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The Ethics of Belief, Cognition, and Climate Change Pseudoskepticism:
Implications for Public Discourse
TopiCS: Topics in Cognitive Science, 8 (2016) 19-48
Lawrence Torcello
Department of Philosophy, Rochester Institute of Technology
Abstract
The relationship between knowledge, belief, and ethics is an inaugural theme in philosophy; more
recently, under the title “ethics of belief” philosophers have worked to develop the appropriate
methodology for studying the nexus of epistemology, ethics, and psychology. The title “ethics of
belief” comes from a 19th century paper written by British philosopher and mathematician W.K.
Clifford. Clifford argues that we are morally responsible for our beliefs because: (1) each belief
that we form creates the cognitive circumstances for related beliefs to follow. (2) We inevitably
influence each other through those beliefs. This paper argues that recent cognitive research
supports Cliffordian insights regarding patterns of belief formation and social influence. From the
confirmation offered by such research, it follows that informational accuracy holds serious ethical
significance in public discourse. Although scientific and epistemological matters aren’t always
thought to be linked to normative morality, this paper builds on Clifford’s initial insights to show
their linkage is fundamental to inquiry itself. In turn, Clifford’s ethical and epistemic outline can
inform a framework grounded in “public reason” under which seemingly opposed science
communication strategies (e.g. “information deficit” and “cultural cognition” models), are
philosophically united. With public discourse on climate change as the key example, empirically
informed and grounded strategies for science communication in the public sphere are considered.
Keywords: Anthropogenic Global Warming, Ethics of Belief; Climate Change; Cultural Cognition;
Information Deficit; Mere-exposure Effect; Public Reason; Science Denial; Scientific Consensus
1. Introduction
Climate change is overtly related to global justice since those most vulnerable to the effects
of climate change are those least responsible for causing it and least able to respond to it
proactively. (Kreft & Eckstein, 2013) These are the global poor. Here I want to concentrate on a
less obvious facet of the ethical significance of climate change, by considering more closely the
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relationship between ethics and epistemology. This relationship is captured by the following
proposition: We are ethically responsible for the consequences of our beliefs (including fact
oriented, value laden, and attitudinal beliefs).
As a general rule, professional ethicists aim to rationally analyze concepts and discourse
about how we ought to live in relation to others. We may draw from the sciences in order to offer
a moral analysis (as I do here), but our obligation is to offer sound arguments about viable ways to
engage in moral decision making and to debunk unsound arguments.1 Drawing attention to the
relationship between ethics and belief continues this practice, but also emphasizes that belief itself
is not something about which one may be vague, inconsistent, or heedless, morally speaking. The
case of anthropogenic climate change and pseudoskeptical arguments against it provides a good
focal point for exploring the ethical relation between inquiry and belief formation, but as I will
argue, climate change is also a matter of such pressing hazard, about which it is now so important
to communicate effectively, that we cannot afford to neglect the ethics of belief as a valuable
resource. This is both because, from a philosophical perspective, beliefs are ethically implicated,
and because, as scientists are finding, the moral context is especially effective as a didactic and
communicative strategy capable of influencing behavior. (Conway & Peetz, 2012; Young &
Chakroff, 2012; Young & Durwin, 2013) Study of the ethics of belief, then, is a productive
convergence point for moral philosophy and the cognitive sciences.
A constellation of objectives meet here. I want first to identify and contextualize what I call
pseudoskepticism, as opposed to scientific skepticism. This is a vital distinction and one that will
prove essential for understanding the kind of epistemic warrant established with a scientific
consensus. Pseudoskepticism, as I will argue, is a species of science denialism related to
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pseudoscience; I will examine the relationship below. I then draw upon the nineteenth century
philosopher W.K. Clifford, in order to reconstruct his notion of the ethics of belief. With that in
place, I extend, and adapt, Clifford’s arguments to address contemporary discourse about climate
change. Toward these goals, I will connect my argument with two contending lines of
contemporary research about effective science communication, and will show how the apparent
discord between them may be effectively dissolved. Finally, I close with recommendations about
how science communication on climate change might be responsibly framed given the relationship
between belief formation and ethics.2 My recommendations will be made in the context of the
philosopher John Rawls’ conception of public reason. (Rawls 1993, 1997, 2001)
2. Identifying Pseudoskepticism and its Connection to Science Denialism, and
Pseudoscience
Science denialism occurs when established science is rejected for motives independent of
scientific research and progress. Such denialism may result from the procedural observance of
religious faith. In this sense, one rejects a claim not because one fails to understand the science
behind it but because one chooses to ignore the science in favor of one’s faith based belief. In such
cases the recognition of science may serve to strengthen one’s commitment to faith. For instance,
in taking communion Catholics implicitly recognize normally understood laws of nature (and
logic) as they accept, on faith, that they are literally consuming the flesh of Christ by a miracle of
transubstantiation. In doing so one recognizes science but denies its claims against faith.
Alternatively, one may promote science denialism as part of philosophical efforts to refute
methodological naturalism. Such philosophical efforts can be found in Paul Feyerabend’s
promotion of epistemological anarchy. Feyerabend understands the arguments in favor of
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epistemologically privileging science over other approaches to gathering knowledge of the natural
world, but he finds (mistakenly in this author’s judgment) such arguments unconvincing.
(Feyerabend 2010).
In contrast to the cases above, the form of science denialism I wish to explore below is what
I refer to as pseudoskepticism.3 When scientific consensus is rejected by non-experts who naively
consider themselves more scientifically astute than the collective scientific community it is
appropriately labeled pseudoskepticism. Pseudoskepticism, I argue, may be influenced by, though
perhaps not exclusively, the following two factors: (1) Ignorance of the scientific process and (2)
Ideologically motivated reasoning (as opposed to the exercise of faith).
2.1 Ignorance of the scientific process
When it comes to ignorance regarding the process of modern science a contributing factor
to pseudoskepticism may be the Dunning-Kruger effect. This effect occurs when one lacks
sufficient knowledge of a topic to accurately judge the depth of one’s own ignorance on that topic.
(Kruger & Dunning, 1999) In such cases responsible awareness of one’s own epistemic limitations
may give way to unwarranted confidence in one’s ability to critique the findings of professionals.
Pseudoskeptics caught in the Dunning-Kruger effect may not wish to reject science at all, they may
even consider themselves scientifically astute, but their ignorance of how modern science works
can lead to an inflated view of their own ability to judge technical matters.
2.2 Ideologically Motivated Reasoning
Tension between the ideological beliefs, and values, important to one’s cultural identity
and the findings of modern science play an important role in pseudoskepticism. This form of
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pseudoskepticism is often exhibited by those with a commitment to free-market ideals when
assessing the robust evidence for anthropogenic global warming. (Dunlap & Jaques, 2013;
Dunlap & McCright, 2010; Dunlap & McCright, 2011; Lewandowsky, Oberauer, & Gignac, 2013;
McCright & Dunlap, 2011a, 2011b; Oreskes & Conway, 2010) Ideologically driven
pseudoskepticism may also be religious in nature, as in the rejection of evolution by natural
selection. Yet a distinction exists between religiously reasoned pseudoskepticism and the
faithbased “suspension of disbelief” discussed above. Religiously driven pseudoskepticism leads
to motivated reasoning in favor of ideology preserving conclusions. In contrast faith-based science
denialism depends on an arational exercise of faith, which need not involve attempts to reconcile
one’s belief to scientific evidence (such efforts might even be viewed as antithetical to one’s
faith).
