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important to participate in the building of new ideas, to criticize the established order and Politikon: IAPSS Political Science Journal Vol. 22, April 2014 Volume 22: April 2014 Academic year 2013-2014 Editor in Chief Rodrigo Vaz Catholic University of Portugal Portugal Editorial Board Caitlin Bagby, USA King’s College, London, United Kingdom Péter Király, Hungary Central European University, Budapest, Hungary Andrijana Nikic, Montenegro University of Montenegro, Montenegro Reint-Jan Groot Nuelend, The Netherlands University of Nijmegen, Nijmegen, The Netherlands Vit Simral, Czech Republic IMT, Lucca, Italy / Charles University, Prague / Masaryk University, Brno, Czech Republic Advisory Board Manuel Garreton, Chile, João Carlos Espada, Portugal, Carole Pateman, England, Leonardo Morlino, Italy, Phillippe Schmitter, USA 2 Politikon: IAPSS Political Science Journal Vol. 22, April 2014 Table of Contents Editorial Message.......................................................................................................................................... 4 Rodrigo Vaz Part 1 – IAPSS Think Tank Working Papers Introduction to Objectives of the United States Foreign Policy ........................................... 5 IAPSS Think Tank Working Group 1 African and Latin American Political Regimes in Perspective: A Regional Analysis of Emerging Socio-Political Trends .................................................................................................... 16 IAPSS Think Tank Working Group 2 From Mere Presence to “Actorness” in International Affairs: Upgrading the EU’s Role to Global ............................................................................................................................................... 21 IAPSS Think Tank Working Group 3 Part 2 - Regular Articles Terrorist Attacks & Presidential Approval Rating ................................................................... 27 Elizabeth Bennett The politics of writing history: historians' debates and high-school history teaching in post-socialist Romania .................................................................................................. 45 Sergiu Delcea Beyond Compatibility : Replicating High-Performing Asian Economies...................... 56 Meicen Sun 3 Politikon: IAPSS Political Science Journal Vol. 22, April 2014 Editorial Message Dear Reader, First of all, let me welcome you to this last issue of POLITIKON, the IAPSS journal of Political Science. I am privileged to introduce to you the first working papers produced by the IAPSS Think Tank. Under the theme ‘Global Governance and New Trends’, they focus on the US Foreign Policy, Latin America and African Political Regimes and the role of the EU in global politics. This issue also features articles selected and reviewed from the last call for papers which cover issues as diverse as Eastern European politics, American Presidencies and terrorist attacks and the rising Asian economies. This is also the last issue I am responsible for, as my mandate as Editor-in-Chief expires with its publication, having already stepped down as Head of Academic Department last February. For that, I would like to thank everyone working at the Department for these last two years, and in this context particularly to the Editorial Boards who I worked with. To the two IAPSS Publications Coordinators I worked over these two years I would like to extend a special word of gratitude. Both Gabriela Marzonetto and Alexandru Volacu were crucial to the development of POLITIKON, the Academic Department and the Association. Alexandru Volacu follows me as Head of the Academic Department and I want to express him my confidence in the excellent work he made us used to and which I am sure he will extend to the whole Department. For now, I will leave you with the excellent articles this issue’s authors have submitted. The topics covered are very heterogeneous and diverse, and I am sure you will find many that suit your likes. Should you have any questions, please feel free to contact Alexandru Volacu directly at [email protected]. Keep up the IAPSS spirit. Rodrigo Vaz Editor-in-Chief 4 Politikon: IAPSS Political Science Journal Vol. 22, April 2014 Introduction to Objectives of the United States Foreign Policy IAPSS Think Tank Working Group 1 : Chander Busham NAGAR, Per HELBERG, Fanny POTKIN Introduction F oreign policy of any country is had not yet entered the industrial revolution. not simply an assemblage of the There were no great discrepancies in policy statements of a country, national wealth and the United States (U.S.) but it also refers to the commitments, the was essentially self sufficient. As like the current and case of colonial India, it engaged extensively objectives of a government. Thus, in order in foreign commerce, but its own resources to understand the foreign policy of any enabled it to do so advantageously and it government it becomes vital to understand enjoyed a high relative standard of living. form of interests, aims the country’s national interests and the strategies adopted to achieve it. It has already been proved several times that no government is able to formulate its foreign policy on a clean slate, its policy is always conditioned by its past circumstances. The fundamental principles of United States foreign policy have been stated in general terms on numerable number of occasions. Some of the statements are general in nature. Some of them were quite relevant from the various point of views. An The case of United States of America is important view in this regard is to study the much similar to those of the India’s foreign history of United States Diplomacy. By policy its going through the various texts we can reach independence. The first prime minister of to this conviction that there are certain India Pt. Jawahar Lal Nehru, has himself underlying concepts and principles which drawn parallel and former Ambassador of had played an important part in U.S. foreign the United States of America, Chester policy throughout all, or most of the history Bowles has given his view that India’s policy of the United States. in the first quarter of is practically indistinguishable from the foreign policy of the United States from 1787 to 1937. The United States won its independence in an un-crowded world that The most basic fundamentals of the U.S. foreign policy are those of the “Security expansion and neutrality”. The other view quotes some of the fixed points in the U.S. 5 Politikon: IAPSS Political Science Journal Vol. 22, April 2014 foreign policy like isolationism, the Monroe rights of Mississippi Doctrine, freedom of seas and the open Spanish New orlean, a problem posed by the door policy”.1 Another view held the British impressments of seaman & neutral following rights. principles like (i) Sovereign Another navigation ports, aspect of the U.S. independence, (ii) Continental Expansion, fundamental in matter of foreign policy is (iii) Avoidance of the ordinary vicissitudes the and ordinary combinations, and collisions of expansion, which found expressions in three the major European politics, (iv) the American military drive for campaigns continental against the neocolonization principle, (v) the non- Western American Indian’s between 1790 transfer principle especially in case of no and 1794. Under this previow, the difference transfer by one European power to another in of fundamental has no parallel text in India’s any possession in the Western Hemisphere, (vi) Freedom of the seas for neutral ships in time of war and freedom of navigation of the international rivers, (ix) the right of expatriation and the wrong of imprisonment (x) a feeling of anti- imperialism2. geographical surroundings, this case. In the matter of peace and war, the foreign policy matters of the United States, as is being considered it as an alternative means of pursuing the independence voiced the hope, that the U.S. may hope to become The geographical factor also plays an an arbiter of Europe in America and to be important role in the U.S. foreign policy. able to incline the balance of European The presence on its western side of a competition in the part of the world as the continent that was relatively sparse and national whose primitive inhabitants were no military determined renunciation of war as a means match for a modern state. This fact invited a of achieving foreign policy is unmatched in policy of expansion that transcends the the history of the United States foreign frontiers of the United States borders. It has policy3. been stated that “the Americans possessed a choosen country with room enough for their descendents to the thousanth and interest may dictate. The The Course of the Postwar Foreign Policy of the United States thousandth generations. The theme of the Before World War – II the United protection of the U.S. sea-based trade also States had only intermittently played a vital forms a vital significance in the U.S. foreign role in the World affairs. It emerged from policy. This theme appears in negotiations the second world war as one of the super for commercial privileges like concerns over power. Much of the U.S. post world War – 6 Politikon: IAPSS Political Science Journal Vol. 22, April 2014 II policy had centered around her efforts to the league of nations in 1919. India also adjust her view position and to the realities participated in the San Francisco Conference of the post war world. In the post war years in 1945 and signed the Charter of United the U.S. entered into forming military Nations. Another important milestone in alliances with old friends in Western Europe same path of progress was the convening and Latin America and with new friends in the Asian Relations Conference in New Asia, nevertheless all of the alliance had been Delhi from 23 March to 2 April 1947. Asia subject to increasing stress. As a matter of after a long period of quiescence suddenly fact, the unsatisfactory state of relations became vital in world affairs. This was the between communist and non-communist major basis of Pt. Jawaharlal Nehru’s states, the postwar era had been projected as perception of Asia in the early years of an era of conflict4. India’s independence. The temper of the By the year 1946, the United States began to show signs of awakening to the nature of Soviet threat and heading toward a new dimension of foreign policy. The new departure in the foreign policy was stated on 12 March 1947, when the U.S. President George Truman delivered his famous ‘Truman doctrine, Speech. In the speech he stated the ‘containment of Soviet Union as a prime objective of the U.S. foreign policy5. India’s Foreign Policy Objectives and U.S. : Asian Relations conference was set by Pt. Nehru in his inaugural address. His address continues four major elements. Firstly, he proclaimed India’s entry in the global scene. Second, he emphasized the need for Asian Unity. Thirdly, he called for avoiding expression of anti-western sentiments. Finally, he attached considerable importance to the imperative of greater regional cooperation6. When India became free on 15 Aug, 1947, the Indian National Congress, became a center of power with Pt. Jawaharlal Nehru fledged as the first Prime Minister of India. Pt. international personality after the attainment Nehru was the architect of India’s foreign of its independence on 15 Aug. 1947. The policy and his influence was overwhelming interim government of the independent in the formulation of policies objectives. The India was formed on 2nd Sept., 1946. governing considerations in Pt. Nehru’s view Before, this date, the external relations of in regard to foreign policies are three : India became a full India were conducted by British governing bodies. India attained the very first recognition at international level after joining a. The newly independent countries inclusive of India, must not be 7 Politikon: IAPSS Political Science Journal b. Vol. 22, April 2014 used as pawns by the other states another, which have led in the past to world for their personal interests. They wars and which may again lead to disasters must have a free hold in deciding on an even vaster scale. We believe that about themselves. peace and freedom are indivisible and the There was urgent need to provide a fair and equitable social and economic foundation for our newly formed democracy. c. denial of freedom anywhere must endanger freedom elsewhere and lead to conflicts and wars. We are particularly interested in the emancipation of colonial and dependent countries and people and in the recognition in theory and practice of equal opportunities There was a need for the for all races. India seek no domination over maintenance of the territorial others and we claim no privileged position integrity of India7. over people. But it do claim equal and honourable treatment for our people The Congress first outlived the foreign wherever they may go and we cannot accept policy of free India in the Jaipur session of any discrimination against them9”. the Indian National Congress in Dec, 1948. The resolution on foreign policy adopted at Pt. Jawaharlal Nehru was fully aware of Jaipur stated that, “ the foreign policy of the main task of India’s foreign policy, that India must necessarily be based on the is the promotion of its national interest. principles that have guided the congress in During his speeches he felt the supreme the past. These principles are the promotion need for peace in building up a new India. of world peace, the freedom of nations, As the circumstances of our country were racial equality and the ending of imperialism not favourable at the time of independence. and colonialism. In particular, the Congress In view of the interdependent world, he felt emphasized on the freedom of the nations that trouble anywhere in the world would of Asia and African continents, who have influence India’s plan for building up its suffered under various forms of colonialism economy. He was anxious to maintain for many generations8. The speeches of Pt. friendly relations with all the neighbours in Nehru presents a clear cut thought of his in Asia and to cooperate with them in regard to India’s foreign policy objectives. In international a speech broadcast to the nation on 7th independence, the “Cold War”10 and had Sept, 1946 he quoted, “We propose as far as already started. The polarization of a large possible, to keep away from the power part of the world into the Soviet block and politics of groups, aligned against one Western block led by United States of affair. By the time of 8 Politikon: IAPSS Political Science Journal Vol. 22, April 2014 America had taken shape. In view of this level. Several of these objectives were India decided to keep away from the politics common by nature. A former foreign of alignment. secretary of India, Muchkund Dubey stated In the interest of economic development of India, for maintaining the independence of action in foreign affairs for safeguarding the security of nation and for working effectively for world peace, India decided to keep away from the rival power blocks and followed an independent foreign policy. In a speech being delivered at Indian Council of World Affairs, New Delhi on 23 March 1949, Pt. Nehru stated When I say that we should not align ourselves with any power block, obviously it does not mean that we should not be closer in our relation with some countries in comparison to a few other one. At the present moment, you will see that as a matter of fact we have for closer relations with some countries of West, then with others. The closer relation will no doubt developed and we will encourage them to develop11.” The that “The primary purpose of any country’s foreign policy is to promote its national interest, to ensure its security, safeguard its sovereignty, contribute to its growth and prosperity, further, generally enhance its stature, influence and role in the comity of nations. A country’s foreign policy should also be able to serve the broader purpose of promoting peace, disarmament, development and of establishing a stable, fair and equitable global order”12. According to him, the goals of India’s foreign policy are simple and straight forward. The primary and overriding goal has always been the maintenance and promotion of international peace and security. The objectives by nature are fundamental and generally accepted by the people13. following India immediately after independence quotations of Pt. Nehru’s speech clearly had to determine its policy objectives under indicate one thing, that both the blocks were difficult having a great expectations in regard to partition of India and creation of Pakistan India’s stand on foreign policy matters just had left a deep wound of hatred and ill will. after the independence. Secondly, it also Before partition, India was till than one revealed the India’s important geostrategic economic unit. The division of economic position in Asia. assets had created many economic problems, The foreign policy makers of India set out certain so as to lay down basic principles to formulate the policy upto a full fledged circumstances. Internally, the with the most challenging one was not very comfortable with the advent of cold war posture. It was in this situation, that India decided that the world peace would be a 9 Politikon: IAPSS Political Science Journal Vol. 22, April 2014 cardinal feature of India’s foreign Policy. several international agencies like W.H.O., Peace meant not only avoidance of war, but UNICEF, UNESCO etc. for the betterment also reduction of tension prevailing in view of these causes. India voluntarily chose to of cold war. India had joined the league of remain a members of the Commonwealth of nations earlier and also supported the Nations. It is the association of free and creation sovereign countries who were colonies in the of United Nations for the attainment of such cause. A related objective was to root out the case of war by measures such as liberation of subject people and the elimination of racial discrimination. In order to follow this goal, India decided to follow an independent foreign policy. Thus, the pursuit of peace became a vital aspect in the foreign policy declaration. Pt Jawaharlal Nehru always quoted Mahatma Gandhi’s teaching as a basis for foreign policy formulation. He once quoted in the United States, “Gandhian ethics was the cornerstone of India’s foreign policy’. He insisted that physical force need not necessarily be the arbiter of man’s destiny and that the method of waging a struggle and the way of termination are of paramount significance14. Another vital objective of foreign policy esstwhile British Empire now recognises the British Queen only as Head of the Commonwealth, not as crown of Republics like India. Before 1949, only. The Bristish Dominions were members of, what was then known as British commonwealth, All the dominions had the British Crown as their monarch also. India decided not to leave the commonwealth even after it decided to become a republic and censed to accept the British monarch as the head of the state. India owed, along with some other countries, common allegiance to a particular way of life. India considered the continued cooperation with the common wealth of mutual benefit to India and all other member countries15. U.S. Concern Over India’s Independence & Before : was “Elimination of Disease and Illetracy”. In the struggle of independence, These are ills not only of Indian society, but India has drawn inspiration from the United also of most of the developing countries of States. The U.S. was the first colonized Aisa and African continent. Whereas India’s country to get freedom from bi-imperialism domestic policy was aimed at the removal of and as such became a modal of emulation. these diseases, it was closely related with the In this background and because of the question of foreign aid and assistance. India shared democratic values, it was expected had preferably chosen to cooperate with that the Indo-U.S. relations would acquire a 10 Politikon: IAPSS Political Science Journal Vol. 22, April 2014 pattern of positive relationship. Whatever and elsewhere were political, appointees, the United States perceptions in the early since then they had been career officials and period she since 1924, they had been regular part of the occupied a special place in their concept of foreign services of the early starting avenue world affairs. Because of this fact United between the India and United States foreign States realized that India was the only relations. of India’s Independence, country in the Asian Region which was deeply committed to the democratic principles and had the determination, will and also the capacity to progress. India and U.S., though wide apart geographically have been intimately connected by the fact, that both are the largest democracies of the world. During 1865 and 1940, American missionaries played a dominant role in the early relations