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1.
2.
3.
4.
THE RISE TO PROMINENCE OF GAIUS OCTAVIUS
We saw how, much to the apparent consternation of his associate and righthand-man Marcus Antonius, GAIUS JULIUS CAESAR had adopted in his
last will and testament and made his primary heir, his 18-year old greatnephew, GAIUS OCTAVIUS.
It remained in the balance whether Gaius Octavius would pursue his
inheritance.
But he quickly returned to Italy and, totally illegally, raised a private army
from amongst Caesar’s veteran troops.
He probably realized that he needed to acquire strength to meet any possible
challenge from Marcus Antonius, who was one of the two consuls for 44 BC
and was continuing Caesar’s policies.
GAIUS OCTAVIUS
(born 23rd September 63 BC)
who, once his adoption was
formalized, became
GAIUS JULIUS CAESAR
OCTAVIANUS
MARCUS ANTONIUS
(20 years Gaius Octavius’
senior)
5. In 43 BC MARCUS ANTONIUS would go off to CISALPINE GAUL and
TRANSALPINE GAUL (Caesar’s old ‘stomping ground’) with significant
troops under his command as governor.
6. a) There was a definite fear amongst “Republicans” in Rome that MARCUS
ANTONIUS would, in the future, use these troops against the city.
b) There was, thus, a period of considerable uncertainty.
7. a) “The Republicans” had no troops.
b) And, although GAIUS OCTAVIUS could hardly be expected (like MARCUS
ANTONIUS) to favour those who had murdered Caesar, the “Republicans”
were happy to support a “compact” (largely negotiated by CICERO) with
him.
c) By it his command of the troops he had raised illegally would be made legal
in return for his support of the Senate’s cause.
CISALPINE GAUL
ROME
MARCUS TULLIUS CICERO
who, more than anyone, had
negotiated a contract between
‘the Senate’ and the young
OCTAVIAN
9. With the compact agreed, “the Republicans”
a) passed a resolution making GAIUS OCTAVIUS a senator (despite his
young age); and
b) took the necessary steps to have formal authority (imperium) bestowed on
him so at he could legally command troops.
10. Having allied themselves with GAIUS OCTAVIUS, “the Republicans”, in early
February 43 BC, had the Senate declare a state of emergency (by passing a
resolution known as ‘the Final Decree of the Senate’ – the senatus consultum
ultimum).
11. It recommended that the consuls of 43 BC and Gaius Octavius use their
‘authority’ (their legal imperium) to guarantee the safety of the state and its
institutions.
12. Soon after this (in April 43 BC) there were two a major military confrontations
six days apart (at Forum Gallorum and Mutina) between “THE
REPUBLICANS” and MARCUS ANTONIUS in northern Italy.
13. The forces of “the Republic” were victorious - although MARCUS
ANTONIUS was by no means beaten.
14. a) Two of MARCUS ANTONIUS’ legions had already deserted to GAIUS
OCTAVIUS - because of the powerful NAME of “Caesar”; AND
b) during the confrontation BOTH of the consuls of 43 BC lost their lives.
15. This added another four legions to the five already under the command of
GAIUS OCTAVIUS who was not yet twenty years old.
16. GAIUS OCTAVIUS (and we should start calling him OCTAVIAN once his adoption was finalized) was
urged by his allies to press the advantage.
17. He chose to do NOTHING.
18. But was it inaction from lack of experience or a calculated inaction?
THE PROVINCE OF
CISALPINE GAUL
The two battles were
fought close to modern
Modena
19. a) The evidence suggests that he was astute enough to realize that he was being “used” by “the
Republicans”.
b) He probably grasped that, if MARCUS ANTONIUS was completely destroyed, “the
Republicans” could well “toss him aside” if they could.
c) And, supposedly, CICERO (in many ways a spokesman for “Republicanism”) had said, in
a private statement, (according to the Augustan writer VELLEIUS PATERCULUS):
“He (Octavian) is a young man to be praised, a young man to be honoured, and
a young man [in the Latin] tollendum.”
[The “tollendum” is ambiguous: this third element said that Octavian was either
a young man “to be raised up” or a young man “to be removed”]
20. And OCTAVIAN will have realized that his future did not lie with “the
Republicans” but with those who had admired and supported his adoptive father.
21. a) BUT he had to be the undisputed leader of “the Caesarians” – hence his
initial willingness to oppose Marcus Antonius who had been so close to his greatuncle.
b) Once he was the undisputed leader of the “Caesarians”, he would take revenge on
those (“the Republicans”) who had killed Julius Caesar - but not before.
