Survey
* Your assessment is very important for improving the workof artificial intelligence, which forms the content of this project
* Your assessment is very important for improving the workof artificial intelligence, which forms the content of this project
We’re Working on It Krogh Seminar Working Paper, Draft 2 Trellace Lawrimore and Reno Varghese Abstract Do small foreign aid donors trade money for political power in international organizations? Large donors, like the United States, famously distribute aid for strategic gain, but scholars often assume that small donors follow more humanitarian motives. Focusing on Australia, this study quantitatively examines how a country’s desire for power in international institutions compels it to give aid to countries that provide it political support. Specifically, we consider countries that elect Australia to the Executive Boards of the Bretton Woods Institutions—the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. Using aid data from 1960 to 2009 and 186 countries, we test whether Australia rewards member of its voting bloc with more foreign aid. Regression analyses controlling for other aid motivations as well as country fixed-effects confirm the hypothesis. We find that Australia, which has historically controlled powerful Executive Directorships at the IMF and World Bank, attempts to signal a seemingly subdued approach to international relations while quietly cultivating power in major financial institutions. I. Introduction Boasting a program that “save[s] lives [and] promote[s] opportunities for all,” the Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID) prides itself on its humanitarian aid practices (AusAID 2012). Large donors famously distribute aid for political gain, but scholars often assume that small donors, like Australia, follow more humanitarian motives (Hoadley 1980, Sielaff and Skillman 2014). Yet, small donors do 2 have strategic goals, and may use aid as a part of their foreign policy toolkits.1 Focusing on Australia, our study quantitatively examines how a country’s desire for power in international institutions compels it to give aid to countries that provide it political support. We assert that Australia in particular achieves regional hegemonic status in the Bretton Woods Institutions (BWI)—the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank—through its strategic aid disbursal. Existing scholarly research has not reached a consensus on Australia’s foreign aid policy. Some find that trade is the primary motivation (Alesina and Dollar 2000, Bermeo 2012, Berthelemy 2006, Berthelemy and Tichit 2004); others argue the importance of colonial legacies and regional ties (Alesina and Dollar 2000, Isopi and Mattesini 2008, Neumayer 2003). Some even propose strictly selfish motives, whereby Australia benefits directly from distributing food aid or technical assistance (Davis 2009; Dollery, Fleming, and Heinecke 2008; Easterly and Williamson 2011). Still others suggest that Australia’s aid disbursal does not reflect political motivations (Gounder 1995, Gounder 1999, Gounder and Sen 1999, McCawley 2009). These dissonant (and in some cases, mutually exclusive) opinions make it difficult to comprehend Australia’s foreign aid policy. We therefore attempt to construct a more comprehensive story of Australian foreign aid. Using aid data from 1960-2009, we analyze variables that support either the Recipient Need (RN) model or the Donor Interest (DI) model. 2 We first rebuff the credibility of the RN model, and then turn to Australia’s DI aid, addressing possible strategic motivations: colonial legacy, regional ties, and bilateral trade. Importantly, we 1 We credit Secretary Madeleine Albright for the imagery of a foreign policy toolbox. Note to ourselves and the particularly prudent Krogh students: This is actually from a book that Vreeland cites in his UNSC book. We’re dealing with it later. 2 We credit this definition of models to McKinlay and Little, 1977. 