Download Religious Islamic Satellite Channels: A Screen That Leads

Reuters Institute Fellowship Paper, University of Oxford
Religious Islamic Satellite Channels:
A Screen T hat Lead s You T o H eav en
by Mohamed El-Sayed
Hilary & Trinity Terms 2009
Sponsor: Mona Megalli Fellowship
1
Table of Conten ts
Intro duction
3
C hap ter 1
The Emergence of Religious Islamic Satellite Channels
7
Chapter 2
Business Model: A Ringtone That Will Lead You to Heaven
17
Chapter 3
Critical Analysis of the Content of Religious Islamic Satellite Channels
21
3.1
Diverse content for diverse audience
21
3.2
Moderatism vs. Traditionalism
24
3.3
Women on Salafi Screens
29
3.4
Different approaches to religion
32
Chapter 4 Market Conditions and Competition: The Boom’s not Over
39
Conclusion
43
Acknowledgements
46
Bibliography
47
2
Introd uctio n
Over the past couple of decades the Arab world has
witnessed an unprecedented boom in the number of
international television services. The Arab satellite television
industry began in the early 1990s in the wake of the first Gulf
War. Arab entrepreneurs and governments then became
interested in launching regional Arabic-language satellite
channels, the former in pursuit of financial gain, the latter in
search of regional influence over editorial lines,
programmes, and pan-Arab public opinion. 1
This wave of establishing satellite channels in the Arab world
began with the launching in 1991 of the Egyptian Space
Channel (ESC), which was soon followed by the creation of
the Saudi Middle East Broadcasting Centre (MBC), the
Kuwaiti Space Channel (KSC), the Jordanian Arab Space
Channel (JASC), the Space Network of Dubai, Tunisia TV7,
Moroccan Satellite Channel, Oman TV, and United Arab
Emirates TV. Hundreds of other national and local
television channels were later put on ARABSAT for directto-home reception across the Arab world. The Arab region
has also witnessed for the first time the birth of private
specialised international television services in the 1990s,
1
Paula Chakravartty & Yuezhi Zhad, Global Communications: Toward a
Transcultural Political Economy, ( Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc,
2008), p. 191.
3
such as Arab Radio and Television (ART), and the Orbit
television package that include mainly entertainment and
sports channels.
Obviously, the primary objective for the development of
these satellite services is that many an Arab country desired
to project a favourable image of its society and government
to the rest of the Arab world. Another secondary objective is
to broadcast programmes in Arabic to Arab nationals living
abroad, for the majority of these channels are transmitting
via satellites covering different parts of the world, given that
there are estimated over 5 million Arabs living in Europe
and more than 2 million in America.
The second half of the first decade of the Arab satellite
television industry is also marked by a transformation from
single channels to multi-channel networks. Many specialised
channels grouped under one name, providing
complementary services that range from general family
stations to sports and entertainment channels. Amid these
flourishing circumstances and a specialisation trend, Islamic
religious satellite channels emerged in the last part of the
1990s. The establishment of the first Sunni Islamic religious
satellite channel in the Arab world, Iqraa∗ , as part of the
Arabic Radio and Television Network (ART), owned by the
Arab Media Company (AMC), in 1998 paved the way for a
proliferation in the number of similar channels in the Arab
world in the following years. Today, while this research was
being written, there are estimated 30 specialised religious
∗
The word “Iqraa” in Arabic means “Read” which constitutes the first verse in
the Holy Quran.
4
Islamic satellite channels transmitting via many satellites
covering the entire Arab world and other parts of the world
as well.
This research is intended to give an overview of the history
of Sunni Islamic religious satellite channels, their missions,
and their raison d’être. I will also provide a critical analysis
of their content, the kind of Islam they promote, programme
formats, and the religious scholars they host. Despite the fact
that precious few pieces of information about the means of
financing these channels are available, I will try to outline the
business models adopted by these channels for them to
survive in what is becoming a highly competitive, expanding
market of religious satellite media bordering on full
saturation. And in light of a lack in official and independent
statistics about the number of audience of these channels as
well as limited resources, the research will not tackle the
impact of these channels on audience, which could be the
theme of a PhD thesis.
The research divides religious Islamic satellite channels into
two main types: Salafi and “moderate” stations. This general
classification is based on the type of content and the kind of
Islam offered by these channels: the former broadcast
puritanical form of Islam, and the latter provides a relatively
moderate version of religion. There are a number of
religious channels that only broadcasts recitals of the Holy
Quran, Hadith (Sayings of the Prohphet Muhammad),
Islamic lyrics. The focus will be on the type of programmes
in Iqraa and Al-Resala channels as representatives of nonSalafi channels on one hand, and on one of the Salafi
5
stations, Al-Nas, which is headquartered in Egypt and
believed to be the most popular among Egyptian viewers. 3
3
According to fifteen interviews with loyal viewers of religious channels in
Egypt in addition to many an analysis published in Arabic by respected
Egyptian media experts, Al-Nas proved to be the most watched religious
channel by Egyptians.
6
Chapter One
The Emergence of Religious Islamic Satellite Channels
“For many years we have yearned to see a channel that
caters for our religious needs and through which we can
interactively communicate with our favourite sheikhs,” said
an Egyptian heavy-bearded young man who has been a loyal
viewer of most of the religious Islamic satellite channels
since their inception in late 1990s. For decades, religious
preaching in the Egyptian media has been confined to
precious few specialised religious newspapers and magazines
that were mostly issued by state-affiliated establishments like
Al-Azhar, and programmes aired by the state-run Holy
Quran Radio Station, or cassette audio- and video-tapes
containing religious sermons given by Islamic scholars and
lay preachers, in addition to a small number of TV shows
aired on official TV channels. However, with the
proliferation in the number of satellite channels in the Arab
world in the 1990s – which hit more than 300 channels in
2009 and are mostly owned by businessmen – and as “Arab
satellite broadcasting offered unparalleled opportunities for
media businesses and advertisers”1 broadcasters began to
think about launching specialised religious channels to cater
to a growing number of religious people in the Arab world.
The proliferation in the number of satellite channels in the
Arab world can not be separated from the fact that 300
1
Marwan M. Kraidy, Arab Satellite Television Between Regionalization and
Globalization, Global Media Journal, Volume 1, Issue 1, Fall 2002
7
million Arab people were ideal targets for corporations
wishing to shape consumer loyalties. This regionalist
approach adopted by broadcasters cashed in on the fact that
the Arab audience is united by language, and, to a large
extent, by religion, which makes standardised advertising
viable. 2 In addition, the satellite revolution that took place in
the Arab world could also be attributed to the convergence
of three factors, with global and regional dimensions: relative
political liberalisation, economic privatisation, and the
acquisition of new communication technologies. As a result,
the satellite industry has changed parameters of television
production, control and reception. Private companies
pumped huge investments into establishing satellite
channels, having lavishly spent on TV shows. Meanwhile,
satellite dishes and receivers became more and more
affordable for the majority of people.
