Download Is Peirce a Relativist

Is Peirce a Relativist? (1995)
“In other words, for you it is the absolute truth.” (WPI, 190)
In his 1905 Essay, “What Pragmatism Is” Peirce more clearly explains his epistemology
and scientific method which he had expounded in his earlier essays. Here I will explain what the
difference is between Peirce’s view of pragmatism and popular misconceptions, as well as
explain the two notions of truth employs, and argue that understanding the “Real” is essential for
grasping these different conceptions. Ultimately, Peirce is clearly not a relativist.
For our purposes, I take it that a relativistism would believe something derivative from
Protagoras' famous dictum, "Man is the measure of truth". For Peirce, this is in part accurate, for
we could only call something true if it seemed to us that it is true; but it is also clear that Peirce
thinks that ultimate reality is that which is apart from what anyone thinks of it, as we will see.
In “What Pragmatism Is” Peirce in fact tells us what his notion of pragmatism is, and in
fact he distinguishes his own position from others by renaming his position “pragmaticism”. He
characterizes his method as having three benefits: 1) it is just as able as other methods, but less
suceptible to their problems; 2) is is more compact; and most importantly 3) it “more readily
connects itself with a critical proof of its truth.” (WPI, 187)
Critique of Method of Doubt
Peirce says that one begins thinking ‘mid-stream’, so to speak. He says,
. . . there is obut one state of mind from which you can “set out”, namely, the very state
of mind in which you actually find yourself at the time you do “set out”-- a state in
which you are laden with an immense mass of cognition already formed, of which you
cannot divest yourself if you would: and who knows whether, if you could, you would
not have made all knowledge impossible to yourself? (WPI, 188)
One comes to the world, in the midst of experiences, with all sorts of beliefs which you do not
doubt. To artificially induce doubt in these beliefs is likely to lead us to a Humean-sort of
skepticism. Many of our beliefs are gained by having a child-like trust towards the world before
we critically reflect on our experiences. But if, when we begin to critically reflect on these
experiences, we determine to doubt anything which cannot be proven to us, we knock the
supports out from under our epistemic project altogether. Peirce is advocating here a coherentist
theory of truth-- that we begin with a certain number of truths, and from that core we build out
and connect new beliefs into that already-existing basic set. If we reject that core set, we will
have no epistemic infrastructure within which to make sense of the world.
But beyond this initial criticism of the method of doubt, he also claims that it is in fact
impossible to artificially induce authentic doubt. He calls this “logical self-control” and
compares it to “ethical self-control”. (WPI, 190) It appears that this is a certain sort of
conscientiousness, an inborn tendency to simply not be able to do that which goes against one’s
conscience. As one might simply not be able to kill another human being, or feel hate towards
someone at a particular moment, one also is not able to doubt particular beliefs in particular
instances, and to do so would be unnatural-- completely against one’s instinct. “Logical self
control” is essentially the control which logic exerts over me-- and much in the same way that it
is impossible for me to really doubt the principle of noncontradiction, it is impossible for me to
doubt beliefs which I hold as having no reasons against them.1 What we don’t doubt at all is
impenetrable to hypothetical doubts because those beliefs have no reasons to be disrupted. “Now
One might here think of Aristotle’s argument for the principle of non-contradiction in
Metaphysics where he claims that one simply cannot think at all without making use of the law
of non-contradiction.
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that which you do not at all doubt, you must and do regard as infallible, absolute truth.” (WPI,
188) This is a psychological point-- you cannot bring yourself to begin to doubt what you have
no uncertainty about. If all of your experiences compel you to believe that you exist, or that the
world exists, or that you are thinking, or that your memories are generally accurate, and you have
no reasons to doubt them, then reason constrains us to follow the impulses of our experiences,
and to rest assured. At this point Peirce makes a very strong and easily miscontrued statement: “
. . . what you cannot in the least help believing is not, justly speaking, wrong belief. In other
words, for you it is the absolute truth.” (WPI, 190) The point here, I take it, is that while one has
the realization that it is, in principle, possible that any one of one’s beliefs may turn out to be
false-- for example my belief that I exist, etc-- one cannot actually see how that it could be
possible, and one has no reasons to think otherwise. In Peirce’s terms, I have nothing disturbing
my habit of belief. Having a belief which presently has no reason to be disturbed constitutes the
"truth" for Peirce-- but in the present moment, the present "truth" works as your "absolute truth",
although, in light of the fallibilistic safeguards, we realize that there may arise some newly
discovered facts in the future which might cast this "truth" into doubt, so while we treat it
practically speaking as "absolute" (since we have no reason to disturb it) we do theoretically
realize that it may not be the absolute truth.
