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The British Empire: Catalyst for the Demise of the Zulu Kingdom Sara Housworth On January 22, 1879, the army of the powerful British Empire suffered its worst defeat since the Crimean War (1854-1856). In about six hours, the British army lost over 1,300 of the 1,700 men in the battle. 1 The defeat was not at the hands of a rival European power, but of one of the last independent African kingdoms: the Zulu. At this battle, on the slopes of a small mountain in southern Africa called Isandhlwana* (figure 1), Zulu impi (soldiers) left only sixty British and about three hundred African auxiliary survivors.2 According to a report of the battle in the New York Times, in addition to the death of so many of its soldiers, the British lost “…a valuable convoy of 102 wagons, 1,000 oxen, 2 cannon, 400 shot and shell, 1,000 rifles, 250,000 rounds of ammunition, 60,000 pounds weight provisions and the colors of the twenty-fourth regiment.”3 These human and material losses, which marked the beginning of the Anglo-Zulu War that would last until the 4th of July 1879, destroyed Britain’s ability to fight in southern Africa for a full three months. The Battle of Isandhlwana made the Zulu famous across the Western world—they were already well known in the southern third of the African continent—for their fighting ability and determination. Isandhlwana sticks up out of the South African lowveld some ten miles north of the Buffalo River, which formed the border between Zululand and the British colony of Natal (see figure 1 for photo of Isandhlwana). The battle resulted from a British invasion of Zululand and declaration of war. Sir Bartle Freer, British High Figure 1: The Small Mountain of Isandhlwana (background) 4 Commissioner for Southern Africa, instigated the 1879 war to eliminate the Zulu threat and force the Zulu to accept Britain’s confederation policy for southern Africa.5 The defeat of such a large portion of British forces resulted in Frere’s and Britain’s humiliation, while proving to the world the military capabilities of native peoples. * Although there have been several spellings of Isandhlwana since the British-Zulu battle, for purposes of clarity and cohesiveness the narrative of this paper will spell the hill and battle-- Isandhlwana. Other spellings from newspapers, letters, maps, and other scholarly works use the following spellings: Isalwana, Isandlwana, and Isandula. These spellings still all refer to the same place and battleground. Housworth 2 Although the Battle of Isandhlwana demonstrated Zulu fighting potential in a single battle, the Zulu kingdom was not capable of sustaining its momentum and continuing ultimately to win the war. The Zulu inability to follow through on this battle is evident in Britain’s victory in a battle at Rorke’s Drift, only a few hours after Isandhlwana, and the subsequent massacre of Zulu soldiers at Kambula, near the northwestern Transvaal-Zulu border, which preceded the ultimate destruction of the Zulu army at the Battle of Ulundi on July 4th. Contrary to popular opinion of the time and later, the Zulu failure to continue its success over British forces in the Anglo-Zulu War was not the result of Britain’s superior weaponry or tactical ability, nor was it due to the determination of Great Britain to build an ever-large empire in Africa. The British won the war and, in the end, destroyed the Zulu kingdom because of exiting fissures in Zulu society, created by an unstable political structure and a conservative military organization. One cannot identify the fault lines in Zulu society without examining the creation of the Zulu kingdom and then viewing the kingdom in light of Britain’s foreign policy. What such an examination reveals, is not a technologically superior British Empire brutally, and perhaps even casually (as the poet Rudyard Kipling might have wanted one to believe in such poems as “Fuzzy Wuzzy”6), destroying another independent African kingdom. Instead, one sees a British Empire serving primarily as a catalyst for actions already occurring within the Zulu kingdom, which led quickly to its collapse. The Zulu kingdom was barely half a century old on the eve of the British invasion in 1879. The Zulu are descended from Bantu-speaking settlers who migrated to southern Africa in the early Common Era. By the 1600s, descendants of these Bantu settlers politically and socially controlled two-fifths of the land suitable for agriculture in southern Africa.7 They practiced a form of mixed farming, herding cattle and sheep while growing such crops as sorghum.8 Labor was divided along gender lines: women cultivated crops, men herded cattle. Once the Zulu incorporated other chieftains into their sphere of control, in the early nineteenth century, they used these labor roles to define an individual’s place in the Zulu military and social structure. Men took on the role of soldiers in addition to their herding duties; women were responsible for providing food for the army in addition to raising children.9 Therefore, the establishment of the Zulu military kingdom did not create an entirely new kind of society, but instead built on existing societal customs. The second and third decades of the nineteenth century witnessed the rise of the Zulu into a centralized state, which amounted to a politically organized region dominated by the Zulu royal family and the Zulu military system. 