22. Even at 19 OCTAVIAN was already showing his ability to assess a situation.
23. Additionally, by remaining INACTIVE he hoped his “Republican” allies would
support something he wanted badly – a consulship (one of the two highest positions in the
Roman state), despite his age.
24. a) His overtures in this direction were rejected.
b) The majority in the Senate, including Cicero, were unbending.
25. Making no progress, OCTAVIAN marched on Rome with his troops, seized the
state-treasury, and had himself and his young cousin elected to the two vacant
consulships!
26. At the age of 20 he was firmly in control of Rome!
27. Very soon after this OCTAVIAN went off to join MARCUS ANTONIUS and
MARCUS AEMILIUS LEPIDUS, another close associate of Julius Caesar.
28. The three of them (MARCUS ANTONIUS, LEPIDUS, OCTAVIAN), each
bringing troops with him, met in northern Italy (Cisalpine Gaul) at BONONIA
(BOLOGNA) and, after considerable negotiations, hammered out an agreement.
29. They agreed to create a formal “Commission of Three” (a TRIUMVIRATE),
which would be entrenched in law and which would see the three of them
administer the Roman state collectively for five years.
30. They would have the power
a) to introduce new laws;
b) to name the annual state officials (without elections having to be held);
c) to appoint the governors of the “provinces” of the empire.
THE “SECOND” TRIUMVIRATE
[Note: The much earlier agreement between Pompey, Crassus, and Caesar was not technically a
‘triumvirate’ since it was a purely private agreement. This ‘triumvirate’ was established by law –
even if the threat of force lay behind it]
The formation of the “TRIUMVIRATE” was followed by brutal formal
“proscriptions”: 300 senators and 2,000 members of “the equestrian order”
found their names listed – all subject to ‘elimination’ and confiscation of their
property.
2. Those who could fled, leaving Italy to join those “Republicans” who had long
ago left Italy from fear of MARCUS ANTONIUS.
3. One “Republican” who did not begin his flight in time and was cut down as he
tried to flee was CICERO - an ignominious end to one of the leading figures
of the later ‘Republic’.
1.
MARCUS AEMILIUS
LEPIDUS
MARCUS ANTONIUS
GAIUS JULIUS
CAESAR
OCTAVIANUS
1.
2.
THE TRIUMVIRATE
As soon as they could, the “triumvirs” moved against “the Republican
assassins”, soundly defeating them at PHILIPPI in Macedonia in October 42 BC
- although a son of POMPEY, Sextus Pompeius, continued to occupy SICILY.
Already “the three” had divided the Roman world for practical purposes:
a) LEPIDUS, always a “sleeping partner”, played only a minor role in AFRICA;
b) MARCUS ANTONIUS took the eastern part of the empire: he had wide
contacts there and there was a need for someone with his military experience
to reorganize the entire region;
c) OCTAVIAN took the western part of the empire and Italy: if he could solve
the problem of finding, primarily in Italy, land for thousands of veteran
troops (perhaps 100,000 of them) as they retired, he could easily be seen as
their “champion” rather than his more senior partners.
BATTLE OF
PHILIPPI
in Macedonia
(October 42 BC)
which saw the
defeat of “the
Republicans” who
had assassinated
Julius Caesar
OCTAVIAN
took charge
of the
provinces
north and
west of
Italy
LEPIDUS took
charge of “Africa”
MARCUS
ANTONIUS
took charge
of the provinces
from
MACEDONIA
eastwards
MARCUS ANTONIUS and OCTAVIAN, as the two most prominent leaders in
the state, quickly began issuing coins depicting their two heads.
A gold aureus of MARCUS ANTONIUS and OCTAVIAN
Note: no living Roman had been depicted on a coin of the Roman state before Julius Caesar towards the end of his life in 44 BC
OCTAVIAN (GAIUS JULIUS CAESAR OCTAVIANUS)
1. As early as 1st January 42 BC Octavian was given a huge social boost: the
SENATE (where “Republicans” had become greatly depleted and weakened
with new men promoted to senatorial status by both Julius Caesar and the
Triumvirs) formally proclaimed JULIUS CAESAR a DIVUS (a person who
had joined the gods) - the first Roman to be “promoted” in this way.
2. a) OCTAVIAN could now call himself “divi filius” (“son of a ‘god’), although
he seems not to have exploited this opportunity until about 38 BC.
b) No one else had that status!
c) He designated himself as such a son later on his coins.