between U.S. and the Indian Sub-continent. The American missionary came to India in the early part of the 19th century, but there were relatively few of them, prior to the American war of independence. After 1865, their number The Indo-U.S. relations date back to increased rapidly and Indian sub-continent the times when the Britishers were here and became the major field of American India was still engaged in her war of missionaries enterprise. In general, the independence prior to the decade of American missionaries had not only been twenties. The contact between the people of the largest single group of Americans in two nations was limited only to the India, but they have also had the most missionaries and trade. The commercial intimate contacts with Indian and have contacts with India date back from the probably made the greatest impact on Indian period immediately following the American philosophies and literature16. revolution, when enterprising merchants in colonial America seeking new fields of commercial enterprises and finding the markets of Europe largely closed to them. Trade with India began to increase again in the early 20th century and it had of course expanded greatly in the post-independence period of India, but the number of consular establishment in India had never been so great as it was during the 1850’s. Until 1906, During the era of Indian Struggle for independence, the American intellectual, the politicians and the press were quite sympathetic to the Indian National freedom struggle, that some of them were critical of British rule in India. The U.S. president Franklin Delano Roosevelt was sympathetic to the Indian national freedom struggle. The U.S. Senator Blaine’s resolution on July American consular representatives in India 11 Politikon: IAPSS Political Science Journal Vol. 22, April 2014 17,1930 expressed support for the Indian fact a war for the liberation of its peoples, it national movement. must assure the sovereign equality of the The Indian opinion sought the American intervention in their efforts in the struggle for the attainment of independence. Mahatma Gandhi wrote a letter to the U.S. president Roosevelt on 1 July, 1942 people though out the world. The U.S. leadership perceives this demand in somewhat substantive way. The future gains from India always dominant in the U.S. policy towards India. appealing him to help the Indian cause. He The U.S. Senate foreign Relations quoted, “both the India and U.S. believe in committee also took a firm stand. It stated knowledge and righteousness, and must the demand that India might be given a make common cause to fight war for the status of autonomy. It further stated, the common enemy of our countries17”. The only way to get the people of India to fight U.S. forwarded is to get them to fight for India. The America’s moral support by sending two committee demanded a status of autonomy special envoys colonel Louis Johnson and for India19. President Roosevelt William Philips. William Philips in his suggestions, advised the President to press for India’s freedom struggle to her excellency of England. On 14 May 1943, he wrote to the president by assuming that India is known to be an important base for the U.S. future operations against Burma and Japan. It would seems to be of highest importance that the U.S. should have around itself a sympathetic India rather than, an indifferent and hostile nation18. Nevertheless, On the occassion of the Quit During the period of intense negotiations for partitioning the country, the United States closely followed the Indian situation and was the only country to receive advance briefing from England. Ultimately, when it found, the partition to be inevitable, it gave up its mediatory efforts, lest this should be misunderstood to be taking sides and thereby jeopardize ties with the successor countries India and Pakistant20. The first prime minister of India Movement, the Indian offer of the independent India Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru wartime collaboration in exchange of the was conscious of the importance of the political concessions was viewed by the U.S. United States, while drawing the resolution as a feeling of blackmail. The U.S. was not for the All India Congress Committee in prepared to perceive the Indian demand. 1952, he stated that “the next 100 years are Yet, the then U.S. secretary of state Sunner going to be the country of America”. As a Wells stated, that if the Indian struggle is in growing power, the United States is un12 Politikon: IAPSS Political Science Journal Vol. 22, April 2014 doubtly going to play a very major role in States to make up a lost ground in South the years and generations to come21. Asia22. In India, even before the transfer of In order to cover the new emerging power, while there as an interim government vacuum in the relations, the U.S. invited Pt. was in the power, India was informed by the Nehru to visit the U.S. He made an official U.S. Secretary of State Lord Byrns that visit in 1949. Pt. Nehru received a warm United States would be happy to receive Sir welcome from the government and the Girija Shankar Vajpayee as Charg. D. people of the United States. Addressing a Affairs, the appointment of an Indian joint Ambassador in Washington D.C., the state Representatives and the Senate, Pt. Nehru capital of the United States of America. On recalled the “declaration of independence” April 10, which greatly influenced him and the Indian four months independence, Henry before India’s Grady of the House of was Constitution. He States, “I have come to appointed the first American Ambassador to United States, on a voyage of discovery of India. He presented his letter of credence on the mind and heart of America and to place 1 July 1947. He expressed the belief that in before the American, our heart and mind”. the context of the cold war it would be Pt. Nehru in this manner describes his visit better for India to be on he Western bloc. as “Discovery of America”23. At this time, This feeling of the United States formed a the United States was favourably disposed sympathetic turn in its perception towards towards India. Although, some India. In the initials phase of India’s dealing differences inherent by nature and a conflict in the international affairs, Pt. Nehru called in opinion had started cropping up the an international conference on Indonesia. issues of foreign policy on world problems India also decided to remain as a part of like colonialism, communism, disarmament, Common Kashmir issue Wealth F. session Association. The etc.24. The basic first ever withdrawal of the French and the Dutch differences in opinion came to light with the from the South East Asian region, the Indian support over the Chinese admission emergence of Communist China and India’s to United Nation (U.N.) and the U.S. sympathetic attitude towards her, made a perceive, this as ‘timid’, short sighted an sense of vacuum being created in the irresponsible step25. In a similar other bilateral relations between India and U.S. It move, Indian opinion outraged at the could only be pervasive for India to play a indiscriminate bombings in South Korea. leading role in this area. India seen as an The Institute of Pacific Relations Organized unparalleled opportunity for the United a conference at Lucknow in Oct. 1950, in its 13 Politikon: IAPSS Political Science Journal Vol. 22, April 2014 report it lamented American action and migration, (iv) Transition from consequently, India remain apart on the colonial to National economy, resolution, authorizing the U.S. Army (v) Agriculture & industry (vi) General Labor Mc. Aurthor to head the U.N. issues, (vii) Cultural force to intervene in Korean crisis. This was Affairs, (viii) Status of women, much resented by the Americans, who were Harcharan Singh Josh, “India’s irritated by this attitude of the Indian Foreign Policy, Nehru to Rao leadership26. (N. Delhi – 1994) P. 12-13 7. India, References : 1. these policies as the basis of U.S. policy. Norman D. 8. United States” Scientific Book agency, Calcutta, 1970, P. 646647. 3. Edwin. C. Hyot, “The 9. opcit. Sisodia, P. 2. 10. Cold war defines as a phase of relations between U.S.S.R. and U.S.A. in which no direct war occurred. There were “Foreign policy criticisms occurred rather than direct use of weapons as Comparison.” P. 161. and Rajkumar, Policy”. (N.Delhi 1952) P. 59. Policies of India and U.S., A Palmar N.V. hostile ibid. P. 646-647. Era”. Background of India’s Foreign “The foreign policy of the 2. Gandhi Delhi 1985) P. 7. Palmer, Haward C. Perkins, 4. Indira (Inter, India Publications, New Nathaneil Peffer has quoted foreign Sisodia S.S., “Foreign Policy of means. Perkins, “International Relations”. CBS Publishers, Delhi, P. 651-252. 11. opcit. Sisodia, P. 4. 12. Muckhand ibid. P. 654- 655. 6. The Asian Relations conference Studies”, comprise of major themes like (i) P.117. (ii) Racial problem, (iii) Issue o “India’s Foreign policy in the evolving 5. National Liberation movement, Dubey, Global order in International 13. April –June 1993. ibid. P. 117 14 Politikon: IAPSS Political Science Journal 14. 15. Vol. 22, April 2014 J. Nehru, “Inside America”, New Indian Journal of Asian Studies, Delhi. P. 34. July 1978, Vol. 18, No.2. Mahendra Kumar, “India’s Foreign Policy”. 16. The writings of the Indian philospher like Raja Ram Mohan 21. opcit. Kamat, P. 208. 22. New York Times, 31 Aug, 1949. 23. J.L. Nehru, “India’s Foreign Policy, Selected Speeches”. Sept- Raj deeply influenced by the thoughts of the 1946- April 1961, Publication American Division, Govt. of India, N. missionaries. Vadilal Dagli, “ Two decades Relation”. of Vohra Delhi, 1961, P.589. Indo-U.S. & Comp. 24. Publishers, 1969, P. 160. 17. except the Kashmir dispute. As Pakistan has joined the South The Hindustan Times, 22 June East Asian Treaty Organization 1960. 18. ibid. 19. Kamath, “ The United States and All issues are generally debatable (SEATO), thus obviously got a favour from the United States. 25. New York Times, 12 Oct, 1950. India”. P. 128. 20. R.C. Joshi, “ The American Effort to Avert the Impending Partition of India 1946-47”. 15 Politikon: IAPSS Political Science Journal Vol. 22, April 2014 African and Latin American Political Regimes in Perspective: A Regional Analysis of Emerging Socio-Political Trends IAPSS Think Tank Working Group 2 : Wilneida NEGRÓN, Jean PEÑA PAYANO, Carolina URREGO SANDOVAL, Pedro CAPRA VIEIRA Introduction T his year’s IAPSS Africa and Latin American Think Tank Team will examine current socio-economic trends and their impact on political regimes in Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America. Our four policy papers will be centered on the following themes: First - Characterization and differentiation of the regions; Second - Analysis of emerging democratic trends such as: direct democracy, multiparty systems and democracy innovations; Third - Trade-related development assistance policies in Africa and trade relations with Latin America; Fourth - Emergence and impact of Internet and social media in these territories. This first paper provides an introduction to these regions and the topics we’ll be exploring in the future. In comparing two regions as diverse and vast as Sub-Sahara Africa and Latin America, it’s helpful to begin by discussing the misconceptions and generalizations often used to describe and label them. Characterization: Fragile States Failed and While Sub-Saharan Africa (from here on out referred to as Africa) and Latin America provide fruitful comparisons, we must avoid broad generalizations. Common among policy makers is the use of concepts such as fragile and failed states. The latter, has been subject to critiques which deem it as simplistic, misleading, and politicallyproblematic (Andersen, 2007; Bøås & Jennings, 2005; Hagmann & Hoehne, 2009). As a result, this paper recognizes the need to avoid this bias by contextualizing the current key trends in these non-Western countries within their respective domestic and regional experiences and realities. Nevertheless, it is suggested that: 1) state failure, whether understood as a process or feature of political systems, is undoubtedly an issue of domestic politics that in International Relations has become a postCold War phenomenon. Failed states are states unable to carry out their major functions such as provision of security, economic services, norm regulation, and political participation. 2) Fragile states are identified as those able to perform most of these activities but which are faced with increasing difficulties and vulnerabilities e.g. vulnerability to poverty, food insecurity, natural hazards, conflict, macroeconomic shocks (Ghani & Lockhart, 2008; Collier, 2009; Naudé et al., 2011). In Latin 16 Politikon: IAPSS Political Science Journal American, Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, and Guatemala are often labeled as fragile states; while in Africa, Angola, Chad, Nigeria, Sudan, DR Congo ., and Timor-Leste often receive this label. Political Regimes in Latin America & Africa When examining political regimes in these regions, the conversation often falls to success and failures of democracy. Both regions have experienced waves of democratization since the 1980’s and have seen the number of military dictatorships and one-party systems go down. However, their transition experiences diverge in that political regimes in Africa have evolved within neo-patrimonial, personalistic (Bratton & van de Walle, 1997) rather than corporatist regimes as often seen in Latin America. Even though, some political regimes in Africa continue to demonstrate personalistic traits, leaders are starting to let go of old patrimonial habits as citizens increasingly demand less corrupt and more competent leaders to represent them in the global economy. Kenya provides a good example of this. Latin America has evolved from a region where dictatorships prevailed for most of the twentieth century to a region where only a single openly authoritarian regime (Cuba) exists today (Mainwaring & Pérez-Liñán, 2013). This transformation is often attributed to the region’s political context, strong normative preference for democracy among citizens, and a lack of radical policy preferences among key actors (Mainwaring & Pérez-Liñán, 2013). Political reforms in both areas have led to an increase in multiparty politics - which presents unique implications for their political regimes. The Rise of Multiparty Politics Vol. 22, April 2014 Instead of single-party politics or military rule, multiparty politics has dominated political regimes in Africa and Latin America. Multiparty democracy swept across Africa in the early 1990s, as singleparty states and authoritarian leaders bowed to pressure from outside and within. Overall, multiparty regimes in Africa have a higher failure rate than in Latin America. Also, multiparty regimes in Africa have suffered from perpetual ‘democratic leaders’, which hold on to power beyond their term limits. For example, Uganda is officially a multiparty democracy, however, its President, Yoweri Museveni, has been in power since 1986. Cameroon's President Paul Biya has also removed term limits and former Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo unsuccessfully tried to do the same. In Latin America, recent periods of economic instability have tested the strength and durability of multi-party systems. Even so, young democracies have shown that while their party systems display high levels of instability, their political regimes have been more stable than expected. Thus, the crisis of the party system has not translated into a crisis of the democratic regimes (Milmanda, 2013). Emergence of Direct Participatory Budgets, Democracy Innovations Democracy, and Other Growing disillusionment in political regimes and institutions has led to demands for more responsive and effective political institutions. Democracy innovations such as direct democracy and participatory budgets are examples of new institutional arrangements which seek to increase citizen participation in decision-making. In Latin America democracy some democracy innovations include: participatory budgeting in Brazil, the “Mesas de Concertacion”, in Peru, “Auditorias Articuladas” in Colombia, the “Consejos Gestores” in Brazil, and the “Consejos Autogestivos” in Mexico are just some examples of these new citizen-led 17 Politikon: IAPSS Political Science Journal arrangements (Dagnino, Olvera & Panfichi, 2006). Although occurring less in Africa, some local governments have experimented with participatory institutions (see Santos, 1998; Heller, 2001; Fung & Wright, 2003). Examples include participatory budgeting in South Africa and recent mobilization in hopes of implementing direct democracy institutions in Kenya. Although promising, it’s still unclear whether democracy innovations can coexist with traditional representative institutions in these regions and what their impact can be. Economic Transformations: Inequality & the Rise of the Middle Class Recent economic transformations in Latin America and “dual transitions” of economic and political reform in Africa have produced high level of dynamic economic growth. As a result and despite the global financial crisis, Africa is currently home to some of the fastest growing economies in the world Ethiopia, Ghana, Mozambique, and Tanzania. This growth has helped build a burgeoning middle class, which has created new markets for goods and services. In addition to growing consumer markets, African countries have discovered additional natural resources which if managed properly, could help spur further economic growth and development in the region. Nevertheless, despite this growth, the regions are still affected by high levels of economic inequality and political exclusion. The situation is direr in Africa, were almost one out of every two Africans continues to live in extreme povertyi. Optimistically, the World Bank (2013) suggests that this rate will fall to between 16& and 30% by 2030. Vol. 22, April 2014 As discussed earlier, democratization in Africa has had a significant impact in the promotion of international trade as a key element to development. The existence of democratic governments has also facilitated international support from donors. For our policy paper exploring aid trends, we will opt for a more policy-oriented analysis than the previous ones. In this paper, we will focus on the characteristics and implications of the Aid for Trade initiative in Africa and its relationship with democratization processes and the promotion of international and intraregional trade. Several reasons for focusing on Aid for Trade are: First, unlike other forms of development assistance, it focuses on matters of economic growth and job creation, helping developing countries to move from reliance on aid to the use of trade to generate higher standards of living. Also, since it was launched in the 2005 World Trade Organization (WTO) Ministerial meeting, it represents an acceptance by donors that trade is an important means to growth and development. However, substantial supplyside investments and policy reforms are necessary to help developing countries lower the cost of trading, increase productivity, help firms diversify into new export products, and integrate into global value chains. Thus, it seeks to mobilize resources to assist developing countries to build supply capacity and trade-related skills. Second, Aid for Trade is growing in importance. It now accounts for 25% of total Official Development Assistance (ODA) (OECD, 2011). Its disbursements have grown steadily - almost doubling for the Least Developed Countries (LDCs) category in which Sub-Saharan Africa is the largest regional recipient. Disbursements have increased from US$ 4.8 billion in 2005 to US$ 8.8 billion in 2010 (UNCTAD, 2012). New Aid Trends: Aid for Trade 18 Politikon: IAPSS Political Science Journal The Initiative does not substitute other ODA disbursements but rather calls for more resources which are directed to: (1 building productive capacity; (2 economic infrastructures; (3 trade-related adjustment; and (4 trade policy and regulations. By addressing these constrains, it seeks to help LDCs be more active players in global trading - helping them tackle obstacles to trade by mainstreaming trade policies into national development strategies, setting up the structures needed to coordinate the delivery of technical assistance and promoting trade capacity building. Emerging Trends in Societies Latin America and Africa Social Media and Internet; the New "Public Space" Internet, communication, technologies (ICTs) are transforming world politics. The current “information revolution" is based on rapid technological advances in computers, communications, and software that in turn have led to dramatic decreases in the cost of processing and transmitting information1. In a world that’s increasingly complex and globalized, there is a growing interdependence among societies around the globe. After decades of political change, especially the formal acquisition of participatory democracy, now we can see the increase of political participation in the regions’ citizens. Africa and Latin America have not been spared from the disruption of the Internet and social media. Although, Africa lags behind most other regions when it comes to number of Internet users, there are still an estimated 100 million users since the end of 2010. This number is expected to grow as the number of people with Internet access has quadrupled since 2000 and cell-phone usage has been greater in Africa than in any other region of the world. Currently, seven 1 Understanding International Conflicts, and introduction to theory and history. Joseph Nye, Jr. 7th edition. Vol. 22, April 2014 in ten Africans own their own mobile phones, with access essentially universal in Algeria and Senegal, according to Afrobarometer findings from across 34 countries. Still, the shortage of electricity and broadband infrastructure, coupled with the high cost of hardware will continue to present barriers to Internet access. However, Africans are increasingly using ICTs in their social and political life. For example, in Botswana, voters are progressively bypassing traditional media and turning to social networks for their news.ii At the same time, in 2009, Facebook became the most visited website in Africa and Twitter and YouTube, rank among the most visited websites in most African countries2. The number of Facebook users in Africa grew from 10 million in 2009 to over 17 million in 20103. On the other hand, Latin America has the fastest growing Internet market in the world, having increased 12% in the past year to more than 147 million unique visitors in March 2013iii. Brazil for example is home to the region's largest number of Internet users, 62 million. Latin America also leads the way in regards to number of social network users. Impact of Increasing Urbanization Lastly, we will explore urbanization in Africa and Latin America. In Africa, more than 30% of all Africans now live in cities (up from 15% in 1965) – and this number is expected to rise. Also, Latin America is more urbanized than any other region in the developing world, with 75% of its people living in cities todayv. 