All forms of science denialism involve selective validation of some scientific conclusions
while rejecting others. This is understandable since living in a modern world influenced
everywhere by science and technology makes it impossible for science deniers to function without
sustained cognitive dissonance. Pseudoskepticism is no different in its displays of selective
validation. In the case of pseudoskepticism an odd twinning of extreme credulity and cynical
disbelief is particularly pronounced since pseudoskeptics seek to both deny accepted science and
adopt the authority of scientific skepticism. For instance pseudoskeptics may aggressively criticize
an established scientific consensus while uncritically referencing nonscientists who assert
unsubstantiated claims. (Elsasser & Dunlap, 2013) To fully understand pseudoskepticism and its
relationship to pseudoscience it is necessary to examine the distinction between pseudoskepticism
and scientific skepticism.4
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2.3 Scientific Skepticism and Scientific Consensus
Scientific skepticism, or reasoned skepticism, is a vital component of the modern scientific
process. (Merton 1942, 1973) Indeed, the scientific process is distinguished, in part, by the
methodological application of skepticism, aimed at the most evidentially warranted understanding
of natural phenomena. Clearly understanding the skeptical process of science allows for better
appreciation of why disregarding scientific consensus (a defining feature of pseudoskepticism) is
epistemically unwarranted and a key aspect of pseudoscience.5
The scientific skepticism of modern science is applied by a community of inquirers; it is
not enough that one researcher endorse a particular conclusion, for scientific findings must be
confirmed repeatedly by other scientists (if they are to gain traction in the broader scientific
community). Part of what scientists do is to test conclusions, examining and when warranted
rejecting them, before they are accepted as established. In this sense, the scientific process
represents a form of empirical contest. When an overwhelming scientific consensus among active
researchers in a field exists, it is often because attempts to disprove a particular claim have instead
converged to strengthen its credibility. This is not to say that any claim, strictly speaking, can be
formally falsified or verified. There will always be a large background of scientific hypotheses and
concepts bundled together in support of any particular consensus, which in turn resist logically
formal justifications. (Quine 1951, Harding 2013) When a consensus view does exist, it signals
that the consensus view functions reliably, under a wide range of skeptically informed empirical
applications, to predict and explain observational results.
Non-experts hold a considerable disadvantage with regard to methodological training and
experience, but rather than realizing this pseudoskeptics may take their lack of training as a virtue.
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A virtue that, or so they may believe, frees them from the traps of professional “group think.” For
this reason, non-experts wishing to deny anthropogenic global warming sometimes reference
historic figures like Galileo as evidence that a scientific consensus can be wrong.6 Yet figures like
Galileo and other thinkers of his time are responsible for ushering in the modern age of
experimental research that has driven the very need for advanced level training separating
professional researchers from the lay public. It is consistent with the Dunning-Kruger effect that
those evoking Galileo and other historic figures don’t know enough about science, and its history,
to understand the error of their comparison.
Consequently, when we refer to the denial of well-established scientific consensus as
skepticism, we invite confusion. Overgeneralizing, and misusing the term, skepticism is damaging
to informed public discourse in at least two ways: (A) Insofar as many people have a nebulous
sense that skepticism is good, pseudoskeptics win a rhetorical advantage by portraying themselves
as skeptical in contrast to “mainstream” scientific research, which they portray as dogmatically set
against their skeptical challenge. (B) Because reasoned skepticism is a crucial component of the
scientific process, misuse of the term skepticism—to mean any form of doubting something, for
any reason—chips away at an understanding of how science actually works, which should be
regarded as the core of scientific literacy. (Holbrook & Rannikmae, 2009) This point is important
because in cases of science denial not explained by motivated reasoning or ideological bias, the
rejection of settled science may simply involve ignorance of the scientific process and the
epistemic significance of consensus in science. Thus one of the dangers of pseudoskepticism is its
potential to mislead the uninformed.
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2.4 Pseudoskepticism and the Public Sphere
To be clear, disagreements about policy and ensuing debates only involve
pseudoskepticism to the degree that relevant scientific consensus is denied in the context of policy
decisions. Strictly speaking the term pseudoskepticism is most reasonably applied to rejections of
established scientific consensus only—not widely recommended public policy or popular political
opinions. Yet science and its findings are woven into most every aspect of our lives and sustainable
modern democracies require informed publics, able to make the distinction between data
skeptically vetted through authentic peer-review, and ideologically inflected claims that are made
directly to the public, often bolstered by the support of likeminded institutions.
(Brulle 2013; Dunlap & Jacques, 2013; Dunlap & McCright, 2010; Dunlap & McCright, 2011;
Oreskes & Conway, 2010; Pfau, Sims, & Wigley, 2007) It is crucial then that public disagreement
with a scientific consensus must be accompanied by the honest acknowledgment of such consensus
in order to avoid the charge of pseudoskepticism. Acknowledging well established science (Rawls
1993, 1997, 2001) and resulting scientific consensus is a requirement of responsibly applied public
reason.7 (Torcello 2011, 2014b) The concept of public reason is discussed further below (section
4.3).
2.5 Pseudoskepticism and Pseudoscience
The importance of skepticism to science stands in stark contrast to pseudoscience. One
identifying feature of pseudoscience is circular belief. In other words circular acceptance of a
contentious claim guides the pseudoscientific pursuit. Thus for instance, “investigators of the
supernatural” assume the existence of “supernatural” phenomena beforehand, which encourages
confirmation bias and motivated reasoning in support of their preconceived conclusions.8 The
absence of any reliably established justification for such endeavors encourages motivated
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reasoning, emphasizing anecdotal evidence, the discounting of established scientific vetting, and
the existence (or epistemic weight) of scientific consensus. The skeptical process of scientific
analysis is procedurally designed to protect research from motivated reasoning of this sort.
The scientific process does err, it should be emphasized, but it also self-corrects over time.
(Merton 1942, 1973) Again, it is this process of progressive self-correction that relies upon robust
genuinely skeptical methodologies. Those who challenge the view that science is necessarily selfcorrecting, in doing so, can even play a role in the long-term trend of scientific critique and selfcorrection. (Ioannidis 2012)
I therefore want to insist on the term pseudoskepticism as a more accurate label for
describing the rejection of scientific consensus based on ideologically driven reasoning, or on the
grounds of some formless preference for contrarianism or cynicism parading as scientific
skepticism (Torcello 2011, 2012, 2014b). It is worth emphasizing that pseudoskepticism, as I
formulate the concept, is a species of science denialism but not a synonym for science denial.9
Pseudoskeptics attempt to portray themselves as scientifically objective while they depict
mainstream scientists as credulous dogmatists. Pseudoskeptics are unique among science denialists
in their attempt to reject science while appropriating the epistemological authority of science and
scientific skepticism. In this way pseudoskepticism is akin to pseudoscience in that both run
contrary to the very conceptions from which they contrive their justifications (i.e. pseudoscience
disavows the methodological constraints of modern science while seeking the approbation of
science. Pseudoskepticism seeks to critique scientific consensus as uncritical, or fraudulent, while
ignoring the extent to which rigorous methodological skepticism informs modern scientific
consensus).
