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Glimpses of
Turkey’s Religious
Opposition : Islam
a Partner for
Democratization ?
Tania Gisselbrecht, Project Associate
@BridgingEurope
EU-Turkey Dialogue Initiative Working
Paper, No. 4
EU-Turkey Dialogue Initiative Working Paper, No. 4
Glimpses of Turkey’s Religious Opposition: Islam a Partner for
Democratization?
by Tania Gisselbrecht
Last August, when a rainbow flag was waved amidst the crowd greeting the presidential
candidate Erdoğan, all bystanders may not have welcomed or understood the signification of
this colorful emblem. So far, recognition of LGBT rights is largely ignored in a party whose
leaders are prone to lash on ‘deviant’ sexual behaviors and fail to recognize homosexuality as
a sexual orientation. So why did a small group called the ‘AKP-LGBT’ decided to make its
struggle in favor of LGBT acceptance within the AKP more visible ? Did they believe that
their political family was ready for an aggiornamento on its traditionally hostile stance ?
Whatever the answer may be, the AKP-LGBT coming out stands out as a clear reminder
that mentalities within the AKP are a priori not as homogenous as one could think.
As anecdotic as it may first seem, this internal note of discord is intriguing. The AKPLGBT’s presence come as odd across the Turkish political spectrum. Similarly a veiled
woman theologian who dares to disapprove of the words of the Turkish President denying
gender equality raises some eyebrows. Why is it so ? In the West, perceptions are certainly
imbued with the idea that Islam is not open to gender equality and to granting LGBT
rights. In Turkey, a predominantly Muslim country, acknowledging a diversity of voices
within political Islam does not necessarily come naturally either, as attitudes are often
tainted with ideological bias.
Turkish history and its by-product, polarization of politics, certainly explain why the
perception of Islam is usually quite monolithic. In its efforts to construct a homogenous
nation of modern citizens, the young Turkish Republic set up to create ‘secular Muslims’. To
that aim, local and popular expressions of faith were reduced to silence and replaced by a
State version of Islam. Those who did not conform to the State-prescribed citizen identity,
and hence to the official version of Islam, were either marginalized, forced to assimilate or
worst, suppressed. In 2002, the balance of power tilted in favor of political Islam. The social
engineering apparatus was however not dismantled but simply reassigned to produce a new
model of citizen, the ‘Islamic Muslim’ .
__________________________________________________________________________________
Tania Gisselbrecht is Project Associate at Bridging Europe
Bridging Europe working papers offer policy-oriented analysis into topical issues of European
Affairs, with the aim of enriching policy-making and contributing to the ongoing debate. The views
expressed are attributable to the author (s) in a personal capacity.
Available for free downloading from Bridging Europe website (www.bridgingeurope.net).
© Bridging Europe 2014
Page |1
EU-Turkey Dialogue Initiative Working Paper, No. 4
Among other consequences, this social engineering endeavor has forged a major fracture
between ‘secularist’ and ‘Islamic’ Muslims. Turkish politics are still hinging on this religious
identity axis as shown by the absence of a clear left/right pattern in the mainstream political
landscape. Bolstered by political discourses from either side of the Islamic/secular divide, a
Manichean perception of the ‘Other’ insidiously pervaded the collective unconscious. Since
the ‘Other’ is perceived as a threat to one’s given identity, ‘difference’ becomes synonym of
danger, of enmity, and fear as well as a low level of interpersonal trust poison the political
debate.
Being a historical legacy and political construction, polarization needs to be nourished in
order to survive. Binary and confrontational rhetoric stigmatizing the ‘Other’ has thus
become rampant across the Turkish political landscape. Institutionalized prejudice and
ideological rigidity took its toll on society, obliterating nuances, the ability to compromise
or to acknowledge convergence of views across the ideological divide.
The purpose of this paper is to go past the leitmotiv of polarization and explore the
periphery of political Islam. On the basis of selected manifestations of Islamic dissensions, it
will try to reflect a more complex reality in which AKP’s dominant version of Islam is no
longer immune to criticism. A closer look at the situation shows that non-conformist, more
liberal Islamic views, although marginal, have the potential of chipping away at the AKP’s
appeal to pious voters. Non-secular critical voices are indeed manifold and vary in intensity
and effectiveness. Some have recently gained momentum against a backdrop of mounting
street protests directed against the growing authoritarianism of the regime. This is for
instance the case of the Anti-capitalist Muslims, who denounce the AKP’s neo-liberal drift
(1) Others have developed over time, like the Islamic ‘feminists’, who benefited from the
more religion-friendly atmosphere fostered by AKP’s rule (2). The coming out of AKP
LGBT individuals also participate to this trend.(3)
Through the chosen examples, this article will expose the obsolescence/irrelevance of the
prevailing secular/Islamic paradigm and suggest possible reconfigurations of the political
landscape along different demarcation lines. Indeed, in the face of reckless neo-liberal
politics and corruption, traditional patriarchy and growing authoritarianism, critics voiced
by Islamic intellectuals or civil movements can have transversal appeal. As unorthodox as
they may appeared compared with the version of political Islam professed by AKP, these
voices can potentially converge with secular opposition. In other words, some forms of
Islamic opposition are also in a position to contribute to the democratization of the country
__________________________________________________________________________________
Tania Gisselbrecht is Project Associate at Bridging Europe
Bridging Europe working papers offer policy-oriented analysis into topical issues of European
Affairs, with the aim of enriching policy-making and contributing to the ongoing debate. The views
expressed are attributable to the author (s) in a personal capacity.
Available for free downloading from Bridging Europe website (www.bridgingeurope.net).
© Bridging Europe 2014
Page |2
EU-Turkey Dialogue Initiative Working Paper, No. 4
in their own right. This conclusion echoes several analyses of the Gezi uprising which
concluded to ‘the possibility of mutually inclusive and reconciling interactions between
Islamic and secular socio-political identities and lifestyles’.
1. When the Quran takes aim at neo-liberal policies : down with ‘ablution capitalism’
and ‘Nurcuvazi’!
In 2013, among the Gezi protesters, a marginal faction drew much media attention, both
inside Turkey and abroad. Grouped under the banner of ‘Anti Kapitalist Müslümanlar’
(AKM) , some pious Muslims brought to the fore their religious identity to advocate against
what they view as excesses of the liberal policies implemented by the AKP government.
More precisely, ‘the Islamic discourse of the Anti-Capitalist Muslims is produced in
contraposition to, and in tension with the dominant Islamic discourse of the AKP’ on the
basis of Islamic texts and ethics. The AKM ‘began to perceive the dominant Islam as a
mistake, for it was transformed, especially by the AKP Government, into a structural logic
of instituting an unequal and oppressive Regime’.
By challenging the ideological hegemony of the AKP over Islamic values, the AKM clearly
embody one possible form of Islamic opposition to an Islamic government.
Little is known about the organization itself. It operates informally, is very loosely
structured and follows an horizontal organization scheme as a probable consequence of its
members’ rejection of any leadership concept . However one figure has recurrently appeared
in the media to personify the group. ιhsan Eliaçık, a religious author with a political Islam
background, seems to be the intellectual guru of the movement. The author of the book
‘Revolutionary Islam’ runs a publishing house which hosts a bookstore and meetings of
AKM groups.
The core of the AKM’s message is a radical anti-capitalist reading of the Quran. Their
manifesto states that property belongs only to God and that ‘Capitalism is the enemy of
God. It's the enemy of humanity, nature, the poor, the hungry’ . Following these premises,
the AKM believe that there cannot be such a thing like ‘Islamic capitalism’. In other words,
no religious ‘sugar-coating’ can strip capitalism from its fundamentally unjust nature.
Accordingly, they denounce AKP’s embrace of liberal policies as ‘ablution capitalism’ .
Religious undertones are nothing but a mask concealing the enrichment of a new religious
__________________________________________________________________________________
Tania Gisselbrecht is Project Associate at Bridging Europe
Bridging Europe working papers offer policy-oriented analysis into topical issues of European
Affairs, with the aim of enriching policy-making and contributing to the ongoing debate. The views
expressed are attributable to the author (s) in a personal capacity.