3 introduce an innovative measure of Australia’s foreign policy interests: membership in Australia’s BWI blocs. Recent foreign aid literature suggests a relationship between BWI voting blocs and foreign aid distribution. Vreeland, the first to use the BWI indicator as such, discusses the flow of bilateral aid from Switzerland to countries in its BWI voting bloc (Vreeland 2011). Mazumder and Vreeland then contest the claim “that middle-power countries like Canada do not disburse foreign aid according to strategic foreign policy objectives” through an analysis of Canadian aid disbursal to countries in its BWI blocs (Mazumder and Vreeland 2013). Peter Carroll specifically addresses Australia’s historical relationship with the IMF. After his extensive analysis of Australia’s IMF bloc dynamics, he ponders, “It would be interesting to see if the membership in the IMF by the other small island state members of the constituency was stimulated not only by Australian diplomatic efforts but by increases in development aid, though there is no evidence to support or reject the case of which the author is yet aware” (Carroll 2011: 11). Our research directly addresses Carroll’s question, and proceeds as follows. In the first section, we synthesize Australia’s history in the BWIs. We then explain AusAID’s foreign aid policy, and expound on the existing research regarding Australian foreign aid. We proceed by dividing our methodology section into three categories: descriptive statistics, control variables, and regression results. We conclude with implications and a discussion of Australia’s future in the BWIs. 4 II. Australia and the Bretton Woods Institutions In the years post-World War II, Australia was among the almost 50 countries that congregated in an array of newly founded international organizations. Two of these organizations were the BWIs, which Australia joined in 1947. Yet despite this long history in global governance, Australia is absent from international power politics today. With its relatively small economy (Australia ranks behind Los Angeles, USA, in a 2009 World Bank analysis of top world economies. And in terms of GDP PPP, Australia falls behind Mexico, Indonesia, Turkey, and Iran.), Australia lacks the clout of G8,3 G8+5, and BRICS members (World Bank 2009). In spite of this, Australia consistently exercises power the BWI Executive Boards. Eight governments, or “great powers” in the BWIs—the United States, Japan, Germany, France, the United Kingdom, China, Saudi Arabia, and Russia (in order of vote-share)— have country-specific directors (Vreeland 2011). The other 180 BWI members choose the remaining 16 (IMF) and 17 (World Bank) directors by forming blocs, usually aligned by geographical region or colonial legacy. Since 1960, Australia has served on one of the BWI Executive Boards all but two years. Today, Australia’s bloc includes Kiribati, Korea, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Mongolia, New Zealand, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Seychelles, Solomon Islands, Tuvalu, Uzbekistan, and Vanuatu. Executive Directors have considerable power.4 BWI Directors have the final say the organizations’ most critical decisions: lending, hiring, and evaluations of membercountries’ economic policies. Furthermore, the position accompanies a status of prestige 3 At the time of publication, a more accurate description of the G8 is the G7+1 suspended member. Certainly, the BWI Executive Boards are no Security Council, on which Australia rarely serves (Langmore 2013). 4 5 and access to private information in board meetings (Vreeland 2011). When considering Australia’s relatively minor role in the global economy, such authority over international economic policy seems even more impressive. But how does Australia convince these small countries to continue electing it to the Executive Board? Ostensibly, Executive Directors serve as representatives for all of their bloc members. But surely, Vanuatu, say, does not rely on Australia and only Australia to deliver its wants and needs to the Executive Board. If relationships of mutual understanding alone determined IMF blocs, it is unlikely that Mongolia or Vietnam would choose to elect Australia to the Board. Australia, in fact, sits in a tenuous place in the IMF. In 2012, Australia’s voting bloc had a voting power share of 4.94 percent, 2.68 percent of which was from Korea and Australia alone (IMF 2012). Moreover, Australia’s Pacific neighbors have some of the lowest quotas in the IMF, leaving Australia with minimal voting capacity (Rapkin and Strand 2005). In fact, the smallest vote-share holder in the IMF—Tuvalu—is in Australia’s bloc (IMF 2012). Although an independent share of 1.31 percent keeps Australia out of the lowest echelon of the quota hierarchy, it holds little gravitas compared to the powerhouse single-country voters like the United States (17.46 percent), or the United Kingdom and France (both at 5.05 percent).5 Consequently, without the electoral support of its bloc members, Australia would lose its most authoritative position in global governance. Thus, it is willing to pay for their support with increased amounts of foreign aid. We will be inserting a paragraph here about New Zealand and Korea. 