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Moreover, pseudoskepticism is a key feature of pseudoscience but it need not be part of
any broader pseudoscientific effort. For instance any given practitioner of pseudoscience (e.g. a
homeopathic practitioner), will exhibit a degree of pseudoskepticism with regard to modern
science (e.g. modern medical science and physics) but it does not follow that pseudoskeptics
necessarily promote a larger pseudoscientific agenda.10 Therefore, pseudoskepticism should be
defined more narrowly than either science denialism or pseudoscience. I propose therefore that
pseudoskepticism be recognized as a subspecies of science denialism and an essential element of
pseudoscience.11
2.6 Pseudoskepticism, Belief Formation, and Morality
Likewise, the problem of pseudoskepticism goes straight to the crux of the relationship
between belief formation and morality. A major danger of pseudoskepticism, as well as of
pseudoscience is its role in the development of socially generated ignorance.12 Examples of the
harm related to such ignorance include: (1) South Africa’s failure to respond appropriately to its
HIV/AIDS epidemic under the leadership of former president Thabo Mbeke. The Mbeke
administration’s denial of the well-established link between HIV and AIDS may have contributed
to an estimated 365,000 deaths between 2000 and 2005, in the absence of timely antiretroviral
programs (Chigwedere et al., 2008). (2) Outbreaks of otherwise preventable and potentially
eradicable diseases may result from ignorance and active disbelief regarding the wellestablished
safety of childhood vaccination programs. Countries with active anti-vaccination campaigns, or
that lack robust policy requiring childhood vaccinations, have lower rates of vaccination and
significantly higher rates of vaccine preventable disease (Gangarosa, et al., 1998). Furthermore,
there is a significant correlation between geographic regions where greater numbers of parents
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resist vaccinating their children and the occurrence of vaccine preventable outbreaks. (Atwell et
al., 2010)
2.7 Pseudoskepticism and Anthropogenic Global Warming
I want to concentrate now on what I take to be the most pressing example of
pseudoskepticism: the denial of anthropogenic global warming. The United States is the world’s
leading producer of GHG emissions per capita, followed by a number of other wealthy nations.
(The World Bank 2013) A variety of traditional ethical perspectives converge on the conclusion
that the United States, and other wealthy polluting nations, should take a leading role in responding
to challenges of global climate change. (Caney 2010; Cuomo 2011; Gardiner 2006,
2011; Jamieson 2010, 2014; Nussbaum 2013; Posner & Weisbach, 2010; Shue 2010; Singer 2004,
2006; Torcello 2011) Yet the United States has the highest level of climate pseudoskepticism
among both private citizens and publicly elected officials (IPSOS Mori 2014). News media outlets,
especially in the English speaking world, mention anthropogenic global warming relatively
infrequently, often providing equal time for pseudoskeptical views. (Boykoff & Bokoff, 2004;
Bokoff 2007; Jones 2014; Painter 2011; Santhanam 2014) Under these conditions, even among US
citizens who accept anthropogenic climate change, there exists a widespread belief that climate
change poses no significant threat within one’s own lifetime and that the causes of climate change
remain scientifically controversial. (Butler & Pidgeon, 2009; Jones 2014; Painter 2011)
Such perceptions are dangerously out of step with reality. Active climate researchers
overwhelmingly conclude that global warming is the result of human behaviors (Anderegg et al.,
2010; Cook et al., 2013; Oreskes 2004; Doran & Zimmerman, 2009;). Additionally, as Antarctic
and Greenland ice sheets continue to melt coastal cities are increasingly vulnerable to storm surges
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and flooding. (Parris et al., 2012) This means that misinformation regarding climate change has
serious implications for public safety if allowed to influence policy decisions. To make matters
worse, much of the climate change misinformation circulating in the public realm has been
introduced through organized, corporate-funded campaigns of disinformation. These vested
interests leverage their political influence in the form of lobbyists, policy think tanks, and political
funding. (Brulle 2013; Dunlap & Jacques, 2013; Dunlap & McCright, 2011; Oreskes &
Conway, 2010) Citizens misinformed about the human causes, and resulting risks, of climate
change are unlikely to pressure politicians to address the problem through policy action. It is
therefore important to recognize climate pseudoskepticism as a key element of the United States’
failure to take meaningful action to curb carbon emissions during the last thirty year period.
(Ding et al., 2011; McCright, Dunlap, & Xiao, 2013)
3. Ethics and Epistemology
As a challenge to contemporary science communication, pseudoskepticism draws attention
to the relationship between ethics and epistemology. Precisely this relationship, or the ethics of
inquiry and belief, is a worthy topic of renewed scientific and philosophical interest. Recent
research suggests that framing a given issue in terms of moral facts related to it has a positive effect
in motivating moral behavior. (Young & Durwin, 2013) So there is some reason to believe that
understanding the ethical or moral implications of climate change and of pseudoskepticism about
it will increase the effectiveness of science communicators in countering the problem. Likewise,
research indicates that, cognitively priming people, especially at an abstract, general level, to view
themselves positively as moral agents, tends to inspire behavior thought, by the agent, to be moral.
(Aquino & Reed, 2002; Reed, Aquino, & Levy, 2007; Conway & Peetz, 2012; Young & Chakroff,
2012) And just as one might then expect, studies reveal that when people judge themselves to have
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acted immorally, the judgment may trigger compensatory behavior aimed at maintaining a positive
moral identity. (Conway & Peetz, 2012) This too suggests that even where some person or group
has behaved in a morally problematic way, our ability to frame their behavior in terms of moral
reconsideration and correction may facilitate a positive change.
While these research efforts give us some cause for optimism, they help to underscore the
startlingly high stakes of effective science communication. Science communication might fail not
only because we are unsure about how best to frame any given scientific position, or to counter
misinformation about it, but because of our inadequate consideration of the moral link between
how we form our beliefs, what we believe, and how we behave. I have already stated that climate
change directly entails matters of global justice—for whether we speak of the young, of future
generations, or of the global poor, the fact remains that those most vulnerable to its effects are
those least responsible for contributing to climate change. (Samson et al., 2011) But as I said
earlier, there is another, ethically weighty connection between what we think climate change is and
how we respond to it. Given that so very much hinges on getting this connection right, and being
able to talk to people about it effectively, it’s here that I’d like to go into more detail.
In his essay “The Ethics of Belief” (1877) mathematician and philosopher William Kingdon
Clifford examines the often overlooked reasons why the epistemological quality of our beliefs is
ethically important. The emergence of pseudoskepticism as an ethical problem heightens the
relevance of his essay. As well, I argue that current findings in cognitive science support crucial
elements of Clifford’s thesis. I want to outline Clifford’s argument in order to
draw conclusions from it regarding the relevance of moral framing in countering
pseudoskepticism and the latter’s moral implications regarding belief formation.
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3.1. The Ethics of Belief
Clifford begins with the following example:
A shipowner was about to send to sea an emigrant ship. He knew that she was old, and not everwell
built at the first; that she had seen many seas and climes, and often had needed repairs. Doubts had
been suggested to him that possibly she was not seaworthy. These doubts preyed upon his mind,
and made him unhappy; he thought that perhaps he ought to have her thoroughly overhauled and
refitted, even though this should put him at great expense. Before the ship sailed, however, he
succeeded in overcoming these melancholy reflections. He said to himself that she had gone safely
through so many voyages and weathered so many storms that it was idle to suppose she would not
come safely home from this trip also. He would put his trust in Providence, which could hardly fail
to protect all these unhappy families that were leaving their fatherland to seek for better times
elsewhere. He would dismiss from his mind all ungenerous suspicions about the honesty of builders
and contractors. In such ways he acquired a sincere and comfortable conviction that his vessel was
thoroughly safe and seaworthy; he watched her departure with a light heart, and benevolent wishes
for the success of the exiles in their strange new home that was to be; and he got his insurancemoney when she went down in mid-ocean
and told no tales. (Clifford 1877)
Clifford makes clear that the tragic ending is irrelevant to the ethical conclusions one ought
to draw from this case, for these conclusions would hold even if the ship had made the voyage
successfully. The question, rather, is whether or not the ship’s owner was justified in believing that
his ship was seaworthy. One might object that it is not the owner’s belief that caused the tragic
outcome, but his failure to maintain his ship properly. After all, it is possible that one would believe
in the safety of one’s ship and still go through responsible procedures of maintenance and
inspection. This counterargument fails to contradict Clifford’s point, though, since such an owner
would have a warranted belief in the soundness of his ship.
