Download environmental conservation [sustainability] as social dilemma

ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE AS SOCIAL DILEMMA:
USING PSYCHOLOGY TO SOLVE THE TRAGEDY OF THE COMMONS
Cover page for corresponding author
Mark Van Vugt
Centre for the Study of Group Processes
Department of Psychology
University of Kent
Canterbury CT2 7NP
United Kingdom
+44 1227 827468/7030 (fax)
[email protected]
Word Count: 2,469
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ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE AS SOCIAL DILEMMA:
USING PSYCHOLOGY TO SOLVE THE TRAGEDY OF THE COMMONS
Mark Van Vugt1
Centre for the Study of Group Processes
Department of Psychology
University of Kent
Canterbury, UK
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ABSTRACT
Many local and global environmental challenges are “tragedies of the commons”
where private and collective interests collide. In commons dilemmas people are not
just motivated by self-interest but also by concerns about the welfare of others and the
natural environment. Based on the commons dilemma literature we identify four
design principles for interventions to save the environment: (1) providing information,
(2) strengthening communities, (3) appropriate incentives, and (4) legitimate
institutions.
Key Words: SOCIAL DILEMMAS, CONSERVATION, ENVIRONMENTAL
CHANGE, TRAGEDY OF THE COMMONS
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ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE AS SOCIAL DILEMMA:
USING PSYCHOLOGY TO SOLVE THE TRAGEDY OF THE COMMONS
Don't it always seem to go
That you don't know what you've got
Till it's gone
They paved paradise
And put up a parking lot -- Joni Mitchell (1970)
Within a short (evolutionary) time frame Homo Sapiens has become a global force
that is dominating the natural world. Currently the human population worldwide
amounts to 6.6 billion and is expected to rise to almost 9 billion by 2050. It is
extremely doubtful whether the Earth’s eco-systems can sustain such large numbers,
particularly with the current standard of living. Human activities are responsible for
depleting natural resources such as land, water and fossil fuels, for polluting the
environment through adding toxics to lakes, oceans and the atmosphere, and reducing
biodiversity through causing mass extinctions of other species. Human-made
environmental problems create economic and social conflicts with devastating
consequences for the health and well-being of ourselves and future generations. This
is nothing new. Humans have a long history of causing ecological destruction; yet due
to a rise in population and technological know-how, these effects are now global.
It is widely accepted that we need to move toward greater environmental
sustainability. Yet making the necessary changes has proved very difficult often
because there are conflicting interests between relevant parties (Dietz, Ostrom &
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Stern, 2003). As the World Commission on Environment and Development
recognized a while ago: “The Earth is one, but the world is not” (1987; p. 27).
TRAGEDY OF THE COMMONS
The social dynamics underlying many environmental challenges was famously
captured by Garrett Hardin in his Science article (1968) “The Tragedy of the
Commons,” one of the most cited works in the social sciences. The essay tells the
story of how the management of a communal pasturage by a group of herdsmen turns
into ecological disaster when each of them, upon realizing that adding extra cattle
benefits them personally, increases their herd, thereby unintentionally causing the
destruction of the Commons:
“Each man is locked into a system that compels him to increase his herd without
limit-in a world that is limited, Ruin is the destination towards which all men rush,
each pursuing his own interest in a society that believes in the freedom of the
commons. Freedom in the commons brings ruin to us all” (1968; p. 1244).
The Tragedy of the Commons has become central to our understanding of many
local and global ecological problems. As an evolutionary biologist Hardin argued that
nature favors individuals who exploit common resources at the expense of the more
restrained users. Furthermore, voluntary contributions to create institutions for
managing the Commons fall short because of free-riders. To save the Commons he
recommended “mutual coercion, mutually agreed upon by the majority of the people
affected” (p. 1247).
The Tragedy of the Commons has generated much research activity in the
behavioral sciences, from psychology to political science and from economics to
evolutionary biology. But despite its compelling logic it has been criticized for two
main reasons. First, scientists studying real-world environmental problems found
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many instances of successful community resource management around the world such
as the maintenance of common agricultural land, irrigation systems, and lake and
shore fisheries (Ostrom, 1990). Rather than a “free for all” these commons are heavily
regulated in terms of access and use. A second more fundamental criticism concerns
the validity of the assumption that commons users are driven exclusively by selfinterest. Informed by much empirical data, recent theoretical developments in social
psychology, evolutionary biology, anthropology and experimental economics suggest
that individuals are not indifferent to the welfare of others, their group, or the
environment. Using experimental paradigms, such as the prisoner’s dilemma, the
public goods game or the resource dilemma game, researchers have examined when
individuals cooperate with each other in preserving commons problems simulated in
the laboratory (Weber, Kopelman & Messick, 2004).
