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Alliance Adjustment in the Post-Cold War Era:
Convergence of Strategic Perceptions and
Revitalization of the ROK–US Alliance
Jaechun Kim
The ROK–US alliance has survived the tumultuous periods following the
demise of the Cold War international order and morphed into what both
countries identify as a global, value-based partnership. Skeptical assessments of the alliance’s future seemed to have overlooked a number of factors.
First, domestic politics can make a big difference; political leadership can
play a crucial role in salvaging or damaging alliance partnership. Second,
the importance of shared values and identities looms larger in modern
alliances. States tend to ally with others to cope with uncertainties, not
necessarily to counter manifest threats. Alliances can survive the disappearance of the common threats that had given rise to the alliances and they can
be sustained in order to further various interests. All these factors and
dynamics help account for why the ROK–US alliance has survived the postCold War adversity. Nevertheless, these factors alone come short of explaining why the alliance has elevated to a core of US security strategy in the
region; they do not explain why the alliance once again has come to occupy
the very heart of the ROK’s security strategy. It was the divergent strategic
perceptions that mostly frayed the alliance in the first place, and it was the
convergence of strategic perceptions that brought the alliance back together.
Key words: ROK–US relations, alliance theory, ROK’s foreign policy, US
foreign policy, US–China relations.
Introduction
The ROK–US alliance once likened by a former senior US diplomat to a
marriage “closer to a divorce” in 2006 was exalted as the “linchpin” of security for
the Pacific by the US president in 2010.1 The 50th anniversary of the alliance in
1. In 2006, Kurt Campbell, former US deputy assistant secretary of defense for Asia and the Pacific,
reportedly likened the ROK and the United States to a king and queen who were close to an official
Pacific Focus, Vol. XXX, No. 1 (April 2015), 33–58.
doi: 10.1111/pafo.12040
© 2015 Center for International Studies, Inha University
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34 / Pacific Focus
2003 prompted a number of celebrative seminars and public speeches, but there
was little doubt that one of the most successful alliances in history was under stress
and in disarray. Despite the efforts of many in both countries to salvage the
partnership, the seeming lack of trust and common vision was clouding the future
of the alliance. As the alliance reached its 60th anniversary in 2013, however, the
mood in the two countries was much more upbeat and experts were generally
sanguine about the future of the alliance. With its renewed mission as moving
beyond the peninsular affairs to contributing to regional stability and the global
public good, both the ROK and the United States did seem to have successfully
found a new raison d’etre of the alliance as a value-based, global partnership. How
did this happen? How can we explain this reversal of fortune for the ROK–US
alliance once declared as defunct by many skeptics? What had transpired to the
alliance in the 10-years span between the 50th and 60th anniversaries? The objective of this paper is to examine some of the more fundamental factors that contributed to the resuscitation of the ROK–US alliance as the alliance celebrated its
60th-anniversary. Convergence of strategic perceptions between the two countries
seemed to have been most instrumental in resuscitating the alliance among a
number of other important factors.
This paper is organized as follows. The next section reviews previous theoretical
attempts and research efforts to make sense of the post-Cold War alliance in
general and the ROK–US alliance specifically. The ROK–US alliance survived
tumultuous times in the early post-Cold War years and was revived as what is
dubbed as a global partnership. The aim of the third section is to explore some of
the more fundamental elements that contributed to resuscitation of the ROK–US
alliance. The last section emphasizes the importance of common strategic perceptions toward North Korea and China in order for the alliance to have continuous
viability even in the age of global alliance.
Evolution of ROK–US Alliance in the Post-Cold War Era:
Theoretical Assessments
IR Theories and Alliances after the Cold War
Alliance, in realists’ parlance, is nothing more than a mundane agreement,
oftentimes transient in nature, entered into by states to cope with common external
threats. If such threats or threat perceptions cease to exist, so will the alliance
divorce. See Kyo-kwan Lee, “Seoul and Washington Closer to Divorce,” Asia Times (7 March 2006),
at <http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Korea/HC07Dg03.html> (searched date: 29 May 2013). US
President Barack Obama said the ROK–US alliance was “the linchpin of not only security for the
Republic of Korea and the United States but also for the Pacific as a whole . . .” President Obama’s
remark during the G-20 Summit in Toronto in 2010, John D. Banusiewicz, “Gates Plans Visit to
South Korea for ‘2-plus-2 Talks’,” American Forces Press Service (16 July 2010), at <http://
www.defense.gov/News/NewsArticle.aspx?ID=60048> (searched date: 29 May 2013).
© 2015 Center for International Studies, Inha University
Alliance Adjustment in the Post-Cold War / 35
because “alliances have no meaning apart from the adversary threat to which they
are a response.”2 Therefore, it is a small wonder that most of the scholarly works
in the realist tradition predicted the demise of Cold War alliances subsequent to the
disintegration of Cold War international order.3 The Warsaw Pact did collapse as
with the Soviet Union, but most of the United Sates’ Cold War alliances survived,
which sparked lively academic debates to make sense of this anomaly. In the eyes
of neoliberalists, alliance as institution, once developed full-fledgedly, takes on a
life of its own, adapts to a new environment, and adopts new missions. For
instance, the institutional underpinnings of NATO are flexible enough to tackle a
host of post-Cold War security problems but hardly replaceable because of “asset
specificity.” Over the Cold War years, NATO had developed a host of institutional
assets that were not just specific to the Soviet threat but general enough to deal with
many post-Cold War security problems.4 Constructivists have paid attention to the
role of identities and values that the US Cold War alliances have come to share and
espouse. Identities and values were as important as the threat perceptions that
brought together NATO allies in the first place. Or it could have well been the
common threat perceptions that gave rise to alliances, but over the course of years,
they grew to acquire similar values and a sense of “we-feeling” that in turn became
the source of durability for alliance partnership.5 Constructivist as well as
neoliberalist accounts would concede that the origins of alliances ought to be
traced back to shared threats (or threat perceptions), but the sustainability of them
could only be accounted for by factoring in institutional resilience and flexibility
(neoliberalist) or the intersubjective nature of alliance partnership (constructivist).
After all, realists had been mostly interested in why alliances rise and fall, but not
in how they transform.6
2. Glenn Snyder, Alliance Politics (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997), p. 192. See also Joshua
S. Goldstein, International Relations (New York: Harper, 1994), pp. 80–81.
3. Kenneth Waltz, “Relations in a Multipolar World,” Hearing before the Committee on Foreign
Relations US Senate, 102nd Congress 1st session (Washington, D.C.: US GPO, 26 November 1990);
Glenn Snyder, “Alliances, Balance, and Stability,” International Organization, 45-1 (1991), pp.
121–42; John Mearsheimer, “Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War,” International Organization, 15-1 (1990), pp. 5–56.
4. For the “asset specificity” argument of alliance, see Celeste A. Wallander, “Institutional Assets and
Adaptability: NATO after the Cold War,” International Organization, 54-4 (Autumn 2000), pp.
705–735; Robert B. McCalla, “NATO’s Persistence after the Cold War,” International Organization,
50-3 (Summer 1996), pp. 445–475.
5. Thomas Risse-Kappen, “The End of the West? Conclusions,” in Jeffrey Anderson, G. John
Ikenberry and Thomas Risse, eds., The End of the West? Crisis and Change in the Atlantic Order
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2008), pp. 263–290; Thomas Risse-Kappen, “Collective Identity in
a Democratic Community: The Case of NATO,” in Peter J. Katzenstein, ed., The Culture of National
Security (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), pp. 357–399.