2 See more at: http://www.un.org/africarenewal/magazine/dece mber-2010/social-media-boom-beginsafrica#sthash.EB1Z2CB2.dpuf. 3 Ibid 19 Politikon: IAPSS Political Science Journal In Africa, the shift from rural to urban life has been crucial for galvanizing economic development because cities bring people with goods and ideas together with those who have capital. Urbanization in Africa, is also forcing members of different tribes to interact with each other. In Latin America, urbanization has raised concerns regarding Vol. 22, April 2014 crime and drug use. All of which can be explored in a future paper. 20 Politikon: IAPSS Political Science Journal Vol. 22, April 2014 From Mere Presence to “Actorness” in International Affairs: Upgrading the EU’s Role to Global IAPSS Think Tank Working Group 3 : Josep GOMILLA PUIGSERVER, Magdalena NASIENIAK, Rachel PETILLO, Scott Nicholas ROMANIUK Introduction T he European Union (EU), with its 504 million citizens, forms one of the largest markets worldwide accounting for approximately 25% of the world economy. Its (global) role, to a large extent, has been based on its ability to act as a standard-setter through the promotion of its normative foundations, such as democracy and human rights, liberal-market economies, and multilateral governance, making it one of the major development assistance donors.4 The actual performance of the EU presents an ambiguous assessment of the EU’s “actorness.”5 agenda (dominated financial policy). by economic and This policy paper aims to review the EU’s current performance with reference to the main areas of European foreign policy and external governance, and to comment on the potential to upgrade the EU’s role one of global “actorness.” The simple scale of issues related to EU policy makes the EU, at least, prima facie present on the international stage; however, its “actorness” depends on a capacity to perform coherently, consistently, and effectively. The complex cross-pillar structure of EU’s external action is one of the main reasons for the EU’s lack of overall effectiveness, and thus, the restructuring of the institutional system has emerged as the key provision for upgrading the EU’s global performance. The current economic crisis has created an unfavourable environment for upgrading the EU’s performance to that of global by prompting a widespread austerity approach linked to the reduction of the EU’s budget and diversion of the EU’s attention from external events to an internal 4 In the academic literature the EU has been referred to as a normative/civil/ethical power. See, for example Manners, I. (2002). Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?, Journal of Common Market Studies, 40(2): pp. 235-58; Larsen, H. (2002). The EU: A Global Military Actor?, Cooperation and Conflict, 37(3): pp. 283302; Aggestam, L. (2008). Introduction: Ethical Power Europe?, International Affairs, 84(1): pp. 111. 5 21 Politikon: IAPSS Political Science Journal Vol. 22, April 2014 Figure 1: EU population in comparison with rest of the world (%). Source: Eurostat (2013). “The EU in the World 2013: A Statistical Portrait,” Belgium 2012. Figure 2: EU’s GDP share in comparison with the rest of the world (%). Source: Eurostat (2013) ‘The EU in the World 2013: A Statistical Portrait’, Belgium 2012. Policy-Making System Upgrading of the High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) was seen as a solution for bridging divisions at the institutional level as well as various policy areas within the realm of external action. The new actor (the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy) was tasked with performing functions of the former-High Representative, the Commissioner for External Affairs, and the rotating Council presidency. This tripartite position enabled the establishment of a position from which overseeing and coordinating the EU’s external relations across various institutional levels and policy areas could be possible. However, with no explicit system of deputation this became a near impossible task. The newly established European External Action Service (EEAS) along with upgraded EU Delegations abroad, provided an additional institutional base for ensuring coherence and consistency within EU 22 Politikon: IAPSS Political Science Journal external action. The post of the President of the European Council (EC) is to contribute by providing strategic guidance at the highest political level. Maintaining distinctive decision-making procedures even though the pillar-structure was formally abolished undermined the latter provision. Therefore, while the policy areas concerning trade and development are pursued within a Community-framework and correspond method, the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) is maintained within the intergovernmental framework6. Nevertheless, with the introduction of a legal “personality” of the EU, negotiating and reaching international agreements is now subject to a single legal procedure and so ensures a legal basis for the EU’s global performance. With only general provisions and no clear division of labour, the new set-up was determined to a large extent by the subsequent informal adaptation. The Arab Spring (including the military operation in Libya), the Palestinian bid for its statehood at the United Nations (UN) level, and the war in Syria, provided a challenging context for testing the new European foreign policy and security apparatus while proving that the impact of the supranational leadership when it came to ensuring a coherent response among the member states (MS) remained limited. The unclear division of labour triggered turf wars among the various actors, which brought about further confusion as regards the EU’s external representation.7 Exporting Values: The EU’s European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) Since 2004, the ENP has been employed by the EU as an instrument of coherence as Vol. 22, April 2014 part of its external policy. This change of strategy in the external action is a consequence of the weakness of the Declaration of Barcelona in 1995. The ENP strategy in 2004 and 2007 focus its goals and give specific weight to potential MS. In this sense, places like the South Caucasus and Belarus obtained more importance8 in the external action arena. During the last nine years, the ENP has been understood as an instrument to export EU rules and values to its neighbours9. While there is no clear definition of “shared European values,” the inquiry here looks a those values commonly associated with the Copenhagen political criteria developed by the EU in the context of the 2004 eastward enlargement10. So-called “European values” distribution has been one of the most conflictive points during recent years and one of the main reasons for difficulties in ENP implementation. The gap between the ENP as a program and the political, economic, and, social reality of the third partners reached its climax when the uprisings known collectively as the “Arab Springs” occurred in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. During the March 2013 ENP revision, the EU changed its imposing democratic and human rights values so that it could assume the role of observing-actor while simultaneously allowing the internal politics of the states in ENP to assume their own course. Notwithstanding this change, the EU continues to employ the ENP with democracy promotion as one of its main goals, yet the EU has demonstrated an understanding that objectives are achieved 6 The original plan to establish a single legal framework for the “Union’s External Action” as expressed in the Constitutional Treaty was not maintained in the Lisbon Treaty. 7 The 2010 EU-summit in May of 2010 was allegedly cancelled by US President Barack Obama due to turf wars at the European level about who should represent the EU – the Spanish PM who was then chair of the Council Presidency or Herman von Rompuy who was President of the EC. 8 COM (2004). 373 Relative to the ENP. Del Sarto, R. A. (July 14, 2013). “Normative Empire Europe: The EU and its Borderlands,” Conference at the ENP PhD Summer School, College of Europe, July 14, 2013. 10 G. Bosse (2007). “Values in the EU’s Neighbourhood Policy: Political Rhetoric or Reflection of a Coherent Policy?,” European Political Economy Review, 7: pp. 38-62. 9 23 Politikon: IAPSS Political Science Journal when governments and civil society are both ready and willing to act accordingly11. Despite its efforts to change and adapt the ENP to new and emerging geopolitical realities, the EU should step-up and streamline its responses to some of the existing conflicts that are currently taking place within its neighbourhood. The EU lost a lot of time while deciding its position at the beginning of the Syrian “conflict.” Its lack of agility in reaching a quick and common response was observed during previous weeks with respect to the refugee shipwrecks that have taken place off the coast of Lampedusa, Italy. No solution has been reached even after the October 24, 2013 EC summit. The EU can still strengthen its common responses regarding an extensive range of issues. The upcoming Eastern Partnership Summit provides a solid venue for the EU to present itself as a strong actor with specific and readily applicable expertise. The ENP will face major challenges as part of EU external policy and governance, however, it presents the EU with major opportunity to come forward as a actor able to resolve conflict and crises quickly while the international community looks on. ESDP/CSDP: EU Military Capabilities “The Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible forces, the means to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond.”12 This sentiment was express by France’s former-President Jacques Chirac and former-Prime Minister (PM) Tony Blair at St. Malo in 1998 where and when issues of the Petersburg tasks, Amsterdam Treaty, and progression of both CFSP and ESDP were addressed. The Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) evolved from the European Security and Defence Policy 11 JOIN (2013). 4 Final. European Neighbourhood Policy: Working Towards a Stronger Partnership. 12 Franco-British Summit Joint Declaration on European Defence, St. Malo, December 4, 1990. <www.atlanticcommunity.org/SaintMalo%20Declaration%20Text.html>. Vol. 22, April 2014 (ESDP), both of which constituted a major part of the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). The ambitions embedded within the CSDP are part of the EU’s strategic vision to act strongly and coherently in the face of regional, interregional, and international conflict and crises. Approval of the European Security Strategy (ESS) in 2003 stands as a momentous occasion in the development of the EU and it’s “actorness” for signalling the first instance in which the EU drafted and implemented a joint security strategy akin to the National Security Strategy (NSS) of the US. Several successful missions characterize the CSDP as a praiseworthy instrument of EU state-building and legitimizing condition of the Union as a major player at home and abroad. Recent intervention missions of the EU include “EUFOR Concordia” (Republic of Macedonia) (together with NATO military assets), “Operation Artemis” (Democratic Republic of Congo) (together with the UN), and further missions in Georgia, Indonesia (Aceh), Sudan, Palestine, Ukraine-Moldova, and Iraq. The EU Operations Centre, sited in Brussels, commands a still-limited military force. Five national operations headquarters (HQs) also comprise the general structure and content of this particular domain of EU policy.13 Criticism regarding the EU’s current state of military strength, partially prompted by sharp budget reductions made across the European continent, has made comparable the EU of today with its former-state in 1991, when Belgium’s foreign affairs minister described Europe as a “military worm.” While national constituents of the EU have shown discordant commitments and contributions to the Union’s overall military strength, they have (more importantly) made deep cuts to their respective defence budgets resulting extensive military discharges and military limitations in numerous dimensions. With its 13 EU Operations Centre. <www.consilium.europa.eu>. 24 Politikon: IAPSS Political Science Journal reliance on military assets from NATO, the US, and lack of capacity to project its existing military capabilities far abroad and in ample force, the EU’s CSDP arguably brandishes a spear with no head. Beyond Europe: The EU Worldwide Regional cooperation between the EU and Africa started in the 1980s as a way of achieving change in trade policies2, not only in Africa but also in lesser-developed countries (LDCs). Europe-Africa cooperation gradually evolved since the 1980s, culminating in the EU-Africa summit in Cairo (2000). The Lisbon Treaty (2007) saw a politicisation of cooperation, and the Joint Africa-EU Strategy was approved. From 2008-2010, the EU and Africa developed an Action Plan (AP), which was updated in 2011. This “Second Action Plan” emphasizes the most recent “priorities,” including policy dialogue and coordination, as well as strengthening capacities of African Union (AU) bodies. The main issue regarding EU-Africa relations consists of hidden neo-colonialism nestled within various development policies. The EU represents a model for Latin American countries in addition to the EEAS (MERCOSUR) being a primary success story of the application of the European model in the region. American presence in the region can potentially temper the effects of such a model. Despite the applicability of the EU model to Latin America, relations between the two remain conditioned by variable global governance dynamics. The behaviour of the United States (US) after 9/11 has shifted the position of the EU to a closer relationship with Latin American countries. However, trade-related issues, which the crisis has made more problematic, still pose an obstacle to the promotion of values in the region, which are vital to assess the success of the European model on a global level. With their large populations and economic growth record and potential, Asian countries play a central role in Europe’s foreign policy Vol. 22, April 2014 strategy. The EU exports a wide range of products and commodities to Asia including normative aspects of security and human rights. Since the establishment of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Regional Forum (ARF), the EU has been adopting a “comprehensive” approach toward Asia based on the so-called “Three Ds:” Defence, Diplomacy, and Development. In 1996, a platform of dialogue was established through the Asia Europe Meeting (ASEM), foreseeing summits every two years with the next one scheduled to take place in Brussels in 2014. In 2001, the EU adopted the “Europe and Asia” Strategy with a strong commitment toward mutual security objectives being injected into the 2003 ESS that was also reflected in the subsequent strategy adopted for the period 2014-2020. Conclusions The EU’s ability to act globally has been influenced by its complex structure of external action formulated through distinctive decision-making processes and various actors at both European and national levels. Even though the Lisbon Treaty formally abolished the three-pillar architecture, it has been maintained informally as an inter-governmental method of the CFSP. Such a complex structure requires extensive coordination and proactive leadership in fostering common positions between various European and national actors, and across various policy areas. While stronger and more determined coordination and clear division between the EEAS and the Commission should be ensured, the political will of the MS is key to ensuring that the new institutional architecture leads to the upgrading of the EU’s external role and its performance. Greater involvement of foreign ministers through their particular thematic or/and geographical specialisations could contribute to a greater sense of ownership at the national level toward the EU’s external action. 25 Politikon: IAPSS Political Science Journal Vol. 22, April 2014 The EU also needs to clarify its interests and projected values in order to ensure an element of strategic guidance. The availability of the diverse toolbox at the disposal of the EU makes it a potentially strong actor in the complex thematic and geographical issues of the contemporary international environment, which requires a comprehensive approach toward such issues as climate change, energy security, sustainable development, and migration, among others. The recent exercise of the European Global Strategy (EGS) undertaken by think tanks in Sweden, Spain, Poland, and Italy has offered a unique platform for discussing items of the EU’s future strategic agenda. Both the breadth and depth of EU policy externally clearly makes the EU present on the global scale. Nevertheless, with recent events shifting international attention away from Europe, budget cuts, prolonged downturn, inconsistent policy, this will not be enough to ensure much less maintain its global role. Effective leadership and clear strategic priorities are required in order to successfully exercise EU influence externally, but most of all, the EU needs to take decisive steps regarding its image in order to restore its attractiveness as an actor capable of being truly global.14 14 Africa Continues to Grow Strongly but Poverty and Inequality Remain Persistently High, World Bank 2013 ii The rising power of social media in African politics. iii 2013 Latin America Digital Future in Focus iv 2013 Digital Future in Focus v Population Reference Bureau, 2012 World Population Data Sheet, 2012. 26 Politikon: IAPSS Political Science Journal Vol. 22, April 2014 Terrorist Attacks & Presidential Approval Rating Elizabeth BENNETT15, New York University Abstract A fter the attacks of September 11th the U.S. focused much of its foreign policy efforts on the War on Terror and prevention of another attack on U.S. soil. This paper will look at terrorist attacks dating back to 1970 in order to fully understand the impact of terrorist attacks on U.S. presidential approval ratings and the existence of the ‘rally around the flag’ effect during different administrations. Location, lethality, style, and political affiliation of the president will be variables focused on in a pre and post 9/11 context. This paper will give special consideration to 9/11, excluding the attacks in many cases, in order to view if there is a significant stable impact on approval ratings from terrorist attacks over time. 15 Elizabeth Bennett, 22, Albany NY, is a graduate student at New York University pursuing an M.A. in International Relations/International Security. In 2013 she received her Bachelor of Science degree in Managerial Economics from Bentley University. Her interests include security studies, terrorism, and South Asia/Middle East affairs. 