Amid this satellite revolution emerged a business
opportunity for Arab entrepreneurs to cash in on a growing
trend of religiosity in the Arab world that gained pace with
the rise of the oil wealth in the conservative Arab Gulf
countries starting from the 1970s. Millions of citizens from
poor Arab countries, especially from Egypt, emigrated to the
Gulf countries in pursuit of better job opportunities, where
they were susceptible to a puritanical version of Islam –
Wahabism.* Many of those who came back to their
2
Ibid.
A strictly orthodox version of Sunni Islam founded by Muhammad Ibn Abd
El-Wahhab (1703–92). It advocates a return to the early Islam of the Quran and
Sunna, rejecting later innovations; this type of Islam is still the predominant
religious force in Saudi Arabia.
*
8
countries stuck to the practices of Wahabism and conveyed
them to their families and acquaintances.
Amidst these favourable circumstances, a host of religious
channels came to existence over the last decade. The most
popular three religious Islamic channels were launched by
Saudi businessmen: the first religious Islamic channel, Iqraa,
was launched by the Saudi billionaire Saleh Kamel in 1998
as part of the ART satellite television network, then Saudi
businessman Prince Walid bin Talal launched Al-Resala
station in 2006 as part of Rotana satellite network. The
launching of Al-Resala could also be attributed to the fact
that the Saudi royal family, to which Prince Al-Walid bin
Talal belongs, wanted to promote a moderate version of
Islam to counterweigh the influence of radical Islamists like
that of Al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden and his followers.
Tareq Al-Suwaidan, producer of the channel, argued that
“so many people are spreading hate and fighting, that we feel
we should spread peace and love by means of the true
message of Islam. We only represent moderate and modern
Islam”. 3 Al-Suwaidan pointed out that the goals of Al-Resala
is to “show that being Muslim also means appreciating
beauty; as Muslims we can enjoy ourselves, live in peace and
love everyone.”4
Afterwards, Saudi businessman Mansour bin Kadsa followed
suit in the same year by launching Al-Nas station in 2006,
which started as an entertainment channel broadcasting
3
Daniela Conte, “Islamic and yet modern television”, Dialogues on
Civilizations, 5 Feb. 2008
4
Ibid.
9
Arabic pop songs, interpretation of dreams, and shortly
afterwards converted to be a religious channel. The
popularity of Al-Nas as a religious channel lured the
businessman into converting another entertainment channel
that he owns, Al-Khalijia, into a religious station.5
Over the past three years, over 27 new religious Islamic
satellite channels were set up. This burst in the number of
channels appearing within a short period of time led analysts
and observers to reflect on what is dubbed “the
phenomenon of religious channels”. Analysts and media
experts, in fact, attribute the proliferation in the number of
religious channels to three factors:
a) Mass media in the Arab world have turned from an
industry with a mission in the twentieth century into a big
profitable business in the 21st century. With the fall of the
Pan-Arabism movement championed by late Egyptian
president Gamal Abdel-Nasser who used the media
(newspapers, radio, and TV) in rallying support for his PanArab dream, and the rise of the influence of oil-rich Gulf
countries, businessmen wanted to capitalise on a growing
trend of economic liberalisation in the Arab world;
b) Social changes that began to permeate through the Arab
middle classes that are turning to be religious, especially after
emigrating to conservative Arab Gulf countries and being
susceptible to an austere version of Islam; and
5
Hossam Tammam, “Religious Satellite Channels and the Making of New
Preachers”, http://islamyoon.islamonline.net , 24 October 2009
10
c) Conflict over the interpretation of Islam and who are
entitled to speak in its name. There has been an ongoing
battle between traditional Islamic bodies like Al-Azhar and
other Islamist movements over the interpretation of the
doctrines of Islam. Al-Azhar scholars regularly criticise the
conten t broadcasted by religious channels that depend
mainly on non-Azhar or lay preachers.
But it must be stressed that the Islamic Revival has affected
the Arab world’s media industry, in particular its twentiethcentury capital, Egypt, in a number of different ways. With
the failure of Pan-Arabism championed by Arab leaders in
the 1950s and 1960s and the rise in the political, cultural and
economic influence of the religiously conservative Gulf states
due to the surplus in petrodollars, there has been a growing
tendency among the general public in Arab countries, and in
Egypt in particular, to show their piety, and the religious
channels cater to their religious needs. Therefore, the
flourishing of religious satellite channels could also be
attributed to the increasing presence of religion in public life
in Arab countries and in Egypt in particular. Egyptians, for
example, were considered by a recent Gallup Poll to be the
most religious people in the world, as 100% of the
interviewees said that religion played an important role in
their life.6
The emergence of the religious satellite channels could also
be seen as an attempt by Saudi businessmen to capitalize on
6
“A poll conducted by Gallup Shows Egyptians Are the Most Religious People
in the World”, www.almasry-alyoum.com, 12 Feb. 2009
11
the unmistakably growing tide of Salafism ∗ in the Arab world.
With a growing number of Salafists who do not have a
media platform – other than sermons given at mosques,
which are then included in cassette tapes or books – that
provides them with the Salafist dose they always cherished.
The religious discourse that was prevalent in the media represented by Al-Azhar scholars who appear on the official
terrestrial and satellite channels, or new, Western-looking
preachers or the platforms of the Muslim Brotherhood - did
not meet the Salafist audience demand1.
Another fact that is believed to have contributed to the wide
spread of religious channels is the fact that satellite dishes
and receivers have become affordable for the vast majority in
the Arab world, and particularly in Egypt, the most
populated Arab country. There were only perhaps 50 dishes
in all of Egypt in 1990 compared to the several million there
today, and as many or more dishes throughout the rest of the
Arab world. However, the number of those viewers who
have access to satellite channels is much bigger than the
number of dishes available for households, for in the poor
neighbourhoods and villages of Egypt and Lebanon video
pirates download satellite signals and retransmit by cable
systems to clusters of buildings or even entire
∗
The term refers to those who want contemporary Arab society to be
reordered based on the model set by the Prophet Muhammad and his
companions – the Salaf. Salafism has come to describe a more puritanical
version of Islam that emphasizes the study of the Qur’an and scrupulous
imitation of the personal characteristics of the Salaf. It is far more interested in
textualism, focused on Islam for its own sake, and much more concerned with
external manifestations of religious practice. It also has a much more rigid
view of gender relations and the symbolic aspects of religion.
12
neighbourhoods, at fees that undercut the costs of dishes and
satellite receivers, not to mention in many cases, pay-TV
charges. 7 This system includes both pay-TV stations like
Orbit and ART network channels as well as free stations like
the news channel Al-Jazeera and religious channels like AlNas, Iqraa and Al-Resala.
This demand on the side of the Salafist audience coincided
with a desire by famous Salafist preachers, who gained wide
popularity through their sermons held at mosques over a
long period of time, to reach out to a base of audience wider
than that of followers who attend their sermons at mosques.
The Salafist preachers, in fact, have been benefiting from
modern media platforms, starting from the cassette tapes
that carried their sermons to millions of people in the Arab
world, to the use of the Internet as a far-reaching platform.