Getting further into the portrayal of epistemic warrant, Clifford presents a second example
involving the reckless dissemination of misinformation. In this example, a rumor is spread through
a community, to the effect that certain teachers are conniving to have children removed from their
legal guardians in order to indoctrinate them into a particular religious sect.
Clifford’s text is once again worth quoting at length:
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There was once an island in which some of the inhabitants professed a religion teaching neither
the doctrine of original sin nor that of eternal punishment. A suspicion got abroad that the
professors of this religion had made use of unfair means to get their doctrines taught to children.
They were accused of wresting the laws of their country in such a way as to remove children from
the care of their natural and legal guardians; and even of stealing them away and keeping them
concealed from their friends and relations. A certain number of men formed themselves into a
society for the purpose of agitating the public about this matter. They published grave accusations
against individual citizens of the highest position and character and did all in their power to injure
these citizens in the exercise of their professions. So great was the noise they made that a
commission was appointed to investigate the facts; but after the commission had carefully inquired
into all the evidence that could be got, it appeared that the accused were innocent. Not only had
they been accused on insufficient evidence, but the evidence of their innocence was such as the
agitators might easily have obtained, if they had attempted a fair inquiry. (Clifford 1877)
The issue for Clifford is not whether those involved in the two examples were sincere in
their beliefs, but whether the beliefs were formed through responsible investigations or, instead,
by motivated reasoning. In both cases, it is possible to determine the difference, through serious
consideration of how evidence was gathered and examined. Epistemic warrant attends only the
analysis of evidence garnered carefully and understood for the causative links it tentatively
confirms or falsifies.
Clifford’s illustrations lend themselves to modern examples of climate science pseudoskepticism.
The first example straightforwardly involves one person risking the safety of others over dubious
beliefs arrived at through motivated reasoning. In keeping with the spirit of
Clifford’s example, take the inevitability of sea level rise from climate change. Even conservative
estimates of sea level rise resulting from climate change implicitly place a large number of the
world’s coastal poor at increased risk of losing their property as well as their lives. (IPCC 2014)
Politicians in nations responsible for the majority of GHG emissions who allow ideologically
motivated reasoning to justify their denial of anthropogenic climate change treat those most
vulnerable to sea level rise as Clifford’s ship-owner treated his seafarers. In both cases,
unwarranted beliefs contribute to people’s willingness to risk the safety of innocent others.
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Clifford’s second example parallels climate science pseudoskeptics who slander climate scientists
and others working on topics related to climate change. It is routine for pseudoskeptical climate
bloggers to accuse scientists of fraudulent research and data manipulation. (Clynes 2012)
In 2009, famously, emails were stolen from Britain’s University of East Anglia Climate
Research Unit. The emails were released online along with accusations that climate researchers
were engaging in fraudulent activity. Subsequent investigations repeatedly demonstrated the
innocence of those climate researchers, though to this day, many in the public know only of the
accusations against and not of the vindication of the scientists. (Fischer 2010) Such behavior puts
researchers at risk of not being able to do and disseminate their work by slandering their reputation.
Clifford takes a hard line, arguing that “…it is wrong always, everywhere, and for anyone,
to believe anything upon insufficient evidence.” (1877) Elsewhere, I examine the viability of so
categorical a conclusion (Torcello 2011, 2014b), but here it is not necessary to delve into an
extended philosophical or textual examination. It is enough to recognize Clifford’s key claim, that
our beliefs carry a moral relevance that is often overlooked. In addition, one can profitably
acknowledge that the values influencing our belief have moral implications. Clifford helps us to
consider how even everyday beliefs, most commonly considered a matter of personal prerogative,
animate far-reaching behaviors that impact the lives of others. The claim I wish to advance upon
the back of Clifford’s argument is that our beliefs always involve a degree of moral hazard.
(Torcello 2011, 2014b) In other words, our beliefs entail risks that may expose innocent people to
harm from which we are insulated and that we cannot predict. Such a claim, explored below, is
supported by the very premises Clifford uses to advance his stronger, more controversial
conclusion about morality and epistemic warrant.
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3.2 Clifford’s Premises and Science Communication
Clifford’s argument depends on the truth of the following two premises regarding the formation of
our beliefs and their social influence:
P1: Any given belief will set the cognitive conditions for related beliefs to follow. P2:
Our beliefs carry a social influence that we cannot easily control or predict.
The first premise (P1) suggests that we should consider our beliefs as part of a larger cognitive
web. This view is consistent with a position referred to by contemporary philosophers of mind as
mental holism. On this view, individual beliefs derive meaning in the context of a holistic web of
related background beliefs. (Quine 1951; Block 1995, 1998) It does not follow from this that all of
our beliefs will be rationally consistent. Instead it suggests that our beliefs are related through
patterns of reasoning suggestive of a consistent cognitive style, but not necessarily by rationally
consistent content. Philosophers have long argued that one set of beliefs will contribute to the
cognitive conditions for related beliefs to follow.13 This is the raison d'être behind efforts to instill
a strong understanding of logic and critical thinking in our students.14 It has also been long
acknowledged by philosophers that our attitudinal and value beliefs influence our perception and
understanding of the larger world. (Engelhardt 1996; Kitcher 2001; MacIntyre 1984, 1988; Rawls
1993, 1997, 2001)
Contemporary cognitive research supports the notion that our value beliefs are closely
linked to our scientific beliefs. A striking example can be found in the research of Lewandowsky
and colleagues, which indicates that strong belief in the value of free market economies serves to
predict the likelihood of climate science rejection. Similarly of relevance, it is also found to be the
case, to a lesser but still significant degree, that belief in conspiracy theories predicts the rejection
of climate science. (Lewandowsky, Gignac, & Oberauer, 2013) It should be noticed that
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conspiratorial accusations aimed at mainstream science are common among both pseudoskeptics
of evolution and climate change. Indeed, there is evidence suggestive that conspiratorial claims are
positively correlated with pseudoscientific beliefs (as well as paranormal beliefs more generally).
(Lobato et al., 2014)
A connection between pseudoscience and conspiracy theory is not surprising. Those
engaging in pseudoscience often invoke conspiratorial claims to explain why their views are not
taken more seriously by mainstream scientists. Such views are consistent with holistic background
beliefs, held by proponents of pseudoscience, that their theories are correct and that their epistemic
standards are scientific. An important aspect of conspiratorial thinking is that it is self-sealing in
nature. This means that attempts to refute conspiracy claims are commonly incorporated into the
conspiracy. (Lewandowsky, Gignac, & Oberauer, 2013) The self-sealing nature of conspiracy
theories ensures that no evidence given against a conspiracy theory need be taken seriously by the
conspiracy theorist. Importantly, Links between epistemically strong beliefs also occur.
Researchers have recently gathered evidence for what has been called the “gateway belief
model.” The gateway belief model has been used to explain why belief in the scientific consensus
on anthropogenic climate change is found to causally correlate with increased belief in the reality
of climate change. (van der Linden et al., 2015) Such findings are consistent with other research
on the persuasiveness of “consensus messaging” (discussed below in section 4.3). (Lewandowsky,
Gignac, & Vaughan, 2013; Maibach, Leiserowitz, & Gould, 2013; Maibach, Myers, &
Leiserowitz, 2014) These findings suggest the existence of beliefs, or cognitive patterns, that
reflect particular cognitive styles, which serve to encourage or discourage particular types of belief.
(Lewandowsky, Gignac, & Oberauer, 2013) Such cognitive styles are consistent with Clifford’s
18
moral concern that any given belief will contribute to cognitive conditions for related beliefs to
follow.