Available for free downloading from Bridging Europe website (www.bridgingeurope.net).
© Bridging Europe 2014
Page |3
EU-Turkey Dialogue Initiative Working Paper, No. 4
bourgeoisie class, dubbed as ‘Nurcuvazi’ . Altogether they reject a mentality based on the
motto ‘Allah’s will is to see Muslims rich and powerful’ because it runs against the true
spirit of Islam which is siding with the poor and the oppressed.
Since Islam cannot endorse capitalism, the AKM consider that the AKP is manipulating
Islam to legitimize capitalism. They deplore the transformation of Islam into an ostentatious
show of fake piety, detrimental to the essence of faith which is social justice. As such,
luxurious iftar dinners held in prestigious hotels are manifestation of a corrupted Islam.
Likewise recent cases of cronyism and corruption scandals that keep on popping up via
leaked wiretapping seem to substantiate the AKM’s views. For them, principles such as
solidarity, equality, equal distribution of wealth should be the pillars of alternative Islamic
economic policies.
Despite their anti-capitalist outlook, it would be erroneous to assimilate the AKM’s stance
with a socialist or Marxist ideology. What some observers hastily described as ‘leftist values’
are intrinsically religious. Eliaçık’s background is political Islam and the AKM’s manifesto
gives primacy to their Muslim identity. It is therefore Islam that shapes their social and
political vision. Eliaçık made it clear in an interview given to Daily Hürriyet. ‘I am a Muslim
with an anti-capitalist and revolutionary understanding of Islam. I defend an understanding
of Islam based on freedoms and pluralism’. To refute being a socialist, he added : ’We
criticize capitalism on its essence while we criticize socialism by method. We share the
fundamental teachings of socialism, like equality, sharing, no discrimination based on social
class; but we criticize the practical implementations, the political experiences of the Soviet
Union, China and Albania’.
The AKM liberal understanding of the Quran is not confined to the political and economic
field. It trickles down into various social areas. According to Eliaçık, ‘the gist of Islam lies in
universal values like justice, equality, love and mercy. The Quran says there is no
compulsion in religion. In this case, religion means worldviews and lifestyles. No one can be
forced to adopt a certain world view or lifestyle. I deduce this from the Quran. It is
unacceptable that people are oppressed due to their religion, language, political and social
identities. There is no place for that in Islam’ .
‘If we choose to follow the Qur'an, we must first admit that the issue in Islam is by no means
whether one is a Muslim or not. The issue is to institute a just regime, wherein a Muslim
will always stand against oppression by taking its side next to the oppressed – without
__________________________________________________________________________________
Tania Gisselbrecht is Project Associate at Bridging Europe
Bridging Europe working papers offer policy-oriented analysis into topical issues of European
Affairs, with the aim of enriching policy-making and contributing to the ongoing debate. The views
expressed are attributable to the author (s) in a personal capacity.
Available for free downloading from Bridging Europe website (www.bridgingeurope.net).
© Bridging Europe 2014
Page |4
EU-Turkey Dialogue Initiative Working Paper, No. 4
judging its identity, character, religiosity, lifestyle or cultural background’ summarized a
supporter. This humanist and non dogmatic interpretation is conducive to an approach
sympathetic to gender equality and sexual issues . When the group performed Friday
prayers on Taksim Square, contrary to orthodox Islamic beliefs, both males and females
participated together. In line with Eliaçık who believes ‘it is wrong to force women to cover
their head in Islam’ the AKM reacted to Erdoğan’s recent denial of gender equality with an
explicit Tweet : ‘Women and men have a different gender but this is no obstacle for them to
enjoy the same rights and status . Similarly, the group publically condemned the murder of a
young homosexual in Dıyarbakır quoting the Quran’s prohibition of murder. ‘Killing one
person is like killing the entire humanity’.
‘This indirect gay-friendly attitude is also
reflected in the words of Eliaçık : ‘it is not up to me to judge people on their personal
choices’ . ‘When we did our Friday prayers in Gezi Park under the rain, the gays were
holding umbrellas for us.’
Additionally, revolutionary Islam as promoted by the AKM adopts a similar openness when
it comes to minority rights. They have been seen toting banners written in Armenian and
Kurdish. Environment and the commoditization and destruction of nature for the sake of
profit also feature among their regular concerns. Uludere , Soma , Validebağ , Kobane etc,
the AKM are on all burning fronts.
Beyond its singular Islamic discourse on economic and social policies, the group
distinguishes itself by its methods of action. Since its first appearance during the May 1st
2011 demonstrations, the movement has staged street actions characterized by a clever use
of symbolism and the ‘highjacking of high profile events’ . Polarized Turkish politics are
indeed fraught with examples of political use of symbols. Items such as headscarf, alcohol
consumption, etc have been invested with political undertones in order to perpetuate the
secular/Islamic Muslims divide. Remarkably the AKM has chosen to use the same weapon
to fight AKP’s conservative interpretation of Islam Though with a slight difference. In the
AKM’s hands, symbols like the Yeryüzü iftarı, earth iftar , are not used to separate citizens.
They simultaneously address a critical message to the authorities (we reject consumer
culture and Islamic populism) and promote dialogue and fraternity.
So to say, the AKM re-appropriated Muslim rituals with the intent to present what they
consider a more authentic version of religion. Their modest iftars ‘tables’ made of tablecloths
or newspaper sheets spread on the pavement contrasted with ostentatious displays of wealth
at events sponsored by AKP politicians or religious bourgeoisie and exposed ‘the
__________________________________________________________________________________
Tania Gisselbrecht is Project Associate at Bridging Europe
Bridging Europe working papers offer policy-oriented analysis into topical issues of European
Affairs, with the aim of enriching policy-making and contributing to the ongoing debate. The views
expressed are attributable to the author (s) in a personal capacity.
Available for free downloading from Bridging Europe website (www.bridgingeurope.net).
© Bridging Europe 2014
Page |5
EU-Turkey Dialogue Initiative Working Paper, No. 4
contradictions between the rhetoric of Islamic values employed by AK Party and the reality
of social practice’ ‘Our understanding of Islam is based on social behavior and moral values;
you should not hurt anyone, you should not steal, you should not lie, you should not remain
silent against injustice; you have to have love and mercy for humans and nature. Those that
[do not apply] these principles fall outside of religion; fasting, praying and covering your
head is all personal. … Fasting and praying five times a day does not mean religion; these
rituals for us are just details. …The real worship is what you do when you are in the middle
of life, walking in the street in your relations with your neighbor’.
Secondly, through public symbolic action, the AKM ‘shattered the attempts of the AK party
government to create a black and white narrative of ‘them’ versus ‘us’ during the Gezi
uprising. The public performance of religious rituals is indeed a token of legitimacy.
Legitimacy for the AKM’s message which is likely rendered more audible for pious
audiences through religious imagery. And more interestingly, legitimacy for other groups
siding with AKM in their opposition to the conservative government policies. The AKM’s
presence in Gezi park made it possible to deflects accusation of irreligiousness addressed by
the government to the protestors. Thus, by sharing the fraternity spirit of Ramadan with
Gezi protesters (secularists, atheists and member of other religions alike), the AKM achieved
a unique feat : bridging the ideological division between secularists and Islamic Muslims.
But does the AKM stand any chance to win this ‘tug of war over religiousness’ ? Can
AKM’s faith-based alternative to unbridled capitalism resonate beyond their limited
constituency and Gezi sympathizers ? Although they are not numerically important , the
AKM’s message and public presence could send rippling effects into Turkish politics. Its
rejection of the venality, hubris and ostentation of the new Islamic bourgeoisie can possibly
resound within the religious electorate. Its socially liberal discourse coming as the antithesis
of the AKP’s rigid stance can catch the attention of secularists and liberal believers alike. Its
condemnation of neo-liberalism can find an echo among left-wing movements. Thus the
interest of the AKM’s stance lies in its hybrid nature. Though it bases itself on religious
premises, its discourse is not confined to religious debates but also elaborates a criticism of a
social model of development echoing global concerns.