According to expert in Islamic movements Hossam
Tammam, “Salafists took great interest in satellite media as
one of the most effective platforms that are capable of
building a direct relationship with their audience where the
image interacts with the language producing a high level of
communication”. 8
For the owners of the channels, those preachers served as a
golden tool to attract great numbers of viewers to their
religious channels, for they already enjoyed popularity
7
Seib, Philip, New Media and the New Middle East, Journal of Islamic Studies
2009 20(1):146-151; doi:10.1093/jis/etn084.
8
Tammam, The Salafist Satellite Channels in Egypt, Weghat Nazar magazine, May 2009
issue.
13
before appearing on these stations. 9 But despite the fact that
the content of the religious satellite channels is of a Salafist
“missionary” nature, Salafist satellite channels were
established as a business aimed at making profits by cashing
in on a wide base of audience who have already converted to
Salafism or beginning to convert to this current. These
channels should be viewed less as a platform aimed at
advocating Salafism.
Religious Islamic satellite channels and the rise of the
phenomenon of new lay preachers who appear on their
screens are also widely seen as a product of the free market
economy. This is best reflected in the variety of religious
treatments that gives many choices to viewers to choose their
own reference version of Islam, thus embodying the supplydemand concept, which is intrinsic to the free market
economy. This is also reflected in the emergence of an
attempt by preachers to protect their intellectual rights, an
unprecedented step in Islamic preaching history. Some of
the preachers, especially the popular ones, are also bound
by exclusive contracts with the channels by virtue of which
he/she is not allowed to appear on any other channel.
Nevertheless, there are many analysts who believe that one
of the factors that led to the wide spread of religious satellite
channels, many of whose headquarters are in Egypt and
transmit via the Egyptian state-owned NileSat, is that the
regime in Egypt seeks to encourage the Salafist current to
become a counterbalance to the country’s biggest Islamist
9
Ibid.
14
opposition movement Al-Ikhwan Al-Muslimun (Muslim
Brotherhood). “Since the Egyptian government does not
allow the more politically-active Muslim Brotherhood (alIkhwan al-Muslimun) to base their own satellite stations in
the country, some critics believe that this is part of a strategy
to cultivate Salafism as a counterweight to the Muslim
Brotherhood. According to Egyptian novelist and cultural
commentator Alaa Al-Aswany, ‘the political quietism of the
Salafis and their injunctions to always obey the ruler are too
good an opportunity for established Arab rulers to pass up,’
adding that Salafism is “a kind of Christmas present for the
dictators because now they can rule with both the army and
the religion.”10
The missions of the religious satellite channels are nearly
indistinguishable. In their mission statement, almost all the
channels mentioned the “spreading of moderate Islam” and
“forming contemporary Islamic society who firmly believe in
Allah and His Messenger [Prophet Muhammad] and the
Holy Quran and the teachings of the Prophet by adopting
Islam in all aspects of life”. 11 They also share the same goals:
displaying the true Sunni image of Islam, stressing the
“tolerant” Islamic identity, “spreading religious knowledge”
among Muslims and non-Muslims all over the world,
defending the Islamic nation, “clarifying the principles of
Ahl al-Sunnah wa al-Jama’ah (the people who follow the
Prophet’s way of life and adhere to his companions) and
responding to destructive thoughts” and “discussing the false
10
Nathan Field and Ahmed Hamam, Salafi TV in Egypt, Arab Media & Society,
Spring 2009
11
www.iqraa-tv.net
15
interpretations of the Sunni approach in a positive scientific
manner”12. Some channels, like Mecca station, have taken
upon their shoulders taking Islam to a universal audience by
broadcasting in foreign languages like Russian or adding
English subtitles to its programmes. But channels like AlResala say that its mission is to “correct wrong principles” by
adopting “moderate Islamic thought”. Some of these
channels, like Al-Majd channels group which are specialised
in either broadcasting recitals of the Holy Quran or Sayings
of the Prophet (Hadith), adopt a mission of “creating a
permanent link between the audience and the Holy Quran
by airing recitals of its verses 24/7.”13
Other channels, like Al-Umma, adopt a mission focused on
“defending the Prophet by replying to those who fiercely
attack him”14, or “glorifying the Prophet” by broadcasting
songs and series of programmes praising him like Sahour
channel.
12
www.taiba.tv
www.almajd.tv
14
www.alomma.tv
13
16
Chapter Two
Business Model: A Ringtone that will Lead you to
Heaven
When it comes to business models, the Islamic satellite
channels vary one from another. The first model,
represented by Iqraa and Al-Risala, is counting mainly on
lavish financing from their Saudi billionaire owners Saleh
Kamel and Al-Walid bin Talal. Despite the fact that they air
commercials, the officials responsible for these channels
state that the profits generated from them do not meet the
expenditures. 1 These two channels are believed to have been
launched by the owners of these diversified networks either
to just complete the package of channels they already have
(sports, entertainment, drama, soap operas…etc.) or to
counterbalance extremist religious currents, rather than
seeking profit. Nevertheless, they accept sponsorships of talk
shows and commercials.
The second type of channels, like Sahour, depends on
donations from wealthy people, charitable organisations, or
political figures.2
The third type of business model adopted by the majority of
1
Interview with Mohamed Hammam, general director of Iqraa, Egypt,
www.islamonline.net, 9 Jan. 2005
2
Sahour receives financial support from President Omar Al-Bashir, according to a paper
prepared by it’s director ?Abdallah Al-Taher published in a conference in Khartoum,
http://csicw.org/mypdf/ic7.pdf
17
channels is based on spending the minimum on the
operation of the channel and making the most of
commercials and other revenue-generating tools. The
majority of preachers appearing on this type of religious
satellite channel, like the Cairo-based Al-Nas, have moderate
demands as far as payment is concerned, which served as a
golden opportunity for the owners of the channels, for they
proved to be cost-effective for them. Many of the channels
host unpaid lay preachers whose ultimate desire is to have a
media platform to get their message across.
The adopters of this type of cost-effective business model
cash in on the fact that the nature of conventional Islamic
preaching in mosques does not call for extravagant
decorations, which, in their opinion, contradicts the
emphasis placed by the Islamic religion on modesty and
unpretentiousness in appearance. Consequently, the studios
of the majority of these channels – except for those of Iqraa
and Al-Risala – are poorly equipped and decorated. All
these factors, as a matter of fact, have helped make
launching and operating a religious satellite channel
economically viable.