3.3 Clifford’s Second Premise and Social Influence
The beliefs that we hold influence the groups with whom we identify and the groups with
whom we identify in turn reinforce and influence the beliefs and values we hold. When we believe
that something will benefit “our” group, we have a greater tendency to engage in motivated
reasoning to support that belief. This phenomenon is well recognized, beyond Clifford, by moral
and political philosophers who must confront the reality of group polarizations while seeking
workable approaches to moral and political problems. (Berlin 1990; Engelhardt 1996; Habermas
1985; Kitcher 2003; Rawls 1993, 1997; Singer 2011; Talisse 2009, 2011; Torcello 2011)
Again, cognitive research confirms that political and economic ideologies predict the
acceptance or rejection of our beliefs about climate science. (Kahan, Smith, & Braman, 2011;
Kahan et al., 2012; Lewandowsky, Gignac, & Vaughan, 2013; McCright, 2011; McCright &
Dunlap, 2011a, 2011b ; Painter 2011) Such influence speaks to the impact of others with whom we
identify and are affiliated culturally. The correspondence between cultural identification and a
person’s acceptance of climate science has been documented by Kahan, and colleagues, who label
the impact of cultural identity on our formation and acceptance of beliefs as the effect of “cultural
cognition.” (Kahan, Smith, & Braman, 2011; Kahan et al., 2012) According to this research
individuals will gravitate to beliefs, and interpret information, in ways that serve to protect the
values they associate with their cultural sense of self. Once we have established our sense of
cultural identity it is difficult to revise beliefs strongly associated with that identity. Indeed, this
problem is supported by research conducted by Shtulman and Valcarcel showing that our previous
19
beliefs continue to influence our understanding of science even after updated information is
received. (Shtulman 2006; Shtulman, & Valcarcel, 2012)
These findings are consistent with my formulation of Clifford’s second premise (P2) that our
beliefs (including ideological and value beliefs) exert a social influence in ways that are not easily
predictable. The driving assumption here is that given our social nature, our reliance on community
life, and our tendency toward group identifications, our beliefs are bound to be socially impactful.
Indeed, our examination of the first premise (P1) and of the role that group affiliation plays in
affecting our cognitive styles provides further support for the social nature of our beliefs taken up
in the second premise. It is therefore morally hazardous to hold epistemically unwarranted beliefs
(including value, metaphysical, or religious beliefs, which stand outside the realm of empirical
support). The ethics of belief (and its implications for inquiry), especially in the context of the
research cited above, suggests a level of increased epistemic and ethical responsibility, especially
for those with greater access to the public sphere and influence over their fellow citizens.
4. Implications for Inquiry and Public Discourse
The question remains as to what this all means for the individual inquirer. Some
philosophers frame the development of strong skills of critical inference and argumentation as a
matter of good cognitive hygiene.15 (Aikin & Talisse, 2013) Habits of physical hygiene have
consequences for communal health and the same can be said of cognitive hygiene in that false
beliefs are more dangerous in a communal sphere than they might seem when considered in
isolation of one’s community and larger society. Knowing how to weigh the evidential merit of
propositional claims, and measure the validity and soundness of arguments attached to such
propositions, is a fundamental feature of solid reasoning and good cognitive hygiene.
20
It goes beyond the scope of this paper to examine all of the epistemological criteria
associated with reasoning skills conducive to sound cognitive hygiene and responsible belief
formation. Such skills are well understood to make up the foundations of critical thinking, basic
philosophical analysis, and logical methodologies. Developing practices of good cognitivehygiene
and incorporating them into one’s mode of inquiry in the world is morally important, and excellent
resources exist to aid one in this endeavor. (Aikin & Talisse, 2014; Cohen & Nagel, 1993; Pigliucci
2010; Sagan & Druyan, 1997; Schick & Vaughn, 2014; Walton 2008) It is taken as a starting point
in this paper that such practices play a central role in the methodological processes of modern
science as well as the analytic tools of philosophy. It is worth pointing out that the arguments in
this paper support a larger role for scientific and philosophical training in our school systems in
order to make the tools of critical thinking (essential to good cognitive hygiene) foundational in
the educational lives of citizens. Relevantly, research has demonstrated that debunking fallacious
patterns of inference, common to science denial, is an effective means of cognitive inoculation
against disinformation. (Muller et al., 2008; Banas & Rains, 2010; Bedford 2010)
As philosophers Scott Aikin and Robert Talisse observe, consistent with the arguments
made above, “we depend on each other epistemically.” (Aikin & Talisse, 2014) One reason for this
dependence is that we cannot personally have all the various levels of expertise needed to
accurately evaluate the entire range of information relevant to our private lives and our political
decisions. This means that we must rely on experts to help guide our opinions on matters where
we lack personal expertise.
21
4.1 Evaluating Experts
It is thus necessary that one be able to recognize appropriate expertise in science when such
expertise exists. The philosopher Alvin Goldman has examined some of the criteria of use to nonexperts in their efforts to discern appropriate scientific expertise. The first criterion introduced by
Goldman involves straightforwardly assessing the quality of arguments presented by the alleged
expert. (Goldman 2001) This, as philosopher Massimo Pigliucci points out, is sometimes possible
for an intelligent and informed layperson to assess but it becomes increasingly difficult as
information becomes more technical. (Pigliucci 2010) For this reason it is important to look for
agreement amongst other experts in the field. (Goldman 2001; Pigliucci 2010)
This requires that one pay attention to the credentials an alleged expert has, and evidence
that they are performing their role as experts in as unbiased a fashion as possible. Additionally,
researchers who have achieved a strong record of accomplishment in their field, as judged by their
peers, deserve to have their opinions weighted more heavily than less accomplished experts.
(Goldman 2001; Pigliucci 2010) There is reason to be cautious if a given expert is employed by a
corporation that benefits from that expert’s promotion of evidence conducive to the latter’s
corporate agenda. (Pigliucci 2010) An obvious example is if a scientist, with legitimate expertise,
is positing contrarian views regarding anthropogenic climate change while being paid by an oil
company for consultation work. Another example is if a scientist receives private funding from
corporate entities with an obvious stake in particular findings.16 This is why it is crucial for
scientists to make such conflicts of interest known and it is a serious ethical concern when conflicts
of interest are not declared.17 The possibility always exists that individual experts can be wrong or
inappropriately influenced. It is all the more important for the layperson to defer to the consensus
22
opinion of experts, when available, since a community of experts is less vulnerable in the aggregate
to inappropriate influence than any one individual.
None of this is epistemically perfect and all of it requires some initial ability to identify
relevant matters (like the existence of relevant educational credentials). Despite the legitimate
challenges poised for the layperson in assessing expertise there are some cases where determining
expertise is relatively straightforward. In cases like anthropogenic climate change the existence of
an Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), organized independently of any one
group’s agenda, and tasked with sorting through the global body of research related to climate
change, makes it easier for the lay person to know where to turn for good information. IPCC reports
are widely publicized and available online for easy access to policy makers and the general public.
4.2 Trusting Scientific Consensus
It bears emphasizing again why trusting in scientific consensus is important for nonexperts
wishing to engage responsibly with scientific findings. As the philosopher Bertrand Russell
explains:
There are matters about which those who have investigated them are agreed; the dates of eclipses
may serve as an illustration. There are other matters about which experts are not agreed. Even when
the experts all agree, they may well be mistaken. Einstein's view as to the magnitude of the
deflection of light by gravitation would have been rejected by all experts not many years ago, yet
it proved to be right. Nevertheless the opinion of experts, when it is unanimous, must be accepted
by non-experts as more likely to be right than the opposite opinion. The scepticism that I advocate
amounts only to this: (1) that when the experts are agreed, the opposite opinion cannot be held to
be certain; (2) that when they are not agreed, no opinion can be regarded as certain by a non-expert;
and (3) that when they all hold that no sufficient grounds for a positive opinion exist, the ordinary
man would do well to suspend his judgment. These propositions may seem mild, yet, if accepted,
they would absolutely revolutionize human life. (1928)
Though Russell uses the word unanimous in this passage we can reliably assume, consistent
with the rest of the quote, that he actually means consensus. Assuming Einstein to be an expert
23
who was not in agreement with other experts reflects the reality of consensus, but not unanimity.