6. One of the exceptions is Stephen M. Walt’s work on alliance transformation. Walt goes to great
lengths to specify the circumstances in which alliances endure and come to a halt. See Stephen M.
Walt, “Why Alliances Endure or Collapse,” Survival, 39-1 (Spring 1997), pp. 156–179.
© 2015 Center for International Studies, Inha University
36 / Pacific Focus
Despite the theoretical attempts to fill the void left by realist theories, why and
how alliances survive the threats that had given rise to them, and how they are
sustained are still understudied and undertheorized. For instance, focusing primarily on institutional characters of alliance, neoliberal theory downplays the
interactive nature of the alliance relationship, thereby failing to explain the ways in
which alliance partnership transforms. The constructivist explanation may confuse
the product of alliance with the producer of it.7 Besides, much theoretical endeavor
in the post-Cold War era has been devoted to the explanation of NATO’s future and
potential for evolution. The ROK–US alliance, like other Cold War alliances of the
United States, has failed to stimulate such lively inter-theoretical discussions in
international relations (IR).
Analyzing the ROK–US Alliance after the Cold War
Although there would not be a dearth of insights to be gleaned from interparadigm debates in IR as to why and how alliances survive and evolve, debates on
the fate of the ROK–US alliance has been fairly limited to assessing why the
alliance has come to the brink of falling apart and how to rescue it. The latter part
of the debate has proceeded in a rather haphazard manner without clear order of
importance and vision, while the former emphasized how the end of the Cold War
affected threat perceptions in both countries, hence the alliance, and also how
domestic factors – political leadership, public opinion, the ROK’s assertiveness as
new economic power, etc. – have aggravated the situation. With evaporation of
common threat perception, realists stipulated that the ROK–US alliance was something that will naturally wither away. Some even suggested that both countries
waste no time and call it quits. In the absence of common threats, prolonging the
alliance only amplifies the danger of entrapment. North Korea without the Cold
War patronage poses no vital threat to US strategic interests, particularly now that
its much stronger southern counterpart can and should singlehandedly shoulder the
burden of countering its threats. The alliance will therefore entrap the United States
into fighting an unnecessary war in Korea, a war that should be considered a
strictly peninsular affair.8 The alliance commitment is to fritter away the scarce
resources of the United States on peripheral concerns. Fear of entrapment was also
conspicuous in the writings and words of some Korean scholars and pundits. The
whole “strategic flexibility” debate on the United Sates Forces in Korea (USFK)
had revolved around how such modification could dangerously drag the ROK into
US–China military confrontation over the Taiwan Straits and possibly other con7. Shared identities may well have been the products of alliances, not producers of them. Values
alone cannot overhaul the alliance in the absence of mutual threats or interests.
8. “The ROK doesn’t even come up to the standard of important interests . . .” See Douglas Bandow,
Tripwire: Korea and U.S. Foreign Policy in a Changed World (Washington, D.C.: CATO Institute,
1996), p. 62. See also Ted Carpenter and Doug Bandow, The Korean Conundrum: America’s
Troubled Relations with North and South Korea (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004).
© 2015 Center for International Studies, Inha University
Alliance Adjustment in the Post-Cold War / 37
tingencies all around the world. Those contingencies may be of importance to the
US interests but not to the ROK’s, so it was just not fair for the alliance to be
transformed in a way that the ROK can get embroiled in conflicts off the Korean
peninsula.
Rather than subscribing to grand theories of IR, a number of researches mobilized more specific alliance theories, such as the “entrapment–abandonment” and
“security–autonomy” trade-off models to illustrate the ROK’s dilemma in dealing
with the alliance in the post-Cold War security environment.9 To some Koreans,
danger of entrapment was graver than that of abandonment, but still to others, it
was vice versa. At the aggregate level, however, the ROK’s attitude was that of
ambivalence: it appeared that the ROK wanted to avoid both entrapment and
abandonment, although there is trade-off between the two in alliance relations. The
same can be said to the security–autonomy trade-off. It seemed as if the ROK
wanted to augment autonomy while at the same time wanting to maintain the Cold
War-level security commitments from the United States. This looked ambivalent
and paradoxical in the eyes of US observers. In contrast, some Korean observers
pointed out that there has not been fair trade-offs on either the “entrapment–
abandonment” or “security–autonomy” continuums. The ROK was willing to
sacrifice security to a certain extent and attempted to enhance autonomy in return
but to no avail. Likewise, the increase in danger of entrapment was not accompanied by a decrease in fear of abandonment. The preponderance of power and
strategic leeway that the United States possesses in the unipolar world is accountable for such unfair trade-offs.10 Without the Cold War threat of bipolar order, US
security guarantees to alliance partners cease to function as public goods, in which
case the United States enjoys an ample amount of strategic freedom, and the
free-riding of US alliance partners is seldom tolerated. Alliance politics is no
longer a necessity but a choice to the United States. As the more dominant alliance
partner unconstrained by Cold War bipolar “structural threats,” the United States
would have “residual rights of control” that enable it to dictate the terms of the
9. For the “entrapment–abandonment” trade-off model, see Glenn H. Snyder, “The Security
Dilemma in Alliance Politics,” World Politics, 36-4 (July 1984), pp. 461–495. For the “security–
autonomy” dilemma, see Michael F. Altfeld, “The Decision to Ally: A Theory and Test,” The Western
Political Quarterly, 37-4 (December 1984), pp. 523–544. For its further application, see James D.
Morrow, “Alliance and Asymmetry: An Alternative to the Capability Aggregation Model of Alliances,” American Journal of Political Science, 35-4 (November 1991), pp. 904–933. For the applications of such modes to the ROK–US alliance, see Soo Hyung Lee, “Dongmaeng-eui anbo
dilemma-wa pogi-yeonlu-eui soonhwan [Alliance Security Dilemma and the Cycle of AbandonmentEntrapment],” Hankuk kukje yeonku journal [The Korean Journal of International Studies], 39-1
(November, 1999), pp. 21–38; Noh Soon Chang, “Kyowhan dongmaeng model-eui kyohwan-seong:
Beedae-ching han-mee anbo dongmaeng [Trade-Off in the ‘Autonomy-Security Trade-Off Model’:
The Case of Asymmetric US–Korea Alliance],” Hankuk kukje yeonku journal [The Korean Journal
of International Studies], 36-1(October 1996), pp. 79–104.
10. Ha Lyong Jung, “Dankeuk chegye-wa hanmee dongmaeng-eui byunhwa [The US–ROK Alliance
in the Unipolar System],” Hankuk jeongchi yeonku [Journal of Korean Politics], 21-1 (2012), pp.
231–254.
© 2015 Center for International Studies, Inha University
38 / Pacific Focus
alliance.11 This is particularly true of the ROK–US partnership wherein the asymmetric nature of the alliance is still very much intact, if not worsened.12 The ROK’s
security strategy is in need of retooling in the post-Cold War era, but influential
“constituencies” that the alliance has created since its inception make it virtually
self-perpetuating.13 With the benefit of hindsight, the skeptics seemed to have
overlooked the fact that strategic perceptions of both countries had remained in a
state of flux long after the Cold War international order had come to an end. As
illustrated in the following pages, resuscitation of the ROK–US alliance is greatly
attributable to convergence of strategic perceptions between the two countries. And
yet, there is a paucity of in-depth research that delves into the manner in which
strategic perceptions affected the ROK–US alliance, particularly during the period
of reinvigoration in late 2000s and early 2010s. As much as a common strategic
perception is a necessary condition for alliance formation, it is instrumental for the
alliance to be sustained, even after the initial circumstances have undergone significant changes.14 The next section traces how the change in perception in both
countries affected the alliance in the post-Cold War era with analytic emphasis on
the period of resuscitation.