Generally speaking, religious Islamic satellite channels
generate money by adopting five methods:
a) Revenues generated from the SMS and call-ins services
for which viewers are paying extra charges: a given
satellite channel concludes an agreement with mobile
phone operators and landline telephone companies in
18
many Arab countries to assign a given phone number
via which the audience can send an SMS that includes
a fatwa (religious edict) request, comment,
congratulations, prayers etc. Channels share the profit
generated from these SMS and call-in services with the
mobile or landline operators. According to professor
of sociology at Cairo University Ahmed Al-Majdoub,
who conducted a study on the religious satellite
channels, “these channels are making profits from
phone calls coming from viewers around the world
asking about religious edicts in what has been
[ironically] dubbed ‘fatwa delivery’.”3 He argues that
“the more controversial the fatwa, the more call-ins and
SMSs flood the channel, the more the profit.”
b) Revenues generated from commercials: Some of the
channels, like Al-Nas, run commercials that take as
long as an hour. Tickers bearing pieces of information
about a variety of products are also seen at the bottom
of the screens of most of these channels. In fact, this
commercials-oriented approach has been the subject of
scathing criticism levelled by viewers and analysts as
well. They believe that “the majority of Islamic satellite
channels are interested in generating profits from
mawkish commercials and SMSs” and that they
“earmark more than 12 hours a day for commercials
about crystal vessels, luxurious sheets, cups, chinaware,
mobile phones…etc.” This profit-oriented approach, in
fact, led some to accuse the religious channels of
3
Nelly Youssef, Religious Islamic Satellite Channels: Mission or Business,
http://ar.qantara.de
19
“commoditising religion and tarnishing its image”. 4
c) Sponsorships of programmes: Almost all the religious
satellite channels accept sponsorships of shows and
programmes. Perhaps the most sponsored TV show
was Amr Khaled’s shows that were hosted by Iqraa for
many years.
d) Revenues generated from interactive services like
downloading ringtones and logos: Most of the channels
put a multi-purpose ticker at the bottom of their
screens. These tickers display phone numbers that a
viewer can call to download “religious” ringtones. AlNas channel, for example, went as far as using the
voices of its preachers while saying prayers and
transformed them into ringtones that could be
downloaded for a certain charge. “A ringtone that will
lead you to enter Heaven” was the selling line of the
ringtones.
e) Selling the content produced by channels in audio and
video forms (DVD) for the public in order to generate
additional income.
4
Awad Ibrahim Awad, “Islamic Satellite Channels, An Assessment”
20
Chapter Three
A Critical Analysis of the Content of Religious Islamic
Satellite Channels
Apart from the profit-oriented approach adopted by the
majority of religious Islamic satellite channels, the content of
programmes and shows aired by these channels remain the
subject of controversy among media and academic circles.
Although the mission statements of the majority of the
channels stress that they promote “moderate” Islam, there
are obviously two types of content with varying degrees: the
relatively moderate and the puritanical Salafist content.
There are also a number of channels, like Al-Majd Quran
and Al-Majd Hadith, that present recitals of the Holy Quran
and Sayings of the Prophet round-the-clock without airing
any programmes.
3.1 Diverse Content for Diverse Audience
Religious channels present two types of lay preachers: one
that is relatively moderate aimed at providing a dose of
religion to the middle, upper middle and upper classes; and
another type of hard-line, Salafist preachers who are popular
among the uneducated and poorly educated who constitute
the majority of the poor in Egypt. Both types of preaching
are apolitical and concentrate on changing people’s
approach to life by calling upon them to stick to the rules
and teachings of the Islamic religion. The relatively
“moderate” satellite channels host “modern” preachers who
21
call for a modern approach to religiosity by concentrating on
refining people’s moral ethics, rather than putting emphasis
on disputes over beliefs.
The first type of content is represented by both Iqraa and
Al-Risala channels. On those two channels, the traditional
staid, bearded and turbaned sheikh – who always appears on
state-run channels – has been largely replaced by young,
stylish beardless men and colourfully-veiled women, most of
whom were formerly unveiled Egyptian movie stars. The two
channels feature a sophisticated line of entertainment
programming that ranges from engaging talk shows, cooking
shows inspired by the prophet Muhammad’s culinary habits,
sleek game shows, intricate soap operas, to reality television
contests where young entrepreneurs devise plans without a
budget to help charitable causes from Darfur to Kosovo. 1
Programmes broadcast by these two channels seek a
simpler, more moderate message that rebukes radicalism
and makes religion “cool”. This kind of content is relatively
different from the customary calls of divine retribution
viewers hear from fulminating sheikhs at the mosque, on
cassette tapes, and on television. However, the channel also
feature heavy-bearded sheikhs wearing traditional galabiya
(gown) who present programmes of prayers.
This moderate approach was formulated by managers of
these channels who either lived and studied abroad or by
“Westernised” non-bearded preachers who wear snappy
suits and ties and speak in colloquial Arabic. The first
1
Nabil Echchaibi, From the pulpit to the studio: Islam’s internal battle
22
category could be represented by the general manager of AlResalah, Tareq Al-Suwaydan, a 46-year-old Kuwaiti
television celebrity and a motivational speaker who teaches
young Muslims how to become effective business leaders.
During his 17 years in the United States as a student, AlSuwaydan was heavily influenced by Western
entrepreneurial approach to life promoted by motivational
works such as Steven Covey’s The Seven Habits of Highly
Effective People and religious literature such as Norman
Peale’s work on the power of positive thinking and faith.
Upon his return to Kuwait, he adapted this literature by
making Islam a success formula for spiritual self-fulfillment
and material achievement. 2
Being at the helm of Al-Resala, Al-Suwaydan pointed out
that he wants to make the medium the message. “So many
people are spreading hate and fighting, that we feel we
should spread peace and love by means of the true message
of Islam. We only represent moderate and modern Islam”
he was quoted as saying.3 Islam, he says, is not supposed to
be dull and irrelevant. Islamic values of self-piety, hard work,
filial piety, helping the poor can be embedded more
effectively in reality TV shows, soap operas, game shows,
cartoons, and even music videos. For him, Al-Resala is a
marriage of tradition and modernity.4 Since its launch in
March 2006, Al-Resalah has been the subject of both praise
and criticism. The detractors of the channel see its mixing of
religion and secular content as bordering on heresy, while
2
Ibid
Interview with Daniela Conte, http://www.resetdoc.org/EN/SuwaidanConte.php
4
Echchaibi, From the pulpit to the studio
3
23
others believe that by promoting this combination the
Muslim world can get rid of forces of religious extremism.
Just like its regular use of graphics and studio sets, AlResalah’s programmes could be described as innovative and
modern. This is could also be said of the programmes and
shows aired by the channel which deal with some daily life
issues like children and women abuse, drug and alcohol
addiction, divorce, corruption, and romance.
3.2 Moderatism vs. Traditionalism
Unlike the channels that are considered purely Salafi, some
of the programmes of Al-Resala feature moderately veiled
women as hostesses and interviewees. And despite the fact
that female hostesses are usually assigned to discuss family
issues, some of these women issue fatwas, a function strictly
reserved for male sheikhs in Salafi channels.