That is probably why over a relatively short time span, the group managed to capitalize on
the public visibility it acquired during the Gezi uprising, building for itself a clear political
identity. The media exposure translated into an increased presence on social media. The
__________________________________________________________________________________
Tania Gisselbrecht is Project Associate at Bridging Europe
Bridging Europe working papers offer policy-oriented analysis into topical issues of European
Affairs, with the aim of enriching policy-making and contributing to the ongoing debate. The views
expressed are attributable to the author (s) in a personal capacity.
Available for free downloading from Bridging Europe website (www.bridgingeurope.net).
© Bridging Europe 2014
Page |6
EU-Turkey Dialogue Initiative Working Paper, No. 4
number of Eliaçık’s Twitter followers rose from 70 000 before the protest to 220 000 in
November 2013, reaching 246 000 as of November 2014.
However, the coming under the spotlights of the AKM was apparently met with great
sarcasm and skepticism by religious conservative pundits. Journalist Mustapha Akyol
ironically analyzed the latter’s reaction: it is ‘the intellectuals of the Islamic quarters who
ridiculed this rapprochement [between the devouts and the opponents of religion] most’ .
He notably reported the comments of Hikmet Genç, a daily Star columnist, according to
whom ‘never before had the world seen such an exploitation of religion’.
On the other end of the ideological spectrum, the AKM’s growing visibility may have been
interpreted by parts of the secular block as an attempt to insidiously steal the role of secular
opposition by disguising a mainly religious message under the veneer of anti-capitalism.
Their presence may also be resent by the secular opposition as the unpleasant symptom of
its own inadequacy to break down ideological walls. Finally the disbelief of the proponents
of the old divide towards this form of revolutionary Islam could also be interpreted as a sign
that most of them have remained blind to the fact that the ‘worrisome aspect of the AKP
government regarding Turkey’s democracy was not the religious fundamentalism of some of
its member, but its consistently neoliberal policies behind it. The first aspect (being) just a
populist toy,’.
Skepticism about the nature and possible impact of the AKM’s movement on both ends of
the ideological divide is the product of ‘an engrained societal conditioning that exists due to
the symbolic usage of religion in Turkish politics in a systematic manner throughout the
Turkish Republic’s short history’. For politicians and citizens, it can indeed be unsettling to
face a political phenomena that does not replicate the all too familiar secular/Islamic
Muslims paradigm.
For his part, Ihsan Eliaçik is however adamant that there is genuine interest for the AKM’s
stance among. secularists. ‘They are interested in our understanding of religion. They
continue to refuse the other [classic] religious understanding, they say, we have nothing to
do with it. ’ (Incidentally, this comes as a reminder that Turkey’s secularists are not all
distant from religion; and that Islam and secularism can be compatible.)
In a press interview, Eliaçık even forecasted that ‘ If one day the Gezi spirit will have a body,
there will be religion in it. A new type of religious understanding is going to be born from
__________________________________________________________________________________
Tania Gisselbrecht is Project Associate at Bridging Europe
Bridging Europe working papers offer policy-oriented analysis into topical issues of European
Affairs, with the aim of enriching policy-making and contributing to the ongoing debate. The views
expressed are attributable to the author (s) in a personal capacity.
Available for free downloading from Bridging Europe website (www.bridgingeurope.net).
© Bridging Europe 2014
Page |7
EU-Turkey Dialogue Initiative Working Paper, No. 4
the Gezi spirit; [it will be] more libertarian, giving more importance to moral social values,
with a spirit of revolution’. Sociological observations give credit to this vision. Emblematic
of the ‘hybridization of the cultural codes’, the AKM’s ‘ground iftar meals point to a brandnew phase. They demonstrate the coexistence of the secular Muslim and the pious Muslim,
especially the desire of the former to learn from the latter’.
The contestation of the AKP’s dominating politics could ultimately be analyzed as a
symptom of a generational crisis for political Islam. Interviews of the movements’
supporters indicate that a vast majority of them are relatively young. They began their
citizen life under the rule of Erdoğan but obviously don’t recognize themselves anymore in
the blend of conservative Islam and global capitalism the AKP is advocating for. In that
respect, the AKM’s emergence should sound like a warning bell to the AKP. For these
young supporters, the AKP has taken distance from its roots, from the basic concerns of
large swaths of its constituency. For them social justice is part of their religious identity. In
that sense, the AKM may be heralding a new breed of political opposition in synch with new
social and cultural realities.
Incidentally, in the wake of the Gezi protests, Eliaçik has been sued for defamation against
the Prime Minister . Should this be read as a sign that the AKM could actually become a real
thorn in Erdoğan’s side ? Evidently, the AKM epitomize the diversity of Islam and its
irreducibility to one single hegemonic political manifestation.
2. Deconstructing patriarchy with Islam : a transversal cause
On 24 November 2014, addressing a meeting on women and justice in Istanbul, the Turkish
President set off a new controversy by saying ‘you cannot put women and men on an equal
footing’ . ‘It is against nature. They were created differently. Their nature is different. Their
constitution is different’. He added :‘Motherhood is the highest position’.
Hidayet Şefkatli Tuksal, a female theologian, described Erdoğan’s words as a mix of truth
and lies . It is right to deplore that the burden of agricultural work falls mostly on women,
but it has then to be condemned everywhere, including Turkey. She also rebuked the
President’s making reference to the religious term ‘fitrat’ (nature, condition) in order to
support gender inequality. According to her, ‘there is no aya in the Quran that clearly
__________________________________________________________________________________
Tania Gisselbrecht is Project Associate at Bridging Europe
Bridging Europe working papers offer policy-oriented analysis into topical issues of European
Affairs, with the aim of enriching policy-making and contributing to the ongoing debate. The views
expressed are attributable to the author (s) in a personal capacity.
Available for free downloading from Bridging Europe website (www.bridgingeurope.net).
© Bridging Europe 2014
Page |8
EU-Turkey Dialogue Initiative Working Paper, No. 4
defines woman's and man's nature (fitrat). Instead, there are ayat that define human nature’.
Therefore ‘Fitrat’ cannot be used to justify inequality.
This kind of intervention is not rare coming from Tuksal. She is known for being a fierce
critic of Erdoğan’s authoritarianism. So much so that she got fired from her columnist
position upon his request. As a theologian, she is one of the most prominent feminine voices
that emerged from within the religious conservative section of society. Commonly labelled a
‘türbanlı feminist’ or (veiled) ‘Islamic feminist’ , she is the obvious offshoot of political Islam.
The advent of political Islam and the ensuing growing visibility of religion in the Turkish
public sphere indeed provided religious conservative women with new opportunities. The
possibility to wear the headscarf and political activism have been instrumental in helping
them to step out from private realm which was traditionally assigned to them. Women acted
as ‘auxiliaries for vote mobilization’ . As such they made a decisive impact on the electoral
successes of Islamic parties, including the AKP. However their efforts went poorly
rewarded . ‘Women in the AKP have had very little impact on increasing representation or
changing the rhetoric or the programme, as well as not being close to power positions in the
organizational culture’. For that reason, some women gradually started to develop an
agenda focusing more on their rights as women within Islam.
Stuck between allegiance to their faith and the necessities dictated by modern life out of the
private sphere, many women believed they had to choose between their Muslim identity and
their belief in gender equality. The dilemma was set between betraying either their faith or
their feminist consciousness. This frustration was overcome when the pioneers of the
‘Islamic feminist’ movement reclaimed the right to interpret the meaning of their religion.
As they autonomously re-appropriated the religious texts, they discovered they had been
deceived by male interpretations as Islamic scriptures were written when the dominant
culture in the Middle East was patriarchal. ‘Islamic feminists’ therefore argued in favor of an
historicization of the Quran’s reading in order to adjust its meaning to the current context.