Strategic Perceptions and Changes in the Alliance
Diverging Perceptions in the Early Post-Cold War Era
The US strategy during the Cold War era was geared toward prevailing in global
competition with the former Soviet Union. Disintegration of the Cold War international order was therefore hailed as vindication of the decades-long containment
strategy, but at the same time it presented a set of new strategic challenges to the
United States. The debate in both academia and policy-making circles revolved
around at least a couple of questions. First, it was debated whether maintaining the
preponderant if not hegemonic status of US power was in the best interests of the
11. Joon Hyung Kim, “Donmaeng eeron-eul tonghan han-mee jeonliak dongmaeng-eui hameui
boonseok [Analysis on Implications of the ROK–US Strategic Alliance based on International
Politics],” Dong-Asia kukje jeongchi-hak hoe-bo [Journal of the East Asian Association of International Studies], 12-2 (2009), pp. 101–125.
12. Noh Soon Chang, op. cit. The alliance was analogized as public goods and also club goods. For
the alliance as public goods, see Mancur Olson Jr and Richard Zeckhauser, “An Economic Theory of
Alliances,” The Review of Economics and Statistics, 48-3 (August 1966), pp. 266–279. For the
application of club good to alliance, see Bruce M. Russett and John D. Sullivan, “Collective Goods
and International Organizations,” International Organization, 25-4 (1971), pp. 845–865; Todd
Sandler and Jon Cauley, “On the Economic Theory of Alliances,” Journal of Conflict Resolution,
19-2 (1975), pp. 330–348.
13. Jae-Jung Suh, “Bound to Last? The US-Korea Alliance and Analytical Eclecticism,” in Jae-Jung
Suh, Peter J. Katzenstein and Allen Carlson, eds., Rethinking Security in East Asia: Identity, Power,
and Efficiency (Stanford: Stanford University, 2004), pp. 131–171.
14. Among a number of variables that contribute to the enduring alliance, shared perception seems
to be the most important. See Stephen M. Walt, op. cit., pp. 157–159.
© 2015 Center for International Studies, Inha University
Alliance Adjustment in the Post-Cold War / 39
United States.15 Second, the debate also centered on what constituted vital security
threats to the United States in the post-Cold War era. The ROK, in a similar
manner, did its share of soul-searching for a new strategic initiative. Attempting to
diversify its diplomatic portfolios hitherto skewed mostly toward the United States,
the ROK made friendly gestures toward Russia and China and established formal
ties with them in 1991 and 1993, respectively. After acquiring membership in the
UN simultaneously in 1991, two Koreas signed the Inter-Korean Basic Agreement
on Reconciliation, Nonaggression, and Exchanges and Cooperation in 1992, a
major breakthrough in inter-Korean relations. Changed environments in the postCold War era compelled both the ROK and United States to redefine strategic
imperatives and sources of security concerns. When their perceptions of core
security concerns diverged, so did their views toward the alliance.
In the late 1980s and early 1990s it seemed that there was an air of uncertainty
in the United States about the proper place of Asia in its grand strategic design. To
some observers, the United States had lost geopolitical interests in Asia as the
strategic focus has shifted from “geopolitics to geoeconomics” in the region.16 As
the economic interests took precedence over security concerns, the bilateral security alliances of the United States in the region had lost much of their strategic
value as well. The allies of the United States would “go from being linchpins of US
security in the region to being mere levers to open markets in the region.”17 It is
well publicized that in these still early days of the post-Cold War era, the United
States contemplated a phased but complete withdrawal of US military presence
from Asia. The US Congress adopted the “Nunn–Warner Amendment” that mandated withdrawal of the US forces in Asia. In response, the US Department of
Defense (DoD) released the East Asian Strategic Initiative (EASI) I in 1990, which
envisaged a three-stage restructuring plan that involved a virtual withdrawal of US
military commitment from the ROK’s defense against the North Korean threat.
The EASI I met vehement opposition from the ROK, which still saw North Korea
as a clear and present danger to its security.18 North Korea’s nuclear ambition led
to the rewriting of the US East Asian strategy; the EASI II, released in 1992 in the
wake of first North Korean nuclear crisis, postponed the scheduled three-stage
withdrawal, but suggested that the ROK be more responsible in coping with the
15. Samuel Huntington, “Why International Primacy Matters,” International Security, 17-4 (Spring
1993), pp. 68–83; Robert Jervis, “International Primacy: Is the Game Worth the Candle?” International Security, 17-4 (Spring 1993), pp. 52–67.
16. Hyug Baeg Im, “The US Role in Korean Democracy and Security since Cold War Era,”
International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, 6-2 (2006), pp. 157–187.
17. Renato Cruz De Castro, “Whither Geoeconomics? Bureaucratic Inertia in U.S. Post-Cold War
Foreign Policy toward East Asia,” Asian Affairs, 26-4 (Winter 2000), pp. 201–221.
18. During the 1990s the US DoD released East Asian Strategy Reports (EASR) in 1990, 1992, 1995,
and 1998. The first two EASRs are also known as Nunn–Warner reports collectively and also as EASI
I and II, respectively. The official title of EASI I is “A Strategic Framework for the Asian Pacific Rim:
Looking Toward the 21st Century.” The 1995 EASR is also known as the Nye Report, which confirms
the US military commitment to Asia.
© 2015 Center for International Studies, Inha University
40 / Pacific Focus
conventional threats of the North. But in the end, the United States came to a
reaffirmation that Asia was of great strategic value, not just in terms of economic
benefits but also in geopolitical interests. The 1993 “Bottom-Up Review” emphasized the necessity of the US forward troop presence in Asia to protect the vital
interests of the United States in the region.19 Nye made it clear that “America’s
interests in the region must be protected and America’s commitments will be
honored. History, geography and demography make the United States an integral
part of the region.”20
The 1995 EASR scrapped the previous plan to withdraw and pledged to retain
100,000 US troop presence in Asia. American military commitment in the form of
forward presence was deemed necessary to counter the rise of China and developments of nuclear weapons capabilities of North Korea. The Nye Report came as
a relief in the ROK, but it was more reassuring to Japan than to the ROK. Although
stability of the Korean peninsula was deemed important to the Asia–Pacific, the
report portrayed the US–Japan alliance as the cornerstone of peace and stability in
the region. North Korea was once again registered as a threat to the United States,
not as an Asian frontier of communism, but as a proliferator of weapons of mass
destruction.21 Be it from nuclear or conventional capabilities, the nature of the
North Korean threat to the ROK, however, did not change. Therefore, when the
Clinton administration approached the North’s nuclear program with a series of
seeming appeasement policies, it was received by the Kim Young-sam government
with skepticism and apprehension. The Kim government’s perception toward the
North was ambivalent at best; in his inauguration speech, Kim declared, “no
alliance is better than a people united.”22 The Kim government toyed with sentimental nationalism toward the North, but soon called for stern measures toward the
North, short of military means. The United States for its own part underestimated
the resilience of the North and entertained “North Korean endism,” which assumed
the North would soon follow the fate of former satellite states of the Soviet Union
in Eastern Europe. Perceptions toward the North were not convergent during the
19. Les Aspin, Report on the Bottom-up Review (Washington, D.C.: Department Of Defense, 1993).
The following document emphasizes the importance of the USFK in the region to accomplish such
missions. Asia is of importance to the United States in virtually all issue areas. See Christopher R.
Hill, “East Asia in Transition: Opportunities and Challenges for the United States,” Archive for the US
Department of State (8 March 2006), at <http://2001-2009.state.gov/p/eap/rls/rm/62755.htm>
(searched date: 23 May 2013).