What sets Al-Resala and Iqraa apart from the rest of
religious Islamic satellite channels is the fact that the main
defining feature of those two channels seems to be this
tension between modernity and tradition, an attempt to
understand modernisation in Arab and Muslim culture. For
example, they broadcast pop songs that either praise God,
the Prophet and his companions, or Islam in general. For
example, on Al-Resalah’s first day of broadcast it featured a
song by singer Sami Yusuf, a 26-year-old British singer of
Azeri origins who has been a sensation around the Muslim
world for many years now. The channel’s use of Yusuf’s
upbeat western-influenced rhythms and captivating Islamic
24
lyrics showed that it opted for a different, modern concept of
Islamic broadcasting. In addition to the praise of the God
and the Prophet, Yusuf’s songs centre on pleas to revive the
united Islamic nation. His sophisticated use of music videos
and his moderate Islamic message are seen by some as “a
new balance for Muslim youth who feel equally estranged by
the moral bankruptcy of pop culture and the excessive
austerity of religious extremism.”5
Iqraa and Al-Resala, as a matter of fact, have a lot in
common. They feature former actors and actresses who gave
up acting and let their beards loose or began to wear a veil as
a sign of becoming religious. They hosted Egyptian actresses
like Abeer Sabri, Mona Abdel-Ghani, Sabreen, and Wagdi
Ghoneim. They all work as presenters who moderate
dialogues between clerics and viewers.
Like Al-Resala, Iqraa for many years hosted the most
popular Islamic show – Amr Khaled’s series of shows for
which the channel has played host for over eight years:
Sunnaa Al-Haya (Life Makers), Qasas Al-Anbiaa (Stories of
Prophets), Ala Khota Al-Habib (Following in the Footsteps
of the Beloved Prophet), Al-Janna fi Biutina (Paradise at
Our Homes), Bismak Nahya (By your name we live), Wa
Nalqa Al-Ahiba (We Meet Our Beloved Mohamed and His
Companions), Khawater Qurania (Quranic Thoughts), and
Hatta Yoghairou ma bi Anfusihim (Unless They Change
Themselves). A veritable sensation and a media
phenomenon both in the Middle East and among the
Muslim diaspora in the West, Khaled’s sermons
5
Ibid.
25
broadcasted on Iqraa has arguably kept millions of viewers
glued to their TV screens. Khaled’s television show quite
literally seems to “replace the mosque” by lifting the
religious sermon out of its traditional environs and placing it
in a much more flexible and abstract area, where genders
mix (but within decent limits) and the pulpit is a shared
space, and a shared microphone.
Perhaps what makes Khaled’s shows on Iqraa very popular
is his charismatic style that combines the trendiness of Arab
pop singers with the unpretentious missionary appeal of
Western televangelist Billy Graham, and the self-help
wisdom of popular American TV psychologist Dr. Phil.
However, Khaled’s sermons on Iqraa decline to tackle
domestic politics, preferring to emphasize emotion, God’s
love, and issues of personal piety, such as dating, family
relationships, veiling, hygiene, manners, Internet use, and
leisure. But it is his style of preaching on TV — in a talk
show format featuring audience participation and
testimonials from both ordinary and famous people — that
sets Khaled apart and makes him such a favourite with
privileged youth and women. His faithful viewers say he
looks like them, speaks their language and makes their
religion relevant to their lives without shouting at them about
fire and brimstone in incomprehensible Classical Arabic. All
Islamists agree that preaching should be done in classical
Arabic, the language of the Qur’an, but some, such as Amr
Khalid, make greater use of the colloquial dialect to reach a
wider audience.
Another popular show aired by Iqraa in 2000 was Khaled’s
26
debut (kalam min al-Alb) (Words from the Heart). Due to
the lavish funding of the channel, its use of graphics and
visual effects is remarkable, in sharp contrast with poorly
equipped Salafi channels. For example, in Khaled’s show a
viewer can watch the stylised Arabic words kalam min al-Alb
drift across the screen as emotive synthesized music sounds,
reminiscent of a soundtrack to one of Egypt’s soap operas.
Khaled’s face looms in a corner, tinted in pastel colors, his
mouth silently moving in slow motion as the music plays on.
Afterwards, his image is followed by the face of Sohair ElBabali, an Egyptian star comedy actress, now wearing a
conservative hijab consisting of black robes and veil. She
nods her head in slow motion with her eyes closed and filled
with tears. Next comes a mixture of different faces, most of
them young, all of them demonstrating a wide range of
emotions in their features as the music ebbs and swells and
credits for set design, music, concept, etc., run alongside.
One can see a young man smiling, a group of veiled girls
with their hands over their faces, an unveiled girl speaking
passionately into a handheld microphone.
As Khaled rises and emerges from the studio audience,
there is a change in the camera angle and the viewer sees the
entire set. The camera quickly pans to smiling faces of the
young audience attending the sermon, both men and
women, sitting together on bleachers. They are subtly
separated by gender in alternating rows, but otherwise give
the appearance of a blended group.
Iqraa, and Al-Resala, host lay preachers who speak
colloquial languages in sharp contrast to other Salafi
27
channels that mainly host lay preachers who speak mostly
classical Arabic. The age of the preachers is relatively young,
and they put a modern look (jeans and polo shirts, or stylish
open-collar suits, clean shaven with a carefully-trimmed
mustache). By doing so, the two channels are trying to make
those lay preachers more accessible to a wide base of young
Muslim audience. Apparently, the young preachers believe
Islam could benefit a great deal from the ways in which
American evangelists have embraced modern media and
mass culture to popularise religion.
Perhaps one of the most popular of Khaled's shows was Life
Makers, aired by Iqraa. It was a series of devotional
speeches with the realisation of social reform projects
helping with poverty, unemployment, health, and small
businesses. The popularity of the show transcended the
Arab world, for when he told his viewers in one of the early
episodes to submit practical reform ideas to his website, he
reportedly received more than 350,000 ideas from 35
countries including the UK, France, Italy, and the US.
Nevertheless, there are detractors of this kind of preaching,
arguing that by adopting this approach to religion preachers
like Khaled are “reducing a serious religious message to a
sound bite.” Salafi lay preachers refer to his preaching style
as “superficial, air-conditioned, and self serving.” On the
other side, Khaled insists young Muslims need concrete
reformers who would guide them, not simply tradition
relayers who would flood them with Quranic recitations.
Perhaps because of Khaled’s approach to preaching, which
was aired on Iqraa, when the Salafi channel Al-Nas hosted
28
one of his shows in 2007, other Salafi Sheikhs who used to
appear on its screen, like Mohamed Hussein Yakoub and
Abu Ishaq Al-Howeini, objected to this move and
threatened to boycott the channel. According to news
reports, this led the officials of the channel to stop airing
Khaled’s shows, in compliance with the Salafi sheikhs
request. Salafi preachers who have great influence on the
content aired by channels like Al-Nas, Al-Baraka, AlRahma…etc. are clearly against the “modern” approach to
religion adopted by preachers like Khaled, simply because
Salafism places strong emphasis on literally mimicking the
pious ancestors. While categorically rejecting the Western
style of dressing, Salafis view mannerisms of the Prophet,
wearing a long beard for example, as a constant reminder of
their commitment that will help avoid sin. These choices
are reflected visually on Salafi stations where preachers wear
long beards and the same type of clothing that the first
generation of Islam would have worn, whereas preachers
who define themselves as non-Salafi wear less conspicuous
robes or a suit and tie.