In the resource dilemma game, a number of individuals come to the laboratory
where they are seated in separate cubicles to prevent visual contact. Instructions (via
the computer) state that the experiment involves decision-making about shared,
renewable resources, and usually an analogy is made with real-world environmental
problems such as water or fish. The resource contains valuable items (such as money
or points) and they are instructed to accumulate as many of them for themselves,
while preserving the shared resource for the duration of the game. Per game round
each user decides individually how much to harvest from the resource. After each
round the resource renews itself at a fixed rate (say 10%) and feedback is given about
the harvest of other users and the pool size for the next round. If the collective harvest
is less than or equal to the replenishment rate the pool is maintained over time. The
game ends when the resource is depleted or the time is up. By varying a certain
element of the decision situation (e.g., resource size, replenishment rate, individual
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harvest limit, number of users), while leaving the rest constant (“ceteris paribus”)
these experiments can isolate the independent influence of particular variables on
commons use.
KEY STRATEGIES FOR SAVING THE ENVIRONMENT
In combination with field data, the experimental games literature suggests four key
conditions that are conducive to successful resource management. Together they are
the “design principles” for intervention strategies to save the environment.
Providing Information
Managing environmental resources depends first and foremost on getting
reliable resource information, for instance, concerning the availability and use of
drinking water, fossil fuels, and fish stocks, and Science plays a vital role in gathering
this information. Resource uncertainty encourages overuse because users tend to be
optimistic about the future and underestimate their environmental impact (Opotow &
Weiss, 2000). Generally, the more local a resource the easier it is to monitor (e.g.,
trees are easier to count than animals). Human minds are probably better adapted to
cope with local than global environmental problems.
A perceptible resource threat like a fuel or water shortage stresses the here and
now and should promote restraint. We conducted a survey among 120 households
during a recent water shortage in the UK and found that perceived severity predicted
conservation efforts (beta = 0.47; Van Vugt & Samuelson, 1999). Attributions matter.
If people believe a shortage is due to the greed of others instead of seasonal
fluctuations they are less likely to hold back. Policy-makers must carefully consider
whether or not to inform the public about the causes for shortages.
Simple
information is most effective --- labels with comparative information about energy use
and emissions of household appliances --and should be congruent with the needs and
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values of decision-makers. Natural and social scientists must work closely together to
integrate environmental and social information for designing effective strategies
(Dietz et al., 2003).
Strengthening Communities
Managing environmental resources will be easier in communities that are
small, homogeneous, and stable and offer many opportunities for social interaction.
Humans evolved in such living arrangements and, not surprisingly, these conditions
elicit cooperation. When people are fully integrated in their community they are more
likely to share communal resources, even compensating for others’ overuse (Brewer
& Kramer, 1986). It is not yet clear why community identity promotes restraint.
Perhaps in small communities people exchange environmentally-relevant information
more frequently. In comparing lobster fishing communities in Maine, Palmer (1991)
found that fishermen in small communities exchanged catch information more often
than in larger communities.
In tightly-knit communities there is also more social pressure to act
responsibly. Humans are social animals who care a great deal about their social
standing and reputation in groups (Hardy & Van Vugt, 2006). Moralizing tactics such
as naming and shaming promote sustainable use, because most people are concerned
about their reputation. Reputational concerns explain why eliciting a public
commitment is very effective in promotion energy and water conservation. It also
explains why environmental groups often use public shame to force polluting
companies to change their policies. Reputation tactics are probably most effective in
modifying public environmental behaviours such as littering and transport choice.
A promising strategy to promote community identity is through inducing intergroup competition. Humans are tribal creatures who cooperate more easily with in-
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than out-group members even when groups are large and diverse. Stressing a common
identity (“We are all students from University X but not Y”) elicits a powerful
cooperative response. However intergroup competition can be a double-edged sword.
Resources that are shared between communities (or nations) deplete more rapidly in
the presence of competition. In such cases it is much better to break down community
barriers, treating users as single individuals rather than group members (Wit & Kerr,
2002).
Appropriate Incentives
Material incentives are also effective in fostering commons management. In
handing out sanctions for environmental pollution it is better to start with a modest
punishment and then gradually increase it after repeated violations (Ostrom, 1990).