CAESAR DIVI F(ILIUS)
“Caesar, son of a ‘god’”
[“Caesar” was Octavian’s formal name]
OCTAVIAN’S DIFFICULTIES FULFILLING HIS TASK
1. In undertaking his task of settling retired legionary troops on land in Italy,
Octavian ran into difficulties.
2. Between 41 and 40 BC his aim was to find land for some 40,000 soldiers from
earlier conflicts.
3. His plan was to confiscate huge amounts of land (which he would then
distribute) from eighteen cities in Italy which had sided with “the Republicans”.
4. His attempts saw resistance and a major confrontation at PERUSIA in northern
Italy (modern PERUGGIA) with, of all people, LUCIUS ANTONIUS, brother of
MARCUS ANTONIUS and with FULVIA, Marcus Antonius’ wife (who had
not yet gone to join him in the East ).
5. a) Octavian’s forces were ultimately victorious - but only after a long siege of
Perusia.
b) The fall of the city was quickly followed by the flight from Italy itself of
many of the remaining supporters of MARCUS ANTONIUS.
c) The whole affair hardly brought OCTAVIAN and MARCUS ANTONIUS
closer together.
6. In fact, when MARCUS ANTONIUS learnt of this confrontation, he felt the
need to abandon his activities in the East and to return to Italy to try to patch
up his relationship with Octavian.
7. When he arrived at Italy’s port of entry from the east, BRUNDISIUM
(Brindisi), he found his landing blocked and there was almost an outbreak of
civil warfare between the two sides because of the mounting tension between
those who supported Octavian and those who supported Marcus Antonius.
8. But an agreement was hammered out between representatives of the two parties
(by “the Treaty of Brundisium”) in October/November 40 BC.
9. a) With a few adjustments, the division of empire-wide responsibilities among
“the Triumvirs” was confirmed – with Italy as a place where both Marcus
Antonius and Octavian could recruit fresh troops;
b) OCTAVIAN promised aid to MARCUS ANTONIUS, in the form of 20,000
troops and a large number of ships, for his planned campaigns in the East
(especially against the Parthian Empire) once things were more stable in the
West - where Sextus Pompeius was causing problems from Sicily; AND
c) the compact was sealed in a traditional Roman way by the marriage to
MARCUS ANTONIUS (whose wife, FULVIA, had just died) of OCTAVIAN’s sister
OCTAVIA.
A gold aureus
of Antony
with Octavia
(only the second
time that the head
of a living Roman
woman had appeared
on a Roman coin)
[Marcus Antonius had
earlier depicted Fulvia]
OCTAVIA
THE WEST
1. For the immediate future, one of the main tasks facing OCTAVIAN was to try
to bring to heel SEXTUS POMPEIUS who continued to control SICILY and
from his bases there continued to cause difficulty for shipping along Italy’s
west coast and to threaten Rome’s grain supply.
2. Public pressure prevented Octavian attempting to deal with Sextus Pompeius
decisively – depriving him of much needed gloria (a military reputation) and of
a fleet which would fall into his hands if he could defeat Sextus Pompeius.
3. a) If not earlier, certainly by 38 BC OCTAVIAN was engaged in psychological
‘warfare’ with MARCUS ANTONIUS, principally over the issue of Sextus
Pompeius.
b) Octavian persuaded Marcus Antonius on more than one occasion to return to
Italy to discuss the need for action against Sextus Pompeius but failed to meet
him as arranged.
4. a) But MARCUS ANTONIUS had his own reasons for coming back to Italy.
b) His periods of absence were making it difficult for him to maintain a close
relationship with his supporters there, especially those “noble” families who
were still sympathetic to him.
5. And while MARCUS ANTONIUS was absent, OCTAVIAN was doing what he
could to win over “noble” families to his cause.
6. One of the problems for OCTAVIAN was that he had a large following in Italy
but his followers were not, socially, of the same ‘quality’ as those of MARCUS
ANTONIUS - in a society where status mattered.
7. HOWEVER, in January 37 BC he did score one major social success:
8. a) divorcing his wife SCRIBONIA the day she gave him a daughter - not least
because she had family links with SEXTUS POMPEIUS, ……..
b) OCTAVIAN married LIVIA DRUSILLA, who belonged to two great
“noble” Republican families with a long history: the LIVII and the CLAUDII.
8. This union would mean that other “noble” families would begin to look more
favourably on OCTAVIAN too.
9. She became, at 20, his life-long soul-mate for
51 years.
LIVIA DRUSILLA
OCTAVIAN’S STRUGGLE WITH SEXTUS POMPEIUS
1. As noted, something had to be done about Sextus Pompeius’ activities which
were, inter alia, disrupting the vital grain supply to the city of Rome.