3.3 Women on Salafist screen
Salafism has also a much more rigid view of gender relations
and the symbolic aspects of religion and is more Wahhabi
and Saudi in its orientation. Indeed, many of the Egyptian
self-defined Salafi preachers received their religious training
in Saudi Arabia instead of Cairo’s Al-Azhar and millions of
Egyptians became more conservative while working in the
29
Gulf.6 For Salafis, who interpret the Qur’an more literally,
there is less gray area: the world is divided into infidels and
believers and the West clearly lies in the former category.
Therefore, at least theoretically, dialogue with the “other” is
highly unlikely. Therefore, some Salafis accuse certain nonSalafi preachers of compromising on principles in order to
gain fame or influence. In a recent speech, a popular Salafi
cleric mocked the “artist” Amr Khalid. 7
The near total exclusion of women from the airwaves of the
Salafi stations reflects Salafism’s more rigid views on gender
relations – a clear distinction from non-Salafi channels. For
example, on Al-Resalah, several female Egyptian preachers
and presenters, who wear only the hijab (a scarf), are listed
as stars of Al-Reselah. On the other side, Salafi channels,
like Al-Nas, got rid of their female presenters under pressure
from Salafi figures like Mohamed Hassaan and Mohamed
Hussein Yaquob for they believe they ought not to appear
on TV.8 While most of the Salafi channels refuse the
appearance of any female presenter on its channel as they
believe it contradicts the teachings of Islam, one of these
channels, Al-Hafez, which is affiliated with Al-Nas channel
and started broadcasting in 2008, broke the rule by hosting
fully-veiled female presenters wearing a black niqab (a long
black loose garment covering the whole body and only
shows the eyes of a woman) who present a programme
about reciting the Holy Quran for women. However, the
6
James Toth, “Islamism in Southern Egypt”, International Journal of Middle
Eastern Studies, 2003.
7
www.youtube.com/watch?v=GkakThjUZKo
8
El-Sayed Zayed, The Female Presenter Who Wears Niqab: Women’s Image
in Salafi Channels, Islamonline.net
30
female presenters never mix with men in the studios of the
channel. According to one of the presenters in the channel,
Omayma Taha, the director of her one-hour show sets the
spotlights and the cameras on her and then leaves the studio
“so as not to be with a woman in the same room which is
impermissible in Islam.”9 Taha believes that her work as a
presenter in the channel is a kind of jihad for the cause of
Islam.
However, the appearance of female presenters ruffled the
feathers of Salafi sheikhs who work for Al-Nas channels
group for they stipulated that no female should appear on
the screen and no music should be aired by the channel.
One of the staunchest critics of the appearance of female
presenters is Abu Ishaq Al-Howeini, a Salafi sheikh who was
taught by Salafi icons like the Saudi Abdel-Aziz bin Baz and
Ibn Othaimin and the Jordanian Mohamed Nasreddine AlAlbani. He stipulated that no woman should appear on the
screen of any of the channels affiliated with Al-Nas. He
believes that a woman, even if she is fully veiled, could be
seductive. But manager of the channels group, Atef AbdelRashid, defended the management’s decision to host female
presenters, arguing that as long as they are adequately
equipped with religious knowledge they are entitled to
appear on TV. These female presenters host recital
programmes aimed at teaching women how to recite the
Holy Quran. Abdel-Rasheed does not find any problem in
the appearance of a fully veiled woman on the screen,
arguing that the priority is given to the content of the
9
Ibid.
31
programme rather than the appearance.
Media experts, in fact, disagree with the notion of having
fully veiled presenters on the screen, arguing that it
contradicts media ethics that are based on transparency.
Mahmoud Khalil, professor of media at Cairo University,
believes that a presenter should reveal their identity to the
audience. “It’s meaningless to watch ‘a female dressed like a
tent’ on the screen,” he said. He even believes that the
appearance of a fully-veiled presenter is meant to trigger a
controversy to attract more viewers. Observers believe that
the number of female presenters will increase as long as callins increase, for the market decides the survival of
programmes. 10
3.4 Different approaches to religion
Another feature of Salafi networks is an unwillingness to give
platforms to non-Salafi viewpoints: while other religious
stations may give airtime to Salafi preachers they disagree
with, when given the chance, Salafis do not return the favor.
For example, Sheikhs Heweny, Hassaan and Yacoub quit alNass in 2006 after management refused to ban Amr Khalid
from the air; the more dogmatic al-Rahma, owned by clerics,
exclusively features Salafi preachers. In contrast, Salafi
preachers do appear on Al-Reselah and Iqraa.
As far as content is concerned, Salafi channels place great
emphasis on basic beliefs (Aqida), rather than Sharia
10
Ibid.
32
(Islamic Law), which would inevitably lead them to question
certain government policies. In fact, many observers believe
this is the reason why the Egyptian government allows Salafi
channels to operate and transmit via the state-owned NileSat.
Salafi Sheikhs’ sermons aired by these channels are
apolitical, for they never tackle political or economic issues.
That’s why, perhaps, the government would not allow a
channel affiliated with the banned Muslim Brotherhood
group to operate from Egypt, since the Egyptian government
is not ready to give a media platform to clerics who would
then use it to question its policies. Tammam argues that
“given the fact that most of the Salafist religious satellite
channels are broadcasting via the Egyptian state-owned
NileSat, there is a set of legal and political measures that
govern Salafist stations…therefore, the Salafist presence in
Satellite channels is limited to giving sermons that are far
removed from the message conveyed by other Salafist and
Jihadist currents that have interests in political and public
affairs.” Therefore, these channels are hosting preachers
whose discourse is apolitical like: Mohamed Hassaan,
Mohamed Hussein Yaquoub, Abu Ishaq Al-Howeini,
Mahmoud Al-Masry, Salem Abul-Fotouh, and others. 11
Nevertheless, the programmes of religious satellite channels
in general are not completely devoid of any political content.
The Palestinian-Israeli issue is tackled by many a preacher,
since they call for offering a helping hand to “our brethren
Palestinians”, praying for them, and invoking God against
11
Hossam Ta mmam, Salafi Satellite Channels: Will Salafism Counteract the
Secularisation of Religion on Satellite Channels?, www.islamonline.net, 18 May
2009
33
the “Jews and Zionists”. But this kind of solidarity does not
extend to directly blaming the plight of the Palestinians on
the Arab rulers or calling the masses to make it to the streets
to demonstrate against their governments. During the Israeli
assault against Gaza in late 2008, some preachers prayed for
the fate of the Palestinians, whereas preacher Mohamed
Hassaan harshly criticised Arab society and leadership,
though not by name, for their failure in assisting the
Palestinians or stopping the war. However, this political
attitude towards the Palestinian-Israeli conflict is not
necessarily something unique about religious satellite
channels, because almost all Egyptian stations, regardless of
their religious orientation, show solidarity with the
Palestinians, for it is not regarded as a red line by the
authorities.