Offering financial rewards, for example, through pay-per-use household water or
electricity meters is also promising, although one must be careful not to “crowd out”
people’s intrinsic environmental concerns. In research in two comparable
communities in England we found that households (N = 278) with a water meter
consumed about 40% less than households without a meter (Van Vugt, 2001).
Metering was particularly beneficial in lowering demand during the summer when
water was scarce. This study also shows how material and social incentives interplay.
The households completed a small questionnaire containing a community
identity-scale with statements such as “I feel strongly attached to this community” and
“There are many people in my community who I think of as good friends” (1 =
strongly disagree, 5 = strongly agree). Water records suggested that community
identity reduced use in households without a water meter but had no impact on
households with a meter (Figure 1). The implication is that individual-financial
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strategies are most effective when community ties are weak such as in large apartment
buildings within big cities.
Financial strategies also promote sustainable use on a larger scale. In the US
market-based systems of tradable environmental allowances (TEA) have become
popular in recent years. This scheme permits companies to buy and sell “pollution”
credits, which has contributed to a reduction in acid rain. TEA’s work better in
markets with fewer and more homogenous companies (Dietz et al., 2003). A potential
problem with treating environmental problems as business transactions is that it
allows rich companies and countries to buy off their moral responsibility for cleaning
up the environment (Tenbrunsel & Messick, 1999)
Other kinds of rewards might also work provided that the incentives match the
needs and values of users. Business people who normally take the car can be
persuaded to switch to trains through improvements in railway infrastructure so that
the train becomes quicker, more reliable, and comfortable (Van Vugt, Meertens & Van
Lange, 1995). People must have easy access to these privileges, however, otherwise
they react. When a carpool lane opened in the Netherlands in 1993 – the first in
Europe -- many car drivers resisted it although it would have cut their travel time
substantially. They developed increasingly negative attitudes towards carpooling,
undertook legal action, and some even placed mannequins in their cars to access the
lane (Figure 2). The lane closed within a year (Van Vugt, Van Lange, Meertens, &
Joireman, 1996).
Legitimate Institutions
A final condition for successful resource management is the presence of
legitimate commons institutions. Authorities play a key role in governing
environmental resources, but who is willing to support them? Institutions are
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essentially public goods that are constantly undermined by free-riders, individuals
who profit from their existence but don’t contribute to their up-keep. One way out of
this dilemma is to have a coercive authority or dictatorial leader in place who controls
resource access. Yet this creates a second problem, the “who guards the guards”paradox: How can we trust these authorities to look after the common good?
Human evolution took place within small societies in which institutional
arrangements were essentially democratic and important group decisions were made
by consensus. Leaders were ephemeral and their main role was procedural -- making
sure no-one dominated the group and everyone would be heard. This democratic
ethos is still with us today and affects the design of effective commons institutions
(Van Vugt, Hogan, & Kaiser, 2008). Laboratory experiments suggest that users
reluctantly hand over resource control to a single leader making decisions on behalf of
them even when a resource is being depleted. Users are quite prepared to self-police
the commons and punish over-users themselves even when punishing is costly for
them. Users much prefer to privatize the commons or adopt a rule that gives everyone
equal access to a resource. If they select a leader, they opt for a democratically elected
leader whom they can influence and control.
A study on the 1991 California water shortage (Tyler & DeGoey, 1995)
demonstrates the importance of procedural concerns. Residents were willing to
empower water authorities to take drastic measures to cut demands only if they were
believed to be using fair procedures (e.g., listening to resident’s views, honest
information). Procedural concerns were particularly important for residents with a
strong community identification. A survey on the British railway privatization found
that train users who believed that privatization was bad because it would relinquish
public control intended to take the train less (Van Vugt et al., 1995). The poet W.H.
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Auden (1966) echoed concerns about privatizing the commons: “Private faces in
public places are nicer and wiser than public faces in private places.”
CONCLUSIONS
Many local and global environmental challenges are commons tragedies in which
private actors undermine public causes. The social dilemma literature identifies four
design principles for interventions to save the environment:
(1) providing
information, (2) strengthening communities, (3) appropriate incentives, and (4)
legitimate institutions. Little is known yet how these strategies interact with each
other -- some might reinforce each other and others cancel each other out. It is also
important to consider individual differences in response to environmental strategies.
For instance, environmental campaigns are more persuasive among people with a prosocial orientation whereas selfish individuals respond more strongly to monetary
incentives (Van Vugt et al., 1995).