5 In their research, Rapkin and Strand discuss more appropriate ways to calculate and define the IMF quotas. 6 III. Determining Australian Foreign Aid The Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID) makes a bold proclamation in its 2012-13 Annual Report: “The fundamental purpose of the Australian aid program is to help people overcome poverty. This also serves Australia’s national interests by promoting stability and prosperity both in our region and beyond” (AusAID 2013). The 2011 Partnership Framework between AusAID and the World Bank epitomizes the agency’s lofty goals, as both parties claim to share the objective of having the “most effective aid program possible” (AusAID 2012). Defending the effectiveness of its program, AusAID declares that its regional focus is the best use of its aid budget, because “two-thirds of the world’s poor live in the Asian Pacific” (AusAID 2012). McCawley of Sydney’s Lowy Institute of Public also asserts that “long-term mass poverty in the third world” is an international emergency in the context of Asia (McCawley 2009). But AusAID’s unsubstantiated claim of regional poverty ignores an important caveat: 46 percent of the world’s poor do live in the Asian Pacific—in India and China, where Australia allocates almost no foreign aid (World Bank 2010). AusAID’s questionable position on the economic status of its aid recipients (AusAID 2012), alongside reports that its aid methods may be ineffective and corrupt (Davis 2009; Dollery, Fleming, and Heinecke 2008), surely challenges the RN model of Australian foreign aid. Easterly and Williamson find that Australia is one of the “largest donors of food aid,” an often tied aid practice in which “higher income countries. . .shed their excess agricultural products without any concern for the local agricultural markets 7 in the receiving country.” In addition to food aid, more than 30 percent of Australia’s foreign aid is technical assistance, which “must be used to hire consultants from the donor country” (Easterly and Williamson 2011). Moreover, when the aid program faced dramatic bureaucratic changes in 2013, it did so at the cost of aid effectiveness. ActionAid Australia noted its concerns after the government announced in September 2013 that AusAID would merge with the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT). “The government’s short sighted decision to integrate AusAID into DFAT will have massive and devastating effects on Australia’s aid program and on the people living in poverty that the program supports. With AusAID reporting to DFAT, we will inevitably see the aid budget used to promote Australia’s national interests first and foremost. Aid programs that don’t contribute to Australia’s interests will be the first to go, and we are extremely concerned about what this will mean for the most marginalised communities in some of the world’s poorest countries. The message Tony Abbott is sending to the world’s poor is that Australia is no longer committed to ending poverty.” (SBS 2013). The merger lends an obvious answer to the question of Australian foreign aid. Australia funds its trade partners. Since Australia’s natural trade partners are in the developing world, its economy will surely benefit if these partners have more money to spend on its imports. Alesina and Dollar’s findings support this view. They report that Australia gives about twice as much aid to open rather than closed economies, rewarding good economic policy (Alesina and Dollar 2000). Foreign aid analysis has historically found that countries give to their trade partners, and Australia is no exception to this theme6 (Bermeo 2012, Berthelemy 2006, Berthelemy and Tichit 2004). Yet, many of Australia’s trade partners are also its neighbors in the Asian Pacific. Perhaps, as Neumayer suggests, Australia merely attempts to exert a sphere of influence The trend continues today. Australia has recently affirmed that its “highest regional trade negotiation priority is the conclusion of the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement” (TPP) (DFAT 2012b). 