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SAT: A Security Architecture Achieving
Anonymity and Traceability in Wireless
Mesh Networks
Abstract:
Anonymity has received increasing attention in the literature due to the users’ awareness of
their privacy nowadays. Anonymity provides protection for users to enjoy network services
without being traced. While anonymity-related issues have been extensively studied in
payment-based systems such as e-cash and peer-to-peer (P2P) systems, little effort has been
devoted to wireless mesh networks (WMNs). On the other hand, the network authority
requires conditional anonymity such that misbehaving entities in the network remain
traceable. In this paper, we propose a security architecture to ensure unconditional
anonymity for honest users and traceability of misbehaving users for network authorities in
WMNs. The proposed architecture strives to resolve the conflicts between the anonymity
and traceability objectives, in addition to guaranteeing fundamental security requirements
including authentication, confidentiality, data integrity, and nonrepudiation. Thorough
analysis on security and efficiency is incorporated, demonstrating the feasibility and
effectiveness of the proposed architecture.
INTRODUCTION
ireless Mesh Network (WMN) is a promising technology and is expected to be
W widespread due to its low- investment feature and the wireless broadband services it
supports, attractive to both service providers and users. However, security issues inherent in
WMNs or any wireless networks need be considered before the deployment and
proliferation of these networks, since it is unappealing to subscribers to obtain services
without security and privacy guarantees. Wireless security has been the hot topic in the
literature for various network technologies such as cellular networks [1], wireless local area
networks (WLANs) [2], wireless sensor networks [3], [4], mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs)
[5], [6], and vehicular ad hoc networks (VANETs) [7]. Recently, new proposals on WMN
security [8], [9] have emerged. In [8], the authors describe the specifics of WMNs and
identify three fundamental network operations that need to be secured. We [9] propose an
attack-resilient security architecture (ARSA) for WMNs, addressing countermeasures to a
wide range of attacks in WMNs. Due to the fact that security in WMNs is still in its infancy
as very little
1.
J. Sun is with the Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science,
University of Tennessee, Knoxville, TN 37996.
E-mail: [email protected].
www.frontlinetechnologies.org
[email protected]
+91 7200247247
2
2.
C. Zhang and Y. Fang are with the Department of Electrical and Computer
Engineering, University of Florida, PO Box 116130, Gainesville, FL 32611. E-mail:
[email protected], [email protected].
3.
Y. Zhang is with the School of Electrical, Computer, and Energy Engineering,
Arizona State University, Tempe, AZ 85287.
E-mail: [email protected].
Manuscript received 4 Sept. 2008; revised 16 May 2009; accepted 7 Sept. 2009; published
online 4 Dec. 2009.
For information on obtaining reprints of this article, please send e-mail to:
[email protected], and reference IEEECS Log Number TDSC-2008-09-0140. Digital
Object Identifier no. 10.1109/TDSC.2009.50.
Architecture Diagram
CONCLUSION
In this paper, we propose SAT, a security architecture mainly consisting of the ticket-based
protocols, which resolves the conflicting security requirements of unconditional anonymity
for honest users and traceability of misbehaving users. By utilizing the tickets, self-
generated pseudonyms, and the hierarchical identity-based cryptography, the proposed
architecture is demonstrated to achieve desired security objectives and efficiency.
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www.frontlinetechnologies.org
[email protected]
+91 7200247247
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www.frontlinetechnologies.org
[email protected]
+91 7200247247