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Philosophy 220
Kantian Moral Theory
and the Liberal View of
Sexual Morality
Kantian Moral Theory
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Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) revolutionized
philosophical ethics. Prior to Kant, people sought
the origin of morality in the natural order, in the
ends proper to human beings, or in feelings. In
contrast, Kant seeks the conditions of the possibility
of morality and locates them in the autonomy, the
self-legislation, of the will.
When we think about moral obligation, he argued,
what we need to account for is its categorical
character, the fact that it commands us absolutely.
Kant and the Categorical
The focus on the categorical nature of
obligation points to a TRC, but Kant also
needs a TV. The notion of the categorical
fills this need as well.
 Kant makes a distinction between
hypothetical and categorical willing,
arguing that the latter can only be
observed when it is the moral law itself
that directs our will.
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What about the Practical Aim?
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So much for the Theoretical Aim of MT, how
does Kant address the Practical Aim?
He does so with a fundamental moral principle
called the Categorical Imperative.
Applying the categorical imperative to proposed
actions provides a principle of moral evaluation,
directing us to the right actions.
CI: Humanity Formulation
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CIHumanity: An action is right if and only if the action
treats persons (including oneself) as ends in
themselves rather than as means to our ends.
There is both a negative (don’t treat them as
means) and a positive (treat them as ends in
themselves) requirement contained in the
formulation.
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The positive requirement is captured by Kant with
the notion of Dignity.
CI: Universal Law Formulation
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CIUniversal Law: Act always in such a way that you
can will the maxim of your action to be universal
law.
Despite the proximity of this formulation to the
Golden Rule, it is really quite different. The UL
formulation imposes a consistency requirement.
You should only act in such a way that
everyone else should act and that you want
them to act.
Mappes on Sexual Morality
Mappes makes clear from the beginning
of his essay that he is taking exception to
what he calls “conventional sexual
morality:” that non-marital sex, or sex
without love, is immoral.
 To dispute this is not to deny that there
are moral limits on sexual behavior. It is
rather to contest the ground on which
such limits are commonly articulated.
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Using Other People
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The ground that Mappes thinks is appropriate is
the Humanity formulation of the CI.
Mappes highlights the concept of “Voluntary
Informed Consent” as an aid to understanding
what’s wrong with “using people” in a way that
violates the CI.
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“A immorally uses B iff A intentionally acts in a way that violates
the requirement that B’s involvement with A’s ends be based on
B’s voluntary informed consent” (47c2).
Two obvious ways that people can be used is
via coercion and deception.
Using Other People for Sex
Employing the concept of VIC, we can
easily provide a criterion by which it can
be determined if a specific sex act
violates the CI’s insistence of personal
dignity.
 A sexually uses B iff A intentionally acts in
a way that violates the requirement that
B’s sexual interaction with A be based on
B’s voluntary informed consent.
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Putting the Informed in Consent
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An important caveat of Mappes’ specification of
the VIC for matters of the moral evaluation of
sex is that by definition sex with children and
other not fully competent agents is by definition
immoral.
The notion of “informed consent” requires a
competency (both legal and moral) that children
never meet and that adults can sometimes not
meet.
Deception and Sexual Morality
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There are obvious, clear-cut cases in which the
use of deception violates the VIC standard and
by extension the CI. At issues is the “informed”
part of the VIC.
• In general, “If one person’s consent to sex is predicated on false
beliefs that have been intentionally and deceptively inculcated by
one’s sexual partner in an effort to win the forrmer’s consent, the
resulting sexual interaction is…[immoral]” (49c2).
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As is typically the case, withholding information
can be as intentionally deceptive as outright
lying.
Coercion and Sexual Morality
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Coercion is the more difficult case of the two, at
least in some of its forms, if only because
coercion can take two forms.
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Occurent coercion occurs when physical force is used to
overwhelm the agents very capacity consent or dissent.
Dispositional coercion occurs when the capacity to consent is
not overwhelmed, but manipulated by threats.
While there is very little confusion about
occurent coercion, the concept of dispositional
coercion does admit of some ambiguity.
Putting it to Work
Look at the examples on pp. 50-51.
 The distinction Mappes makes is
grounded in the conceptual space
between threats and offers.
 Can this distinction be maintained?
 What about the “Coercive Offer?”
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What does it all Mean?
What are we to make of the obvious
difference between Mappes’ position and
that of the Natural Law Theorists.
 What should we do in the face of this sort
of conflict?
 Have to address the question of what
makes a theory a good one.
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