(Torcello 2011)
4.3 Public Reason and the importance of referencing scientific consensus in public discourse.
The ethical and political significance of referencing a scientific consensus when relevant to
ongoing public discussions (such as policy discussions regarding anthropogenic climate change)
supports the crucial role of public reason in political discourse. Public reason is a concept
emphasized by the political philosopher John Rawls as a discursive framework to help guide
constructive debate in highly diverse and pluralistic modern societies. The impetus for
emphasizing public reason is the recognition that a plurality of comprehensive doctrines exist
within free societies. A comprehensive doctrine is one that purports to explain the world in a
detailed way involving both epistemic and ethical values. It may be a religious doctrine or a secular
philosophical doctrine. In many cases members of differing comprehensive doctrines come into
conflict over basic issues of justice and the essential features of democratic governance.
In working out these differences the ideal of public reason requires that arguments be made
in a way understandable to reasonable members of distinct comprehensive doctrines even if they
disagree. For instance in public-sphere political discussions about contentious topic like abortion
reasonable citizens should avoid making metaphysical and religiously laden claims and instead
appeal to arguments independent of such contentious content. Likewise, if established science
exists citizens ought to agree to reference such science, even when in disagreement with that
science. In this way a fair and civil discourse can be procedurally maintained in order to determine
the best democratic policy decisions. (Rawls 1993, 1997, 2001) Placing an emphasis on public
reason helps to address Clifford’s ethical concerns regarding inquiry and belief since it requires us
24
to reference scientifically vetted facts in public discourse when such facts are available. It turns
out that public reasons’ emphasis on settled science in public discourse can also be part of an
effective strategy for climate communication consistent with empirical
findings.
There is a great deal of evidence that repeatedly highlighting in particular the scientific consensus
on climate change can serve to neutralize cognitive resistance to climate science. (Cook & Jacobs,
2014; Lewandowsky, Gignac, & Vaughan, 2013; Maibach, Leiserowitz, & Gould, 2013; Kotcher,
Myers, & Maibach, 2014; McCright, Dunlap, & Xiao, 2013) It is important to think clearly about
what these findings mean. It is not enough that the research referenced in this paper offers support
to Clifford’s concerns regarding the ethics of belief, or Rawls concerns regarding public discourse.
If cognitive research is to inform our normative approach to science communication, on publicly
contentious topics like climate change, it must be the case that different research findings
ultimately lead us to consistent recommendations.
5. Dissolving the False Dilemma between “cultural cognition” and “information deficit”
models of science denialism
As we have seen comprehensive cultural and ideological influences clearly play an
important role in our beliefs, related values, interpretations of science, and the world in general,
(section 2.2) but the fact of cultural influence on cognition does not negate the need for accurate
information to inform epistemically warranted beliefs and opinions. The explanation (section 2.1)
that some people deny well established science, such as the reality of anthropogenic global
warming, because they lack the information necessary to develop informed opinions or to be
inoculated against misinformation remains vital. The notion that the rejection of settled science
25
stems from a person’s lack of reliable information or scientific literacy is known as the information
deficit model. According to the information deficit model providing clear, accurate and consistent
information, (i.e. emphasizing the fact of scientific consensus) is essential to good public
communication on science. It follows from the information deficit model that one of the reasons
people reject established climate science is because they fail to understand that a large consensus
actually exists among scientists. The information deficit model provides a straightforward path to
increase the societal acceptance of anthropogenic climate change thereby making meaningful
action to address the problem more likely: In particular science communicators should strive to
make clear and consistent information, consistent with public reason, including the fact of
scientific consensus on anthropogenic global warming, widely known to the general public. (See
section 4.3)
Yet, the information deficit model has been called into question by findings that scientific
literacy (as measured by one’s knowledge of what scientists actually believe) does not reliably
predict the acceptance of climate science. (Kahan et al., 2011; Kahan et al., 2012) The information
deficit model suggests that increased scientific literacy should be correlated with increased belief
in anthropogenic climate change. However, according to Kahan and colleagues, increased
scientific literacy better enables individuals to engage in motivated reasoning against established
science more effectively. Such findings have led Kahan and his colleagues to emphasize the
cultural cognition model over the information deficit model. (See the appendix below for more on
the concept of scientific literacy)
Still, as stated at the top of this section the influence of culture and ideology (i.e. cultural
cognition) on our beliefs and values need not invalidate the importance of consistent and accurate
26
information (i.e. consensus messaging) in belief formation. This is especially the case in a society
where citizens with low-levels of political polarization, or even with politically left leanings, are
unaware of the scientific consensus on anthropogenic global warming. 18
The cultural cognition model supports the premises discussed in this paper. (See section
3.2) People do tend to embrace the discourse on climate science that most reflects their political
and cultural ideologies without understanding the nature of scientific consensus. Yet, the
messaging of scientific consensus (consistent with the use of public reason) may still be the best
way to begin a conversation that prompts those in denial of the science to reconsider their own
beliefs, and provide a touchstone for that conversation in the larger context of publically circulated
disinformation. (See section 4.3) The facts on the ground, currently, regarding organized
disinformation about climate science and ignorance of the scientific consensus certainly suggest
the need to convey and insist upon the reality of climate consensus in public discourse. 19
Furthermore, framing belief in terms of moral obligations and cognitively priming discussants to
think of themselves as moral agents could, and should, make a significant difference to that
discussion. (See section 3)
Given the existence of strong supporting data for the cultural cognition model, and for the
importance of consensus messaging in climate communication, it is worthwhile to ask what
underlying mechanism exists to clarify both data sets. I propose that the effectiveness of consensus
messaging and the influence of cultural cognition are both related to the impact that repeated
familiarity and exposure have on belief and value formation.
27
5.1 Familiarity and Exposure in Belief Formation
The more familiar we become with a set of beliefs, the more open we are to the acceptance
of those beliefs. Marketers and political operatives know this; it is also the operative reason that
arguments from repetition work, even if they are fallacious. As a fallacy, the argument from
repetition involves the repeated utterance of a controversial claim until the audience comes to
accept it, through the sheer force of familiarity. This argumentum ad nauseam is fallacious if it is
offered as a substitute for evidential justification. Otherwise, clear and unequivocal repetition of a
concept can be an effective tactic in communicating unfamiliar information to an audience. In
psychology, the familiarity principle, sometimes referred to as the mere-exposure effect, is well
documented. (Zajonc 1968, 1980, 2001; Bornstein 1989) We are influenced more by those with
whom we are familiar, and those with whom we are familiar tend to make up our social and
communal spheres.
It bears emphasizing that the psychological effect of familiarity is consistent with studies
demonstrating both the influence of cultural cognition and the importance of communicating
climate consensus. Even when a group is polarized and hostile against a scientific finding, there is
reason to think that consistent exposure to the fact of scientific consensus will soften resistance
and may even eventually be incorporated into a group’s cultural identity. Once interpreted this
way, the apparent conflict between the cultural cognition model and the information deficit model
disappears. What is more, repeated exposure to new information may be necessary to mitigate the
lingering influence of prior misinformation, or misunderstanding, given the findings of Schtulman
and Valcarcel. (Schtulman 2006; Schtulman & Valcaracel 2012)
28
6. Summary Recommendations and Conclusions
I have described the scientific process as one that incorporates a strongly skeptical methodology
in its progressive extension of knowledge. This is an ideal conception of what science is like. I do
not claim that scientists always live up to the ideal but when viewed over the long course of history,
this is overall how the scientific process works and how we continue to insist it must work. The
process of science, with all its imperfections, has contributed more to understanding the natural
world than any other methodology, and it depends on rigorous, skeptically minded peer-review as
well as skeptical methodologies, to do so. A consensus in science does not imply that testing comes
to an end. The fact of consensus signals that belief in a concept (i.e. evolution, anthropogenic global
warming, the link between HIV and AIDS) is warranted. It follows for the layperson that rejection
of scientific consensus is not a form of epistemologically warranted skepticism (even if the
consensus is later overturned by ongoing science).