6 8 by concentrating its aid in the Asian Pacific (Neumayer 2003).7 Neumayer defines this idea as regional bias. Or, considering that many countries in Australia’s region also share its colonial ties, maybe Australia bases its foreign aid policy on colonial history. Alesina and Dollar find that 55.5 percent of Australia’s aid goes to its former colonies, while Isopi and Mattesini find a statistically significant relationship between colonial status and aid received (Isopi and Mattesini 2008). As the introduction discusses, few scholars have considered how Australia’s desire for power in the BWIs influences its foreign aid distribution. Yet Carroll’s 2011 research prompts us to explore a new hypothesis regarding Australian foreign aid: Australia buys its power in the Bretton Woods Institutions by exchanging foreign aid for membership in its voting blocs. IV. Methods A. Descriptive Data We test whether members of Australia’s BWI bloc receive more foreign aid than other countries when controlling for regional status, colonial past, and bilateral trade with Australia. We analyze a time-series cross-sectional dataset of the Official Development Assistance (ODA) that Australia provides to countries. The dataset comes from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and its Development Assistance Committee (DAC). It includes annual observations from 1960 to 2009 for 186 countries. The dataset consists of 9,078 country-year observations, and out of these country-year observations, Australia provides aid in 3,070 of them. Hugo Dobson also discusses Australia’s motivations for regionalism, but in terms of G20 involvement (Dobson 2011). 7 9 We generate a dichotomous indicator for membership in Australia’s BWI bloc, our main independent variable. The indicator is coded 1 for years when a country is a part of the Australian bloc and coded 0 otherwise. The country-years where the indicator is 1 are: South Africa (1960-1974), New Zealand (1963-2009), Philippines (1975-2009), South Korea (1979-2009), Vietnam (1960-1966), Papua New Guinea (1977-2009), Lesotho (1969-1972), Western Samoa (1973-2009), Marshall Islands (1993-2009), Swaziland (1971-1974), Mongolia (1993-2009), the Federal State of Micronesia (19952009), Seychelles (1979-2009), Solomon Islands (1979-2009), Vanuatu (1983-2009), Palau (1996-2009), Kiribati (1987-2009), Cambodia (1995-2009).8 Excluding Korea and New Zealand, the two developed countries that have served as Executive Directors and rotated the Alternate Directorship, Seychelles has the highest per capita GDP in the Australian bloc countries at $13,684 (Constant 2013 USD). Australia provides its bloc members approximately 48 percent of its aid budget. Considering that the population of these countries is less than 4 percent of the world’s population, this is a high amount of aid earmarked for solely Australian bloc countries. However, other factors, such as regional status and bilateral may confound this apparent relationship. As a result, we begin a rigorous analysis of this perceived relationship. 8 Tuvalu and Uzbekistan joined the bloc in 2011, but our dataset only has data until 2009. 10 B. Control Variables Our control variables include GDP per capita and population. Not only has previous literature asserted these as important factors in determining foreign aid, they also test for the recipient need model. Additionally, we capture the traditional explanations for receiving Australian foreign aid by controlling for a past colonial legacy with Australia, as well as Britain, regional status, and bilateral trade with Australia. We predict that poor countries that have historically strong trade relations with Australia will receive more aid, particularly if they have an Australian or British colonial past. In addition, we control for Australia’s Executive Director status to determine whether holding the position affects foreign aid distribution. We include a dichotomous indicator 1 for years when Australia is Executive Director of both institutions, and 0 otherwise. 11 Years for which the indicator was 0 are: 1971-1976, 1981, 1982, 1987-1990, 1995-1999, 2004-2007, and 2010. We expect that when Australia holds the Executive Director seat in the BWI, more aid is dispersed to members of their bloc because of promises made in the election period. Bilateral trade data is from the dyadic dataset used in the Correlates of War project. The dataset measures trade flows between states from 1870-2009 and contains national export and import data for all countries. Countries in Australia’s region include: East Timor, Papua New Guinea, Western Samoa, Marshall Islands, the Federal State of Micronesia, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Vanuatu, Palau, Tonga, New