Download Morality and Relational Properties

Morality and Relational Properties
Could moral truth be based on relational properties?
What are ‘relational properties’? Some claims are objectively true, and they hold
absolutely. An example would be ‘all triangles have three sides’, which is true across all
possible worlds. Other claims may be objectively true, but are not absolute. They are
true in certain types of situations or circumstances. An example might be ‘water boils at
100 degrees Centigrade’. This is true in most conditions, but it does not apply at very
high altitudes where the air pressure is lower, and water boils at around 98 degrees
Centigrade. Claims about the boiling point of water being 100 degrees can beobjectively true, but hold only under normal climatic conditions. This means the truth of
the claim is dependent on how one natural feature of the world (the boiling point of
water) relates to another natural feature of the world (altitude).
One line of thought in ethics is that moral claims might be objectively true in this
relational sense. This would mean that the claim ‘X is good’ might be objectively true for
humans, although it is not an absolute truth. Protagoras makes this claim in Plato’s
Theaetetus. He claims that there are no absolute moral truths, but acknowledges it is
objectively true that certain features of the natural world are good for humans in that
they promote a good human life. For example;
‘olive oil ….is very bad for plants, and most inimical to the hair of all animals
except man, whereas men find it of service both to the hair and to the rest of
the body’
Plato’s Theaetetus, 334a-c
A more obviously moral example might be the concept of equality. We might argue that
it is an objective good for humans that they are seen as equal in some sense, and that
being seen as equal in some fundamental sense is essential for humans to lead a
flourishing life. But while this might be a good for humans, it might be seen as bad for
other species. If lions failed to recognise the importance of a strict hierarchy within
the pride, whereby the alpha male dominates, then there might be catastrophic failure
for the whole pride due to constant internal conflict. This means equality might be an
objective good for humans, but not an absolute good because it is not good for all
creatures.
If we start with the view that moral properties are relational, then McDowell’s
Secondary Property Realism could explain why there can be objective moral truths which
are not statements describing independent features of the world such as Platonic
Forms.
1
2
Can you think of any other properties which are good specifically for humans,
but are not good in some wider, absolute sense?
Can you state in outline McDowell’s Secondary Property Realism?