One of the early figure of this contestation in Turkey is Konca Kuris. A member of a
religious brotherhood, she felt rejected for being a woman on which the rule of haremlikselamlik (sex separation) was imposed. Upset, she left the assembly and started to read the
Quran by herself. The experience was revealing. For her, the only possible source of Islam
was the Quran. The Hadith (commentaries) which were transmitted by words of mouth and
laid down on paper centuries after the prophet’s death were there ‘to put [women] asleep’.
__________________________________________________________________________________
Tania Gisselbrecht is Project Associate at Bridging Europe
Bridging Europe working papers offer policy-oriented analysis into topical issues of European
Affairs, with the aim of enriching policy-making and contributing to the ongoing debate. The views
expressed are attributable to the author (s) in a personal capacity.
Available for free downloading from Bridging Europe website (www.bridgingeurope.net).
© Bridging Europe 2014
Page |9
EU-Turkey Dialogue Initiative Working Paper, No. 4
‘Why be a slave to the hadith, while we have the Quran ?’ she asked. The Quran said ‘I gave
you intelligence, use it to move towards truth’ . On this basis, she rejected all the genderbiased hadiths not in conformity with the spirit of the Quran . In her wake, women like
Hidayet Şefkatli Tuksal continued to reclaim equal rights as a woman within Islam. ‘I can’t
imagine a prophet who bullies women...the hadiths that portray him so should be
abandoned’.
These women operated on the belief that patriarchy is not inherent to Islam but is the result
of the male monopoly on the interpretation of Islamic texts. They believe that Islam gives
women equal status with men in terms of human dignity although they are biologically
different. By rejecting unegalitarian interpretations, the feminine exegesis initiated a process
of ‘individualization and democratization of Islam’
insofar as these women dared to
question the collective identity (mothers and spouses) assigned to them by political Islam. In
other words, they were expressing a personal and dual identity as both committed Muslim
and women. In doing do, Islamic feminine thinkers were demonstrating that they are
capable to reconstruct new religious identity models, recombining characters (religiousness
and a woman consciousness) deemed incompatible on both side of the old secular/Islamic
paradigm.
Their first target was the subordinate status of women in political militancy. Hidayet
Şefkatli Tuksal highlighted for instance ‘the inherent contradiction of supporting
democratization and working in civil society organizations while denying women the
freedom to enjoy a life other than one devoted to ‘washing a husband’s socks’.’
In 2000, Cihan Aktaş, a religious intellectual, writer and former architect, described the
condition of Islamic militant women as ‘an identitary emprisonment’ . As political activists,
she explained that women are referred to as ‘baci’ (sister), a word that legitimatizes the
presence of a woman in the public sphere as a loyal ‘comrade’ but at the same time,
overshadows her sexual identity. In Aktaş’ analysis, women are rhetorically stripped from
their feminity in order to mingle with men. As a consequence, they are denied romantic
feelings or desire.
Interestingly this ‘desexualisation’ of women religious activists is not peculiar of Islamic
movements. A similar terminology with denigrating undertones has been used throughout
Turkey’s history to address women involved in political militancy. ‘The Kemalist comradewoman and the Islamist bacı share the same ground: both are de-feminized, de-sexualized
__________________________________________________________________________________
Tania Gisselbrecht is Project Associate at Bridging Europe
Bridging Europe working papers offer policy-oriented analysis into topical issues of European
Affairs, with the aim of enriching policy-making and contributing to the ongoing debate. The views
expressed are attributable to the author (s) in a personal capacity.
Available for free downloading from Bridging Europe website (www.bridgingeurope.net).
© Bridging Europe 2014
P a g e | 10
EU-Turkey Dialogue Initiative Working Paper, No. 4
and transformed into “ wombs without bodies” in the name of serving a greater cause, in one
case the nation, in the other Islam.’ It is no coincidence since ‘both the Kemalist male elite
and the Islamist male elite derive their codes, values and metaphors from a common
rhetorical and aesthetic pool’.
Turkey’s nation building’s process partly explains the prevalence of patriarchy across the
board. Since the inception of Republic, the country’s history has indeed been marred with
conflicts. From the WWI to the war of independence, to the violent repression of dissidence
and lastly the civil war with Kurdish citizens, the culture of violence never fully subsided in
Turkey. This perpetual state of war generated a valorization of the soldier, of the patriotic
hero. The political discourse got infused with a gendered vocabulary in which the Nation
under threat acquired feminine characteristics. Like a woman’s body, its integrity became a
cause for honor. In parallel, (supposedly) man virtues (virility, courage, independence,
rationality) are praised. In this context, the ‘masculinity’ concept is a politically engineering
one and has become hegemonic in all fields of life to the extent that ‘in Turkey masculinity
functions as an imperatively constitutive element in the fabrication of identities both at the
individual and national level’ .
In fact, the shaping of the nation’s contours, as well as the definition of the identities
composing it, (including the gender identities) is essentially in the hands of State
institutions. This top-down approach to model the Turkish society is another common point
that both the secularists and the Islamic Muslims share . As far as the image of women is
concerned, in both ‘camps’, ‘womanhood’ is associated with patriotism and motherhood,
while ‘feminity’ is denigrated as frivolous, weak. That is why, across the secular/Islamic
divide, a woman is respected only when she conforms with an ideal womanhood (mother of
ideal citizens, tool for the development of the country) and not as an independent subject.
In view of this backdrop characterized by women’s instrumentalization in the name of
nation-building (whatever the state ideology is), ‘Islamic feminists’ could not limit their
struggle to fighting against Islamic men assigning them secondary roles. Their rebellion
against the imposition of a collective identity moved to another level in order to denounce
State engineered female identities tainted with patriarchal connotations. As a matter of fact,
top-down imposition of collective identities has been achieved through the channel of the
secular/Islamic divide. This fragmentation line delimitated the contours of one identity
against the other. Understandably the ‘Islamic feminists’ contestation comes as a threat to
the very foundations of the Turkish political system since regarding identity as a matter of
__________________________________________________________________________________
Tania Gisselbrecht is Project Associate at Bridging Europe
Bridging Europe working papers offer policy-oriented analysis into topical issues of European
Affairs, with the aim of enriching policy-making and contributing to the ongoing debate. The views
expressed are attributable to the author (s) in a personal capacity.
Available for free downloading from Bridging Europe website (www.bridgingeurope.net).
© Bridging Europe 2014
P a g e | 11
EU-Turkey Dialogue Initiative Working Paper, No. 4
personal choice challenges rigid and exclusive identity norms as well as mutual perceptions.
Hence ‘Islamic feminists’ are participating to the reconfiguration of the political debate along
new demarcation lines. They are transcending the secularism/Islam cleavage to focus on the
patriarchal/anti-patriarchal divide. What they suggests to women is to accept no ‘diktats’
imposed by others : Islamic men, secularists, or the State.
Two debates illustrate the potential impact of their struggle beyond their fight against
Islamic men’s patriarchy : the headscarf ban and abortion. Hidayet Şefkatli Tuksal rejects
politization of religiousness as epitomized by the headscarf controversy. As a women’s rights
defender, she ‘object(s) to all pressures and impositions, including written/non-written
regulations and clothing rules that deprive women of their rights in education, work and
social life in the case that they are not followed. In an environment where there are no such
rules and impositions, respect of a woman’s personal choice to cover up or not would
prevail.’ By advocating for individual choice, she condemns the use of the women’s body for
political gains and opposes State intrusion (secularist or Islamic) into different ways of life.
According to her both the former secularist rulers who imposed the headscarf ban, and the
conservatives instrumentalized the headscarf and are a reflection of patriarchal politics. She
goes as far as questioning the sincerity of the government in wanting women with
headscarves to fully integrate public life : ‘some AKP members of parliament see [the ban]
as an advantage to them that they do not have to compete with headscarved women.’ In her
perspective, freely donning the headscarf strips the veil of its symbolic charge. It can no
longer be viewed as a tool of male domination nor as a symbol of political Islam. As Cihan
Aktaş said :‘Different groups claim liberation of women. It is not liberation if others claim
they freed you’.