20. Joseph S. Nye Jr, “Strategy for East Asia and the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance,” remarks
delivered to the Pacific Forum Center for Strategic and International Studies/Japanese Institute of
International Affairs Conference, San Francisco, 29 March 1995, at <http://www.defense.gov/
speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=878> (searched date: 23 May 2013).
21. For the US documents in support of this, see Richard B. Cheney, Annual Report to the President
and the Congress (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Secretary of Defense, 1992), p. 3.
22. Tae-ho Kang, “Han Wan-sang Contemplates History of Progressivism in South Korea,”
The Hankyoreh (18 January 2013), at <http://www.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_national/
570316.html> (searched date: 12 May 2013).
© 2015 Center for International Studies, Inha University
Alliance Adjustment in the Post-Cold War / 41
era of Clinton and Kim, but the perception gap between the two countries became
widest in the years of succeeding presidency in both countries.
Sunshine Policy Meets Bush Doctrine
To the Bush administration, North Korea was just another rogue state on the axis
of evil of which the danger needed to be dealt with in a proactive if not preemptive
manner. However, to the governments of Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun, North
Korea was a fellow brethren country and a partner with which to build a reunified
Korea in a peaceful manner. At one time, Koreans were more worried about the
danger posed by the US reaction to the North Korean nuclear programs than about
North Korean nuclear weapons themselves.23 Leadership in both countries
reinforced such perception by making unwanted comments that fueled suspicion of
each other’s intention. When President Roh remarked that “there was some validity
to the North’s argument that its nuclear and missile programs are intended to deter
outside threats,” he sounded as if he was speaking on behalf of the North. When
President Bush likened Kim Jong-il to a “pygmy” and “a spoiled child at a dinner
table” and the country as an “outpost of tyranny,” he sounded as if he was ready to
venture into another war of preemption on the Korean peninsula.24 Polls and
surveys in the 1990s and early 2000s demonstrate that ROK–US relations were
fraying. According to a poll by Joongang ilbo and the East Asian Institute (EAI) in
2002, more than half of the respondents said that the USFK should be withdrawn.25
23. Michael H. Armacost, “The Future of America’s Alliances in Northeast Asia,” in Michael H.
Armacost and Daniel I. Okimoto, eds., The Future of America’s Alliances in Northeast Asia (Washington, D.C.: Asia-Pacific Research Center, 2004), pp. 16–17.
24. “Roh daetongryung ‘WAC ochan yeonseol’ yoji [The General Thrust of President Roh’s ‘WAC
Luncheon Speech’],” Associated Press (13 November 2004), at <http://news.hankooki.com/lpage/
politics/200411/h2004111309313521080.htm> (searched date: 25 May 2013); The Washington
Times, “Rice Targets 6 ‘Outposts of Tyranny’,” The Washington Times (19 January 2005), at <http://
www.washingtontimes.com/news/2005/jan/19/20050119-120236-9054r/?page=all> (searched date:
22 May 2013); Helene Cooper, “A New Bush Tack on North Korea,” New York Times (7 December
2007), at <http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/07/world/asia/07korea.html?_r=0> (searched date: 22
May 2013). In the early 2000s, it was alleged that the United States contemplated the use of force during
the first nuclear crisis, see Don Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History (New York:
Perseus Books, 1997); Joel Wilt, Daniel Poneman and Robert Galluci, Going Critical: The First North
Korean Nuclear Crisis (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2005).
25. Forty-four point six percent and 6.3% agreed on phased withdrawal and immediate withdrawal,
respectively, whereas 27% and 21% supported permanent deployment and temporary deployment,
respectively. Joongang ilbo (18 December 2002). However, the poll conducted in June 2003 indicates
that anti-Americanism had subsided and more Koreans saw the need for the alliance and USFK
deployment. Sixty-one percent of respondents supported USFK deployment, while 35% supported
withdrawal in a poll conducted in June 2003. However, 46.3% still responded that the United States
was the country that was most obstructive to the unification of Korea, whereas 25.1% replied that it
was North Korea. About 90% supported Status of Forces Agreement amendment. Joongang ilbo (11
June 2003). For similar results, see Hankook ilbo (22 February 2004).
© 2015 Center for International Studies, Inha University
42 / Pacific Focus
The September 2003 Gallup poll results were astounding. Eighty-five percent of
respondents replied that anti-Americanism was necessary to rectify the unequal
nature of ROK–US relations. Thirty-eight percent viewed Bush as posing more
threats to the Korean peninsula than Kim Jong-il.26 The low standing of the United
States was compounded by a series of accidents and crimes committed by USFK
soldiers and subsequent mismanagement of the incidents. Bush’s unilateralism
was also a source of anti-Americanism; among Asian countries, the ROK was
mostly opposed to the US War against Terror.27 Of course, rampant antiAmericanism of this sort soon subsided, but there was little doubt that the alliance
was drifting apart. Although one can say that the alliance was never on the verge
of collapse, an EAI poll in 2006 indicated that 74 percent of foreign policy and
security experts in the ROK responded that the alliance had weakened since the
inauguration of the Roh administration.28 It is noteworthy that at one point, the
United States was perceived as posing more threats to peace in Korea than
were North Korea and China. The perceptions toward China as well as North
Korea had improved significantly, while those toward the United States were
deteriorating.
While the ROK was carrying out soul-searching with the rising China, the
United States had made the strategic decision to discourage China from ascending
to hegemonic status in the region.29 NYT Maintaining a forward troop presence in
the region was deemed necessary to cope with a host of post-Cold War security
threats, including the rise of China. In contrast, China was increasingly perceived
by the ROK as an economic opportunity and also a strategic partner for peninsular
affairs. Historically, the periods of conflict and instability on the Korean peninsula
and also in the region coincided with the periods of China’s descent. China’s rise
therefore should be welcomed and even encouraged. First, as the largest trading
partner of the ROK, China presented enormous economic opportunities.30 Second,
China was viewed as an alternative to the United States as strategic partner;
therefore the ROK–US alliance should not work as a stumbling block between the
26. Chung Min Lee, “Domestic Politics and Changing Contours of the ROK-U.S. Alliance: The End
of the Status Quo,” in Michael H. Armacost and Daniel I. Okimoto, eds., The Future of America’s
Alliances in Northeast Asia (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, July 2004), pp. 199–220.
27. The Pew Global Attitudes Project, What the World Thinks in 2002 (Washington, D.C.: The Pew
Research Center For The People & The Press, 2002), pp. 53–61.
28. A total of 395 experts were sampled for the survey. Kyu-jin Shim, “EAI jeonmoonga yeoron josa
gyeol-goa [EAI Survey Results of Expert Opinion],” Media daum (13 September 2006), at <http://
www.eai.or.kr/type_k/panelView.asp?bytag=n&catcode=1110161000&code=kor_eaiinmedia&idx
=6626> (searched date: 19 May 2013).
29. New York Times, “Excerpts From Pentagon’s Plan: ‘Prevent the Re-emergence of a New Rival’,”
New York Times (8 March 1992), p. A14.
30. China surpassed the United States as the largest trading partner of the ROK; Youkyung Lee, “AP
IMPACT: China Surpasses US as Top Global Trader,” Associated Press (3 December 2012), at
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/feedarticle/10554597> (searched date: 12 May 2013).
© 2015 Center for International Studies, Inha University
Alliance Adjustment in the Post-Cold War / 43
ROK and China.31 In the short run, China was expected to play the role of honest
arbitrator to broker a peaceful resolution to the North Korean nuclear crisis whilst
the United States was viewed as willing to escalate military conflicts on the Korean
peninsula over the nuclear issue.32 In the long run, China was expected to play a
more constructive role in the reunification of the two Koreas than the United States.