Despite the severity of the current environmental problems, there is still room for
guarded optimism. Evolution has equipped humans with an innate tendency to enjoy
and affiliate with Nature, biophilia, and, annually, more people go to the Zoo than to a
sports stadium (Wilson, 2006). Surely, humans are keen to preserve their Creation.
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AUTHOR NOTES
1. Address correspondence to Mark Van Vugt, Department of Psychology, University
of Kent, Canterbury, UK, [email protected].
2. Acknowledgments: The author wishes to thank Tim Hopthrow and Robbie Sutton
for their comments on a previous version.
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REFERENCES
Brewer, M. B., & Kramer, R. M. (1986). Choice behavior in social dilemmas: Effects
of social identity, group size and decision framing. Journal of Personality and
Social Psychology, 3, 543-549.
Dietz, T., Ostrom, E., & Stern, P. C. (2003). The struggle to govern the commons.
Science, 302, 1907-1912.
Hardin, G. (1968). The tragedy of the commons. Science, 162, 1243-1248.
Hardy, C., & Van Vugt, M. (2006). Nice guys finish first: The competitive altruism
hypothesis. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 32, 1402-1413.
Opotow, S. & Wiess, L. (2000). New ways of thinking about environmentalism:
Denial and the process of moral exclusion in environmental conflict. Journal
of Social Issues, 56, 475-490.
Ostrom, E. (1990). Governing the commons: The evolution of institutions for
collective action. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Tenbrunsel, A. E. & Messick, D. M. (1999). Sanctioning systems, decision frames,
and cooperation. Administrative Science Quarterly, 44, 684-707.
Tyler, T. R., & Degoey, P. (1995). Collective restraint in social dilemmas:
Procedural justice and social identification effects on support for authorities.
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 69, 482-497.
Van Vugt, M. (2001). Community identification moderating the impact of financial
incentives in a natural social dilemma: A water shortage. Personality and
Social Psychology Bulletin, 27, 1440-1449.
Van Vugt, M., Hogan, R., & Kaiser, R. (2008). Leadership, followership, and
evolution: Some lessons from the past. American Psychologist, 63, 182-196.
Van Vugt, M. and Samuelson, C. D. (1999). The impact of metering in a natural
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resource crisis: A social dilemma analysis. Personality and Social Psychology
Bulletin, 25, 731-745.
Van Vugt, M., Van Lange, P. A. M., Meertens, R. M., & Joireman, J. A. (1996). How
a structural solution to a real-world social dilemma failed: A field experiment
on the first carpool lane in Europe. Social Psychology Quarterly, 59, 364-374.
Weber, M., Kopelman, S., & Messick, D. M. (2004). A conceptual review of social
dilemmas: Applying a logic of appropriateness. Personality and Social
Psychology Review, 8, 281-307.
Wilson, E. O. (2006). The creation: An appeal to save life on earth. New York:
Norton.
Wit, A. P. & Kerr, N. L. (2002). Me versus just us versus all: Categorization and
cooperation in nested social dilemmas. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 83, 616-637.
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RECOMMENDED READINGS
Biel, A., Eek, D., Garling, T., & Gustafson (2008). New issues and paradigms in
research on social dilemmas. Berlin: Springer – State-of-the-art review of contemporary
research on social dilemmas.
Gardner, G. T., & Stern, P. C. (1996). Environmental problems and human behavior.
Boston: Allyn & Bacon – A complete, highly accessible text about the human impact
on the environment.
Ostrom, E. (1990) (see References) – A classic book with case studies of commons
resource management problems
Penn, D. J. (2003). The evolutionary roots of our environmental problems. Quarterly
Review of Biology, 78, 275-301 – This original article analyzes human-made
environmental problems from a Darwinian perspective.
Van Vugt, M. (2001). (see References) -- A representative study that illustrates
original research about a real-world commons dilemma
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FIGURE CAPTIONS
Figure 1. Average monthly water use among households as a function of tariff (meter
versus no meter) and level of community identification (high versus low) in UK,
1997.
Figure 2. Carpool preference for solo drivers and carpoolers before versus after
implementation of carpool lane in the Netherlands, 1993.
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low community identification
high community identification
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19
17
15
monthly 13
water use 11
(x1000
9
liters)
7
5
3
1
no meter
meter
18
solo drivers
carpoolers
6
5
carpool
preference
4
3
2
before
after
carpool lane
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