The emphasis placed on personal choices paves the way for a system where the right to wear
the headscarf and the right not to wear are both respected and enforced by the institutions.
In such a society, the binary opposition between traditional and modern women which is a
reproduction of the secular/Islamic divide can no longer remain valid. Finally this approach
is also moving the debate into the field of recognition of all individual rights . In any cases,
the 2013 lift of the headscarf ban for civil servants (to the exception of judges, prosecutors,
police and military personnel.) may further dissolve contention around this symbol high
jacked by ideology.
The abortion debate as well has crystallized patriarchal discourses. When the former
Turkish Prime Minister equated abortion to murder, Hidayet Tuksal commented harshly on
__________________________________________________________________________________
Tania Gisselbrecht is Project Associate at Bridging Europe
Bridging Europe working papers offer policy-oriented analysis into topical issues of European
Affairs, with the aim of enriching policy-making and contributing to the ongoing debate. The views
expressed are attributable to the author (s) in a personal capacity.
Available for free downloading from Bridging Europe website (www.bridgingeurope.net).
© Bridging Europe 2014
P a g e | 12
EU-Turkey Dialogue Initiative Working Paper, No. 4
his words :’I am against abortion, but Erdoğan’s statement that abortion is ‘murder’
disturbed me’. By insisting on making a distinction between her personal beliefs and
binding rules that can be imposed on society as a whole, she once again puts the emphasis on
freedom of choice according to one’s beliefs and conscience. ‘In this country not everyone is
Muslim, nor do they all share the same opinion. A ban is not the right way. We need to find
an answer to the question: ‘Why do women not want to have their babies?’ The Religious
Affairs Directorate could issue a fatwa about anything but a secular state cannot ban
anything on the basis of a fatwa…I am against abortion. But I am also against the state’s
telling women what (or what not) to do.‘
What is at the heart of her reasoning is the women’s perspective. ‘I am against a ban on
abortion even though I don’t think that abortion is a family planning method or a right that
women can feely use. Indeed, even though it is unadvisable from a religious point of view, I
think that the current legal practice of abortions with a 10-week period should continue. I do
not see the issue from the viewpoint of “My body, my right!” but as a person who knows
how determined women are in acting on their desires if they do not want to give birth to a
baby; I support the current practice in order to prevent bigger problems if a ban is placed on
abortion. The government should use such methods as encouragement, persuasion and
financial aid [in order to prevent abortions], but at the end should leave the final decision to
parents’. Cihan Aktaş echoed Tuksal’s position by protesting ‘the state’s language [which]
provokes reactions because its dry and harsh tone portrays women as purely ‘carriers’
although women have different ideas and emotions about every issue. Abortion is an
intervention that concerns the female body so the issue must be discussed by taking into
consideration women’s feelings and experiences.’
Both women resent politicians bringing issues pertaining to women’s bodies unto the public
agenda in a way that is forgetful of women’s privacy. Making women’s bodies an object of
public attention is nothing but a strategy of control reaffirming the male supremacy. That is
why these ‘Islamic feminists’ argue in favor of dialogue and above all participation of women
in the public debate. According to Hidayet Tuksal, ‘the government has failed to manage the
abortion debate…. Raising the issue without discussing it with NGOs, scientist, experts was
not a good strategy. It is absurd that Turkey is shifting its presidential system into a oneman rule instead of a participatory and democratic regime’.
These examples illustrate that the individualization and democratization of Islam under
women’s lead is of a subversive nature as it is exposing the patriarchal administration of
__________________________________________________________________________________
Tania Gisselbrecht is Project Associate at Bridging Europe
Bridging Europe working papers offer policy-oriented analysis into topical issues of European
Affairs, with the aim of enriching policy-making and contributing to the ongoing debate. The views
expressed are attributable to the author (s) in a personal capacity.
Available for free downloading from Bridging Europe website (www.bridgingeurope.net).
© Bridging Europe 2014
P a g e | 13
EU-Turkey Dialogue Initiative Working Paper, No. 4
power and the political dynamics (the secular/Islamic divide) as sources of undemocratic
practices. In short, the discourse of some segments of Turkish ‘Islamic feminism’ has
morphed from an intellectual faith-based rebellion against women’s subordination within
political Islam into a criticism of an authoritarian social engineering apparatus (in whichever
hands the latter finds itself). Consequently the ‘Islamic feminist’ narrative has not only the
potential to open new perspectives for the feminist struggle at large, but also for the
country’s democratization.
Recurring themes such as non intrusion of the state, personal freedoms are central in this
version of ‘Islamic feminism’s’ discourse. These notions foster a renewal of women’s relation
to Islam and to society in general. Since feminism and Islam are no longer perceived as
mutually exclusive (although their association still irritates the Islamic patriarchy and rises
suspicion among some secular feminists who cannot conceive women’s emancipation within
a religious framework), the secular/Islamic dichotomy is as well called into question. By
considering the issue of woman rights to be alien to polarization, ‘Islamic feminism’ has, to
some extent, reconciled Islamic values with human rights and reestablished women’s issues
as the main concern prevailing over instrumentalized fears of top-down Islamization or
secularization.
The headscarf and abortion debates, which framed conflicting understandings of Islam and
different visions of the ideal Turkish/Muslim woman, have been used to reinforce
ideological antagonisms, i.e. the secular/Islamic pattern. For decades, this divide concealed
the fact that women’s rights were trampled in the name of ideological goals determined by
male dominated institutions and obscured common problems that are shared by both secular
and pious women. Polarization has kept politicians and citizens alike obsessed with
denigrating the Other to the point that the country became largely blind to differences or
cross-cutting identities such as womanhood, homosexuality, Kurdishness etc… ‘Women
themselves and their democratic rights, and their agency to exercise those rights actually
[had] become secondary to what women symbolize’ .
Consequently ‘politicization of the headscarf has generated a division in women's movements
in Turkey which prevented secular and religious Muslim women’s organizations from
engaging in meaningful dialogue.’ Nonetheless, as far as women’s cause is concerned, the
Islamic voices are a strengthening factor. They can definitively be a catalyst to help spread
‘feminism’ more widely within the country’s conservative swathes. Their religious outlook,
in tune with local values, can make them appear as an endogenous, and hence more
__________________________________________________________________________________
Tania Gisselbrecht is Project Associate at Bridging Europe
Bridging Europe working papers offer policy-oriented analysis into topical issues of European
Affairs, with the aim of enriching policy-making and contributing to the ongoing debate. The views
expressed are attributable to the author (s) in a personal capacity.
Available for free downloading from Bridging Europe website (www.bridgingeurope.net).
© Bridging Europe 2014
P a g e | 14
EU-Turkey Dialogue Initiative Working Paper, No. 4
acceptable, form of ‘feminism’. Whether veiled or unveiled, all women can experience male
domination. But the latter comes in different forms and varies in intensity depending on each
woman’s cultural background. The cause of women rights requires empathy for the suffering
of all women independently of their believes. So secular and Islamic women need to expand
contacts in order to enrich their respective perspectives. With a better grasp of different
women’s problems, the women’s movement can broaden its constituency and accentuate the
pressure on governments. But it won’t be an easy task since ‘Islamic feminists’ face distrust
in both the secular and religious milieu. They are marginalized because of their antigovernment stance and many are targeting them for being anti-religion. On the other hand,
they are still ostracized by some secular feminists who do not imagine emancipation within a
religious framework so that the defense of veiled women remains necessary. (The opposite
also rings true : secular women are not welcomed by all conservatives women). In a context
of persistent polarization, pragmatic alliances with other feminists groups along common
causes should be further pursued if patriarchy is to be defeated.