Uncertainties surrounding China’s rise present significant challenges to the ROK,
but as one China expert in Korea pointed out, “despite the formidable threats that
China may pose for Korea, no trace of concern for South Korea’s security [was]
evident in Seoul.”33 Some in the ROK remained skeptical of China and called for
strengthening the ROK–US alliance, but it seemed that the country as a whole was
drawn toward China in late 1990s and early 2000s, hence the term “China fever.”
In 2004, 55 percent of the newly elected members of the ROK’s National Assembly viewed China as the most important diplomatic partner of the country in the
future.34 Those who thought of China as an important strategic partner did not call
for immediate scrapping of the ROK–US alliance, but it was imperative that the
alliance should not work as a stumbling block toward building closer relations with
China. To the ruling elites within the Roh Moo-hyun government, the alliance was
no longer the centerpiece of the grand strategy of the country. Roh himself said,
“The power equation in Northeast Asia will change depending on the choices we
make . . . ROK could mediate in a war between the US and North.”35 Such rhetoric
deteriorated the already damaged relationship and estranged even those in the
United States who had been favorable to the alliance.36 The ROK was a “runaway
31. David C. Kang, “Between Balancing and Bandwagoning: South Korea’s Response to China,”
Journal of East Asian Studies, 9-1 (2009), pp. 1–28.
32. China kept a low profile toward the first Korean nuclear crisis, but had become more proactive
in brokering a peaceful settlement for the second crisis. It seemed that at least on the principle of
peaceful and diplomatic resolution to the nuclear crisis, the strategic interests of the ROK and China
were convergent.
33. Jae-ho Chung, “The Rise of China and Its Impact on South Korea’s Strategic Soul-Searching,”
in Korea Economic Institute, ed., The Newly Emerging Asian Order and the Korean Peninsula
(Washington, D.C.: Korea Economic Institute, 2005), pp. 1–12.
34. “Special Feature Series Part 1: Dangseonja eenyum-goa seonghyang [The Political Ideology and
Orientation of the Elected],” Donga ilbo (16 April 2004), at <http://news.donga.com/3//20040416/
8051641/1> (searched date: 13 May 2013).
35. Gi-Wook Shin, “Asianism in Korea’s Politics of Identity,” Inter-Asia Cultural Studies, 6-4
(2005), pp. 616–630; Choong Nam Kim, “The Roh Moo Hyun Government’s Policy toward North
Korea,” East-West Center Working Papers, 11 (August 2005), pp. 1–28.
36. For instance, see the column by Richard Allen. Richard Allen, “Seoul’s Choice: The U.S. or the
North,” The New York Times (16 January 2003), at <http://www.nytimes.com/2003/01/16/opinion/
seoul-s-choice-the-us-or-the-north.html> (searched date: 25 May 2013). The political situation in the
ROK was one reason the US opinion-makers called for withdrawal of USFK and dismantlement of
the alliance. See for instance, Jack Kelly, “Nuclear Saber-rattling and Reacting,” The Washington
Times (31 December 2002), at <http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2002/dec/31/20021231111425-2916r/> (searched date: 24 May 2013); Doug Bandow, “Time for a Korean Divorce,” CATO
Institute (8 January 2003), at <http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/time-korean-divorce>
(searched date: 24 May 2013).
© 2015 Center for International Studies, Inha University
44 / Pacific Focus
ally,” a country “governed increasingly in accordance with graduate-school ‘peace
studies’ desiderata.”37
Converging Perceptions Toward North Korea and China
As the 20th century was winding to a close, however, the ROK grew increasingly disenchanted with North Korea. A series of North Korean provocations
reinvigorated the perception that despite 10 years of Sunshine Policy, the nature of
North Korea’s threat had not changed and the North’s assertiveness and provocation in fact fed on the Sunshine Policy. Among many acts of the North’s provocations, the shelling of Yeonpyeong Island in 2010 subsequent to the sinking of the
Cheonan corvette was the most blatant military provocation against the ROK since
the signing of the ceasefire agreement in 1953, and was considered a virtual act of
war. North Korean provocations in 2010, which produced sizable casualties,
including two civilians, were surefire confirmation that the North’s threat to the
South’s security was still very real. In fact, in the ROK’s public opinion there is a
discernible pattern between the status of inter-Korean relations and the support for
the ROK–US alliance. When the ROK perceives growing threats from the North,
it demonstrates increasing support for the alliance. In contrast, inter-Korean rapprochement is accompanied by lackadaisical support for the alliance.38 As such, it
was “after North Korean provocations in 2009 and 2010” that the ROK “has
emerged as the most important Asian ally of the United States in the region.”39 This
is an indication that after all is said and done, the most important rationale for the
alliance to the ROK is still grounded in “security interests,” that is, to contain the
North.
As the tension between two Koreas escalated, the ROK also became increasingly disillusioned with China; “China option” as a viable “strategic alternative”
began to lose much of its appeal in the ROK’s public opinion. There are a number
37. Eberstadt likened the ROK to a “runaway ally,” see Nicholas Eberstadt, “Tear Down this
Tyranny: A Korea Strategy for Bush’s Second Term,” Weekly Standard (29 November 2004),
at <http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/004/951szxxd.asp?page=2>
(searched date: 25 May 2013).
38. The ROK’s threat perception toward the North was proportional to north provocations, which in
turn was proportional to the support for the alliance. This pattern culminated in the period immediately following the shelling of Yeonpyeong Island and was very much visible after the third nuclear
testing of the North in 2013; Han-wool Jeong and Won-chil Jeong, “Yeoron josa-reul tonghae-bon
2009 anbo wigi-wa kookmin yeoron [Public Opinion Survey on 2009 National Security Crisis and
Public Opinion],” EAI Opinion Review Series 200903-01 (March 2009), pp. 2–4, at <http://
www.eai.or.kr/data/bbs/kor_report/200905271494992.pdf> (searched date: 12 May 2013); NaeYoung Lee and Han-wool Jeong, “Fluctuating Anti-Americanism and the Korea-US Alliance,”
International Studies Review, 5-2 (October 2004), pp. 23–40. If North Korea wants to drive the
wedge between the United States and the ROK, provocations certainly have backfired by reinforcing
the ROK–US alliance.
39. Victor Cha and Ellen Kim, “US-Korea Relations: Death of Kim Jong Il,” Comparative Connections, 13-3 (January 2012), pp. 43–52.
© 2015 Center for International Studies, Inha University
Alliance Adjustment in the Post-Cold War / 45
of reasons that the ROK’s love affair with China turned out to be a short-lived fling.
They include the following:
Tariff disputes arising from Chinese flooding of South Korea garlic markets in 2000; China’s
controversial claim to the ancient Korean kingdom of Koguryo in 2004; Chinese violence during
the torch relay for the Beijing Olympic Games in 2008; Chinese fishermen’s illegal fishing and
the murder of a Korean coast guard in 2011; Chinese repatriation of North Korean defectors;
Potential disputes over Socotra Rock in 2012.40
But nothing was more damaging to Sino–ROK relations than North Korean
provocations and the seeming aversion of China to fault and contain them. China
was once expected to be an honest peace-broker in peninsular affairs, but the
ROK’s call for China to intervene and play a constructive role fell on deaf ears.