Referring to science denialists as skeptics serves to strengthen their rhetorical position by implying
an intellectual virtue that they do not demonstrate. Let us instead identify their actual practice of
pseudoskepticism, or of another form of science denial. Those who fall into the category identified
here as pseudoskepticism use motivated reasoning to avoid conclusions they have predetermined
themselves to reject. Let us not dodge the conclusion that pseudoskepticism is morally problematic.
The moral relevance of belief provides good reason to frame discourse around climate change in
the context of ethical and epistemological responsibility. One strategy suggested by John Nolt is
to speak of the harms of climate change in terms of projected casualties (Nolt 2014). Nolt’s
suggestion forces us to think deeply about the ethical costs of climate change in terms of lives lost.
Other strategies for framing public discourse in a morally and epistemically responsible way might
involve the following:
29
1. Mindful of the role of cultural cognition and the existence of diverse comprehensive
doctrines. It is important to preface discourse (when appropriate) with affirmations of
familiar overlapping commitments. E.g. Insofar as we are citizens bound together in a
collective political body, we share common moral and constitutional responsibilities that
transcend individual affiliations with specific groups.
2. It is critical to follow and promote responsible tenets of public reason. (see section 4.3)
People are free to disagree with a scientific consensus, but in doing so they continue to
have a moral and intellectual responsibility to acknowledge when a scientific consensus
exists.
3. Educators, journalists, and politicians have a moral and professional responsibility to
counter erroneous statements by emphasizing the actual scientific consensus on climate
change, and other publicly consequential topics, whenever they are able to do so.
4. Climate scientists have an ethical responsibility to clearly correct misunderstandings of
their research to the degree they are able to do so in the public sphere. (Aikin & Harbour,
2010, Torcello 2011) This is important because climate scientists, whether they like it or
not, are the representatives of their research (often made possible through public funds).
The more members of the public are familiar with individual scientists the more they are
likely to trust them and their work. This may be uncomfortable for scientists wishing,
understandably, to remain out of the public’s eye. Nevertheless, given the high stakes of
anthropogenic climate change, such public engagement is necessary to encourage the civic
30
and political engagement needed to mitigate risks to health and public safety posed by
climate change.
5. Public discussions of climate change in the media should always involve reference to the
scientific consensus. Journalistic neutrality requires objectively reporting the state of
climate consensus and does not require equal time for pseudoskeptics. Science is not in the
category of things settled by political debate. Moreover, it is inappropriate for journalists
to refer to pseudoskeptics, or other science deniers, as “skeptics.”
The rationale behind these suggestions is to emphasize exposure and familiarity with both
climate science as well as the moral and political responsibility to address climate change in
accordance with Rawlsian public reason, which (in part) procedurally deemphasizes ideological
differences and encourages familiarity with scientific facts. The influence of familiarity is crucial,
I maintain, in understanding why one’s ideological groupings predict belief in climate change and
why emphasizing scientific consensus is an effective way to move opinion on climate change
despite one’s ideologically comprehensive commitments. The information deficit model and the
cultural cognition model are not contradictory to each other. Both models are consistent with what
we already know about cognition and familiarity. Making the realities of scientific consensus on
climate change and the moral urgency of climate change familiar to the general public through
sustained, consistent, and politically responsible messaging should now be the focus of effective
climate communication.
Even in the United States (at the time of writing), a majority (61%) of citizens recognize that
anthropogenic climate change is happening, but just under half (48%) see it as a serious threat to
the United States (Pew 2014). On the “full side of the cup,” this means that repeated messaging
31
will resonate with, and reinforce the views of, more than half of the United States population.
Consequently, citizens more confident in their warranted scientific beliefs will be more likely to
have a positive influence on fellow citizens. These figures also suggest that more messaging on the
dangers of anthropogenic climate change needs to repeatedly reach the public. It would make sense
for public information campaigns on the risks of climate change, similar to previous campaigns on
the risks of smoking, to be implemented.
We have reason to believe that public opinion can shift rapidly on even the most divisive topics,
as it has for example regarding public support of same-sex marriage.20 Generational shifts may be
responsible for much of this, but an aging out of conservatism is not the whole picture. Those who
have changed their minds to be more supportive of same-sex marriage report they became more
familiar with someone, such as a family member, who identified as homosexual. (PEW 2013)
Again, this reinforces what has been said here about exposure and familiarity as tools against
entrenched ideological beliefs, and I believe that it also lends support to findings about discussing
the moral context of our beliefs. It is also worth noting that same-sex marriage, like climate change,
is a topic that requires a commitment to the tenets of public reason in order for politically
responsible public discourse to inform legislation and public policy. (Torcello 2008) With regard
to climate change, a wide-ranging public campaign to communicate the facts of climate change in
the context of moral and epistemic responsibility is overdue and we can each contribute to pushing
it forward now. Continuing to examine the most effective strategies for climate communication
and developing a deeper appreciation for the scientific process is an intellectually vital and morally
necessary task for researchers in a range of fields.
32
Appendix on Scientific Literacy
Perceived tension between the information deficit and cultural cognition models may
stem from the fact that participants in the most relevant study (Kahan et al., 2012) who reject
climate consensus could more accurately demonstrate knowledge of what climate scientists
believe. In point of fact, however, this type of demonstration is not necessarily an appropriate
measure of scientific literacy. (Holbrook & Rannikmae, 2009) It may merely be a measure of
familiarity with general concepts that one can name and identify, without an informed grasp of
how those concepts developed. These are the concepts that Kahan and his colleagues’ subjects
believe scientists get wrong, and that those subjects suppose themselves to understand correctly.
A more robust measure of scientific literacy involves the ability to articulate what is
methodologically entailed in scientific consensus and how that epistemological process measures
up against other attempts to understand the natural world. Scientific literacy should be reflected
in a person’s ability to understand the scientific process, to articulate why it has a place of
epistemic privilege, and to incorporate such understanding into their own belief formation in a
way that they can identify and account for. (Holbrook & Rannikmae, 2009)
Knowledge of claims made by scientists (that one believes to be erroneous) fail to capture
the deeper, and I argue, more relevant epistemological understandings of why the scientific
process works as well as it does. Furthermore, one cannot be expected to know the current claims
being made by researchers in every field of science. So any understanding of scientific literacy
depending on such knowledge is necessarily incomplete and arbitrary. Scientific literacy,
regarding the epistemological merits of the scientific process, should be relevant across scientific
domains. The information deficit relevant to science denial seems more appropriately to be a
philosophical deficit regarding a clear understanding of the epistemology of science.
33
Acknowledgments
I would like to thank the editor of this issue and the articles anonymous reviewers for their generous
and exceedingly helpful comments.
Notes
1
2
For the purposes of this paper, I will use “ethics” and “morality” interchangeably, with no assumption that their
realms of reference are meaningfully different.