3. Crossing the ultimate frontier : being a religious Muslim LGBT
For LGBTs, Turkey is an ambivalent environment. First of all, Turkey does not have laws
that explicitly criminalize LGBT identities. Homosexual relations have been legalized by the
Ottomans in 1858, but sexual orientation or gender identity is not incorporated in its civil
rights laws and there is no legal recognition for same-sex couples. Before Erdoğan became
prime minister in 2003 and started employing virulent language to stigmatize LGBT as
anti-Islam, he declared in a public meeting that homosexuals’ rights need to be protected by
the law. In 2003, Turkey became the first Muslim country to host a pride march and by
now, Istanbul’s Gay pride is the largest in the region attracting almost 100,000 participants.
Additionally, in a landmark decision from July 2014, the country’s Supreme Court
acknowledged that calling LGBT citizens ‘perverts’ is hate speech .
In spite of these milestones (notable exceptions among Muslim countries), lesbians, gays and
transsexuals routinely suffer abuses such as discrimination, harassment, mobbing, and
stigmatization. During many years, LGBT associations were under constant threat of being
banned and frequently prosecuted for pursuing activities ‘against morality.’ Regrettably the
country has the highest levels of LGBT hate crime in Europe .
As seen in the previous chapter, the particularity of the Turkish context is to have ‘stringent
norms for “masculinity” and “femininity” (that) are particularly ingrained in both Turkish
__________________________________________________________________________________
Tania Gisselbrecht is Project Associate at Bridging Europe
Bridging Europe working papers offer policy-oriented analysis into topical issues of European
Affairs, with the aim of enriching policy-making and contributing to the ongoing debate. The views
expressed are attributable to the author (s) in a personal capacity.
Available for free downloading from Bridging Europe website (www.bridgingeurope.net).
© Bridging Europe 2014
P a g e | 15
EU-Turkey Dialogue Initiative Working Paper, No. 4
society and the state itself’. . Since masculinity is the superior gender referent and is defined
in opposition to what is feminine, ‘hybridization’ of genders is not conceivable. ‘Feminity’ is
frowned upon whichever gender it incarnates itself. Its male version, ‘effeminacy’ and
consequently homophobia are rejected as threats to the traditional gender identities which
warrant the country’s very foundations: the family. In Turkey, this entity is still widely
considered as the basic social structure and the guarantor of national unity and morality.
Attribution of intangible gender identities is therefore essential to maintaining the
patriarchal status quo and to safeguard the nation’s integrity.
By the same token, homophobia is not limited to conservative circles. Homophobia is the
reflection of the patriarchal culture shared by secularist and Islamic men who equally
employ a ‘highly heterosexist jargon’ ‘The word “sapıklık” (perversion or heresy) is used by
both secularist and Islamist male writers to designate homosexuality’.
Until recently, because homophobia is just another facet of embedded and cross-cutting
patriarchy, issues of discrimination against LGBT individuals remained largely absent from
the Turkish political agenda . Among the ranks of the religious political class,
homosexuality is frequently discarded under various derogatory labels : ‘immorality’,
‘abnormal behaviour’. The former Women and Families Minister Aliye Kavaf described
homosexuality as a ‘a biological disorder, a disease’; an AKP MP spoke of ‘a social
subversion, …an accomplishment the reversal of sexual orientation’ AKP lawmaker Halil
Urun, for his part, said, ‘What does LGBT mean? I don’t know. How am I supposed to
know? We are ignorant on this issue.’ Thus in the AKP terminology, the LGBT identity is
dominantly portrayed as alien, irreconcilable with the Turkish Muslim identity as upheld in
the party’s version of Islam. LGBT cannot be like ‘us’. Sexual minorities are rhetorically
denied a presence in the public sphere which should remain clear of disease and perversion
so that families remain safe. As a result, the existence of LGBT communities cannot be
apprehended in terms of rights.
However ‘the reaction against homosexuality does not only stems from Muslim
preoccupations. It is also articulated as a response against Kemalist ‘social engineering
projects’. The journalist Hilal Kaplan declared she was upset by the fact that some Muslims
do classify homosexuality as a disease thereby using a secular terminology to describe it.
Instead she prefers to tackle homosexuality like a sin . She deplored that Muslims faced no
other choice than being accused of homophobia (and Islam of being homophobic) or asked to
remain silent about issues contradicting their beliefs. For her, Muslims are victims of
__________________________________________________________________________________
Tania Gisselbrecht is Project Associate at Bridging Europe
Bridging Europe working papers offer policy-oriented analysis into topical issues of European
Affairs, with the aim of enriching policy-making and contributing to the ongoing debate. The views
expressed are attributable to the author (s) in a personal capacity.
Available for free downloading from Bridging Europe website (www.bridgingeurope.net).
© Bridging Europe 2014
P a g e | 16
EU-Turkey Dialogue Initiative Working Paper, No. 4
totalitarian oppression as secularists cannot tolerate differences. By construing
homosexuality as question of religious faith, she is politicizing the topic, replacing it at the
center of the secular/Islamic divide. Erdoğan was not doing something different when he
called homosexuality a ‘sexual preference’ and said it conflicted with the ‘culture of Islam’,
i.e. was a sinful act.
That being said there are also more liberal voices within the Islamic constituency who
defend individual choice against officially approved ways of life. The declaration of the
former Women and Family Minister has come under criticism of some AKP lawmakers such
as MPs Zafer Üskül, Nursuna Memecan et Egemen Bağış. Fatma Bostan Unsal, a political
scientist and one of the 64 founding members of the AKP declared in an interview that ‘all
human rights are valid for [the homosexuals] as well — the right to life, the right to own
property. But they are being driven from their homes. What a shame! The new legal
protection against hate crimes should cover them as well. In fact, they are the number one
targets of hate crimes. They are more threatened than those [of us] who wear the
headscarf.’ Reportedly she went as far as extending the members of the LGBT community
an invitation to pray together with other believers at the mosque. ‘They should be able to
join the mosque community. If they feel uncomfortable and thus want to form another line
[during prayer] we should tolerate this, too. When you exclude them, you don’t help them
… Closing those doors [to the faith] will only displease God.’
As seen in the previous chapters, outside the AKP family, Anti-capitalist Muslims and some
religious women rights activists who are resisting state intrusion in personal ways of life,
display a more compassionate approach towards to the LGBT community . Although
homosexuality is one of the strongest taboos for Islam, Hidayet Tuksal personally, or via
Başkent, the women organization she founded, does not hesitate to forge alliances with
LGBT groups. However this quarter of Islam is not homogenous either. So a fully-fledged
junction of forces between Islamic feminists and LGBTs against patriarchy in each of its
aspects (misogyny, sissyphobia, homophobia) may prove difficult as some Islamic women are
still reluctant to consider homosexuality as a ‘natural’ condition.
Ambivalent environment, hostility across the secular/Islamic divide, mixed attitudes among
Islamic quarters. In such complex circumstances, the public appearance of an AKP’li LGBT
group waving the rainbow flag at a rally in a show of support for Erdogan’s presidential bid
last August, cannot be overlooked. This unusual event was met at best with surprise, at
worst with suspicion or hostility. A year ago, a foreign journalist wondered if the group was
__________________________________________________________________________________
Tania Gisselbrecht is Project Associate at Bridging Europe
Bridging Europe working papers offer policy-oriented analysis into topical issues of European
Affairs, with the aim of enriching policy-making and contributing to the ongoing debate. The views
expressed are attributable to the author (s) in a personal capacity.
Available for free downloading from Bridging Europe website (www.bridgingeurope.net).
© Bridging Europe 2014
P a g e | 17
EU-Turkey Dialogue Initiative Working Paper, No. 4
not ‘AKP's foray into courting the LGBTT vote’ or simply a ‘spoof’, so inconceivable it
seemed to encounter individuals openly claiming their dual belonging to the LGBT
community and AKP constituency. It is worth noting that the group freely uses the party’s
emblem as profile picture on its Facebook page (opened in September 2013) and their
Twitter account puts up Erdoğan’s presidential campaign logo. This imagery could
substantiate the speculations of organic links with the party and lead to believe the AKP’li
LGBT were merely created as an electoral tool. However, members of group interviewed in
the press explain that group is an informal assembly born out of a friends initiative . No
mention of official endorsement is ever mentioned in interviews. Besides given the group’s
limited audience (714 Twitter followers and 1,179 likes on their Facebook page) which
includes non-AKP and non-LGBT people, one is bound to believe that their claims are
sincere rather than politically motivated. Indeed the potential pool of voters they could
appeal to (religious or conservative LGBT individuals) is too insignificant to make a real
difference in an electoral process.