China’s failure to prevent and reprimand the North’s wrongdoings met a barrage
of criticism in the ROK and reinforced the ROK’s earlier concern that the North
and China are eventually “birds of a feather.” An EAI poll in 2013 suggests that
far from being an honest arbitrator, China is perceived to be unreasonably partial
to the North by the majority of Koreans.41 Hankook ilbo and a Millward Brown
poll suggest that the ROK’s perception of China deteriorated significantly after
the Cheonan and Yeonpyoung attacks.42 The majority of Koreans now tend to
think that China is not in support of unification and has territorial ambition
toward the Korean peninsula. Even after the successful summit meeting between
the ROK and China in June 2013, 83 percent of respondents viewed China as the
country most impeding the unification of Korea.43 An Asan Report released in
40. Suk-hee Han, “South Korea Seeks to Balance Relations with China and the United States,”
Council on Foreign Relations Report (November 2012), at <http://www.cfr.org/south-korea/southkorea-seeks-balance-relations-china-united-states/p29447> (searched date: 18 May 2013).
41. Sixty-two point one percent of respondents replied that China was more likely to support the
North if military confrontations broke out between the South and the North. See Han-wool Jeong,
“Anbo wigi-wa hankuk-in-eui anbo euisik [National Security Crisis and South Korean Public’s
Security Perceptions],” EAI Issue Briefing on Public Opinion, 132 (May 2013), at <http://
www.eai.or.kr/data/bbs/kor_report/201305241820168.pdf> (searched date: 15 May 2013). Sixty-five
point six percent replied that the ROK–US alliance needed to be strengthened. In cases of confrontations between the United States and China, 45.6% responded that the ROK should support the
United States. Only 3% responded that the ROK should support China.
42. Hyun-kyung Kang, “Half of Koreans Say China’s Image Deteriorated,” The Korean Times
(31 December 2010), at <http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2013/02/113_78942.html>
(searched date: 12 May 2013).
43. Nae-young Lee and Han-wool Jeong, “The Impact of North Korea’s Artillery Strike on Public
Opinion in South Korea,” EAI Issue Briefing on Public Opinion (December 2010), at <http://
www.eai.or.kr/data/bbs/eng_report/201101281811046.pdf> (searched date: 15 May 2013). Sixty-five
point six percent replied that the alliance should be strengthened in a poll conducted after the third
North Korean nuclear testing; Han-wool Jeong, op. cit. Hansun Foundation Survey Center, “Park
Geun-hye daetongryung bang-joong gwan-ryun jeonmoonga yeoron josa [Survey of Expert Opinion
on President Park Geun-hye’s Visit to China],” Hansun Foundation (1 July 2013), at <http://
www.hansun.org/board/seminar_view.php?b_idx=7767> (searched date: 22 July 2013).
© 2015 Center for International Studies, Inha University
46 / Pacific Focus
Figure 1. Favorability shifts towards the neighboring four powers (mean
value)
Favorability Rating : 0–100 pts (median 50 pts)
US
China
N. Korea
80
71
70
60
50
67
58
58
46
58
57
49
61
61
50
49
49
51
53
41
40
30
32
32
August 2011
April 2013
20
July 2004
July 2006
February 2008
January 2010
Source: EAI·CCGA Global Views (July 2004; July 2006; February 2008), EAI·Hankook Research Regular
Survey (January 2010), EAI·ARI Survey on S. Korean–Chinese Public Perception (August 2011),
2013 Survey on Public Perception of Politics and Security (April 2013).
July 2014 after President Xi’s high-profile visit to the ROK also indicates that
many Koreans still harbor such reservations despite a series of charm-offensives
launched by the Chinese leader.44 Deterioration of the ROK’s perception toward
China coincided with improved US standing and increased support for the
ROK–US alliance. After experiencing a series of North Korean provocations
beginning with the first nuclear test in 2006, the ROK’s public opinion has
increasingly turned back to China in favor of the United States. The shift in such
public perception played out as a backdrop against which the Lee Myoung-bak
government was able to mend fences with the United States and reinvigorate the
alliance (Fig. 1).
The ROK’s maintaining a constructive Sino–ROK relationship is a strategic
necessity. The ROK is cognizant of China’s growing importance to the nation’s
security as well as economic interests, and thus has taken steps to upgrade the
Sino–ROK relationship to that of strategic partnership over the years. But at the
same time, the ROK has become increasingly wary that “China’s rise will be a
source of instability.” In addition to North Korean security threats, “South Koreans
rank the issues of China’s continued rise, China’s military modernization, and
44. See Asan Report on South Korean Attitudes on China (3 July 2014), at <http://en.asaninst.org/
south-korean-attitudes-on-china/> (searched date: 28 July 2014).
© 2015 Center for International Studies, Inha University
Alliance Adjustment in the Post-Cold War / 47
South Korea’s increasing dependency on China’s economy high on the list of
potential security threats to South Korea.”45 As long as the ROK perceives China
as more of a threat than an opportunity, Korean public opinion will remain positive
toward the ROK–US alliance. The ROK’s threat perception of China works to the
advantage of the alliance and is welcome to the United States, which has long
decided to contain China’s rise to regional hegemon.
The ROK–US alliance is of added importance to the US strategy in the context
of hedging against China’s rise. Japan has already placed all its bets on the
US–Japan alliance in the region’s geopolitical chess game, but the ROK may hold
the casting vote.46 In purely military sense, the US–Japan alliance may be more
significant to the United States than the ROK–US alliance. However, as former US
Secretary of Defense William Perry suggests, in light of strategic value, no other
Asian alliances are more important to the United States than the ROK–US alliance.47 In a similar vein, Kissinger emphasizes the importance of continued US
troop presence in the Korean peninsula regardless of how Korea’s future pans
out.48 Bush said of the potential of the ROK–US alliance: “It’s going to be very
important [that] a 21st century alliance recognizes that China is an opportunity for
both nations to engage in a constructive way.”49 In the absence of US military
commitments in the region, the ROK may well be dragged into China’s sphere of
influence.50 The alliance is a means to keeping the ROK on the US side and to
preventing the ROK from drifting toward China.51
45. Jung-Nam Lee, “Faltering Korea–China Relations with the Emergence of the G2 Era,” EAI Asia
Security Initiative Working Paper (October 2012), pp. 1–35.
46. Condoleeza Rice, “Campaign 2000: Promoting the National Interest,” Foreign Affairs, 79-1
(January/February 2000); Larry Wortzel, “Planning for the Future: The Role of US Forces in
Northeast Asia,” The Heritage Foundation Backgrounder 1388 (July 2000), at <http://www.heritage
.org/research/reports/2000/07/the-role-of-us-forces-in-northeast-asian security> (searched date: 10
May 2013); Zalmay Khalilzad, David T. Orletsky, Jonathan D. Pollack, Kevin L. Pollpeter, Angel
Rabasa, David A. Shlapak, Abram N. Shulsky, Ashley J. Tellis, The United States and Asia: Toward
a New U.S. Strategy and Force Posture (Santa Monica: RAND, MR-1315-AF, 2001).
47. William Perry, “Comprehensive Remarks,” in Yoichi Funabashi, ed., Alliance Tomorrow: Security Arrangements after the Cold War (Tokyo: Tokyo Foundation, 2001), pp. 295–298.
48. Henry Kissinger, “A Road through Seoul,” The Washington Post (6 March 2001).
49. Remark made at news conference after 2008 April summit meeting between the ROK and
the United States; CFR, “President Bush Participates in Joint Press Availability with President
Lee Myung-Bak of the Republic of Korea,” Council on Foreign Relations (19 April 2008), at
<http://www.cfr.org/trade/president-bush-participates-joint-press-availability-president-lee-myung
-bak-republic-korea-april-2008/p16068> (searched date: 23 May 2013).