A great deal of contemporary philosophical work explores questions relevant to the communication of climate
science in the public sphere and related issues of social epistemology and justice: Questions of how laypersons
can come to determine appropriate sources of expertise. (Brewer 1998; Goldman 2001; Pigliucci 2010) As well
as, conceptions of justice and virtue in the context of social institutions have been explored to great profit along
with the nature of epistemologically linked social injustice. (Fricker 2009; Anderson 2012) Such philosophical
work (some of which will be examined below) is important, needed, and indeed relevant to the larger concerns of
the author.
34
3
The term was coined by sociologist Marcello Truzzi to describe what he considered to be dogmatic skepticism.
(Truzzi 1987) The present author uses the term in a similar fashion but with important caveats that are developed
below and in other writings. A detailed contrast between Truzzi’s application of the term and my own would go
beyond the present paper’s appropriate scope. For further usage of the term by the author see (Torcello 2011,
2012. 2014b). The present paper develops a more precise distinction between pseudoskepticism and science
denial, more broadly construed, than contained in previous work.
4
In referring to scientific skepticism I mean skepticism that is aware of its own fallibility and cautious in both
rejecting unsupportable claims and accepting evidentially cogent and rationally sound conclusions. I use
“scientific skepticism” for clarity given the topic of this paper. I also could use “reasoned skepticism” in order to
emphasize that such skepticism is not unique to professional science but common to philosophical analysis in
general—despite a separate epistemic category of skepticism known as “philosophical skepticism.” The latter
generally refers to the hyper-skeptical position that knowledge requires certainty, which, strictly speaking, is
thought to be epistemologically unattainable.
5
This claim need not imply that an established scientific consensus cannot be mistaken, but such mistakes are best
discovered through the ongoing skeptical, and self-correcting, process of modern science. The dissenter may be
correct, but it does not follow that she is evidentially warranted in her correct belief. A correct belief may be
necessary for knowledge but it is indistinguishable from a lucky guess absent evidential warrant. If someone who
has relevant scientific training rejects an established scientific consensus that person takes on an evidential burden
to show why the consensus is flawed and, in doing so, work to change the currently predominant view with
empirically strong research. This is a tall task and when the burden falls to someone who lacks scientific training
it is a practically impossible task, given the importance of domain specific technical training in evaluating
appropriate evidence, in addition to the normal epistemic constraints on what counts as supporting evidence and
strong argument.
6
Former Texas Governor Rick Perry has famously attempted to justify his own rejection of the scientific consensus
on anthropogenic global warming by comparing himself, and others who deny scientific consensus, to Galileo.
(Romm 2014)
7
The idea of public reason is a familiar one in contemporary political philosophy. The concept was made famous
by John Rawls who formulates it as the appropriate framework for public discourse on issues of basic justice and
constitutional form. Public reason requires that one formulate one’s public arguments in such a way that everyone,
regardless of ideological allegiance, can understand the argument even while disagreeing. This means that in a
diverse open society one should avoid appealing to contentious metaphysical and religious arguments with regard
to matters of public legislation and policy. As a corollary one should defer to established science when it is
available and relevant to matters of public policy. If one does invoke controversial metaphysical or religious
principles they should be accompanied by public reason or transparently translatable in terms of public reason.
(Rawls 1993, 1997, 2001)
8
The concerned reader might point out that the biologist likewise presumes the existence of biology. The relevant
distinction is that the existence of biological life is not a question of controversy. Indeed, whether or not biological
life (as a whole) is in existence is not the very thing biologists are seeking to prove.
9
It bears repeating, the philosophical science denier is deliberative and honest in her attempt to argue against
methodological naturalism. The faith based science denier need not deny that evidence is on the side of science.
Indeed, regarding matters of the miraculous (as with the above example of transubstantiation) the very definition
of a miracle hinges on the assumption that a particular event stands in violation of understood physical laws, and
therefore, beyond the explanatory power of science. It follows that such faith based denialism ought to play no
legislative role in secular democratic societies, and those who understand the epistemological implications of what
it means to have faith will recognize this limitation (this point relates to the dictates and requirements of public
reason).
10
It may be the case that some pseudoskeptics of climate science elevate the denial of climate change to the level of
a pseudoscience, but full examination of this possibility goes beyond the scope of the present paper.
11
For a useful discussions of pseudoscience and the demarcation problem see Pigliucci (2010, 2013)
35
12
A proper understanding of pseudoskepticism, and pseudoscience, falls within the domain of agnotology.
Agnotology refers to the study of how socially constructed ignorance is generated and spread (Proctor 2005). 13
This concern goes as far back as the writings of Plato (Cooper 1997) in the Ancient world and is particularly
relevant in Renee Descartes’ 1641 Mediations on First Philosophy. (Dicker 1993)
14
Once a logical form of inference is accepted as the appropriate foundation for one belief, whether sound or not, it
stands to reason that the same form may accepted vis-à-vis related beliefs.
Take as example the case of Smith who thinks in the following manner regarding environmental regulations and
political ideology: Smith believes that socialist leaders are eager to enforce environmental regulations. Smith knows
that President Obama is currently promoting new environmental regulations to curb carbon emissions. Smith
concludes that President Obama is a socialist.
The formation of Smith’s belief that President Obama is a socialist, based on the above inferential pattern, provides
reason to expect that Smith will accept the following argument presented by Jones who is Smith’s favorite radio
personality: “Scientists know that long before human beings existed, natural forces caused the earth’s temperature to
rise. The earth’s temperature is currently rising. Therefore, science demonstrates that natural forces are causing the
globe’s temperature to rise.”
Accepting either of these arguments, regardless of their ordering, should make it easier to accept the other, simply
because they share a common logical form. The form these arguments share is referred to by logicians as affirming
the consequent or converse error. The fallacy of affirming the consequent (converse error) is a fallacious logical
form by which one erroneously accepts the converse of the original proposition. The logical symmetry that would
exist if this were a valid form of argument might be intuitively appealing; nevertheless, arguments of this form are
always invalid, i.e. their conclusion does not follow from its premises. The form is symbolized below:
P Q
Q___
P
Affirming the Consequent/Converse Error
My intent with such examples is not to provide actual denialist arguments translated into a logically invalid form.
My claim is merely that we are likely to repeat inferential patterns when we accept particular logical forms as valid
or invalid (regardless of the forms actual validity).
15
The idea that developing good reasoning skills is a part of good “cognitive hygiene” can be related, as Aikin and
Talisse acknowledge, to the ancient notion promoted by Aristotle in his ethical teachings that the cultivation of
high order reasoning skills is necessary for human flourishing. (Aristotle 1999)
16
There is a great deal that can be said about the moral implications of corporate vested interests actively seeking to
undermine the public’s informed understanding of matters relevant to health and public safety. I have written on
this topic elsewhere (Torcello 2011, 2014a). It is clear that such behavior is grossly immoral and dangerously
irresponsible, but delving deeper here would bring us away from the topic at hand.
17
The recent case of Wei Hock Soon who received 1.5 million dollars in funding from various fossil fuel interests
over the course of a decade, while often neglecting to divulge conflicts of interest as part of his published work on
climate science is a case in point. (Gillis & Schwartz, 2015) Soon is not trained as a climate science but has spent
the last decade arguing, counter to the vast majority of trained climate scientists, that natural forcing (the sun in
particular) is responsible for current global warming.
18
The contrast between the number of scientists who accept climate change and the number of U.S. citizens who do
not realize that a scientific consensus exists, or how strong that consensus is, is significant. Even among liberals,
recent polling suggests there is low recognition that a scientific consensus actually exists. (Pew 2012)
19
The concern might be raised that given the cultural cognition model, consensus messaging risks further polarizing
the public. Yet this concern is at odds with data, referenced above, providing repeated empirical support for the
positive effects of consensus messaging. (See section 4.3)
20
For a summary of polling trends on same-sex marriage see Silver (2013)
36
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