Zealand, Kiribati, Tuvalu, Fiji, and Nauru. This variable is time-invariant and always coded 1 for these countries, and 0 otherwise. We expect a positive and statistically significant correlation between the controls and Australian foreign aid after we place an Ordinary Least Squares regression (OLS) on the data. However, we wish to know if the BWI bloc indicator will remain statistically significant with rigorous controls. Finally, we apply a year-fixed effects model to our regression analysis to address possible endogeneity. We do consider controlling for country-fixed effects, but since there are minimal changes in other variables of interest including the BWI bloc dichotomous indicator, it is not possible to include them. As a result, we control for region fixed effects in lieu of controlling for country fixed effects. While these measures should capture unobserved endogenity between both years and regions, in lieu of countries, we keep their possible effects in mind. 12 C. Regression Results The regression results support our hypothesis. Australian bloc status has a statistically significant effect on foreign aid distribution to countries. The coefficient of Australian bloc status is positive and statistically significant at the 0.01 level in all models including those with all control variables. Table 1 displays descriptive statistics and data sources. 13 TABLE 1: Descriptive Statistics Variable Stata Name Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Measure Source Australian ODA aussieaid 9,080 7.2 53.5 -1.06 1260.23 constant 2010 USD, millions OECD Binary IMF & WBG Annual Reports Count World Development Indicators 2012(WDI) Membership in Australia's Bloc Population GDP per capita Bilateral Trade Membership in Asian Pacific aussieBWI population 9,080 9,077 0.04 34,700,0 00 0.2 142,000,0 00 0 6,104 1 1,340,00 0,0000 constant 2010 gdppercapita totalflow 7,122 3006 4868 55 61375 USD, thousand WDI 2012 constant 2012 Correlates 9,080 191 1730 -18 75998 USD, millions of War 9,080 0.06 0.2 0 1 Binary Vreeland regional aussie Australian ODA when ED aussieBWIED 9,080 0.02 0.15 0 1 Binary World Bank Reports; Vreeland Colony aussiecolony 9,080 0.002 0.04 0 1 Binary CIA World Factbook 14 Table 2 illustrates that with (Model 2) and without (Model 1) preliminary controls placed on the independent variable, there remains a positive, statistically significant correlation between the log of Australian Aid and membership in the Australian bloc at the 0.01 level. All of the controls had the expected effect, except for the Australian BWI Executive Director variable, which had a statistically significant negative correlation instead of the expected positive correlation. Overall, membership in the Australian bloc delivers an extra Table 2: Preliminary Effects on Log of Australian Aid Variable Log of Australian Aid (1) (2) Membership in Australian Bloc 1.442*** (0.061) 0.756*** (0.094) No No 0.428*** (0.012) 8753 0.06 -0.479*** (0.115) (0.000) 0.127*** (0.008) 0.133*** (0.007) 2.216*** (0.071) 1.087*** (0.250) 0.365*** (0.029) No No -1.80*** (0.122) 6077 0.4 Australian BWI Executive Director Status Log of Population Log of Bilateral Trade Australia’s Region Australian Colony British Colony Year Fixed Effects Country Fixed Effects _cons Number of observations Adj. R-squared Table 3 illustrates the results for when we address endogenity. When both models for year fixed effects (Model 1) and country fixed effects (Model 2) are applied to the data with all relevant controls, the positive correlation remains statistically significant at the 0.01 level. Therefore, our results are robust after we apply fixed effects to the data. Table 3: Results on Log of Australian Aid Variable Log of Australian Aid Australian Bloc GDP per Capita Log of Population Log of Bilateral Trade Australia’s Region Australian Colony British Colony Australian BWI Executive Director Status Year Fixed Effects Country Fixed Effects _cons Number of observations Adj. R-squared (1) (2) 0.709*** (0.195) -0.000*** (0.000) 0.077*** (0.012) 0.181*** (0.016) 2.113*** (0.228) 0.977 (0.822) 0.321*** (0.027) 0.537*** (0.124) -0.000*** (0.000) 0.118*** (0.008) 0.052*** (0.009) 2.646*** (0.089) 1.248 (0.840) 0.375*** (0.028) -0.498*** (0.186) -0.538*** (0.165) Yes No -1.071*** (0.181) 6077 0.40 No Yes -1.725 *** (0.120) 6077 0.51 16 Beyond our findings about the positive correlation between Australian ODA and Australian bloc status, the effects of some of the control variables are