2. Initially, Octavian agreed with Marcus Antonius that a solution might be to
bring him into some sort of ‘partnership’ with them.
3. But it seems to have been Octavian’s aim all the time to take military action
against him so that he could gain an enhanced military reputation AND a readymade fleet.
4. Once Marcus Antonius’ attention was again concentrated on ‘the East’, it
was not long before Octavian took direct action against Sextus.
5. While Octavian suffered serious set-backs as he went to war against Sextus,
ultimately his side was victorious (but only thanks to the superb military skills of
his close associate MARCUS [Vipsanius] AGRIPPA) at the naval battle off
Naulochus on 3rd September 36 BC.
THE EAST
1. While Octavian was active removing any threat Sextus Pompeius posed to the
control of Italy by “the Triumvirate” MARCUS ANTONIUS was very active
in “the East”
2. It involved
a) continuing the process of re-organizing boundaries, rewarding client kings
and princes who had supported the cause of the triumvirs with additional
territory and depriving opponents of part of theirs; and
b) finalizing his preparations for his campaign against the Parthians – not least
in order to restore Roman honour since Roman legionary standards had
been seized by them when CRASSUS had lost his life in 53 BC at the Battle
of Carrhae and these standards need to be recovered.
THE PARTHIAN EMPIRE (to the east of Rome’s eastern provinces – particularly “Syria”)
3. In any plan for a campaign against Parthia, the KINGDOM of EGYPT, the
richest state in the eastern Mediterranean, was a vital consideration because
of its resources and its location.
4. It would be of enormous importance for MARCUS ANTONIUS to renew
the firm alliance which Julius Caesar had established with that kingdom
through its resolute and powerful ruler CLEOPATRA.
5. That he also quickly engaged in a personal relationship with Cleopatra (as Caesar
had done) was a consideration but a secondary one to Egypt’s strategic
importance - based on all it had to offer.
6. a) With his plans to begin a campaign ready by 37 BC, MARCUS ANTONIUS
approached Parthian territory through the kingdom of ARMENIA, ruled by
Rome’s ally, King ARTAVASTES.
b) BUT in 36 BC MARCUS ANTONIUS suffered a serious reversal when his
supply train was lost - because Artavastes abandoned him.
c) MARCUS ANTONIUS lost about 25% of his forces, but was able to withdraw
successfully (although bloodied) to Egypt.
d) There he spent his time with CLEOPATRA, becoming more and more
enamoured of Egyptian culture and practices (although we should be wary since all
our sources are very hostile to him).
LOOMING CONFRONTATION
1. OCTAVIAN (always a bit of a ‘prude’) was not happy about MARCUS
ANTONIUS’ personal relationship with CLEOPATRA, given that he was
married to OCTAVIA, his sister.
2. While the evidence is not easy to analyse, it appears that OCTAVIAN engaged
in a campaign of ‘character assassination’ against MARCUS ANTONIUS from
this time (about 36 BC), stressing, inter alia, the inappropriateness of his
relationship as a Roman father and husband with CLEOPATRA.
3. Now that all threat at the hands of SEXTUS POMPEIUS had been
eliminated in “the west”, OCTAVIAN, learning of MARCUS ANTONIUS’ set
-back in his Parthian campaign, could hardly refuse now to send him resources.
4. Back in late 40 BC, by “the treaty of Brundisium”, Octavian had promised him
20,000 men and a very large fleet once things stabilized in “the west”.
5. Now (in 35 BC) he sent to MARCUS ANTONIUS just 2,000 troops, only a small
fleet, and OCTAVIA, Marcus Antonius’ wife.
6. It has been suggested that his act was meant to send a ‘subtle’ message:
“Break your links with your mistress, begin acting like a true Roman
husband, father and family head and, then, but only then, will you receive
all the resources you need.”
7. It threw the ball into Marcus Antonius’ court.
8. MARCUS ANTONIUS
a) sent OCTAVIA back to Rome (although not yet divorcing her); and
b) began bestowing titles on CLEOPATRA and her children.
9. a) Various client kingdoms were granted to Cleopatra’s children (“the Donations
of Alexandria”); and
b) the kingdom of Armenia which had deserted him was seized.
10. THEN MARCUS ANTONIUS held a spectacular parade in Egypt’s capital,
Alexandria, and
a) named CLEOPATRA “Queen of Kings”, and
b) her son by Julius Caesar, CAESARION, “King of Kings”, recognizing
CAESARION as Julius Caesar’s true heir - a challenge to Octavian as
Caesar’s adopted son.