27 Politikon: IAPSS Political Science Journal P Vol. 22, March 2014 Introduction resident George W. Bush’s first term in office was met with an alltime high presidential approval rating of 90 percent. This spike in approval ratings after the attacks of September 11th is attributed to the nation uniting under the president for support and leadership, an effect know as the ‘rally around the flag’ effect, previously applied to international crisis and is now viewed with terrorist attacks. This study looks at this type and similar effects on how terrorist attacks are a determinate of United States presidential approval. Attacks both domestic and abroad will be used at that were against U.S. citizens and U.S. interests. Although the statistics have few domestic attacks included, tactics and strategies used by terrorist organizations are evolving, keeping relevant the real and perceived threat of large-scale domestic attack. Presidential approval rating fluctuations are attributed to many inputs, economic and otherwise. If terrorist attacks do have a significant effect on approval rating then the characteristics of the attack will be analyzed as well. As mentioned there has been a domestic terrorist attack in just more than one percent of all months from 1970 to 2010, so it is this infrequent type of attack that tends to result in a large rally round the flag effect. For a presidential administration the goal of limited U.S. deaths in these attacks have been successful, with only three attacks with more than 100 Americans died. But depending on the type of lethal attack used by the group could determine the outcome of the impact. To view the impact of these effects, this paper will look at 1) the number of attacks per month, 2) the location of the attack being domestic or in the Middle East, 3) the number of U.S. citizens killed in different attack types such as bargaining (hijacking, skyjacking, and kidnapping), bombings and infrastructure attacks, 4) the impact of being a Republican president when there is a lethal attack, and 5) the impact of being a Republican president during a domestic attack. Terrorist methods, tactics, and targets have and continue to evolve but the impact of these attacks on approval ratings is predicted to show stability over a considerable amount of time. As the fight against terrorism wages on presidential approval ratings remain susceptible to attacks and public perception of the handling of an attack. And although terrorist attacks are only one of many variables in approval ratings, attacks from pre and post 9/11 remain a significant variable. Literature Review Since the attacks of September 11th (9/11) several studies have explored the relationship between terrorist attacks and the presidential approval rating. Controlling for the economy, scandals, and war, Guilmartin (2004) analyzes presidential approval ratings from 1942-2002 concluding there is a significant relationship between the incidence of terrorist attacks and the approval rating. This study showed that after a lethal terrorist attack Republican presidents experience an increase in approval rating relative to Democrat presidents as well as a relative increase for a Republican presidents when attacks are kidnappings, hostages, and hijackings involving American citizens. And lastly Guilmartin finds that terrorist attacks in the Middle East are positively related to approval in the month following the attack. There have been additional studies on the ‘rally-round-the-flag’ effect dating back to President Carter up to the most recent administrations. The ‘rally round the flag’ effect introduced by Mueller (1973) has three main aspects: an international event that sparks crisis, the event must involve president directly, and the event must be sharp, focused and dramatic. Brody (1984) further explains that the phenomenon 28 Politikon: IAPSS Political Science Journal results from an international crisis where the country is united around the president, stating the effect will only last as long as the crisis. Callaghan and Virtanen (1993) cite the great increase in Carters presidential approval rating at the onset of the Iranian hostage crisis, thus showing the bipartisan impact and susceptibility of all political groups to this effect. In this case independents increased their approval of Carter by 27 percentage points and Republicans and Democrats by 10 and 14 percentage points respectively. Further studies by Hetherington and Nelson (2003) compared presidential approval to three major terror attacks, showing President George W. Bush’s presidential approval rating that increased from 57 percent to 90 percent after the attacks of 9/11. A study differing from most in its field by Johnasen (2008) uses an increase in the level of terror alert to view the impact on presidential approval. Controlling for war, campaigning, and the state of the economy the hypothesis states: when there is a change in the terror alert level, presidential approval increases. In this study the hypothesized relationship between approval ratings and the level of the terror alert (Johnasen). Using the data and results, Johnasen concludes the relationship between the increase of 33 percentage points in presidential approval for George W. Bush is not directly from the rally round the flag effect yet more from a public evaluation of the president’s handling of the crisis and resulting foreign policy. Shambaugh (2004) using Gallup Poll data from 1980-2003, demonstrates that the “best predictor of presidential approval following an attack is the level of presidential approval before the attack”. Acknowledging the change in approval ratings may be from a lack of public awareness and with increased salience of terrorism after an attack it is expected to have a larger impact on presidential approval, in particular when the human and material cost of terrorism is high. Vol. 22, March 2014 While the sheer incident of a terrorist attack can directly impact approval rating, many studies test the type of terrorist attack to show level of significance on presidential approval. Using data from Terrorism in the 20th Century, Guilmartin breaks down attacks into categories: was the attack domestic or was it against U.S. citizens abroad, if the attack was foreign, was it in the Middle East, how many people were killed, and what tactics were used- bombing, kidnapping, assassination, skyjacking/hijacking, or hostage taking, and how many attacks occurred between polling periods. Guilmartin’s results show by breaking down the type of terrorist attack that every person killed in a terror related “hostage, skyjacking, hijacking, or kidnapping situation, there is a predicted increase of .06 points approval” whereas bombings resulted in a negative correlation with presidential approval. James and Rioux (1998) add in a variable for the use of force after a terror attack on presidential approval. This variable is used along with time, economy, crisis level, region of attack, U.S. response, U.S.S.R. activity in attack, and causalities. The use of force is measured in ranges of: no use of force, minor use of force, one major force component or strategic nuclear unit, or two or three major force components are used, plus at least one strategic nuclear unit. This study finds the positive impact of rally effect resulting from a terrorist attack is sensitive to the resulting use of force and depending on the level applied the resulting costs could outweigh or negative the initial approval increase. Further James and Rioux show that with a use of force the members of the presidents opposing party will show the greatest decrease in support. Studies on determinants of presidential approval use both economic and noneconomic indicators to analyze impacts of each. Fox & Phillips use real GDP growth, target unemployment, and inflation to view the importance of economic 29 Politikon: IAPSS Political Science Journal conditions to people when determining presidential approval. Winder (2002) also uses unemployment and inflation rate, as well as the honeymoon effect in a regression of presidential approval. This study by Winder breaks down the importance of economic variables concluding although both coefficients for unemployment and inflation were negative, economic variables more significant to males than females in their approval of the president. Both Fox and Phillips and Berlemann and Enkelmann include variables for scandal and war, where scandal is included that represents the negative public personal and political incidents, such as Watergate and the IranContra scandal, to control for shift in popularity due to these events. These studies factor in the impact of terror attacks retain focus on economic determinants and from that which economic determinant is most influential for the political party of the president (Berlemann and Enkelmann). This study will use similar framework as prior studies to control for variables of: honeymoon, war, scandal, and unemployment. Using the rally round the flag effect as basic framework for time series analysis beginning at 1970 terrorist attack characteristics will be used to analyze the various types and degree of the effects. Location is an important variable in terrorist attacks and approval ratings, like similar studies a dummy variable for domestic attacks will but used, as well a variable for terrorist attacks in the Middle East. Other variables such as attack lethality and attack type will be used in a similar manner to prior studies. All of these terrorist attack variables will largely determine if a rally effect takes place and if so the scale and duration of the effect. Theoretical Model Much presidential literature shows the strong correlation between economic indicators such as unemployment and approval ratings. Concluding a negative correlation as unemployment goes up presidential approval goes down. Similarly, Vol. 22, March 2014 there is a strong positive correlation between GDP growth rates and approval rating. A non-economic indicator such as scandal is unanimously believed to have a negative effect on approval rating. But in other factors such as domestic and international crisis have more variation in their outcomes. John Mueller (1973) first introduced the rally around the flag effect. This theory includes three aspects: event is an international event that triggers crisis, second that the event must involve the president directly, and third that event must be dramatic and focused. This effect, when all three aspects are met, can greatly increase presidential approval. This theory states it is a natural reaction and a symbol of unity to support the president in the time of crisis regardless of politics or policies. The duration of this effect is believed to be only a few months, regardless of the outcome of the crisis. It was Hetherington and Nelson (2003) that first applied this rally round the flag effect to the attacks 9/11 increasing the scope of this effect to domestic crisis. This effect is clearly visible after the attacks of 9/11 with the spike in President George W. Bush approval ratings, figure 1. At this point once the ‘rally round the flag’ effect was applied to domestic events such as 9/11, various characteristics were introduced in order to further analyze the degree of impact from a domestic terrorist attack. Major variables include the location of the attack, the lethality of the attack, and political party of the president at the time of the attack. Five different OLS models will be used in order to test the impact of these factors on the rally round the flag effect. In around 44 percent of the months in dataset there has been no incident of terrorist attacks (figure 2) and almost 99 percent of the months there were no attacks on domestic soil (figure 3). Attacks in the Middle East occurred more frequently with 24 percent of the months experiencing an attack in the Middle East (figure 4). The lethality of all of the terrorist attacks has been minimal since 1970 in this dataset there 30 Politikon: IAPSS Political Science Journal Vol. 22, March 2014 is only two recorded attacks with 100 or more U.S. citizens killed, once of which being 9/11. Since this variable is measured in one U.S. citizen killed it will still remain an important factor in approval ratings. measured by the frequency of attacks in said month and in the prior month for the lagged variable num_montht-1. With over 400 months (figure 5) with no attack or an attack resulting in no U.S. lives lost, it is predicted that a high profile attack like a hijacking will result in a positive impact on approval ratings. For the most part, Americans have been free of terrorist attacks at home and abroad. But when attacks do occur it is likely that Americans look to the president for unity and support until the situation has been resolved or diffused. To analyze the impact of the varying types of lethal of attacks on presidential approval the following variables are used: number of U.S. killed (nkilledUS), number of U.S. killed in bombing attack (nkilledUSbomb), number of U.S. killed in infrastructure attack (nkilledUSinfra), and number of U.S. killed in bargaining attack (nkilledbar). The number of U.S. killed is a measure of how many U.S. citizens were killed in a month with an attack. To separate by attack type, the number of U.S. killed in a bombing attack is measured in number of U.S. citizens killed in a bombing type attack in that month. Number of U.S. killed in bargaining attack and infrastructure attack are similar variables to number U.S. killed in bombing but the type of attack is changed to view effect. Data and Variables The dependent variable for this study is national presidential approval rating on a monthly basis from 1970-2010 that results in 491 observations for this data set. Data for this variable was collected from Gallup, where the polling question asks people if they approve or disapprove of how the president is handling his job. Statistics on this variable and all independent variables can be found in table 1. Data for the independent varaibles on terrorists attacks comes from the Global Terrorism Databse. Here only attacks were used if the target was a U.S. citizen or if the attack was against U.S. interests, including ships, buildings, etc., regardless of the location or magnitude of the attack. These terrorist attacks are additionally sorted by attacks perpetrated by a group of 53 foreign non-state organizations identified by the Department of State as posing the greatest threats to U.S. citizens. The independent variable, terrorist attack, is a dummy variable that will have a 1 if an attack occurred in that month and a 0 if no attack occurred. The lagged incidence of terrorist attacks will show the delayed influence, measured if an attack happened in the previous month. The variable num_month is the number of terrorist attacks per month that will be Terrorist Attack Variables The variables analyzing the location of the attack have been coded into two dummy variables: domestic and Middle East. Domestic is given a 1 if attack occurred in the United States and a 0 if attack occurred anywhere else. Middle East is given a 1 if the attack occurred in the Middle East and a 0 if attack occurred anywhere else. An interaction term of GOP_nkilledUS is used to view the impact of the number of U.S. citizens killed in an attack if the president was a Republican, relative to a Democrat president. And lastly GOP_Domestic was coded to look at the impact on ratings during a Republican presidency if there was a domestic attack relative to the impact if the president was a Democrat. This data viewed on a monthly basis is from the Global Terrorism Database and descriptive statistics for this data can be found in table 1. Economic and Other Variables 31 Politikon: IAPSS Political Science Journal Presidential approval ratings are susceptible to the state of the economy, war, and scandal during the time in office. To control for the amount of time the president has been in office the log of time is used, which is measured by number of days the president has been in office. And the honeymoon variable is created to control for the honeymoon effect a president enjoys the first seven months of his administration, here a 1 is entered for the first seven months of each president’s term and a 0 for all of the other months outside of the honeymoon time frame. Due to the influence the economic conditions have on presidential approval rating each month, the variable of lagged unemployed is used to control for the effect of changing economic conditions during a presidency. This national monthly data was obtained from the St. Louis Fed and is measured in percentage points. A control for the attacks of 9/11 was created due to the outlying nature of the attack and great effect on presidential approval rating. Here a 1 is entered during the first four months after 9/11 and a 0 for all other times. The next variable is a dummy for GOP that is a measure of the president’s political party, if Republican will be coded as a one 1 and all other political affiliation is given a 0. Finally to control for personal and administration scandal, the dummy for scandal variable is included. During the times of Watergate 04/197307/1974, Iran-Contra 12/1986-12/1988, and the Lewinsky scandal 01/1998-08/1998 a 1 was entered and all other times a 0 was assigned. Data on scandals is sourced from “Presidential Scandals and Job Approval”. Descriptive statistics for this data is found in table 1. Empirical Methodology With approval ratings influenced by both economic and noneconomic indicators in order to view the effects of all of the variables five OLS regression models were run under: number of attacks per month, location of attack, lethality and type of Vol. 22, March 2014 attack, lethality of attack when president was Republican, and impact of a domestic attack when a Republican is president. If the first model results in a significant impact on presidential approval ratings, the subsequent models will provide clarity on significant attack characteristics and their impact. The following OLS regression models use the same dependent variable: presidential approval rating on a monthly basis from 1970-2010. In order to test if the occurrence of a terrorist attack is significant on presidential approval ratings the following model was used: PAR= B0+B1(num_montht-1) + (1) B2(lntime) + B3(honeymoon) + B4(wartimet-1) + B5(unemploymentt-1) + B6(scandal) +B7(Indicator_911) +B8(monthdummy2) +…B18(monthdummy12)+B19(yeardumm y2)+…B58(yeardummy41) It is expect when there is a terrorist attack in the prior month it will result in a positive effect on PAR (B1>0). This conclusion is drawn from the rally effect theory a president experiences after a terrorist attack. All of the models include: the log of days in office (lntime), honeymoon, unemployment, scandal, wartime, a 9/11 indicator, and month and year dummies. Both controlling for time president has been in office honeymoon is expected to be positive (B3>0) while the log of time is expected to be negative (B2<0). Scandal is included due to the public nature of these adverse events and it is expected to have a negative impact on popularity for the presidential administration (B6<0). The wartime dummy variable because presidential approval prone to public perception of the war is anticipated to result in a negative coefficient (B4<0). The lagged unemployment percentage is included in all of the models due to the inverse relationship between increasing unemployment and presidential approval (B5<0) (Fox and Phillips). Again because the attacks of 9/11 are a considerable outlier in, a variation of this 32 Politikon: IAPSS Political Science Journal first model will be run to test if effect of a terrorist attack has been stable over a long period of time or if it has become significant in the decade since 9/11. To do this all of the dependent and independent variables remain the same, but the time frame of the model is shortened 1970-2000, in order to exclude 9/11. PAR= B0+B1(num_montht-1) + B (lntime) + B (honeymoon) + 2 3 (1a ) B4(wartimet-1) + B5(unemploymentt-1) + B6(scandal) +B8(monthdummy2) + …B18(monthdummy12) +B19(yeardummy2)+…B58(yeardummy32 ) The mean for attacks per month prior to 9/11 is equal to 1.33 which is slightly higher than the mean post 9/11 of .718 so it is predicted that the coefficient will be significant and very similar to the coefficient in the first attack. This result should exhibit that although the post 9/11 world has increased notice on counterterrorism and terrorist attacks the effect of an attack on approval ratings has been consistent over a considerable amount of time. To analyze the effect of location of a terrorist attack two dummy variables were coded, domestic and Middle East, to