noteworthy. We find the expected negative correlation with GDP per capita, indicating that Australia still follows are RN approach to ODA to a certain extent. The effects of the control variables support the existing literature. Regional membership, colonial status, and trade have positive, statistically significant correlations. Interestingly, Australia’s Executive Director status has a statistically significant negative correlation with foreign aid. We suggest more rigorous experiments to explain why Australia may give out less aid when it is the Executive Director. It is possible that Australia increases donations before the vote, and then decreases aid distribution while it is on the Executive Board. In context, the results support the claim that Australia follows a DI model of ODA. After rigorous controls, the correlation is positive, statistically significant, and robust. Australia, despite its economic mediocrity and military negligence, remains a power in international financial institutions through manipulating ODA. Conclusion Small and mid-level donors go to extensive lengths to gain clout in international organizations. Despite its unassuming character on the world stage, Australia maintains a commanding presence in the world’s preeminent financial institutions by exchanging foreign aid for loyal votes. Since Australia cannot wield great military or economic power, it pays increased costs in foreign aid to its BWI mates to assert its voice in global financial decisions. Most members of Australia’s bloc reap the benefits of increased aid, 17 and the two members that do not require aid (Korea and New Zealand), have a separate arrangement to rotate the Alternate Directorship. These commitments create a cohesive bloc. Thus, despite its weak status relative to single elector states, Australia’s bloc has remained remarkably consistent since the Cold War. Still, we wonder if Australia’s system of exchanging aid for political power will hold in the future. Reapportionments in the IMF and World Bank quota systems will undoubtedly favor Korea and other Asian countries at the expense of the original 50 Bretton Woods countries. Perhaps Korea and the developing nations in Australia’s bloc will come to challenge Australia for the Executive Directorship. Australia’s carefully crafted system may fail as their current aid recipients assert themselves on the international stage. While its foreign aid scheme has worked in the past, the future is uncertain. Rising costs, domestic politics, and the growing Asian Tigers imperil the aidfor-votes arrangement Australia has cultivated for the last 50 years. Pieter Willem Botha, one of the politicians who helped South Africa leave the Australian bloc in 1975, stated in 1979, “We are moving into a changing world, we must adapt otherwise we shall die.” Australia would do well to heed his words. 18 References Alesina, Alberto, and David Dollar. 2000. Who Gives Foreign Aid to Whom and Why? Journal of Economic Growth, 5: 33–64. AusAID. 2013. AusAID Annual Report, 2012-2013. Australian Aid. AusAID. 2012. About Australia's Aid Program. Australian Aid. Available at: http://www.ausaid.gov.au/makediff/Pages/default.aspx. Barbieri, Katherine and Omar Keshk. 2012. Correlates of War Project Trade Data Set Codebook, Version 3.0. Available at: http://correlatesofwar.org. Barbieri, Katherine, Omar M. G. Keshk, and Brian Pollins. 2009. Trading Data: Evaluating our Assumptions and Coding Rules. Conflict Management and Peace Science. 26(5): 471-491. Bermeo, Sarah Blodgett. 2010. Development and Strategy: Aid Allocation in an Interdependent World. SSRN. Bermeo, Sarah Blodgett and David Leblang. 2012. Foreign Interests: Immigration and the Political Economy of Foreign Aid. Duke University. Berthelemy, Jean-Claude. 2006. Bilateral Donors’ Interest vs. Recipients’ Development Motives in Aid Allocation: Do All Donors Behave the Same? Review of Development Economics, 10 (2): 179–194. Berthelemy, Jean-Claude, and Ariane Tichit. 2004. Bilateral Donors’ Aid Allocation Decisions: A Three-Dimensional Panel Analysis. International Review of Economics and Finance, 13 (3): 253–274. Capling, Ann, and John Ravenhill. 2013. Australia, the United States and the TransPacific Partnership: Diverging Interests and Unintended Consequences. Australian Journal of Political Science, 48(2): 184-96. Carroll, Peter. 2011. Australia and the Bretton Woods Institutions: The IMF. APSA Conference Proceedings 2011. Cheru, Fantu, and Colin I. Bradford. 