11. By 32 BC MARCUS ANTONIUS had divorced OCTAVIA and gone through
some form of marriage ceremony with CLEOPATRA, although a
Roman could not legally marry a non-Roman – even if she was a queen!
[Here there is some uncertainty: foreign ‘client’ rulers were often made Roman citizens, but there
seems to be no record of Cleopatra being honoured in this way]
THE DARK OLIVE GREEN SHOWS THE AREAS OF THE
MEDITERRANEAN UNDER THE NOMINALCONTROL
OF MEMBERS OF CLEOPATRA’S FAMILY
12. All of this activity on Marcus Antonius’ part was the sort of thing OCTAVIAN
needed to depict Marcus Antonius in a negative light.
13. He stepped up his propaganda campaign against him.
14. a) The parade which MARCUS ANTONIUS had held in Alexandria was
depicted as a formal Roman “triumph”, the honour of which ONLY the
Roman Senate could bestow; AND
b) Marcus Antonius was painted more and more as acting in a non-Roman way
AGAINST HIS WILL because he was under the spell of “EASTERN”
practices and of a FOREIGN queen who was ambitious and who had her eye
on the Roman empire itself.
15. But OCTAVIAN, who still needed to build his support in Italy even further, did
not always get his own way.
16. a) The “triumvirs” (whose constitutional arrangement had been renewed for a
second five-year term) appointed the annual state officials in advance rather
than elections being held (as under the “free” Republic).
b) The two men who had been selected as the consuls of 32 BC were both
partisans of Marcus Antonius.
17. Although it wasn’t until late in the year, they spoke in the Senate in praise of
MARCUS ANTONIUS and tried to introduce a motion of censure against
OCTAVIAN.
18. OCTAVIAN’s reaction was to approach the Senate with armed men, staging the
equivalent of a coup d’état - against the established institutions of the
Republic.
19. Thereupon both consuls and some 300 senators fled from Italy and went to join
MARCUS ANTONIUS in the East.
20. Despite all his propaganda efforts against Marcus Antonius, Octavian clearly
still had not won over to his cause a significant portion of the state’s leading
families.
21. BUT, once in the East, these supporters of MARCUS ANTONIUS became
divided over “the Cleopatra question” and engaged in factional in-fighting.
22.. Two important partisans of MARCUS ANTONIUS defected and
returned to Rome, bringing with them information which included the
knowledge that Marcus Antonius had deposited his last will and testament with
the Vestal Virgins in Rome (although it was not al that unusual for this to happen).
20. BUT, contrary to all religious standards, OCTAVIAN then seized the will in a
blatantly sacrilegious act and made full use of it (or one he manufactured!) to
convince more of his fellow citizens of MARCUS ANTONIUS’ degradation.
21. By 31 BC OCTAVIAN had stripped MARCUS ANTONIUS of all the offices he
was holding or scheduled to hold under the arrangements of the renewed
“Triumvirate” (for example the joint-consulship for 31 BC which he was to hold
with Octavian) as no longer worthy of any Roman office.
22. Then with all the pomp that the Roman state could muster, war was declared -
not on MARCUS ANTONIUS, since it was unthinkable that there could be
further civil war with a fellow citizen, but on EGYPT and its ambitious queen,
CLEOPATRA VII.
23. All that remained during the following months was for the preparations for the
inevitable armed confrontation to be made and for the propaganda war to
continue.
24. The decisive encounter did not occur until the naval battle of ACTIUM off
north-western Greece on 2nd September 31 BC – a victory for OCTAVIAN and
his supporters (although a rather “shoddy affair”, it seems).
25. The “great victory” would, of course, be widely celebrated in the victor’s
version of events.
THE GULF OF AMBRACIA
AND
ACTIUM
26 While “mopping up” operations were still necessary - leading to
the deaths of both MARCUS ANTONIUS and CLEOPATRA, OCTAVIAN, at
the age of 32, was left the sole surviving military commander from what was,
really, another “civil war” – since Lepidus had long ago been disgraced and
gone into exile.
27. All power was now in Octavian’s hands and any successful opposition to him in
the foreseeable future difficult to imagine.
28. How would he use the power he had won?
29. Would he be able to keep it without assassination becoming a distinct
possibility?
30.What did the future hold for him and the Roman state?
The talks after this may anwer some of these questions.
OCTAVIAN AS
PRIEST
OCTAVIAN AS MILITARY
LEADER