Nevertheless, critics of the religious channels argue that
these channels — which stress in their launching statement
that they were meant to boost moderateness and fight
extremism — have failed in fulfilling this promise. Montasser
El-Zayyat, prominent Egyptian lawyer and expert in Islamist
groups, is of the opinion that “they failed in addressing
violence and the terrorism phenomenon, let alone failing in
criticising Arab governments’ policies aimed at remaining [in
power]…”12. He added that religious channels do not have a
work plan aimed at fighting violence and terrorism in “a
methodological and academic manner instead of crying
people’s eyes out by sermons about behaviour and
12
Montasser El-Zayyat, Religious Islamic Satellite Channels and Their Role In
Fighting Terrorism
34
morals…New preachers who appear on religious satellite
channels were focused on attracting the audience by
programs about morals and behaviour, without dealing with
the problems of the nation under the pretext of keeping
away from politics, for they receive a list of taboos from
official media and security establishments…”13 These
channels, according to El-Zayyat, failed in supporting the
culture of religious moderation or stopping violence
committed in the name of Islam, for they did not provide a
platform to former extremist Islamic groups, like Jihad and
Jamaa Islamiya (Islamic Group), who revised their views on
Jihad and called for the cessation thereof, in order to set a
good example for the viewers.
A glance at the content of religious satellite channels,
especially the Salafi-oriented ones, reveals to what extent
these stations adopt a puritanical approach to religion. For
instance, one of the religious edicts broadcast by one of the
channels made impermissible the standing of a naked
woman in front of a male dog. In another example, a guest
hosted by Mecca station on 28 May 2009 said that Swine flu
started in Mexico because “it produces pornography like the
United States and because it raises millions of pigs which
God forbids the eating of its meat.” He said: “eating pork in
general causes cancer, high blood pressure, increase in
cholesterol, and causes hundreds of other diseases.”
A great deal of the fatwas issued by lay preachers on these
channels promotes rejection of the other, and Western
13
Ibid.
35
civilisation in particular. For example, a sermon given by a
lay preacher aired by Al-Hidaya channel on 12 June 2009
was centred on the West. “What we see in the West is not
civilisation; it is only technology. The West lacks morals, so
they don’t have [real] civilisation. How come they have a
civilisation while they allow gay marriages,” the preacher
said.
This “chaos” in issuing religious edicts prompted reaction
from Al-Azhar scholars who called for “an immediate
cessation of this farce by establishing an apparatus within the
Religious Edicts House to monitor fatwas broadcast on
religious satellite channels.”14 Qutb believes that these
channels “are unprofessional and are lacking proper
planning.”15
While such controversial edicts are more likely to be
adopted by illiterate people in a country like Egypt (around
one-third of the country’s population is illiterate), the
relationship between viewers and religious satellite channels
are mainly one-way, especially in Salafi-oriented stations.
The majority of the programmes aired are mainly presented
by one preacher or a dialogue between a presenter and a
preacher. Viewers are given the opportunity to interact by
calling in or sending SMS posing questions about a host of
religious issues, ranging from how to perform rituals, or how
to behave in daily life situations. However, in Salafi channels
the interaction between the audience and the preachers is
14
Gamal Qutb quoted in an article entitled “Religious Islamic Satellite
Channels: Mission or Business”, 7 November 2007, http://ar.qantara.de
15
Ibid.
36
limited to posing questions on the part of the former and
giving answers on the part of the latter. This one-way
interaction has turned the audience into receivers, depriving
them of taking part in a wider discussion about the issue
tackled or the question posed.
In fact, there is a remarkable difference between a show in a
Salafi channel and in a non-Salafi one like Iqraa and AlResala. Each presents a different type of relationship with
the audience which reflects a different image of the type of
Islam the preacher is advocating. Khaled’s highly produced
“modern” programme, with its abstract studio, inter-gender
audience and overt emphasis on individual relationships and
personal emotions, contrasts greatly with, for example,
Mohamed Hussein Yakoub’s paternalistic, homespun show,
which depends on either preaching fire and brimstone
sermons or answering the questions of the viewers without
giving them the opportunity to communicate their opinions.
On the other side, the audience attending Khaled’s show at
the studio who are mainly young people, pass the
microphone around, and Khaled constantly encourages,
challenges and engages with them, calling on them to speak.
He always reacts individually to each person and sometimes
he repeats their words and adds his own thoughts, or uses
one of their comments as a jumping-off point to relate a
Quranic story or share a relevant saying of the Prophet
(Hadith).
Nevertheless, religious Islamic satellite channels have paved
the way to the individualisation of religion, having cut the
relationship between the traditional religious establishments
37
and the general public by building a new relationship
between new lay preachers and the audience. In fact, these
channels have arguably changed the way people consume
religion. “Religious satellite channels have given people
many choices by giving them the ability to handpick from a
variety of religious programmes and sheikhs… a demandsupply relationship has arisen between preachers who
appear on satellite channels and the viewers, as the former
provides a religious product that meets the demands of
audience.”16
16
Hossam Tammam, Religious Satellite Channels and New Preachers and the
Secularisation of Religion, Islamonline.net
38
Chapter Four
Market Conditions and Competition: the Boom’s not over
The advent of transnational satellite television broadcasting
in the Arab world in the 1990s has been accompanied by an
explosion in private, commercial television productions that
paved the way for the emergence of religious Islamic satellite
channels. However, with the proliferation in the number of
religious Islamic satellite channels, which hit 30 this year, the
market becomes even more competitive. Although no
channel revealed its operating costs, revenues or net profits,
it seems that the market still has opportunity for new
stations. Given the low cost of launching such a channel, new
stations are scheduled to be launched this year — like the
one that will be launched by Egyptian preacher Khaled ElGuindi.1
I do believe that the number of religious stations will
continue flourishing due to the ever increasing presence of
religion in public life in Arab countries in general, and in
Egypt in particular. Egyptians, as mentioned before, are
considered to be the most religious society in the world.
Therefore, there has been and will be an increasing demand
on religion in mass media.
Another key factor that is likely to influence the shape of
competition among religious satellite stations is the attempts
1
Interview with Preacher Khaled El-Guindi in the Egyptian daily Al-Masry AlYoum
39
by official religious establishments in many an Arab country
to restore its pioneering role in Islamic preaching, a role it
held for centuries without competition. Al-Azhar, a seat of
Sunni Islam, announced few months ago that it would
launch a channel carrying its own brand. The religious
committee at the People’s Assembly, the Egyptian lower
house of parliament, gave its seal of approval of the new
channel. Omar Hashem, the head of the committee and
former chairman of the Al-Azhar University, was quoted as
saying that the TV channel will be managed by its board of
Trustees comprised of benevolent people and experts of
propagational media.2 According to Hashem, non-biased
religious scholars and experts will monitor programs of AlAzhar channel, which is aimed at “fighting extremism and
the issuance of irresponsible Fatwas”. He pointed out that
the programmes of the channel would reflect “difficulties
and plight of Palestinians and Muslim minorities around the
world, encouraging innovative religious dialogue based on
rationality and justice”.3
Another country, Qatar, is set to start working on a new
Islamic satellite channel with the aim to offset the growth of
other religious channels. 4 The initiative was promoted by the
Organisation of the Islamic Countries and Qatar was ready
to start working on the project. “The Organisation of the
Islamic Countries has approved an initiative for the creation
of an Islamic satellite channel and Qatar has a fully-fledged
2
An interview with Hashem in the Egyptian daily official Al-Ahram
Ibid.