regress against presidential approval. Both the current and lagged month a used in the model along with all of the economic and time control variables from the prior regressions. The location model is as follows: PAR= B0+ B1(lntime)+B2(honeymoon)+ (2) B3(mideast)+ B4(mideastt-6)+ B5(domestic)+ B6(domestict-6) +B7(unemploymentt-1)+ B8(wartimet-1)+ B9(scandal) + B10(Indicator_911) + B11(monthdummy2) +…B21(monthdummy12) +B22(yeardummy2) +…B61(yeardummy41) For this model it was projected that an attack that occurred in the Middle East would result in a negative coefficient (B34<0) for both the current and lagged months. The negative coefficient for Middle Vol. 22, March 2014 East lagged six months (MidEastt-6) is predicted to show the degree in which the public approves the president’s handling of the attack in the long term. But if the attack was domestic then the coefficient for this dummy variable is expected to be positive (B5-6>0), resulting in a rally around the flag effect for the current president. Since most terrorist attacks are unique these characteristics will have a varying effect on presidential approval rating. The lethality of an attack (nkilledUS) is a variable which impact depends on the total U.S. citizens killed and the style of attack used by perpetrators. The following model was used to differentiate number of deaths and deaths resulting from a specific attack type. PAR= B0+B1(lntime)+B2(honeymoon) +B3(nkilledUSt-1) +B4(nkilledUSt-2) +B B6(nkilledbart-2) 5(nkilledbart-1) + (3) +B7(nkilledbombt-1)+ B8(nkilledbombtB9(nkilledinfrat-1) + 2)+ B10(nkilledinfrat-2) +B11(wartimet-1)+ B12(unemploymentt-1) + B13(scandal) +B14(Indicator_911) +B15(monthdummy2) +…B25(monthdummy12) +B26(yeardummy2)+…B64(yeardummy41 ) When breaking the characteristics of an attack down it is expected the coefficient for number of U.S. citizens killed lagged one month will be negative (B3<0), showing an inverse relationship with increasing number of U.S. deaths and approval. Also the same negative sign is expected for number killed in a bombing (B7<0) and number killed in an infrastructure (B9<0) attack lagged one month. For the number of U.S. citizens killed in bargaining attack (hijacking, skyjacking, kidnapping), due to the increase in media coverage, it is predicted that the coefficient for this variable would be positive (B5>0), resulting in a rally around the flag effect. For the next model the political party of the president is coded as a dummy variable with a 1 for Republican and 0 for a 33 Politikon: IAPSS Political Science Journal Democrat. An interaction term, GOP_nkilledUS was created to analyze the effect of a lethal terrorist attack for a Republican president relative to a Democrat. This variable is lagged for one and two months (GOP_nkilledUSt-1, GOP_nkilledUSt-2). The following OLS model was used: PAR= B0+ B1(lntime)+B2(honeymoon)+ (4) B3(GOP)+ B4(nkilledUS)+ B5(gop_nkilledUSt-1)+ B6(gop_nkilledUSt-2) +B7(wartimet)+B (unemployment ) + B 1 7 t-1 9(scandal) + B10(Indicator_911) +B11(monthdummy2) +…B21(monthdummy12) +B22(yeardummy2) +…B61(yeardummy41) For this model, it is predicted that if the president is a Republican a terrorist attack will have a larger positive impact on approval ratings than if president was a Democrat. Although this effect is projected to be small, it is significant in recalling that number of U.S. killed is measured per individual victim of the attack. Following the same method as model (4) here models (5) and (5a) look at the impact on a Republican president if there was a domestic attack, relative to if president was a Democrat. The following OLS model was used: PAR= B0+ B1(lntime)+B2(honeymoon)+ B4(Domestic)+ (5) B3(GOP)+ B5(GOP_Domestic)+B6(unemploymenttB7(wartimet-1)+ B8(scandal) + 1)+ B9(Indicator_911) + B10(monthdummy2) +…B20(monthdummy12) +B21(yeardummy2) +…B60(yeardummy41) For this model it is predicted that a Republican president would receive great positive effect from a domestic attack than a non-Republican president, resulting in a positive coefficient (B5>0). Just as in model (4) the effect of this interaction term will be small. Vol. 22, March 2014 Because the rally around the flag effect for President Bush was so great from the 9/11 attacks to test the stability of the coefficient in model (5), this model excludes 9/11 looking at the dataset from 1970-2000 on a monthly basis. The following OLS model, (5a), was used: PAR= B0+ B1(lntime)+B2(honeymoon)+ (5a) B3(GOP)+ B4(Domestic)+ B5(GOP_Domestic)+B6(unemploymenttB7(wartimet-1)+ B8(scandal) + 1)+ B9(monthdummy2) +…B19(monthdummy12) +B2(yeardummy2) +…B59(yeardummy32) It is predicted for this model and interaction term GOP_Domestic that the coefficient will be positive (B5>0), indicating a higher approval rating for Republicans than nonRepublican presidents following a domestic attack. This coefficient is predicted to be significant but smaller than the same coefficient in model (5). Findings Because this data set is a time series, it is to be expected that presidential approval rating from this month to be related to that of previous months. For all of the models a correction for serial correlation is used. For model (1), reported in table 2, the results predicted the number of attacks coefficient to be positive and significant at α= .05. The positive coefficient of .362 means with an increase of one more attack in the prior month, presidential approval rating will increase by .362 percentage points. Predicted approval rating at the beginning of a president’s administration (first twelve months) is 4.65 percentage points higher than after the honeymoon period. Once this time period is over the model predicts a decay in support with the log time of time coefficient -2.66, significant at α= .01, suggesting an increase of 100 percent days in office will decrease approval rating 2.66 percent. 34 Politikon: IAPSS Political Science Journal For economic variables, results were as predicted and similar the conclusion of Fox & Phillips. Unemployment as predicted has a negative significant coefficient of 2.19, meaning with an increase of unemployment by 1 percent, presidential approval ratings decease by 2.19 percentage points, significant at α= .05. Scandal was to capture the negative personal events in presidential administrations, the coefficient of -9.73, significant at α= .01, is as predicted. Lastly the control for 9/11 is used due to the magnitude of this event, as theorized with the rally round the flag effect this coefficient did in fact come out positive equal to 20.53, with significance at α= .01. With an original Durbin Watson statistic of 1.153, indicating a positive correlation, a correction for serial correlation was run on this model resulting in a new Durbin Watson statistic of 2.09. After running this correction the new coefficient remains positive at .0288 but is now not significant at α = .05. Number of attacks per month, with lost significant, can still be seen as a preliminary indicator that the incidence of terrorist attacks has some type of an impact on presidential approval ratings. In order to further conclude terrorist attacks are significant excluding 9/11 this same regression was run but with a limited time frame from 1970-2000. Results from this new model (1a) are in table 2, it is seen in the coefficient for number of attacks per month from the prior month is equal to .383 percentage points and significant with α= .05, which is very similar to the original coefficient including 9/11. From this coefficient it can be concluded that the structural effect of terrorist attacks on approval ratings has been stable over a long period of time, even though in the post 9/11 world there is an increased importance counterterrorism and the perceived role of the president in preventing attacks. Location of the attack can be a determinate in the scale of the ‘rally round the flag’ effect as discussed in prior studies. Vol. 22, March 2014 Results from model (2) are seen in table 2. The OLS model predicted that a domestic attack would have a larger positive impact on approval ratings then if attack were not on U.S. soil from the current month. The model predicted a negative impact from an attack 6 months prior in the Middle East on approval ratings. This model also included the log of time, honeymoon, scandal, wartime, 9/11 indicator, and month and year dummies all as controls. This OLS model concluded that a domestic attack will result in an increase of 8.06 percentage points in approval rating, relative to if attack was not domestic, significant at α= .01. Similarly this model provided expected results for the Middle East coefficient for an attack 6 months prior equal to -2.01 with significance. Because of serial correlation and a low original DW statistic of 1.16, again suggesting positive correlation, a correction for this serial correlation was run. After the correction the DW statistic was transformed to 2.07. The coefficient for Domestic remained significant at α= .05 with a p value of .016 and a coefficient of 4.48. This result confirms with prior studies by Callaghan and Virtanen the ‘rally round the flag’ that in this model shows an increase in approval rating of 4.48 percentage points, relative to attack that was not domestic. The coefficient for an attack in the Middle East 6 months prior remained significant for α = .05 with a p value of .012 and maintained the negative impact with a coefficient of -1.37 percentage points. This coefficient shows an attack in the Middle East lagged 6 months is a referendum on the presidents handling of the situation. It was hypothesized that varying attack styles resulting in U.S. citizens being killed would have different impacts on presidential approval in model (3). When there is an increase in one more U.S. citizen being killed in a bargaining style attack (hijacking, kidnapping, and skyjacking) that is type of attack would be the only one to have a positive result on presidential 35 Politikon: IAPSS Political Science Journal approval. This attack style is high in profile and receives more media attention and public awareness. If the attack was bargaining style, an increase of 1 in the number of U.S. killed in the attack, from two months prior, results in a decrease of -.942 percentage points in approval. For the number of U.S. killed in a bombing the coefficient was -.9089075. The number of U.S. killed in an infrastructure attack had the largest negative coefficient of -9.98. To compare which of the attack types had the largest impact on approval rating standardized betas where computed for all three attack types: bargaining attack= -11.12, bombing attack= -.829 and infrastructure attack= -.053. Bargaining was predicted to have the largest positive impact out of the three; from these standardized betas for every one standard deviation increase in number of U.S. killed in an attack presidential approval will go down 11.2 standard deviations. To correction for serial correlation, a new regression was run resulting in a transformed DW statistic from 1.22 to 2.097. The results from this regression again resulted in all negative coefficients: bargaining attack= -.443, bombing attack= .405 and infrastructure attack= -4.52. For no level significance at α=.01, .05, or .1 were the variables significant. Although this model lost significance after the serial correlation correction, the results reveal that no different style attack will yield a positive impact on presidential approval. Finally in the last models it is seen that political party of the president matters. The interaction term GOP_nkilledUS in an attack in OLS model (4) supports Fiorina and Guilmartin’s testing and conclusion that a Republican president will receive more confidence during times on international crisis. For this model the dummy variable for GOP, was significant at α= .01 with a coefficient of -18.79. The next variable, number of U.S. killed in an attack, was significant at α= .01 with a coefficient of Vol. 22, March 2014 .0117. This interaction term with a coefficient of .0066 confirms the positive put small increase of an increase in one U.S. citizen killed in an attack. These OLS results all were significant but positively correlated with a DW= 1.106. To correct for this serial correlation, a new model was run with a transformed DW=2.077. The results for this model were the same as predicted. The coefficient for the interaction term GOP_nkilledUSt-1 in an attack, one month lagged was equal to .0066. With significance at α= .01. This model confirms in removing correlation, the theory for Fiorina and Guilmartin’s conclusion is again supported for in a terrorist attack under a Republican president an increase U.S. citizen is killed one month prior has an approval rating .006 percentage points higher than a Democrat president. The next two models analyze the impact of a Republican being in office when a domestic attack occurs. The coefficient of this interaction term GOP_Domestic in model (5), table 2, was equal to 13.61 with significance at α= .01. Because of the positive correlation shown in the original DW=1.141, a correction was run transforming the DW statistic into 2.084. The new coefficient for GOP_Domestic is equal to 10.73 significant at α= .01. This interaction term shows that if a president is a Republican, a domestic attack will result in approval 10.73 percentage points higher relative to a non-Republican president. This importance of this term is limited due to the spike in approval Republican President George W. Bush received on 9/11. To view if this impact was stable over a long period of time, the model (5a) was run with data from 19702000, excluding 9/11. The coefficient for GOP_Domestic after a correction for serial correlation was equal to 2.207, but no longer with significance. After excluding 9/11 from the time frame, the model shows a Republican president when a domestic attack occurs will have an approval rating 36 Politikon: IAPSS Political Science Journal 2.207 percentage points higher than nonRepublican presidents. Although this value is insignificant it supports the theory of Fiorina and Guilmartin in Republican presidents receiving higher levels of confidence in international crisis. Conclusion The models demonstrate that although terrorist attacks are not the only determinate for approval ratings, the terrorist attacks remain a significant variable. Terrorist attacks are related to approval rating in the following ways: 1) Domestic attacks in the current month are positively related to presidential approval while attacks in the Middle East from 6 months prior are negatively related and significant. This suggesting the relationship between attacks in the Middle East is judgment on how the president handled the situation. 2) Bargaining type attacks (hijacking, kidnapping, skyjacking) are not positively related to approval ratings regardless of the increased media attention. 3) For Republican presidents that experience a domestic attack or an increase in U.S. deaths in an attack from the prior month receive high approval ratings than that of any other political party. This analysis supports the rally around the flag effect literature, especially for Republican presidents and those presidents who experienced domestic attacks. From these relationships the impact of a domestic attack and differences in political parties are most significant. We have only seen 6 domestic terrorist attacks since 1970 but combined these attacks have killed over 3,000 people and it will be these domestic attacks from the current month that will have one of the largest effects on approval ratings. The analysis of the impact of a president being a Republican resulted in small but significant results, again confirming Fiorina’s theory that Republican presidents historically receive higher confidence during international crisis. When a domestic attack occurs and when there is Vol. 22, March 2014 an increase of lives lost in an attack from prior months Republican presidents are receiving higher approval ratings, relative to Democrat presidents. Terrorist attacks are only one of many non-economic and economic variables that are determinants of presidential approval. But the above relationships remain consistent and relevant in this type of presidential approval rating analysis. It is only recently, post 9/11, that the rally round the flag effect has been applied to terrorist attacks, domestically and abroad. And while terrorist attacks continue to happen the rally around the flag effect and other effects will continue to play a role in presidential approval ratings. 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International Security and Arms ontrol Section of the American Political Science (2004). St. Louis FED. Civilian Unemployment Rate (UNRATE). 2012. <http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred 2/series/UNRATE>. Stapley, Criag. "The Domestic Rally Effect and Terrorism." Global Security Studies (2012). State, U.S. Dept. of. Foreign Terrorist Organizations. September 2012. <http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/oth er/des/123085.htm>. Willer. "HE EFFECTS OF GOVERNMENT-ISSUED TERROR WARNINGS ON PRESIDENTIAL APPROVAL." CURRENT RESEARCH IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY (2004). 38 Politikon: IAPSS Political Science Journal Vol. 22, March 2014 APPENDIX 1 Figure 1 President George W. Bush’s Presidential Approval Rating Jan-01 thru Feb-02 Figure 2 Frequency of Attacks per month 39 Politikon: IAPSS Political Science Journal Vol. 22, March 2014 Figure 2a Attacks per Year Figure 3 Frequency of Domestic Attacks per Month 40 Politikon: IAPSS Political Science Journal Vol. 22, March 2014 Figure 4 Frequency of Attack in the Middle East per Month Figure 5 Frequency of Lethal Attacks per Month 41 Politikon: IAPSS Political Science Journal Vol. 22, March 2014 APPENDIX 2 Table 1: Descriptive Statistics Variable Dependent Independent Independent Independent Independent Independent Independent Independent Independent Independent Independent Independent Independent Independent Independent Independent Independent Independent Presidential Approval Terrorist Attacks Description Presidential approval rate, measured in percentage points Terrorist attack, measured by number of terrorist attacks in a month Attacks per month Total terrorist attacks per month, measured in number of attacks Total U.S. Killed Total number of U.S. citizens killed in attack, measured in number of U.S. deaths Total Killed in Total number of U.S. killed in Bargaining Attack bargaining style attack Total Killed in Total number of U.S. killed in Bombing Attack bombing attack Total Killed in an Total number of U.S. killed in Infrastructure infrastructure attack Domestic Attack Was the attack perpetrated on U.S. soil, measured by location Middle East Attack Did attack happen in Middle East region, measured by the location of attack GOP*Number of Interaction term between GOP U.S. Killed and number of U.S. killed in an attack GOP*Domestic Interaction term between GOP and if attack was domestic U.S. in Wartime Was U.S. at war during time of attack Unemployment National unemployment rate, Rate measured in percentage points Honeymoon Popularity boost for first 12 months, the 1st month =12, and so on until the 12th month=1, & 0 for months thereafter GOP Dummy Variable. Equal to 1 if president was a Republican Log of Time in Log of the amount of time Office president has been in office, measured in number of days Scandal Dummy Variable. Equals 1 for the period 04/1973-07/1974, 12/1986-12/1988, 01/199808/1998 9/11 Indicator Dummy Variable. Equal to 1 for 5 months after 9/11 attack Number of observations Sample Statistics 51.601 (12.067) 0.562 (0.497) Sample Statistic (1970-2000) 52.07 (10.97) 1.179 (1.738) 1.33 (1.912) 7.36 (142.82) 6.527 (142.43) .7128 (10.999) .0041 (.0638) .0122 (.10998) .2383 (.4265) 7.189 (142.818) .0061 (.078) .3177 (.466) 6.3 (1.527) .169 (.3752) .0054 (.0732) .124 (.3300) 6.35 (1.434) .1586 (.366) .6599 (.4742) 6.697 (1.060) 6.70 (1.025) .1039 (.3054) .1370 (.3444) .0081 (.09) 491 371 Notes: Mean and standard deviation (in parenthesis) reported above. The mean for number of attacks per month post 9/11 was .718. 