Assuming that the AKP’li LGBT demands are genuine, do they stand a chance of ‘queering’
the Islamic conservative electorate i.e. to eradicate prejudices ? Certainly, the variety of
stances regarding recognition of different sexual orientations among religious conservatives
confirms that the Islamic identity has evolved and henceforth encompasses many nuances.
However the official discourse does not seem ready to embrace this reality. Its authoritarian
tones rather indicate a willingness to homogenize the community of political Islam
supporters as revealed by the hostile depiction of the LGBT individuals articulated by the
AKP leaders. In spite of it, AKP’li LGBT are adamant about adding another layer to an
Islamic identity already in the process of recomposing. In that respect, even if the AKP’li
LGBT posture amounts to wishful-thinking, it should not be discarded as vain. ‘They’re also
laying important groundwork for making the loud and proud case that they can be dedicated
Muslims and be gay at the same time, which will probably benefit many other gay Muslims
the world over in years to come. The reaction of the AKP supporters who witnessed their
‘performance’ also show how much pedagogy is needed. Asked how they were received at
Erdogan’s rally, one of their representative said: ‘The police thought we were Gezi Park
activists and mistreated us. Some people mistook our flag for the flag of the PKK [Kurdistan
Workers Party]. After we explained who we were, there were only chuckles.’ ‘What does
LGBT mean? I don’t know. How am I supposed to know? We are ignorant on this issue.’
Actually the words of the AKP MP Halil Urun ring true.
__________________________________________________________________________________
Tania Gisselbrecht is Project Associate at Bridging Europe
Bridging Europe working papers offer policy-oriented analysis into topical issues of European
Affairs, with the aim of enriching policy-making and contributing to the ongoing debate. The views
expressed are attributable to the author (s) in a personal capacity.
Available for free downloading from Bridging Europe website (www.bridgingeurope.net).
© Bridging Europe 2014
P a g e | 18
EU-Turkey Dialogue Initiative Working Paper, No. 4
What is significant with the AKP’li LGBT initiative is that they insist on contesting from
within. Because they do not see any contradiction between their personal and
religious/political identity, the AKP’li LGBT are actually delivering a double-sided
messages. First of all, had they chosen to speak from the periphery of the party, their
message may have get blurred. Being LGBT could have been seen as a condition
incompatible with being an AKP supporter or religious person. In that respect, their action
bears a certain similarity with the rise of Islamic women to purge the interpretation of Islam
from patriarchal undertones. Women and LGBTs alike chose to embark into an educational
campaign to alter negative perceptions and reclaim the part of their identity that was being
denied to them. They refuse to sacrifice one identity in favor of another. They advocate for
individualization of identity and strive to convince others of the legitimacy of multiple
identities. Religion may be a crucial criteria of their identity but it cannot alone define a
person. On the opposite, a personal identity (womanhood, LGBT…) does not exhaust one’s
personality either. Finally, when applied to the political sphere, this reasoning exposes the
illusion of collective identities and the flaws of the secular/Islamic divide which engulfs
diversity.
The resemblance between the women Islamic movement and the emergence of the AKP’li
LGBT ends however here. The other noteworthy characteristic of the AKP’li LGBT’s action
is that so far they don’t seem to resort to religious argumentation to justify their presence.
‘The homosexuals stand with Tayyip Erdoğan. We are at the rallies, we are everywhere —
get used to it’. It looks as if they just want to impose their presence and dual identity to their
fellows AKP supporters. Curiously their slogan is reminiscent of the Gezi vocabulary.
Coincidence or provocation ? It will be worth studying their strategy in the near future.
Will they continue to simply insist on being visible among the AKP constituency or will
they become more assertive ? So far, they admit they need to be patient and that changes
will be incremental. Their rallying chant ‘The homosexuals stand with Tayyip Erdoğan’ is
the expression of their trust in Erdoğan’s ability to answer their demands. Wasn’t he the
only political leader able to settle the Kurdish and the headscarf issues ? For the time being,
they want to interpret Erdoğan’s smile during the rally and absence of offensive response, as
a promising sign. Rightly Erdoğan has not a reputation of cold-bloodedness and verbal
restraint. So they probably imagine that, had he been displeased by their apparition, they
would have faced a swift and concrete reaction. Although they are fully confident that
Erdoğan will undertake LGBT reforms in due time, speculating on the president’s intentions
might not be their best guess. Actual support came from other sources. ’There are people in
our group who are highly influential within the AKP. In the days we created the group, we
__________________________________________________________________________________
Tania Gisselbrecht is Project Associate at Bridging Europe
Bridging Europe working papers offer policy-oriented analysis into topical issues of European
Affairs, with the aim of enriching policy-making and contributing to the ongoing debate. The views
expressed are attributable to the author (s) in a personal capacity.
Available for free downloading from Bridging Europe website (www.bridgingeurope.net).
© Bridging Europe 2014
P a g e | 19
EU-Turkey Dialogue Initiative Working Paper, No. 4
received a congratulation message from an AKP mayor. And we are in contact not only with
the AKP. We have received support also from other LGBTI groups such as the LISTAG
group [of families of homosexuals], Hevi LGBTI and the Istanbul LGBTT Solidarity
Association.’ Both internal and external support will prove instrumental for the group to
continue to formulate its critics against AKP’s current LGBT policies. Indeed the conviction
that homosexual and pious lifestyles cannot go hand in hand spreads across the
secular/Islamic divide.
Sticking to its pledge, the group is standing at the crossfire of distrust and hostility coming
from both other LGBT organizations and their fellow AKP supporters. For some
secularists, their posturing is merely useless. Others, more radical, opposed the participation
of the AKP’li LGBT to this year Gay Pride on the basis of their political credentials . This is
just another demonstration that the secular/Islamic demarcation is still heavily ingrained in
mentalities. That is why, short-lived or long standing, the AKP’li LGBT initiative will have
one essential merit. To remind society at large that ‘LGBT people can have various political
views like any heterosexuals. Conversely AKP militants can have different personal
identities’..; (there can be) lesbians with headscarves, bisexuals doing their daily prostrations,
transsexuals going to perform the hajj, atheist gays. The LGBT community is diverse, there
cannot be a political or religious norm for every LGBT. Why should there be a ‘real’ LGBT
individual and a bad, fake one ? If we follow that reasoning it is not realistic to think that a
country’s majority party would not have an LGBTI constituency. ’ The ultimate message
points to the possibility of mixing political and personal identities which are not exclusive. It
is all about ‘not confus(ing) political identity with sexual identity’ and vice versa in the
name of an alleged collective identification.
Conclusion
One of, if not the, strongest obstacle to the full democratization of Turkey is probably the
‘us’ vs. ‘them’ paradigm. As a matter of fact, to date, the secular/Islamic cleavage remains
entrenched in the Turkish political lexicon and the antagonism it has produced is still very
much ingrained in people’s minds.
However that divisive pattern is starting to show some signs of frailty. The first massive
demonstration of its vulnerability came from the Gezi uprising. The coexistence of people
with different orientations and social belonging was a major trespass to the overarching
polarization.
__________________________________________________________________________________
Tania Gisselbrecht is Project Associate at Bridging Europe
Bridging Europe working papers offer policy-oriented analysis into topical issues of European
Affairs, with the aim of enriching policy-making and contributing to the ongoing debate. The views
expressed are attributable to the author (s) in a personal capacity.
Available for free downloading from Bridging Europe website (www.bridgingeurope.net).