4
Qatar working on new Islamic satellite television channel, Gulfnews.com, 19
September 2007
3
40
plan for its implementation. Hopefully, the project will help
curb the growth of Islamic satellite television,” according to
Doha-based media expert Marzouq Bashir. 5
In Yemen, the government is reportedly planning to launch
a religious satellite channel, Al-Iman. Its Minister of
Information, Hassan Al-Lawzi, announced his ministry’s
intention to launch a religious satellite channel, but did not
reveal when the channel would start broadcasting. Al-Lawzi
said the decision to launch his Al-Iman Channel was “a real
vision of the media's role and duties towards Islam and its
issues.”6
One of the important goals of Al-Iman is to “educate and
make people aware of Islam as a faith, along with its morals
and rules.”7 He also noted the significance of the media's
role in presenting Islam, pointing out its significance for all
peoples and confronting the distorted picture of Islam
“reflected by its enemies.”8 Al-Lawzi said that the channel
would be neither fanatical nor extremist, and in accordance
with Sharia law. The channel will present Islam’s legacy and
its strong points to viewers. However, he did not reveal from
where the channel plans to broadcast.
Algeria also is planning to launch a religious channel to
counter unauthorised fatwas broadcasted by satellite
5
Ibid.
Almigdad Dahesh Mojalli, “Minister of Information will launch a religious TV
channel”, Yemen Times, 31 May 2008
7
Ibid.
8
Ibid.
6
41
channels and on the Internet. The success of Al-Quran AlKarim (the Holy Quran) radio station encouraged the
authorities to launch a TV channel under the same name
and with the same purpose: unifying Algerians under one
religious banner, a source at the Ministry of Religious Affairs
said.9 The aim of launching the channel is countering
unauthentic fatwas and particularly violent ones that played
an important role in destabilising the country during the
security crisis that bordered on civil war in the 1990s. “The
new channel will aim at projecting a moderate image of
Muslim Algeria,” according to Azeddine Mihoubi, Director
General of Algerian National Radio (ENRS).10 The
launching of the Algerian channel is meant to provide the
Algerians with religious edicts that appeal to them. “Some
fatwas coming from satellite channels could be suitable for
other countries, but not Algeria,” he said.11 The channel will
feature interactive fatwa programs and viewers’ questions will
be received via phone calls and text messages. Providing a
“moderate” version of Islam remains the motto of all the
new channels: “Questions will be answered by Algerian
preachers known for their moderate stances. However, new
preachers with moderate religious views could also be
introduced,” Mihoubi stressed.12
9
Ramadan Belamry, “Algeria to launch state-owned religious channel”, 9
March 2009, www.khilafah.com
10
Ibid
11
Ibid.
12
Ibid.
42
Conclusion
Religious Islamic satellite channels came to existence in the
first place to appeal to a growing number of religious people
in the Arab world. The emergence of this type of station
could also be seen as an attempt by Saudi businessmen to
capitalise on the unmistakably growing tide of Salafism in the
Arab world. With a growing number of Salafists who do not
have a media platform that provides them with the Salafist
dose they always cherished, a business opportunity emerged
for Arab businessmen. This high demand on religion in
satellite media was spurred by the fact that the religious
discourse prevalent in the official media - represented
mainly by Al-Azhar scholars who appear on the official
terrestrial and satellite channels — did not meet the Salafist
audience demand. Another factor that affected the
emergence of these channels was the fact that their
programmes are apolitical, which convinced the Egyptian
government to allow them to have their headquarters in
Cairo and to transmit via its satellites.
Obviously, the appeal of Salafist stations is most prevalent
amongst the Egyptian lower classes for economic reasons.
Liberalisation and privatisation adopted by the Egyptian
government might be producing economic growth, and
certainly benefit the upper and upper middle classes, but the
policies also put at least half of Egyptians at the mercy of the
market. For most, barely struggling to get by, and with no
foreseeable prospects for improvement, the more
puritanical, dogmatic views of Salafism provide comforting
answers to their predicament.
43
While some channels are counting on financial support
from charities and public figures, the cost-effective business
model adopted by the majority of channels is proving
successful up till now. With the minimum operation costs
and the utmost use of commercials, charged SMS,
downloads and logos, a station like Al-Nas is arguably one of
the most viewed among Egyptians. Interviews with a sample
of twenty viewers of TV in Egypt conducted by the author of
this research showed that religious channels, and especially
Al-Nas, has become a daily habit, especially among the
residents of rural conservative audience.
“Moderateness” is the keyword in most of the mission
statements announced by channels. However, the content of
programmes and shows aired by these channels can be
divided into two types: the relatively moderate and the
puritanical Salafist content. Religious channels present two
types of lay preachers: one that is relatively moderate aimed
at providing a doze of religion to the middle, upper middle
and upper classes; and another type of hard-line, Salafist
preachers who are popular among the uneducated and
poorly educated who constitute the majority of the poor
class in Egypt. The first type channel tries to portray Islam as
“modern” religion that appeals to young people by featuring
former Egyptian movie stars who wore veil and sleek lay
preachers, while the second type host Salafist preachers who
keep crying people’s hearts out by reminding them of the
tortures they will endure in the afterlife.
The market still holds opportunities for more new religious
Islamic satellite channels. While the number of these
44
stations stands now at 30, tens of new channels are likely to
be launched in the coming few years, especially after many
an Arab government and official religious establishment
announced that they would enter the competition to win
people’s hearts and minds. Every party, be it a private
company, a government or a religious establishment, seeks
to make capital out of an increasing presence of religion in
public life.
45
Acknowledgements
This research paper is the product of a six-month research
and over a year of observation. It wouldn’t have been
possible without the cooperation of Egyptian interviewees
through whom I gauged the audience’s different reactions
to religious satellite channels. Any mistakes are entirely the
authors’.
I particularly thank Professor Paul Gifford, School of
Oriental and African Studies (SOAS), the University of
London, for his guidance and kind help. I am also grateful
to Mr. James Painter and Dr. David Levy from the Reuters
Institute for the Study of Journalism, who helped me a lot
and offered insightful comments that improved the research
paper.
Particular gratitude must go to Rima Dapous, Alex Reid
and Kate Hanneford-Smith from the Reuters Institute for
the Study of Journalism whom I knew to be of great help
throughout my six-month stay in Oxford.
Final thanks to my wife, Enjy, who tolerated the idea of
traveling to Oxford to honeymoon and start my research at
the same time during the coldest month the UK has ever
seen in twenty years, thus saving me a considerable sum of
money I would have spent on honeymooning in the Far
East!
Mohamed El-Sayed
Oxford, July 2009
46
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49