42 Politikon: IAPSS Political Science Journal Vol. 22, March 2014 Table 2: Regression Output Model Effect of Number of Attacks per Month (1) Dependent Variable Log of Days in Office Honeymoon Presidential Approval -2.66*** (.6898) 4.65* (2.562) .362** (.1696) Number of Attacks per Month Domestic Effect of Number of Attacks per Month 1970-2000 (1a) Presidential Approval -3.49*** (.794) 3.72 (2.66) .383** (1.80) Effect of Location (2) Effect of Number of U.S. Killed (3) Presidential Approval -2.859*** (.807) 7.35** (3.07) Presidential Approval -2.94*** (.844) 7.598** (3.14) 4.48** (1.86) .819 (1.72) -.390 (.538) -1.36** (.5401) Domestict-6 Middle East Middle Eastt-6 Number Killed US Number Killed Bargaining Attack Number Killed Bombing Attack Number Killed Infrastructure Attack GOP .443 (.3598) -.443 (.3598) Unemploymentt1 Scandal 9/11 Indicator Month Dummy Year Dummy R-Squared Observations Effect of Political Party with Domestic Attack (5) Presidential Approval -2.80*** (.803) 8.08*** (3.06) Effect of Political Party with Domestic Attack (5a) Presidential Approval -4.21*** (.953) 7.808** (3.27) -.897 (2.599) -.703 (2.96) -2.96 (6.32) -26.95*** (8.14) 10.73*** (3.644) 5.65** (2.36) -1.37 (.914) -6.64*** (2.31) 10.49*** (3.90) Yes Yes .4257 491 2.207 (4.23) 2.16 (2.87) -2.46** (1.20) -5.64** (2.42) .0104*** (.0015) -.405 (.3602) -4.52 (3.57) -4.49 (5.87) .0066*** (.0016) GOP*Number U.S. Killed GOP*Domestic Wartimet-1 Effect of Political Party with Number of U.S. Killed (4) Presidential Approval -2.74*** (.763) 7.96** (2.90) 9.22*** (2.04) -2.19** (.793) -9.73*** (2.11) 20.53*** (3.38) Yes Yes .7826 491 9.61*** (2.22) -3.33*** (.962) -9.67*** (2.16) Yes Yes .7289 371 5.88** (2.38) -1.55* (.928) -6.90** (2.35) 8.73** (3.87) Yes Yes .4293 491 5.46** (2.61) -.881 (.998) -6.496** (2.36) 4.41 (4.76) Yes Yes .3870 491 8.45*** (2.43) -1.72** (.873) -6.98** (2.22) 10.07** (4.57) Yes Yes .4915 491 Yes Yes .2476 371 Notes: Variable coefficient and standard error (in parenthesis) reported above. Asterisks denotes significance at different levels of: *** p value≤0.01 **0.01<p value≤ 0.05 *0.05 <p value ≤0 .1. Models (2), (4), (5), and (5a) results shown after serial correction correlation. 43 Politikon: IAPSS Political Science Journal Vol. 22, March 2014 Table 3: Serial Correlation Correction Model (1) (1a) (2) (3) (4) (5) (5a) Original DW Statistic 1.153 1.0613 1.158 1.216 1.106 1.14 1.039 Transformed DW Statistic 2.089 2.119 2.067 2.097 2.077 2.08 2.116 44 Politikon: IAPSS Political Science Journal Vol. 22, March 2014 The politics of writing history: historians' debates and high-school history teaching in post-socialist Romania Sergiu DELCEA16, Central European University, Budapest Abstract A fter exhibiting one of the "hottest" instances of ethno-national related violence in all post-socialist transitions, early 90s Romanian society seemed to have "cooled" down in terms identitarian conflicts, hence making it even more surprising why an apparently small-scale debate concerning history textbooks quickly spiraled to the point of becoming a fully-fledged public scandal against a Government dubbed as "Anti-Romanian". The aim of this paper is thus to contribute to the overarching research question: Why did nationalism remain such a powerful force despite the fall of the Ceausescu regime? To provide a comprehensive answer the article looks at two, tightly interwoven, sides of cultural reproduction: the politics of history-teaching in Romanian high-schools and its more general background historians' debates on nationalism. The conclusion reached through this analysis is that a conservation of ethnocentered nationalistic thinking about history was generated by a distorted understanding of professionalization of history qua science. 16 Sergiu Delcea is a second year MA student in the Nationalism Studies Programme, Central European University, Budapest, with a previous background in Political Science (graduated BA studies in 2012) from the University of Bucharest. He is currently a member of the editorial board for the IAPSS blog A Different View, where he is exploring his current research interests that revolve around linking nation-building processes and welfare-regime construction (with a focus on Eastern Europe). 45 Politikon: IAPSS Political Science Journal T he sweeping events of Eastern Europe in 1989 were intuitively expected to bring a sharp break with the past and all its "obsolete" elements: centralized economies, monolithic Party rule and rampant ethnonationalism. Interestingly enough though post-socialist transitions seemed to be more complex than this envisaged one-way road, with societal cohesion towards the goal of re-uniting with the "West" being oftentimes questioned. Naturally, in such a scenario, cultural reproduction remains an important element of stability and cohesion(Paraianu:2001, 111 in Trencsenyi et al. (eds):2001). What follows logically is that perceptions of the past and more importantly, their massification, via history teaching are put in a very intricate position. The aim of this paper is to focus on post-socialist Romania, trying to contribute a possible answer to a huge over-arching question: Why did nationalism remain such a powerful force despite the fall of the Ceausescu regime? The intuitive consequence foreseen by many was that the oppressive ethnocentric discourse of the Ceausescu regime would generate a backlash effect of complete refutation towards manifestations of nationalism. Much to the contrary, Romania seemed to exhibit a continuation of strong nationalist feelings (the violent events of Targu Mures are most often quoted in this line of thought). Despite the fact that violence occurred only in this singular event, the huge scandal prompted by alternative history textbooks in the late 90s showed clearly that Romanian policy makers were still very much attached to older interpretations of history, which were used to draw popular attachment and legitimacy. Using this example, I will expand the discussion and analyze the broader topic of historical myth-making as a basis for identity-building in post-socialist Romania. My main argument is that although there has Vol. 22, March 2014 been a liberalization of historical research and historiography in the post-socialist setting, the nation-building inner logic, so dear to communist state-makers, is still very much preserved. While the old historians are preserving it via the classical proxy of antiHungarian rhetoric (and the age-old of myth of Romania protecting the "West"), the new wave of "de-mystifying" historians have fallen to the other extreme of considering Romanian history purely as a succession of national myths (with the apparent aim of creating a quasi-void on which a more European identity might be built - obviously, still identity-building!). To be precise, I am not arguing that the presence of some form of nationalism is the central cause of Romanian laggard transition (Petrescu:2001 in Trencsenyi et al (eds):2001). What I will argue throughout this paper is that the outward liberalization of Romanian historiography is still done under the old template of "historia magistra vitae" (Iggers:2010, 35-36) which entails a clear instrumentalization. This idea is perfectly caught by Dumitru Nalin who argues that the core of the problem lies in the use of discourses about the philosophy of history in a debate that was intended to be political (Nalin:2002, 44). The consequence of this continuation of patterns is that nationalism in post-1990s Romania was perpetuated (at least in part) by a lack of modernization of history as a science. Structurally I will divide the paper into two main parts: an analysis of the 2000 alternative textbook scandal and a widening of the discussion through the debate between the "old guard" historians and the new "de-mystyfiers"17. Certainly, the second part cannot be fully mapped in the narrow 17 To be clear, I am not arguing that all Romanian historians fall into this model. What I am arguing is that on a large scale (i.e. mass-media and nonuniversity school-teaching) this is the fundamental divide. As noted by Paraianu in the early 2000s when the original textbook scandal erupted Western academic debates about Romanian history were not very well integrated into the Romanian academia thus making it methodologically sound to analyze the divide I have selected. 46 Politikon: IAPSS Political Science Journal confines of this paper (for in-depth analysis Iordachi&Trencsenyi:2003, 415-453) and therefore I will focus on the debates spurred up by Lucian Boia and his followers, and the rather recent critique put forward by a group of University Babes-Bolyai of Cluj lead by Ioan-Aurel Pop (member of the Romanian Academy). It feels methodologically sounds to do this selection because Prof. Boia's works have been best-sellers (albeit not instantly in some cases), achieving this status by taking a controversial stand on topics such as Romanian national history and nationalism in general. Interestingly enough, despite having originally been published before the 1999 textbook scandal, Boia's opus had not achieved public notoriety until then. Certainly, any direct link cannot be inferred but this intertwining does point towards a clear tendency. The alternative textbook scandal - What image of the nation is the Romanian educational system disseminating? According to Brubaker, the tendency to view the nation as incomplete makes the state adopt an active political stance (Brubaker:1996, 63). After the abrupt fall of the Ceausescu regime, the Romanian policymakers were faced with the daunting challenge of re-structuring an obsolete educational system, which was massproducing obedience towards a unitary teleological vision of the "socialist nation" (Petrescu:2007 in Jarausch&Lindenberger:2007). The early reforming of this system was a tenuous process, torn between the need for a new approach and the overwhelming mass of personnel inherited from communism. History-teaching continued to be rather monolithic: while certain aberrations were abandoned, the core teleology and "hard truths" (i.e. continuity, unity, nationhood) were maintained. During the early 90s, public debate towards alternative text-books and interpretations was limited, while grass- Vol. 22, March 2014 roots pressures for reforms tended to focus more on the quantitative side (i.e. refurnishing schools, heating systems etc.) rather than on fundamental epistemological issues. History-teaching reform in Eastern Europe followed three important dimensions: ideological reconsideration, lightening the syllabus and teacher innovation (Nalin:2002, 41). In the following, I will attempt to analyze the first two criteria in the context of the Romanian text-book scandal, which escalated almost instantaneously from a scholarly debate into a fully-fledged political scandal where the opposition labeled the Government as having "Anti-Romanian feelings". This scandal highlights that despite its outward liberalization the post 1989 Romanian nonuniversity education system still aimed at mass-producing the communist creed of "good Romanian citizens with a love of country and past"(Nalin:2002, 43) The main point of contention in these early attempts at reforming the system was the introduction of alternative text-books for final year highschool students, which were supposed to focus exclusively on Romanian national history. One interesting side-note must be made here: within the Romanian education framework study of national history is reserved for the last year of the high-school studies, which overwhelmingly overlaps with the age of vote-right acquisition. Although a direct link is not easily measurable, there seems to be an intricate underlying logic between a particular way of understanding Romanian history and the transformation of students into "good" citizens. The first major shock came as a result of Romania's efforts to join the EU, namely the late 90s-early 2000s European recommendation of moving towards liberalized history teaching emphasizing the European dimension of regional evolutions. In the autumn of 1999, historian Sorin Mitu was publicly scorn by the opposition parties for coordinating a text-book that introduced perceived identity-threatening topics: the idea of constructed nationhood, the brief hint that mechanisms of the historical imaginary plays a role in the image of the 47 Politikon: IAPSS Political Science Journal Romanian ethno-genetic process, the downplay of some national heroes (Paraianu:2001, 95-97 in Trencsenyi et al (eds):2001). As an accomplished historian Mitu was trying to bring his text-book at a crossroads between the aforementioned goals: attempting to tear down Romanian perennialism and lightening an overburdened curricula. The intellectual background here is rather interesting to note: the EU directive involved integrating national histories into a broader narrative, which generated a divergence between Romanian historians acting as textbook authors - some continued to stress the old myth of Romania having protected Europe from the Ottoman invasion, while Mitu was pursuing the more delicate aim of introducing Western-inspired scholarly perspectives on Romanian history. A broad comparative overview between Mitu's textbook and the available alternatives uncovers the following differences: instead of certainty the author proposes understanding the construction of a narrative (Iggers:2010, 41-43 and White:1973); instead of heroes of Europe medieval rulers approached as boyars with personal aims and agendas; nationhood not as fact but construction, with state-hood being another purpose on the agenda rather than an "eternal dream". By contrast, other manuals kept to the hardcore myths (Manea&Teodorescu:1994 for example), stating that the Romanian nation is a fact, a result of a 2000-year old teleological evolution (eerily reminiscent of the communist discourse). To further complicate the issue, Mitu was not outwardly anti-Hungarian: the arrival of the Hungarians in Transylvania is depicted in a moderate stance, with an eye on both narratives, clearly leaning towards caution when looking at 12-13th century sources (Mitu et al:1999 textbook). Much more abrupt is the textbook's stance on 19th century nation-building: top-down eliteconstruction of the nation, an idea perceived as radical by hard-core historians and particularly by politicians. Instead of following main-stream public discourse Vol. 22, March 2014 which was constantly including issues on perceived Hungarian revisionism (Paraianu:2001, 105 in Trencsenyi et al (eds):2001), Mitu's textbook hints towards the fact that Romanian and Hungarian narratives should be seen as intertwining histories. The critique was violent, straightforward and mirrored a very simple template: if Hungarian text-books state it as fact that the Romanian ethno-genetic process took place in the South of the Danube, why should Romanian schools teach teenagers that the North-Danubian continuation narrative is a hypothesis and not fact?(A. Nastase apud Paraianu:2001 in Trencsenyi et al. (eds):2001) The siege mentality so dear to communist nation-forgers pervades this rhetoric and points towards an important direction: the Romanian education system, particularly through history-teaching (Nalin:2002, 40), was mass-producing attachment to a very organic definition of the nation. The point of contention raised in the Romanian media was not that of whether high-profile Western academic studies (that Mitu was mirroring, being himself a prominent name in the field Mitu:2001) are suitable for high-school pupils, but that the author is falsifying what "The Romanian Academy in its entirety has certified" (C.T. Popescu apud Paraianu:2001, 107 in Trencsenyi et al (eds):2001). On the other hand, I disagree with general assertion that in a turbulent political context a grassroots level "longing" for the nation (Verdery:1993, 192), substituting distorted understandings of democratic values and practices (Gaber:2006, 35-39), was the logical fallback point. Rather I would concur with the argument that what should have been an academic debate was quickly enveloped in politics, pointing towards the direction that this clash was perceived by society as a manifestation of "conflicting interests" (Nalin:2002, 44-45). Consequently, it feels safer to assume that at a grass-roots level the scandal was perceived through a political lens: emphasizing a complete break with the old-guard politicians inherited from communism, the CDR Government 48 Politikon: IAPSS Political Science Journal appeared to back an anti-national version of history, which meant a huge blow to their popularity. Although alternative manuals had existed for quite some time in the Romanian education system, this complete deviation from the norm happened to overlap with an EU recommendation, which Romania had recently started negotiating with. Consequently, there is yet another paradox: the intellectual origin of Mitu's purported "Anti-Romanian" character is not based on European discourse, but on globalization a la americaine! (C.T. Popescu apud Paraianu:2001 in Trencsenyi et al (eds):2001) The siege mentality is obvious: if the EU cannot be directly blamed due to immediate interests, the need for a new scapegoat arises. Reflected in the history textbooks the issue was simple: Romania's return to Europe is natural because ever since the Middle Ages Romanians have protected Christian Europe from the "onslaught" of the Ottoman Empire. Quite to the contrary, the image of the US becomes blurred in with that of a "West" that abandoned Romania at Yalta, the 1918 unification became a purely Romanian victory rather than a contextual exploitation of Wilson's 14 points and so on (these were not novel issues but rather a continuation of what communist historiographers had stated for over 20 years). Instead of an integration of regional narratives, the Romanian education system made it clear to its pupils that EU integration is not an ongoing process but part and parcel of some sort of "national pride". Last but not least one important point should be tackled here: does history teaching matter that much? In his critique to Boia, Pop argues that society does not listen that closely to historians making it hard to assume that there would be some sort of grass-roots pressure against a perceived obsolete philosophy of history (Pop:2011, 180). Certainly, this argument does hold some validity in the sense that it is extremely hard (if not impossible) to assume that society is made up of social scientists that would immediately react to a change such as Vol. 22, March 2014 that proposed by Mitu's textbook. Nonetheless I draw attention again to the important issue of politicization. Even if society does not listen to historians and their debates, it seems safe to assume that when politicians render the impression that the textbook will fuel sensitive issues such as purported Hungarian revisionism, society is likely to respond. The obsessive use of "what history are we teaching our children?" rhetoric is likely to directly influence the significantly greater electorate schooled in communism (the 10 years since the fall of communism were not sufficient to consider a generational change), who was socialized with the fundamental myths of continuation, unity and the nation. Consequently it seems rather clear that cultural reproduction in post-socialist Romania was still revolving around national identity. This scandal highlights that despite an outward rhetoric of breaking with the ethno-centered communist approach to nationalism, the underlying truth is that national identification was still a key coordinate of post-socialist Romanian society and its politics. Summing up, there are a few key issues to be noted from the history textbook scandal: despite outward liberalization the education system was still focused on an identity-building style of cultural reproduction; while nationalist rhetoric is not an outward and open tool of electoral competitions and politics, there seems to be a rather tacit acknowledgment that certain "lines" connected with national identification must not be crossed clearly pointing towards the direction that nationalism qua ideology was still a force in post-socialist Romania. Beyond the textbooks - historians, historiography and nationalism in postcommunist Romania To being with, in the post-socialist context national historiographies in Eastern Europe were expected to depart from their underlying parochialism and start employing 49 Politikon: IAPSS Political Science Journal a more "Western" framework and methodology (Iordachi&Trencsenyi:2003, 416). The envisaged liberalization would entail a renouncing of the communist teleology, a re-consideration of the exaggerations concerning Romania's history. Reconciliation with the past glossed with remarkable ease over communist influence on historiography, considering it a mere compromise with the totalitarian state rather than analyzing its very intricate effects. The point here is to analyze the intellectual background on which the Romanian textbook scandal fell: it is not only that a politicized education system disseminates a nation-building rhetoric, but academic debates also seem to revolve around it. Although this stepping back to a more theoretical level might seem a bit far from the very concrete issue of high-school textbooks, one can argue that it is impossible to consider text-book authors as a "special group" of historians to be delineated from the broader academic debates. Most aforementioned authors are university professors fairly well connected with the zeitgeist of historians' debates in Romania hence solidifying the link between these seemingly disengaged lines of analysis. What emerges is a very complicated picture: a large number of communisteducated historians faced with political