© Bridging Europe 2014
P a g e | 20
EU-Turkey Dialogue Initiative Working Paper, No. 4
Other encouraging developments can be identified at the fringes of political Islam. The
emergence of critical Islamic voices like the Anti-Kapitalist Müslümanlar, liberal Islamic
feminism, AKP LGBTs is fraught with social transformation potential as these groups
exemplify the fragmentation of the collective religious identity induced by top-down nationbuilding. Because Islam is being individually reclaimed, religion can no longer be perceived
as a monolithic bloc of stringent dogmatic views and is gradually shedding its political
signification. Islam‘s diversity is reflected in a variety of discourses : defense of anti-capitalist
policies, of women and LGBT rights …. All the groups mentioned in this article are
formulating demands detached from strictly religious issues. They are instead rephrasing
social aspirations, often shared by some secularists, in light of their own beliefs. Their
narratives’ sources have to some extent blended with other political and social repertoires
like socialism, feminism, human rights. Through this bottom-up process of individualization,
Islam is resisting being a political tool under State control. This development ultimately
suggests the anachronism or fallacy of the secular/Islamic divide.
Nonetheless those tenets of liberal Islam cannot tear down the old system alone. It will be
possible to articulate a new political culture of opposition only if secular and Islamic actors
follow a collaborative approach about transversal issues. As writer Elif Shafak observed , ‘I
don't know if there is any difference between a conservative who has no tolerance for
diversity, and an anti-conservative who has no tolerance for diversity.’ That means that
representatives of liberal Islam will remain lone fighters as long as Turkish Islam’s multifaceted aspect is not more widely recognized by some staunch secularists bogged down in
suspicion and fear. Conversely, it will be required to convince some religious Turks that not
all secularists seek to curtail their religious practices. A inclusive approach is needed at both
end of the political divide to put an end to the political and social deadlock and for a new
model of society to emerge.
So far the secular/Islamic divide largely prevented real political contestation. The latter was
de facto limited to ideological battles between the two main identities. Hence the gradual
deconstruction of that political trap will be a powerful indicator of democratization. ‘The
contestability of this divide opens the Turkish socio-political landscape to the formation of
multiple secular and Islamic identities.’ . With further fragmentation of collective identities,
religion, which used to be the axis of the political divide, could cease to be seen as a political
attribute and come out as an individually-chosen component of one’s multiple identity. In
the end, this argumentation points to the necessity to rethink secularism. A secularism that
__________________________________________________________________________________
Tania Gisselbrecht is Project Associate at Bridging Europe
Bridging Europe working papers offer policy-oriented analysis into topical issues of European
Affairs, with the aim of enriching policy-making and contributing to the ongoing debate. The views
expressed are attributable to the author (s) in a personal capacity.
Available for free downloading from Bridging Europe website (www.bridgingeurope.net).
© Bridging Europe 2014
P a g e | 21
EU-Turkey Dialogue Initiative Working Paper, No. 4
does not operate on the basis of a top-down approach, but embraces diversity and ensures
the protection of all identities. Once the State renounces its prescriptive approach to national
identity, a secularism respectful of pluralism can surface and tilt the balance in favor of
individuals and civil society. This will allow citizens to leave behind politically
instrumentalized topics and focus on real issues like respect for human rights and the rule of
law, corruption, good governance, ecology etc... The next battle awaiting Turkey will
engage individuals against the State with re-appropriation of identity at stake. As the
famous writer said : ‘We all need to become individuals.’
Bibliography
Anti-Kapitalist Müslümanlar
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__________________________________________________________________________________
Tania Gisselbrecht is Project Associate at Bridging Europe
Bridging Europe working papers offer policy-oriented analysis into topical issues of European
Affairs, with the aim of enriching policy-making and contributing to the ongoing debate. The views
expressed are attributable to the author (s) in a personal capacity.
Available for free downloading from Bridging Europe website (www.bridgingeurope.net).
© Bridging Europe 2014
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Monitor.com. Retrieved from : http://www.al__________________________________________________________________________________
Tania Gisselbrecht is Project Associate at Bridging Europe
Bridging Europe working papers offer policy-oriented analysis into topical issues of European
Affairs, with the aim of enriching policy-making and contributing to the ongoing debate. The views
expressed are attributable to the author (s) in a personal capacity.
Available for free downloading from Bridging Europe website (www.bridgingeurope.net).
© Bridging Europe 2014
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__________________________________________________________________________________
Tania Gisselbrecht is Project Associate at Bridging Europe
Bridging Europe working papers offer policy-oriented analysis into topical issues of European
Affairs, with the aim of enriching policy-making and contributing to the ongoing debate. The views
expressed are attributable to the author (s) in a personal capacity.
Available for free downloading from Bridging Europe website (www.bridgingeurope.net).
© Bridging Europe 2014
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__________________________________________________________________________________
Tania Gisselbrecht is Project Associate at Bridging Europe
Bridging Europe working papers offer policy-oriented analysis into topical issues of European
Affairs, with the aim of enriching policy-making and contributing to the ongoing debate. The views
expressed are attributable to the author (s) in a personal capacity.
Available for free downloading from Bridging Europe website (www.bridgingeurope.net).
© Bridging Europe 2014
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EU-Turkey Dialogue Initiative Working Paper, No. 4
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__________________________________________________________________________________
Tania Gisselbrecht is Project Associate at Bridging Europe
Bridging Europe working papers offer policy-oriented analysis into topical issues of European
Affairs, with the aim of enriching policy-making and contributing to the ongoing debate. The views
expressed are attributable to the author (s) in a personal capacity.
Available for free downloading from Bridging Europe website (www.bridgingeurope.net).
© Bridging Europe 2014
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EU-Turkey Dialogue Initiative Working Paper, No. 4
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__________________________________________________________________________________
Tania Gisselbrecht is Project Associate at Bridging Europe
Bridging Europe working papers offer policy-oriented analysis into topical issues of European
Affairs, with the aim of enriching policy-making and contributing to the ongoing debate. The views
expressed are attributable to the author (s) in a personal capacity.
Available for free downloading from Bridging Europe website (www.bridgingeurope.net).
© Bridging Europe 2014
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__________________________________________________________________________________
Tania Gisselbrecht is Project Associate at Bridging Europe
Bridging Europe working papers offer policy-oriented analysis into topical issues of European
Affairs, with the aim of enriching policy-making and contributing to the ongoing debate. The views
expressed are attributable to the author (s) in a personal capacity.
Available for free downloading from Bridging Europe website (www.bridgingeurope.net).
© Bridging Europe 2014
P a g e | 28
EU-Turkey Dialogue Initiative Working Paper, No. 4
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__________________________________________________________________________________
Tania Gisselbrecht is Project Associate at Bridging Europe
Bridging Europe working papers offer policy-oriented analysis into topical issues of European
Affairs, with the aim of enriching policy-making and contributing to the ongoing debate. The views
expressed are attributable to the author (s) in a personal capacity.
Available for free downloading from Bridging Europe website (www.bridgingeurope.net).
© Bridging Europe 2014
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EU-Turkey Dialogue Initiative Working Paper, No. 4
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__________________________________________________________________________________
Tania Gisselbrecht is Project Associate at Bridging Europe
Bridging Europe working papers offer policy-oriented analysis into topical issues of European
Affairs, with the aim of enriching policy-making and contributing to the ongoing debate. The views
expressed are attributable to the author (s) in a personal capacity.
Available for free downloading from Bridging Europe website (www.bridgingeurope.net).
© Bridging Europe 2014
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EU-Turkey Dialogue Initiative Working Paper, No. 4
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__________________________________________________________________________________
Tania Gisselbrecht is Project Associate at Bridging Europe
Bridging Europe working papers offer policy-oriented analysis into topical issues of European
Affairs, with the aim of enriching policy-making and contributing to the ongoing debate. The views
expressed are attributable to the author (s) in a personal capacity.
Available for free downloading from Bridging Europe website (www.bridgingeurope.net).
© Bridging Europe 2014
P a g e | 31