he
argued, what we need to account for is its
categorical character, the fact that it
commands us absolutely.
Kant and the Categorical
The focus on the categorical nature of
obligation suggests a Theory of Right
Conduct: those actions are obligatory
which we are categorically commanded to
do, wrong which we are categorically
commanded not to do, and permissible if
we are not either commanded or forbidden
to do.
 The categorical character of obligation also
provides us with a Theory of Value: that will
is good which freely choses to satisfy her
duty.

Two Different Imperatives
The form taken by the categorical nature of
obligation is what Kant calls an imperative.
Imperatives are expressions of the human will, but
only some of them exhibit the categorical force of
a duty.
 There are two types of imperatives. The more
common is what Kant calls a Hypothetical
imperative. It has the form: “If I have an end/goal
‘X,’ and doing ‘Y’ is required for ‘X,’ then I should
do Y.
 The moral imperative is a function of categorical
willing, and can only be observed when it is the
moral law itself that directs our will.

What about the Practical Aim?
So much for the Theoretical Aim of MT,
how does Kant address the Practical Aim?
 He does so with a fundamental moral
principle called the Categorical Imperative.
 Applying the categorical imperative to
proposed actions provides a principle of
moral evaluation, directing us to the right
actions.

CI: Humanity Formulation

CIHumanity: An action is right if and only if the

action treats persons (including oneself) as
ends in themselves rather than as means to
our ends.
There is both a negative (don’t treat them as
means) and a positive (treat them as ends in
themselves) requirement contained in the
formulation.
 The positive requirement is captured by Kant
with the notion of Dignity.
CI: Universal Law Formulation
CIUniversal Law: Act always in such a way that
you can will the maxim of your action to be
universal law.
 Despite the proximity of this formulation to
the Golden Rule, it is really quite different.
The UL formulation imposes a consistency
requirement.
 You should only act in such a way that
everyone else should act and that you want
them to act.

Mappes on Sexual Morality
Mappes makes clear from the beginning
of his essay that he is taking exception
to what he calls “conventional sexual
morality:” that non-marital sex, or sex
without love, is immoral.
 To dispute this is not to deny that there
are moral limits on sexual behavior. It is
rather to contest the ground on which
such limits are commonly articulated.

Using Other People
The ground that Mappes thinks is
appropriate is the Humanity formulation of
the CI.
 Mappes highlights the concept of
“Voluntary Informed Consent” as an aid to
understanding what’s wrong with “using
people” in a way that violates the CI.

 “A immorally uses B iff A intentionally acts in a way that
violates the requirement that B’s involvement with A’s
ends be based on B’s voluntary informed consent”
(47c2).

Two obvious ways that people can be used
is via coercion and deception.
Using Other People for Sex
Employing the concept of VIC, we can
easily provide a criterion by which it can
be determined if a specific sex act
violates the CI’s insistence of personal
dignity.
 A sexually uses B iff A intentionally acts
in a way that violates the requirement
that B’s sexual interaction with A be
based on B’s voluntary informed
consent.

Putting the Informed in Consent
An important caveat of Mappes’
specification of the VIC for matters of the
moral evaluation of sex is that by definition
sex with children and other not fully
competent agents is by definition immoral.
 The notion of “informed consent” requires a
competency (both legal and moral) that
children never meet and that adults can
sometimes not meet.

Deception and Sexual Morality

There are obvious, clear-cut cases in which
the use of deception violates the VIC
standard and by extension the CI. At issues
is the “informed” part of the VIC.
○ In general, “If one person’s consent to sex is predicated on
false beliefs that have been intentionally and deceptively
inculcated by one’s sexual partner in an effort to win the
forrmer’s consent, the resulting sexual interaction
is…[immoral]” (49c2).

As is typically the case, withholding
information can be as intentionally
deceptive as outright lying.
Coercion and Sexual Morality

Coercion is the more difficult case of the
two, at least in some of its forms, if only
because coercion can take two forms.
 Occurent coercion occurs when physical force is used to
overwhelm the agents very capacity consent or dissent.
 Dispositional coercion occurs when the capacity to
consent is not overwhelmed, but manipulated by threats.

While there is very little confusion about
occurent coercion, the concept of
dispositional coercion does admit of some
ambiguity.
Putting it to Work
Look at the examples on pp. 50-51.
 The distinction Mappes makes is
grounded in the conceptual space
between threats and offers.
 Can this distinction be maintained?
 What about the “Coercive Offer?”

What does it all Mean?
What are we to make of the obvious
difference between Mappes’ position
and that of the Natural Law Theorists?
 What should we do in the face of this
sort of conflict?
 Have to address the question of what
makes a theory a good one.