2005. The Millennium Development Goals: Raising the Resources to Tackle World Poverty. London: Zed Books. Davis, Thomas. 2009. The Politics of Human Rights and Development: The Challenge for Official Donors. Australian Journal of Political Science, 44 (1): 173-92. Dobson, Hugo. 2011. The G20: Engine of Asian Regionalism? Working paper. German Institute for Global and Area Studies. Gounder, Rukmani. 1999. Modeling of Aid Motivation Using Time Series Data: The Case of Papua New Guinea. Oxford Agrarian Studies, 27 (2): 233-50. Gounder, Rukmani. 1995. Non-nested Models of Australia's Overseas Aid Program. Applied Economics, 27 (7): 609-22. Gounder, Rukmani and Kunal Sen. 1999. What Motivates Foreign Aid: A Case Study of Australia's Aid to Indonesia. The Journal of Developing Areas, 33 (3): 379-94. Heinecke, Danielle, Brian Dollery, and Euan Fleming. 2008. The Samaritan’s Dilemma: The Effectiveness of Australian Foreign Aid to Papua New Guinea. Australian Journal of International Affairs, 62 (1): 53-71. Hoadley, J. S. 1980. Small states as aid donors. International Organization, 34(1), 12137. 19 International Monetary Fund. 2012. Composition of the Executive Board, November 2012. Report. Available at: http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/memdir/ ED_110112.pdf. International Monetary Fund. 2012. "IMF Members' Quotas and Voting Power, and IMF Board of Governors." Available at: http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/memdir/ members.aspx. Isopi, Alessia, and Fabrizio Mattesini. 2008. Aid and Corruption: Do Donors Use Development Assistance to Provide the “Right” Incentives?. SSRN. Langmore, John. 2013. Australia's Campaign for Security Council Membership. Australian Journal of Political Science, 48(11):1-11. Lim, Daniel Yew Mao and James Vreeland. 2013 Regional Organizations and International Politics: Japanese Influence over the Asian Development Bank and the UN Security Council. World Politics 65 (1): 34-72. Mazumder, Soumyajit and James Vreeland. 2013. O Canada, we stand on guard for thee: Foreign aid benefits for members of the Bretton Woods Canadian-bloc. Mortara Center Working Paper. McCawley, Peter. 2009. Mass Poverty in Asia: The Impact of the Global Financial Crisis. Publication. Sydney, Australia: Lowy Institute for International Policy. Available at: http://www.ciaonet.org/pbei/liip/0017591/f_0017591_15069.pdf. McGillivray, Mark, and Edward Oczkowski. 2012. Modeling the Allocation of Australian Bilateral Aid: A Two-Part Sample Selection Approach. Economic Record, 14752. McKinlay, R. D., and R. Little. 1977. A Foreign Policy Model of U.S. Bilateral Aid Allocation. World Politics, 30(1): 58-86. Neumayer, Eric. 2003. Do Human Rights Matter in Bilateral Aid Allocation? A Quantitative Analysis of 21 Donor Countries. Social Science Quarterly, 84(3): 650-66. Neumayer, Eric. 2003. The Pattern of Aid Giving: The Impact of Good Governance on Development Assistance. London: Routledge. Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. 2012. DAC 2A: Official Development Assistance. Raw data. Available at: http://www.oecd.org/dac/ aidstatistics/internationaldevelopmentstatisticsidsonlinedatabasesonaidandotherres ourceflows.htm. Sielaff, Erin and Kristen Skillman. 2014. Krogh Seminar Working Paper. Special Broadcasting Service. 2013. AusAID to be absorbed into Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. Available at: http://www.sbs.com.au/news/ article/2013/09/18/ausaid-be-absorbed-department-foreign-affairs-and-trade. Strand, Jonathan, and David P. Rapkin. 2005. Developing Country Representation and Governance of the International Monetary Fund. World Development 33(12): 1993-2011 Strand, Jonathan, and David Rapkin. 2005. Regionalizing Multilateralism: Estimating the Power of Potential Regional Voting Blocs in the IMF. International Interactions, 31(1): 15-54. Vreeland, James. 2011. Foreign Aid and Global Governance: Buying Bretton Woods-The Swiss-bloc case. Review of International Organizations 6 (3-4):369-391. World Bank. 2012. World Development Indicators and Global Development Finance 20 (WDI). Raw data. Available at: http://databank.worldbank.org/ddp/home.do? Step=12&id=4& CNO=2. World Bank. 2009. The World’s Top 100 Economies. Available at: http://siteresources. worldbank.org/INTUWM/Resources/WorldsTop100Economies.pdf. World Bank. 2010. The State of the Poor: Where are the Poor, and where are they Poorest? Available at: http://www.worldbank.org/content/dam/Worldbank/ document/State_of_the_poor_paper_April17.pdf. 21