pressures for reconsideration, free from oppressive ethno-national ideological boundaries, yet faced with an abrupt return to a democracy with a very unclear place in Romanian history (intellectual and political history). This provides a fertile ground for vicious circle effects both for demystification efforts as well as for hard-core supporters of the old interpretations. In the following, I will argue that in fact this vicious circle effect did happen in the case of the most systematic effort at demystification. Equally interesting is the fact that instead of focusing on certain methodological aspects that are obviously shaking in Boia's argumentation, critics have responded in a predictable manner: national teleology. What will be drawn is the rather logical conclusion that both discourses fall Vol. 22, March 2014 into the trap of the East/West divide framework (Brubaker:1998 in Hall(ed):1998), thus ensuring the survival of some forms of nation-building rhetoric and logic. Before any conclusions on cultural reproduction can be made a brief overview of the main spokes-persons for both sides of the debate is needed. In the Romanian context, a bhuge shock was generated by Lucian Boia's 1997 work History and Myth in Romanian Consciousness (for a synthetic presentation of the author's main approach see Stancu:2012, 56-67; Boia:2001) followed by an ample series of publications, by the same author, dedicated to the mechanisms of historical imaginary, a methodology that had previously not gained much ground with Romanian historians. By employing a lax definition of historical myths Boia attempts a blending in of modernist theories on nationalism (Boia often quotes Anderson's classical works for instance, Anderson:1991) and Hayden White's approach to historiography (White:1993), reaching the conclusion that what is being taught as Romanian history is mostly a well-plotted narrative instrumentalized from its earliest beginnings qua science for the sole purpose of nation-building. The gist of Boia's opus is epitomized by the following idea: since unity and the nation are being considered by historians as fundamental for Romanian history, this points towards a very fragmented polity who was held together by powerful symbolic myths, most of which revolved around organic ties and cultural homogeneity. He goes on to argue that historians cannot seek truth but must contend with putting forward convincing narratives, inextricably linked with moral judgments (Pop:2011, 20-25). Not surprisingly this approach shocked (although it is important to say that for some years the book was not a best-seller) violently contradicting the cause-effect teleology employed by the bulk of Romanian historians. A coherent reaction in the form of a book appeared rather late, in 2011 in the 50 Politikon: IAPSS Political Science Journal guise of Ioan Pop's18 Istoria, Adevarurile si Miturile[History, Truth and Myths]. Written with a collective tone, Pop proceeds with a step-by-step analysis of Boia's framework and arguments reaching the following conclusions: the lax use of myths (which have a conceptual background and framework of their own) makes it possible to consider any passed event as fiction for the simple fact that the modern historian did not partake in them directly, but relies on written accounts which according to Boia are meaningless stories; the critical reader of History and Myth is left with a sense of having been taken through an exercise in convenience sampling by putting together seemingly methodologically inconsistent examples; Boia's approach to nationalism gives the impression that nation-building is a normatively undesirable process of elitemanipulation, myths representing the only point of cohesion of the national community. This book encompasses a blending in of criticism aimed at methodology with epistemological concerns, attempting to "rehabilitate" the image of the Romanian historian. For the sake of space I will not provide a thorough individual analysis but rather focus on the purported aims of the debaters: reconciliation with the past in the sense of better delineating the place of nationalist rhetoric and nation-building projects in Romanian history, with an eye on regional European integration. In itself this points to a clear direction: Romanian historians seem to take a very normative approach to nationalism, focusing on the new teleology of EU integration19. It is important to bear in mind this stake since it 18 Ioan Aurel Pop - member of Romanian Academy, fairly accomplished historian of the Middle Ages, Professor at Babes-Bolyiai University of Cluj. 19 Again I emphasize that it is beyond any shadow of a doubt that there historians who fall outside the framework of this debate, but Boia and his followers seem to have gained public notoriety to rival that of the 1999 textbook scandal.On the other hand, Pop's reply although not highly mediatized is written as a collective response, thus permitting us to use overarching categories such as "Boia and his followers", "main-stream Romanian historians". Vol. 22, March 2014 appears to be the center of the normative vicious circle around which both sides of the debate gravitate. Since the paternalistic argument is rather straight-forward I shall start by analyzing cultural reproduction through this lens. Although Pop's approach is not stereotypical of the old-guard historians, his nuancing does not hide the perennialist tone: the Cluj historian argues that there is an undeniable "core" to nationhood (although he is very far from the classical use of the notion in Benner:2001, 155-174) and it is the "honest historian's mission" (a phrase that he uses obsessively) to uncover the truth (similar approach as in Berindei:1997). For this type of discourse national identity is salient, the purpose of historians being to come as close as possible to a purist type of objectivity in uncovering the national past. This discourse would aim to go beyond normative debates since in this line of thinking a historical fact cannot be good or bad, it simply exists. The immediate proxy through which this intellectual strand of thought reaches main-stream audiences is simple and potent: ancient hatreds. By continuous referrals to purported Hungarian revisionism this discourse remains at least latent in Romania. The vicious circle is rather obvious: even if free from political constraints, historians will continuously uncover the truth that will always be a part of a national past regardless of methodology and outward liberalization of discourse. Consequently, instead of escaping the oppressive ethno-centrism of communist historiography, paternalist post-socialist Romanian historians continuously operate within its framework ensuring its cultural reproduction (albeit in a more toned-down fashion). In this sense there is no reconciliation to be done with the past: communism did not have an impact on Romanian nation-hood whose "natural" place is in the European community from whom it was temporarily disconnected. The case of the de-mystification trend is somewhat more complicated as it supposedly draws on a purely Western methodology .Boia's main point is that 51 Politikon: IAPSS Political Science Journal history writing cannot be separated from the historian's belief system hence making it a futile effort to search for "truth" since history itself is a narrative. Two important consequences can be drawn from here about Boia's approach: although modernist in the sense of recognizing the importance of constructionist approaches, there is a pervading sense of normative judgment. The veil seems to be better lifted when one takes a closer look at Boia's subsequent works that complement his opus: Romanian national history is not only a myth, but it is a bad myth in the sense of espousing non-Western values (Boia:2001). Since the shortcomings of this East/West ethnic/civic approach are well documented, for the purpose of this paper suffice it note a more subtle observation on the Romanian demystification trend: in itself it creates the myth that "everything is a myth", which is envisaged as a foundation for a new identitybuilding in a Western-civic-normative understanding! However, the issue here is still nation-building, although in a different scope: the teleology of civic nationhood and "Western liberalism". Certainly, the communist template is abandoned, yet the inner logic of identity creation through history is maintained. The normative argument of this de-mystification is that once the realization that Romanian history of a myth is acknowledged, a new identity can be constructed, supposedly better managing the delicate regional integration of historical narratives. There is one underlying thread connecting these two issues in a very subtle way: both strands consider themselves as "de-mystifiers"! In a very ironic twist the early 90s historians considered their mission to de-mystify communism, Lucian Boia and his followers claim to de-mystify the entirety of Romanian historiography and its nationalist-orientation, while Ioan Pop opens his laborious critique with the clear aim of tearing down the "Lucian Boia myth"! (Pop:2011, 120) Acknowledging the very strong point that one can analyze this issue through the obvious need for truth in the post-socialist setting (Nalin:2002, 44), I Vol. 22, March 2014 draw attention to another important dimension to be noted here: if myths are, by and large, considered identity building blocks then de-mystification efforts clearly signal the presence of perceived identitythreats and nation-building rhetoric. In the post 90s Romanian environment the issue of reconciliation with the past is aligned with delineating a "true" historical identity: a communist-shaped one, or an older version rooted in the perceived democratic inter-war (hence communism being perceived as a past-discontinuous). This seems to point towards some sort of "new nation syndrome" (Petrescu:2007, 39 in Jarausch&Lindenberger:2007), again strengthening the argument of cultural reproduction towards identity-building. Even if one concurs with Pop's idea that society rarely listens to historians, the overarching sense of a vicious circle persists: post-socialist Romanian historiography is spinning around everyone "de-mystifying" everyone for the sake of "truth". Although Boia and his followers disagree with the idea that the historian is looking for "truth" they are putting forward the very normative argument that "Eastern" nationalism is the sole cause of Romania's economic and political problems (a rather similar argument to be found in Petrescu:2001 in Trencsenyi et al. (eds):2001). This is the point of the myth that "everything is a myth": identityvoid on which a purported "better" nationalidentity be constructed. Either side seems to fallen into a teleological trap: nationalidentity as a salient category (be it constructed, or perennial the pervading idea seems to be that there it is a clear developmental-historical goal). Certainly, both sides acknowledge that the goal of EU integration is an on-going progress, nonetheless they seem tied down to finding a "hard-core" starting point for a quasihistorical quasi-cultural argument of why Romania should join the EU. 52 Politikon: IAPSS Political Science Journal Conclusions Broadly speaking, historical discourse in post-socialist Romania seems to gravitate around the very political goal of EU integration, attempting to put forward a hard-core argument of why Romanian's particular historical trajectory recommends it as a natural enlargement goal. The 1999-2000 alternative text-book scandal and the vicious "de-mystification" circle seem to be powerfully intertwined: although oppressive ethno-national discourses are not used in political competitions, there is an institutionalized cultural reproduction that ensures the presence of a latent nationalist discourse. The background is not purely political rhetoric, as historians themselves seem to be locked into a debate in which everyone espouses a more "truthful" history than the other. The criticism that society does not follow historians fails when faced with the institutionalization of a rigid ethno-centered approach to history. Certainly, the polarization between the text-books and historians must not be directly equated with a societal polarization. On the other hand, polarized historical narratives seemed to point towards normative stances more than actual methodologies of historical research: the teleology of the East/West ethnic/civic divide. To be fair to the sides, I am not arguing that they are putting forward pseudo-scientific research, rather that the conclusions they seem to draw have less to do with history than with the politics of nation-branding and nation-building. Consequently, post-socialist Romania seems to be exhibiting an exaggerated identity crisis based on its efforts to join the EU and the continuous struggle for reconciliation with the past. The natural backlash effect of the communist ethno-centered discourse is that open nationalist rhetoric does not raise much political support (being perceived as extremist), yet socialization is still done under a very rigid pattern that continuously emphasizes the mythology of continuation, Vol. 22, March 2014 unity and nation-hood. Institutionalized cultural reproduction seems be revolving around a different type of discourse (certainly, it is far-fetched to call either Boia and his followers or the critics as "communists"), which touches however on a hard-core set of issues that is continuously preserved. All things considered, nationalism in post-socialist Romania appears not to be a freak occurrence, nor is it a persona non grata of public discourse. The efforts of tearing down socialist legacies (institutional and intellectual) seem locked, for the time being, in a vicious circle. Nonetheless, open and fair debate has taken a fairly solid grip in the Romanian environment, leaving the door open for the possibility of reconciliation with the past and a fair reconsidering of Romania's place in an integrated regional narrative. Bibliography Benner, Erica (2001), Is there a core nationalist doctrine?, published in Nations and Nationalism, Vol. 7, No. 2, pp. 155-174; Berindei, Dan, (1997) Revolutia Romana din 1848-1849. Consideratii si Reflectii[Romanian Revolution of 18481849. Considerations and Reflections] – own translation – Transylvanian Studies Center, (Romanian Cultural Foundation: Cluj-Napoca) Boia, Lucian, (2000) Doua Secole de Mitologie Nationala [Two centuries of National Mythology - own translation],(Humanitas: Bucharest) Boia, Lucian, (2001) History and Myth in Romanian consciousness, (CEU Press: Budapest) 53 Politikon: IAPSS Political Science Journal Brubaker, Rogers (1996) Question in University Europe, Press: Copoeru, Târãu, (1999) IstoriaRomânilor: Manual pentru clasa a Cambridge) XII-a (Romanian history: Twelfth grade BRUBAKER, Rogers (1998) Myths textbook). (Sigma: Bucharest) Mitu, Sorin (2001) National Identity of Nationalism. In. John HALL(ed.): The Romanians State of the Nation: Ernest Gellner and Press: New York) Nalin, in Transylvania, Dumitru (2002) (CEU History University Press. Cambridge:1998) Teaching in Romania, published in Gaber, R., (2006) National Identity Diogenes, Vol. 49, Issue 2, No, 194 Petrescu, Dragos (2007) Communist and Eastern Europe, published in Legacies in the “New Europe”. History, International Journal of Sociology, Vol. Ethnicity, and the Creation of a “Socialist 36, No. 3 Nation” Iggers, Georg (2010) The Role of published Professional Historical Scholarship in the Europeanizing Contemporary Histories, Creation and Distortion of Memory, edit. published in Chinese Studies in History, Lindenberger,( New York: Berghan Vol. 43, Issue 3 Books, 2007) Iordachi, Constantin, Trencsenyi, K. in Romania in 1945-1989, Conflicted H. Jarausch Memories. and T. Pop, Ioan-Aurel, (2011) Istoria, Balasz (2003) In Search of a Usable Adevarul si Miturile [History, Truth and Past: The Question of National Identity in Myths - own translation throughout the Romanian paper], (Virtual: Cluj), Studies 1990-2000, published in East-European Politics and Lucia Virgiliu National and Democratic Consolidation in Central Sorin, the the Theory of Nationalism. (Cambridge Mitu, Ovidiu Pecican, Liviu Tîrãu, and and Misconceptions in the Study of Nationalism Reframed. Nationhood and (Cambridge Vol. 22, March 2014 Stancu, Eugen (2012) Lucian Boia Societies, Vol. 17 and Manea, Mihai, Teodorescu, (1994) Romanian Istoria Românilor de la 1821 pânã în Intellectual 1989:Manual pentru clasa a XII-a Critics, published in Yearbook of the (Romanian till 'Gheorghe Sincai' Institute for Social 1989:Twelfth grade textbook); (Editura Sciences & the Humanities of the Didacticã si Pedagogicã: Bucharest) Romanian Academy, Vol. 15 history from 1821 the Demythologization Historical Origins, of the Discourse. Arguments and 54 Politikon: IAPSS Political Science Journal Vol. 22, March 2014 Balasz TRENCSENYI, Dragos History Textbooks: The Mitu PETRESCU, Cristina Controversy PETRESCU, Constantin o Dragos Petrescu, Can IORDACHI, Zoltan KANTOR Democracy work in Southeastern (2001), Nation-Building and Contested Europe? Ethnic nationalism vs. Identities: Romanian and Hungarian Case Democratic consolidation in post- Studies, (Regio Books, Budapest, communist Romania 2001) Verdery, Katherine, (1993) o Razvan Paraianu, National Nationalism and National Sentiment in Prejudices, Mass Media and Post-socialist Romania, published in Slavic Review, Vol. 52, No. 2, 1993 55 Politikon: IAPSS Political Science Journal Vol. 22, March 2014 Beyond Compatibility : Replicating High-Performing Asian Economies Meicen SUN20, University of Pennsylvania Abstract T here is much contention on the applicability of the high-performing sian economic (HPAE) model, often on the basis that the Asian countries’ unique historical, political, economic and cultural conditions are really what make the model work. I argue in this paper, however, that the replication of this model may be desirable for certain economies. This is of course not without conditions. First, the country should have a significantly Pareto-suboptimal starting level of resource mobilization. The HPAE model is most effective in pushing a country’s economic development toward the Pareto frontier through mobilization of underutilized resources. Second, given this, the success of an HPAE model hinges on the state’s intervention in not only the procedural but also the substantive aspect of economic policymaking. Since there are presumably high stakes involved in having the state playing the “coach” (and not just the “referee”), having a reliable decisionmaking body is indispensable to implementing the HPAE model. Third, for the HPAE model to achieve its maximum effect, the demographic makeup of the target country should meet a few requirements, such as a relatively low dependency ratio. On the other hand, I contend that the country’s sociocultural compatibility with the HPAE model is of limited importance because the HPAE is powerful in transforming such contexts to its advantage. Lastly, I address what I call a “latent political cost” in adopting the HPAE model as a policy caveat looking forward. 20 Meicen Sun is a Ph.D student of International Relations at the Department of Political Science, University of Pennsylvania 56 Politikon: IAPSS Political Science Journal I Vol. Nr.20, June 2013 DEFINING HPAE – ESSENTIALS AND NON-ESSENTIALS first set straight what defines an efficiency-based economies,24 or in some HPAE model. The World Bank cases “agriculture-oriented,” or “labor- characterizes the HPAEs as implementing intensive,” I consider these as different neoclassical economic fundamentals such as manifestations of the aforementioned two high levels of capital and macroeconomic policy dimensions. They are the economic stability on the one hand, and enforcing dependent variables resulted from the robust government intervention to entrench political explanatory variables – orientation these fundamentals on the other.21 Thus the and degree of state intervention. Similarly, orientation of the HPAE model distinguishes specific tactics used by different HPAEs in it from the plan ideological model in the realizing their economic objectives, such as sense that the model ultimately relies on the the different forms of centralized economic regulatory power of the market rather than planning across various HPAEs, should not that of the government to achieve economic be confused with the commonality in their growth, and the degree of state intervention political distinguishes it from the market rational economic growth through goal-oriented model because the government plays a much state intervention. Only the latter is relevant more central role in manipulating the to my argument henceforth. market’s regulatory power in the HPAEs economic I. STATE REALIZING Partly as a result, a strong, insulated elite RESOURCES as primarily responsible for the making and implementation of key economic policies.23 While scholars have attached various other qualifiers to the basic HPAE model, such as “input-based” vis-à-vis the which INTERVENTION than in a typical laissez-faire economy.22 bureaucracy is often observed in the HPAEs strategy, is IN UNDERUTILIZED Paul Krugman correctly identifies that a key to the HPAEs’ success is their massive mobilization of resources to feed productivity growth by increasing input. Without achieving a level of technological progress comparable to that in the U.S., even highly efficient HPAEs like Singapore “Strategies for Rapid Accumulation,” World Bank, 1993, 192. 