50. See for example, Zbigniew Brzezinski, Strategic Vision: America and the Crisis of Global Power
(New York: Basic Books, 2012); Scott Snyder, “Sino-Korean Relations and the Future of the
US-ROK Alliance,” NBR Analysis, 14-1 (2003), pp. 51–72.
51. The Korea–US FTA and the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) are also meant to prevent Korea and
other Asian countries from drifting toward China’s sphere of influence. The US military presence in
a unified Korea is needed for this purpose.
© 2015 Center for International Studies, Inha University
48 / Pacific Focus
Importance of Strategic Perceptions in the Era of Global Alliance
Global Interests and Global Alliance
It is a common threat perception that generally gives rise to an alliance, but once
an alliance is formed it can endure for a number of different reasons.52 Over the
years, alliance partners may develop a set of new converging interests that they find
it convenient to pursue through the existing alliance mechanism. As Morgenthau
points out, “whether and for how long [an alliance] will be operative depends upon
the strength of the interests underlying it as over against the strength of the other
interests of the nations concerned.”53 Viewed from this rationalist perspective, the
ROK–US alliance has weathered out post-Cold War adversity because the benefits
still far outweigh the costs.54 Both the ROK and the United States agreed that the
alliance should morph into a comprehensive, value-based, global partnership
because both countries share vested interests in doing so.55 In fact, the global
strategic outlook of the two countries in the 21st century is largely compatible; the
ROK’s pursuit of “Global Korea” and the “Defense, Diplomacy, and Development
(3D)” initiative of the United States are of mutual benefit.56 The US strategy to
maintain preponderance of global influence through network and smart power
requires a like-minded partner like the ROK, as the ROK can improve international
standing through the US-led global governance. Korea’s soft power engagements
will augment the US global leadership, as the United States will be of indispensable assistance to the ROK’s policy to promote soft power.57 As an important
middle power country in the world, the ROK’s national interests are not limited to
Northeast Asia, and in recent years the ROK and the United States have been
reliable partners on the global stage. When others are toying with the “Beijing
model” in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, Korea was quick to recover
and trumpeted “the virtues of an open market economic model” of the United
52. Stephen M. Walt, op. cit., pp. 156–179.
53. Hans Morgenthau, Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace (New York:
Alfred A. Knopf, 1973), p. 185.
54. For this rationalist view of alliance persistence, see Ole R. Holsti, P. Terrence Hopmann and John
D. Sullivan, Unity and Disintegration in International Alliances: Comparative Studies (New York:
John Wiley & Sons, 1973), p. 4.
55. See the Joint Fact Sheet: The United States-Republic of Korea Alliance: A Global Partnership
(April 2014), at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/04/25/joint-fact-sheet-unitedstates-republic-korea-alliance-global-partnershi> (searched date: 2 December 2014).
56. Hillary Rodham Clinton, “Leading Through Civilian Power: Redefining American Diplomacy
and Development,” Foreign Affairs, 89-6 (2010), pp. 13–24. The 3D strategy as a new vision for
rethinking security is also detailed in the 2006 National Security Strategy of the United States.
57. Kurt M. Campbell, Victor D. Cha, Linsey Ford, Narav Patel, Randy Schriver and Vikram J.
Singh, Going Global: The Future of the U.S.-South Korea Alliance (Washington, D.C.: Center for a
New American Security, February 2009), p. 71.
© 2015 Center for International Studies, Inha University
Alliance Adjustment in the Post-Cold War / 49
States.58 When the traditional Western allies of the United States balked at the US
War on Terror, the ROK committed its military in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Lebanon.
As the first country in history to go from donee to donor of foreign aid, the ROK
is a showcase for the US aid and development policy. For a number of reasons, the
ROK has emerged as an attractive alliance partner to the United States in Asia.59
The support of the United States likewise has been instrumental for the ROK to
host the fifth G-20 summit in 2010 and the second Nuclear Security Summit in
2012. Aside from the mutual benefits that both countries can reap, there are many
more compelling reasons as to why the ROK–US alliance should be sustained.
Above all, the precarious balance of power in the region may break down in the
absence of US commitment in Korea. Even China is cognizant of the nature of the
alliance as a regional public good.
Political leadership in both countries was also important in resuscitating the
alliance. It is true that the alliance was never on the brink of disbanding during the
presidencies of Roh and Bush. After all, it was the presidential meeting between
Roh and Bush in 2005 in Gyeongju wherein both countries agreed on upgrading
the alliance to a comprehensive and strategic one. Roh acceded to a number of
important US policy initiatives, including flexibility of USFK and relocation of
military bases, and initiated the ROK–US free-trade agreement (FTA) deal at the
expense of his own domestic political capital. But it is no secret that the “ideological mismatch” between the two presidents and unwanted rhetoric from them
had been sources of stress in the alliance relationship.60 The personal chemistry
between Presidents Lee Myung-bak and Barack Obama has also been instrumental
in rejuvenating the alliance relationship; their relationship was unusually amicable
to the extent that the New York Times described it as a “man-crush.”61
Values, Perceptions, and 21st-Century Alliance
Aside from converging interests, sharing similar values and identities has
increasingly become an integral part of the alliance partnership in the modern era.
Alliance in the modern era is in flux. Traditionally, alliance was defined as “latent
war community” to use military means to cope with manifest threats that are
common to alliance partners. Alliances in the 18th and 19th centuries were formed
for solely anti-hegemonic and “balance of power” purposes, which explains the
transient nature of those alliances. In contrast, values and identities as well as
58. Victor Cha, “What’s Next for The U.S.–Korea Alliance,” Hearing before the Subcommittee on
Asia and the Pacific of the Committee on Foreign Affairs House of Representatives, 112th Congress
2nd session (Washington, D.C.: US GPO, 6 June 2012).
59. Kurt M. Campbell, Victor D. Cha, Linsey Ford, Narav Patel, Randy Schriver and Vikram J.
Singh, op. cit., p. 36.
60. Michael H. Armacost, op. cit., pp. 11–24.
61. Mark Landler, “S. Korean State Visit Highlights Bond between 2 Leaders,” New York Times
(12 October 2011), at <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/13/world/asia/south-korean-state-visit
-highlights-bond-between-obama-and-lee-myung-bak.html?_r=0> (searched date: 12 May 2013).
© 2015 Center for International Studies, Inha University
50 / Pacific Focus
“balance of power” had been the underlying forces for establishment and unity of
the US Cold War alliances. Values and identities account for resilience of the US
Cold War alliances in the post-Cold War era. The United States is transforming its
hitherto “threat-based” military into a “capability-based” one that is prepared to
deal with amorphous and ubiquitous threats of the 21st century.62 The US alliance
therefore intends to cope with uncertainties and contingencies rather than manifest
threats of fixed enemies.63 Under such a strategic environment, birds of a feather do
tend to flock together. Since trust proves to be an integral part of such a partnership,
values and identities weigh in more heavily in modern day alliances.
Accordingly, the scope of alliance cooperation in the new century has become
much broader than in the Cold War era. The 21st-century ROK–US alliance is
tasked with such comprehensive missions that dwarf those of the ROK–US alliance during the Cold War era. Recent publications and researches all call for
expanding cooperation between the two countries under the framework of 21st
century comprehensive alliance to such areas as official development assistance,
anti-terrorism and piracy, and green energy, to name a few.64 Integration of such
missions is deemed central to sustaining the alliance in the new century. As Snyder
pointed out, “the true benefits of a comprehensive alliance for South Korea” may
be “political – not military.”65 There is no denying the importance of expanding the
scope of alliance in both geographic and issue areas. As many suggest, if the
alliance is to be revitalized, common values and strategic interests, rather than
common threats, should be the basis of rationalizing the renewed raison d’etre of
the alliance.66 But at the same time, it is also questionable whether the alliance
could be sustained with common values and global strategic interests alone in the
absence of convergent strategic perceptions toward North Korea and China. Integration of global missions may well be a necessary condition for the alliance to
endure, but it may not be a sufficient one. We have witnessed how the alliance had
strained when the perceptions of the two countries diverged toward the North and
China. These threat perceptions may well change in the future, in which case
values and other strategic interests may prove insufficient to hold the alliance
together. In order for the ROK–US alliance to have continuing viability in the 21st
century, it is very important for the two countries to stay on the same page in their
perceptions and policies toward the North and China.