Truths and Reals
To understand more clearly here, it is essential to understand that there is a difference
between my present beliefs and my “ultimate” beliefs. One might also state this distinction in
terms of a difference between my current habits, and my ultimate habits of belief. Peirce says
“Of course, that ultimate state of habit to which the action of self-control ultimately tends, where
no room is left for further self-control, is, in the case of thought, the state of fixed belief, or
perfect knowledge” (WPI, 191) Peirce admits that the distinction between absolute truth and
what you do not doubt is only a distinction in an abstract and “Pickwickian sense”; in other
words, I think, this is a distinction which one has in principle (abstract) but it is not held to be a
live or likely option in any substantial sense, at the moment.
To understand this difference between what we take to be true and the absolute, we must
understand the relation of truth to “reals”. Later in this essay on Pragmatism, Peirce claims that “
. . . whatever is true represents a real.” (WPI, 194) The real is that which is independent of what
anyone presently thinks of it-- but this distinction alone shows us that the real is no what I take
truth to be, necessarily. It is possible that what I take to be the truth about the cup on the table
(that it is white, and on the table) does in fact correspond to what my belief is presently. But the
real-- the reality about the cup-- remains in some sense separate from what anyone thinks. The
real is, in short, the “real meaning” behind what I think. I think “the cup is white” and the
meaning behind that is the real cup, which is not an instant in time; rather, “the sum of the
experimental phenomena that a proposition implies makes up its entire bearing upon human
conduct.” (WPI, 195) An essential reason why one’s current indubitable beliefs (which are
“truth”) are not necessarily identical to the real is evolution in two senses. First, the evolution of
our understanding, as we come to learn more and more. Second, the evolution of the world,
which brings about new facts into being constantly. What is the best answer today may not be so
tomorrow because the world will produce a novel new possibility through evolution.
This
evolution of our understanding more and more towards what reality is spoken of by Peirce as
“that process of evolution whereby the existent com es more and more to embody those generals
which were just now said to be destined, which is what we strive to express in calling them
reasonable.” (WPI, 199) This process is, then, the proceeding of our understanding towards the
real, as our truth is continually refined through experiences until that future goal of meeting
with/becoming the real, which is the destiny which thought strives towards-- that ultimate eternal
peace where our habits have finally come into perfect harmony with the real, when there is no
more room for discrepancy between truth and the real, and they have become one in the ultimate
and absolute truth. This is the metaphysical picture which Peirce gives us to give “life and light
to cosmology and physics” as well as our philosophical endeavors. The light of the possibility of
our truths evolving towards their reals is the possibility which stimulates us to strive to know.
The discrepancies which arise give rise to authentic doubt, changes in habits, and new beliefs
about the world. Through the process of experiment we strive towards te fixation of our beliefs.
Fallibilism, Relativism and the Coming of the Promise
Peirce’s fallibilism is an issue which deserves much exploration, but for here we should
mention at least that he acknowledges that “the perversity of thought of whole generations may
cause the postponement of the ultimate fixation (of our beliefs).” (WPI, 198) It does not seem
clear whether or not the fixation of beliefs will always remain merely “in principle” possible,
working as a regulative idea to guide our thought (of course it will do this either way), or whether
the attainment of the real in all cases is actually considered by Peirce to be an attainable
possibility. It seems that, as long as there is a future, and a process of change in the world itself,
that no such ultimate Real (when all truths and reals would match) can be achieved.
Conclusion
What does this all mean then? It does not mean that there is no truth. There is truth.
What I cannot doubt is the truth. But that which I cannot doubt presently (the truth) is not the
absolute truth (although I cannot imagine that it is not-- for if I did doubt that it was the absolute
truth, I wouldn’t think it was the truth at all, but would doubt it). The absolute truth would be
perfect correspondence to the real. The truth I presently have is a sign of the real, and the more
closely that such truth represents the real, the closer I am to the promised evolution of my truth
towards the real. Peirce appears to have elements of both coherentist and correspondence
theories of truth, and certainly holds that there is a real which my beliefs must correspond to in
order to gain status of absolute truth. It does seem that what is true for you might be different
from what is true for me, but that is just to say that there are particular things I cannot doubt
which you can, or visa-versa. The absolute truth will be the same for both of us, although
disagreement may persist between us throughout our lifetimes. Again, understanding the
difference between mere “truth”-- beliefs which cannot practically be doubted presently-- and
“absolute truth”-- the belief which ultimately will never be able to be doubted-- is key to
realizing that Peirce is ultimately not a relativist, although his fallibilism allows for the
discrepancies which might make you and I believe that opposite things are true. The real is
something altogether different from either truth or absolute truth, as it is not a belief but the fact
apart from what anyone thinks. While there are semantic troubles with this way of talking,
Peirce’s theory seems to help us develop a more nuanced realist epistemology. I think it is quite
clear that Peirce is not a relativist, although his way of speaking about our epistemic struggles
certainly can give rise to such an impression.