22 These terms are borrowed from Chalmers Johnson. See Chalmers Johnson, “”Market Rationality vs. Plan Rationality,” 216. 23 Gregory Noble, “The Japanese Industrial Policy Debate,” 59. 21 are merely a “one-time” occurrence and little more than the result of deferred gratification Paul Krugman, “The Myth of Asia’s Miracle,” 64. 24 57 Politikon: IAPSS Political Science Journal Vol. Nr.20, June 2013 – namely the people’s “willingness to was, for example, essential to overcoming sacrifice current satisfaction for future gain” market failure associated with privatized by complying with government policies education while creating the necessary aimed at producing future economic growth positive externalities conducive to economic through sacrifices made in the present. growth. Similarly, the miracle of China’s rapid horizontally growth an comparable development levels such as exceptionally low baseline and the open-up Pakistan and Peru, the success of the policy that served as a “one-time recovery” HPAEs’ human capital accumulation can from its near total stagnation.25 almost solely be accounted for by their is simply attributable to Krugman’s critique is valid insofar as More importantly, compared to states when of public education policies.26 The productivity an input-driven development model is hard growth derived from improved basic to sustain absent of a matching level of education in the HPAEs was less the result technological innovation. But to the extent of their cultural legacy than of this specific that suboptimal growth is attributable, at policy directive. least partly, to the underutilization of The accumulation of physical capital resources and a weak capital stock, the is a more complex issue. Some ascribe the HPAE model is still effective in quickly boom of HPAEs like Japan, South Korea bridging the capital gap. This is especially and Taiwan to the initial funding from the true for the so-called late developers in U.S.27 This fails to explain the success of Alexander stage other HPAEs that did not have such foreign theory, such as the vast majority of sub- aid, e.g. China. To be sure, foreign direct Saharan and a number of Latin American investment (FDI) was the most prevalent countries today, which typically have both means of acquiring physical capital from low an abroad for all HPAEs. Salient in this undereducated population, and low levels of approach was the joint promotion of physical capital. The World Bank’s analysis domestic savings on the one hand and shows the HPAEs’ advantage in providing investment, especially FDI, on the other.28 the levels initial Gerschenkron’s of human momentum linear capital through – rapid accumulation of capital on both fronts. The HPAEs’ prioritization of basic education through substantial government subsidies 25 Krugman, 70-78. “Strategies for Rapid Accumulation,” 199-200. Tun-jen Cheng, “Political Regimes and Development Strategies: South Korea and Taiwan.” 147-150. 28 See the discussion on such measures as favorable tax policies and price manipulation to attract (foreign) investors in “Strategies for Rapid Accumulation,” 228-235. 26 27 58 Politikon: IAPSS Political Science Journal Vol. Nr.20, June 2013 Together, these two levers created a steady economic behaviors of the HPAE model and systematic bias toward investors at the also suggests that if there were a history of expense of domestic savers. The importance adversity that the government could tap of FDI and trade for a developing economy into, as is the case for a large number of sub- speaks for itself: Whereas Mexico had a Saharan African countries and certain Latin similar level of per capita GDP to that of American countries that have undergone Japan, it plummeted immediately after the prolonged civil wars such as El Salvador, it government restricted foreign trade, and has might be especially easy for the government since fallen progressively further behind that to promote domestic savings by appealing to of Japan’s.29 Not only did capital flow faster people’s sense of insecurity. into the HPAEs, but it was usually better II. MAINTAINING A utilized as well. A horizontal comparison of BUREAUCRACY the HPAEs with Latin America, again, MERITOCRACY shows that much of the former’s superiority in growth was accounted for by the governments’ direct channeling FDI into the most efficient industries, in this case manufacturing.30 In most cases, household savings in particular provided the first “pool of funds” which was then efficiently invested to spur productivity and growth.31 Though frugal Confucious ideology and the history of suffering both played a part in people’s desire to save, the HPAEs’ domestic savings policies that actively rewarded such behavior was what ultimately sustained the capital flow.32 This ability to select certain Henry Rowen, “The Political and Social Foundations of the Rise of East Asia: An Overview,” 18. 30 Anthony Elson, “What Happened?” 31 Edward Lincoln, “The Showa Economic Experience,” in Daedalus Summer 1990, 196197. 32 This point will be elaborated in Section III below. 29 COMPETENT THROUGH Given the HPAE model’s efficacy in mobilizing underutilized resources on a massive scale, we should then ask how such can be best achieved. Chalmers Johnson contrasts the “plan rationality” of the Japanese economy to the “market rationality” of that of the U.S., primarily by the state’s substantial undertaking not only in the regulatory but also substantive economic matters in the former, to the extent that it essentially dictates “which industries ought to exist and which industries are no longer needed.”33 At different times and to different degrees, the MITI in Japan, the EPB in South Korea and the CUSA in Taiwan all assumed such a role in prioritizing economic goals by directly or indirectly dictating what was to be produced. This clearly demands tremendous foresight 33 Johnson, 216. 59 Politikon: IAPSS Political Science Journal Vol. Nr.20, June 2013 on part of the leadership, and it was not that was critical to the consolidation of state- accidental that all three states had a well- business relations.36 established institution that steadily supplied qualified civil servants into the system. Although both the examination system and the incentive structure for The legacy of the civil examination maintaining a qualified bureaucracy have system in Confucious Asia did provide a their cultural roots in the HPAEs, these foundation for such rigorous screening states processes. For instance, in South Korea entrenching these mechanisms in their under Rhee and Park, hundreds of exam- development model, hence making such a takers typically vied for one vacancy in civil bureaucracy endogenous to their political service, much like civil exams at ancient economy, hence replicable beyond the Asian times.34 But more important than the context. screening process is a robust incentive structure that in Because of the highly paternalistic bureaucracy. All HPAEs employed various leadership to the successful implementation schemes of reward-punishment to ensure of the HPAE model is evident. The strength that qualified bureaucrats not only enter, but of state intervention amplifies both the stay in the system. Such incentives boil successes down to compensation and security. In economic policies. China, a latecomer in postwar Taiwan, for example, technocrats in Gerschenkron’s theory, offers one example the were in each direction: With the two disastrous consistently better paid than those in the policy programs of the Great Leap Forward other ministries. The status of the EPB in and the Cultural Revolution, Mao practically South Korea, similarly, was elevated not only stripped China of its economic productivity by way of financial compensation, but also and trade capacity within three decades.37 by its minister being given the same title of Yet under the equally decisive leadership of deputy prime minister.35 Long-term job Deng, and the continuation of his open-up security for civil servants in Japan likewise policy under Jiang and Hu, China caught up create planning not only in engaged role of the state, the importance of helped talents aggressively the economic retains also agencies a failures of the state’s competent bureaucracy, but also corporate coherence Tun-jen Cheng et al., Institutions and Growth in Korea and Taiwan: The Bureaucracy, 99. 35 Cheng et al., 102-105. 34 and Peter Evans, Embedded Autonomy: the State and Industrial Transformation, 12. 37 See, for example, Kenneth Lieberthal’s account of the Maoist Era in Chapter 4 of Governing China: From Revolution Through Reform, and his attribution of the “greatest weakness of the Maoist system” to the fact that the Chairman “loomed so large in it,” 122. 36 60 Politikon: IAPSS Political Science Journal Vol. Nr.20, June 2013 to be one of the largest and fastest growing dependency ratio, for example, meant that economies second only to the U.S., also any increase in physical capital and education within about three decades. China’s case is resources already predicted by the policy illustrative in showing not only the miracle would be further amplified by the decline in that a market-conforming, “plan rational” population.40 Because of this, skeptics like dictatorship can achieve, but also the havoc Krugman dismiss such growth as a one-time that occurrence a market-nonconforming, 38 ideological” “plan since drastic demographic dictatorship can wreck, ceteris transitions resulting in a sudden, drastic drop paribus. This dichotomy, as well as the in dependency ratio rarely happen. However, dichotomy of the two Koreas, demonstrate this does not mean that these policies are that the HPAE model goes far beyond the ineffective, just that they may not have as cultural constraint, and that the quality of dramatic an effect as they did in the HPAEs the decision-making elites is a far better if the dependency ratio happens to be high. predictor of economic growth than either Furthermore, since most of the developing culture or history. A competent bureaucracy countries today are characterized by a high therefore serves to guard against the HPAE and rising population density, such as most model’s one inherent weakness – that of sub-Saharan African countries and Asian sporadically “worst countries like India, the HPAE model may outcome”39, of which market rational liberal be particularly suitable for creating and democracies usually manage to steer clear. furthering comparative advantage in labor- giving rise to a intensive industries. IV. IV. III. MAXIMIZING THE HPAE EFFECT WHY SOCIOCULTURAL COMPATIBILITY IS OVERRATED – – DEMOGRAPHIC MAKEUP THE TRANSFORMATIVE POWER OF THE HPAE MODEL I outlined in Section I the policy undertaking by certain HPAE governments Finally, I evaluate from a historical to secure rapid capital accumulation. Some constructivist of these policies’ efficacy was derived from sociocultural compatibility theory holds the country’s demography at the time of poorly for the HPAE model. Proponents of implementation. the “culture” theory argue that it is not the A dramatic fall in point of view why economic policies of the HPAEs per se, but Again, we are borrowing Johnson’s term used for the USSR. See Johnson, 216. 39 Yuhua Wang, lecture, October 14, 2013. 38 40 “Strategies for Rapid Accumulation,” 194-195. 61 Politikon: IAPSS Political Science Journal Vol. Nr.20, June 2013 rather such sociocultural norms as “group- model’s innate compatibility with Asian oriented” ideology41 that make these policies cultures, we ought to recognize the HPAE work only in these Asian countries. It model’s implies therefore that only countries with sociocultural norms to its advantage. It does such deep-rooted ideologies can readily so by selectively rewarding the desirable absorb aspects of the culture, such as the desire for the government redistribution shock policies and from such top-down aggressive as powerful ability in shaping radical secure savings in the case of the postal economic savings scheme in Japan,44 while punishing planning. undesirable ones, such as the feudalistic line daimyo-samurai relations and landlordism.45 overlook the fact that more often than not, The prevalent land reform in virtually all state intervention had to work against the postwar East Asian economies, often in East Asian culture in which it was extremely violent forms which essentially embedded. The effective implementation of “separate[ed]…the landlord from the land,” economic policies in the HPAEs owes more was perhaps the most radical move to to the state’s active “persuasion and mobilize social resources by completely incentives to steer the private sector in severing old socioeconomic ties. This was desired directions,”42 rather than a natural often the result of “blatant manipulat[ion]” inclination of the private interests to by the military or civilian bureaucracy,46 succumb to those of the state. Almost all which HPAEs took coercive measures to weaken bureaucracy argument than to the culture entrenched argument. Interpretations traditional along and this indigenous lends To more be support sure, the to my gradual interests at some point43 for the purpose of elimination of these “counterproductive” economic development. More than the sociocultural aspects have helped sustain, For an example, see Kozo Yamamura’s discussion on Japan’s postwar industrialization in “Bridled Capitalism and Economic Development in Japan, 1880-1980”, 67-68. A similar argument has been used for China and East Asian countries in general, where the ideological essence (Ti) of the country does not change with the practical means of production (Yong) borrowed from the West. See Jonathan Spence, The Search for Modern China, 225-226. 42 Daniel Okimoto, “Japan, the Societal State”, 214. 43 See for instance, the KMT’s strategy aimed at weakening and transforming the indigenous interest structure in Taiwan post 1949, in Cheng, 146-151. 41 over time, an illusion that HPAE has worked because of the Asian cultures in which it finds itself. “Strategies for Rapid Accumulation,” 220. For a detailed discussion of the tremendous risks involved in the abolition of the samurai class and the agricultural tax reform during the Meiji restoration, see Ann Waswo, Modern Japanese Society, 1868-1994, 43-45. 46 John Dower, “The Useful war,” in Daedalus Summer 1990, 60-61. 44 45 62 Politikon: IAPSS Political Science Journal Vol. Nr.20, June 2013 In reality, what is left of the apparent highly centralized and insulated bureaucracy. “Asian culture” today is in itself the product This is perhaps one of the strongest critiques of aggressive selection by the HPAE model for the HPAE model – that it tends to over The prioritize economic growth over other “embeddedness” or “networked-ness” is, development objectives such as human rather than a predetermined outcome of rights, cultural compatibility, the very process by democratization, at the sole discretion of the which ruling elites. at the least HPAE six decades. model works to manipulate the malleable private interests environmental In fact, sustainability HPAE works and well through lowering transaction cost on the economically precisely by creating political, one hand and closing the bureaucracy- social and environmental externalities.49 market information gap on the other. Such often goes unnoticed at first because the political cost of corruption and rent- POLITICAL SUSTAINABILITY – AFTER seeking typically lags behind economic growth. This latent political cost may PROSPERITY Having evaluated the feasibility of therefore only be activated at a later time, the HPAE model, I now turn to its when marginal return from the input-driven sustainability. As Krugman points out, the growth starts to diminish and be outweighed HPAEs’ success hinges not upon “growth in by the sociopolitical price. The existence of output per unit of input,” or efficiency- this “tipping point” finds evidence in the driven growth, but merely upon a sheer similar paths taken by HPAEs including “expansion of inputs.”47 Additionally, the Japan, South Korea and Taiwan. In all three HPAE model may be unsustainable for a states, the formerly centralized decision- deeper, political reason – the HPAE model making body gave way to market and tends to be politically self-undermining in political liberalization after prosperity was the longer run.48 Once a certain level of achieved: In Japan, the dissolution and economic growth has been reached and all replacement of MITI ran concurrent to the previously resources country’s economic development, and were mobilized, the HPAE model may undercut carried out as a relatively smooth phase-out its own achievement by degenerating into a process. South Korea and Taiwan, by underutilized system of diminishing productivity growth resulted from unchecked power of the 47 48 Krugman, 63-64. Cheng et al., 100-101. For example, this can be political externalities such as corruption and rent-seeking, or environmental externalities such as pollution. For such cases see Cheng et al.’s discussion on the political implication in South Korea and Taiwan. 49 63 Politikon: IAPSS Political Science Journal Vol. Nr.20, June 2013 contrast, paid a much higher political price established ex ante to put a limit on the for a similar transition in their political bureaucracy’s power, the HPAE model can economy.50 On the other hand, Singapore is be implemented with considerable success at a case where the technocracy has carried a minimal cost. through despite sustained high growth rate, and is sometimes considered to be an References anomaly of high growth rate and rule of law Edward Lincoln (1990) “The Showa Economic Experience,” in Daedalus, June 1990 51 without democracy. While there is no sure way to predict, a priori, which of these will occur once a country implements the HPAE model, the multiplicity of paths serves as a caveat that a sound exit option or phase-out strategy, ex ante, should be in the policymakers’ calculus before implementing the model. Moreover, externalities like corruption are path Evans, Peter (1995) Embedded Autonomy: the State and Industrial Transformation, (Princeton University Press) Johnson, Chalmers (1998) “Market Rationality vs. Plan Rationality” in Inside the Japanese System: Readings on Contemporary Society and Political Economy (Stanford University Press) dependent. Japan avoided this cost by strictly enforcing intra-system personnel rotation early on in its economic Krugman, Paul (1994) “The myth of Asia’s Miracle”, in Foreign Affairs Nov/Dec 1994; 73; 6 development, which helped ensure that the eventual phase-out of the centralized bureaucracy was prompt and smooth. China and Indonesia, on the other hand, missed the window of opportunity in their earliest stage of development, resulting in an ever increasing gap of corruption over time. But as Haggard suggests, it is entirely possible for countries to develop institutions conducive to both political liberty and economic growth.52 If a phase-out strategy is Noble, Gregory W (1989) “The Japanese industrial policy debate” Rowen, Henry (1997) “The Political and Social Foundations of the Rise of East Asia: An Overview” in Henry S. Rowen, eds. Behind East Asian Growth (Routledge) Tun-jen, Cheng (1990) "Political Regimes and Development Strategies: South Korea and Taiwan” in Gary Gereffi and Donald L. Wyman, eds., Manufacturing Miracles : Paths of Industrialization in Latin America and East Asia (Princeton University Press). Cheng et al., 89-90, and Wang, lecture, September 30, 2013. 51 Wang, lecture, October 14, 2013. 52 Stephan Haggard, Pathways from the Periphery, 256. 50 64 Politikon: IAPSS Political Science Journal Vol. Nr.20, June 2013 Call for Papers Volume 23 Politikon is the flagship publication of the International Association for Political Science Students. It publishes papers submitted by undergraduate and graduate students and it appears with a frequency of four times per year, with one issue out every three months. The abstracts of each issue of Politikon are indexed in the IPSA Annual International Political Science Abstracts. Politikon is currently accepting papers for the publication of its next volume, due to appear on the 30th of July. The deadline for papers submission is set for the 15th of May. The articles should respect formal structure and all requirements stated on the How-to-publish guide below. 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