62. See the US Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review (Washington, D.C.: US
Department of Defense, 2001).
63. Jae Jeok Park, “The US-led Alliances in the Asia-Pacific: Hedge against Potential Threats or an
Undesirable Multilateral Security Order?” The Pacific Review, 24-2 (2011), pp. 137–158.
64. For instance, see Kurt M. Campbell, et al., op. cit., p. 71; Scott Snyder, Pursuing a Comprehensive Vision for the U.S.-South Korea Alliance (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, April 2009).
65. Ibid.
66. For instance, Kurt M. Campbell, Victor D. Cha, Linsey Ford, Narav Patel, Randy Schriver and
Vikram J. Singh, op. cit., pp. 7–32.
© 2015 Center for International Studies, Inha University
Alliance Adjustment in the Post-Cold War / 51
China Quandary
The China factor will continuously play out as a tough test for the alliance in
coming years. The ROK is located in such a geopolitical position that proactive
diplomatic partnership with China as well the United States is a strategic must.
Extending the relationship with China while reinvigorating the alliance with the
United States is much easier said than done. In principle, China opposes foreign
troop presence in a sovereign nation, and hence grudgingly condones the US troop
presence in the ROK. China, however, thinks that it is in their long-term interest to
reduce US influence in Korea and expand its own influence. Circumstantial evidence before and after Xi’s much-celebrated visit to Korea in 2014 suggests that
China thinks in the long run it is possible for Korea to be absorbed into its sphere
of influence.67 China once identified the alliance as a regional threat, a relic of the
Cold War and a stumbling block in the way of a proactive Sino–ROK relationship.
A spokesman of China’s foreign ministry reportedly made the comment that “the
US Korea alliance is a historic relic. The times have changed and Northeast Asian
countries are going through many changes and transformations. We should not
approach current security issues with military alliances left over from the past Cold
War era.”68 As China is envisioning a new security concept for Asia, it will certainly
stay alert to the nature and missions of the evolving ROK–US alliance.69
The ROK is the 12th largest economy and has the sixth largest military in the
world. It has grown to an influential middle power on the global stage, but in terms
of regional geopolitical metrics, it still is a diplomatic lightweight. By and large,
the US–China relation sets the context in which the ROK must make strategic
choices.70 Escalation in the Sino–US rivalry can place the ROK in a very precarious strategic position. If the United States does “too much” and if the US policy
becomes outright balancing against China, the ROK might face the dilemma of
choosing a side.71 The ROK likewise would be tempted to jump on China’s
bandwagon, if the US does “too little” in Asia and if the United States’ “offshore
balancing” strategy encourages Japan’s penchant for practicing “creative” history.
If the offshore balancing strategy of the United States relies too much on Japan’s
67. Denny Roy, “China and the Korean Peninsula: Beijing’s Pyongyang Problem and Seoul Hope,”
Asia Pacific Security Studies, 3-1 (January 2004), at <http://www.apcss.org/Publications/APSSS/
ChinaandtheKoreanPeninsula.pdf> (searched date: 15 May 2013).
68. Michael Ha, “Chinese Official Calls Korea-US Alliance ‘Historical Relic’,” Korea Times
(28 May 2008), at <http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2011/04/116_24932.html>
(searched date: 22 May 2013).
69. China’s President Xi proposed at the fourth summit of the Conference on Interaction and
Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA) a new concept of Asian security in May 2014.
70. Scott Snyder, op. cit., pp. 51–72.
71. Recent controversy in the ROK over the pros and cons of participating in the Asian Infrastructure
Investment Bank and the Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense will prove to be two of many tough
choices that the ROK will have to make in the years to come. There is a danger in US policy of doing
both too much and too little. Zbigniew Brzezinski, op. cit.
© 2015 Center for International Studies, Inha University
52 / Pacific Focus
move to a “normal” state, the American presence in East Asia and also the
ROK–US alliance may cease to function as public goods that have discouraged an
arms race in the region. If the US influence in the region dwindles and China
emerges as a benign alternative to the United States, the ROK with other neighbors
of China may well bandwagon on China. As Scheweller observes, bandwagoning
is quite common in world politics. If the United States loses its preponderance of
power and influence, the rest can jump on the China bandwagon and gravitate
toward the “wave of the future . . . when the status-quo order starts to unravel,” it
is the time when “bandwagons roll” and states pile onto the new hegemon.72 When
the bipolar international order of the Cold War came to an end, most states in the
system decided to stay on the US bandwagon because the US unipolar world is
based on rules rather than coercion.73 The future hegemonic struggle will all come
down to the matter of who will build a regional order that is more appealing to the
member states in the region. It is critical for the United States to be able to project
its influence through hard power, but at the same time it is equally important, if not
more, to prevail in its competition against China to win the hearts and minds.
Conclusion
The ROK–US alliance endured hardship following the disintegration of the Cold
War order, but was able to adjust to new strategic environments of the post-Cold
War era. Political leadership in both countries has contributed in no small part to
cultivating the moods to find the common grounds for rejuvenating the alliance.
The alliance has assumed a new identity and has been upgraded as a value-based,
global partnership because both countries have substantial interests in doing so.
The uncertain nature of the 21st-century security environment compels the alliance
to expand the scope of tasks in both issue and geographic areas. Nevertheless, it
was after the perceptions of the ROK and the United States began to converge on
North Korea and China that they were able to agree on the rationales for global
alliance. This does not mean that the two countries do not share significant interests
in expanding the scope of the alliance. The ROK can certainly further its national
interests by participating in and contributing to global governance; partnership
with the United States is instrumental to the ROK’s policy of “Global Korea.” As
the sole superpower constrained by domestic economic woes, the United States is
in desperate need of trustworthy alliance partners to share the burden of maintaining the international order to its liking. Convergence of such interests has contributed to the successful metamorphosis of the alliance to a significant extent. But it
72. Balancing does not predominate as Walt has claimed; Randall L. Schweller, “Bandwagoning for
Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In,” International Security, 19-1 (1994), pp. 96,107.
73. G. John Ikenberry, Liberal Order and Imperial Ambition: Essays on American Power and
International Order (Cambridge: Polity, 2006). To the contrary, realists claim that anti-US balancing
did not take place because of difficulty in organizing collective action and high transaction cost. See
Stephen M. Walt, “Alliances in a Unipolar World,” World Politics, 61-1 (2009), pp. 86–120.
© 2015 Center for International Studies, Inha University
Alliance Adjustment in the Post-Cold War / 53
seems the convergence of strategic perceptions toward North Korea and China had
been indispensable to reinvigorating the alliance. If this observation is valid, it
raises an important question concerning the durability of alliance in the absence of
shared perceptions toward North Korea and China. If the perceptions concerning
North Korea and (or) China diverge once again, the alliance may well begin to fray.
The health and longevity of the alliance will therefore depend on the way North
Korean problems and China’s rise unfold in the future and the way the alliance
deals with them.
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