10 Specific geographic boundaries marked the region once white settlers began claiming territory and making land agreements with Zulu kings. Before centralization, political structures in the area were based on chiefdoms, wherein a chief ruled with the help of his kinsmen and councilors.11 Housworth 3 The Zulu were originally one of the smaller chiefdoms of southern Africa’s Nguni* region, but through conquest and alliances, the Zulu were able to incorporate most northern Nguni chiefdoms under a central ruling family. This family was descended from Shaka Ka Senzangakhona.** Shaka was the eldest (though illegitimate) son of chief Senzangakhona. His enlistment in the Dingiswayo’s Mthethwa army about 1810 marks the beginning of Zulu power and dominance.12 It is during this time that the Zulu structures and practices were established. The first major change in Zulu practice involved the realignment of loyalties. Ian Knight, an Anglo-Zulu War expert, explains that Shaka and Dingiswayo created a political and military structure that took away loyalties from local chiefs and refocused them on a king.13 This was possible through intertwining military might with political control. If the Zulu were going to exert power over others, their leaders needed to create a highly militarized state. This they accomplished through military innovations and a restructuring of the Zulu army. The introduction of improved weaponry and suitable military tactics allowed the Zulu army to evolve into a deadly fighting force. As one of Dingiswayo’s high commanders, Shaka led the innovations by forcing his impi warriors to adopt new fighting techniques and strategies. One of his major innovations was the development of the assegai, a short stabbing spear with a long double-edged blade. 14 This gave the Zulu impi considerable advantage over the traditional long spear used by others. The close-combat capabilities of the assegai were more effective in inflicting casualties and forcing the enemy to retreat. The long spear was comparatively ineffective, since it was traditionally used to throw at the enemy from a distance and could easily miss its intended target. The introduction of the assegai turned the long spear into a secondary weapon, used only for the initial Zulu attack, when the enemy was out of the assegai’s deadly range.15 Shaka’s innovation created a bloodier type of warfare, which inflicted a considerably higher death rate in battle than in previous engagements. A climate of fear resulted among other South African clans or chieftains. This climate created the Mfecane, which enabled Shaka to incorporate other groups into the Zulu Kingdom or forced groups to flee, leaving their land in Zulu control.16 With the introduction of new weaponry, the Zulu army needed a new military strategy. Again, Shaka provided the solution through a battlefield strategy designed to take full advantage of the assegai’s close combat deadliness. His strategy was known as the “izimpondo zankhomo or horns of the beast” attack formation17 (diagram 1). This formation allowed the impi to encircle the enemy, closing off any routes of escape. The surrounding Zulu army would then use the assegai to stab to death the trapped enemy * Technically, Nguni is a sub-group of the larger Bantu language family. Speakers of the language inhabit a fertile corridor of land between the Drakensberg Mountains and the Indian Ocean. ** Shaka has also been spelled Chaka and Tshaka. “Ka” in Zulu was used to denote “son of.” Housworth 4 army. Symbolic of a bull’s charge, the formation contained three primary groups of warriors (diagram 2). The isifuba, or chest, consisted of the most mature and experienced men, who led a frontal assault on the enemy. The izimpondo, or horns, consisted of young men who were experienced in battle. They were divided into the right horn and left horn. Their purpose was to encircle the enemy, cutting off all escape routes. Frequently, one of these horns would use southern Africa’s terrain to conceal its movements until in position to encircle the enemy. The third group, called the umuva, or loins, was composed mostly of older men and inexperienced young men. These warriors were held as a reserve force. They filled the gaps in the formation created by fallen impi.18 Shaka’s “horns of the beast” military strategy became the central fighting technique of the Zulu army. It played an important role in both Zulu victories and defeats throughout the rest of the history of the Zulu kingdom. The second way Zulu power and dominance was established involved the remolding of the region’s traditional military system. Age groupings of men already existed across Zulu society, but Dingiswayo molded these groupings into age regiments (amabutho*), which became a defining feature of his army.19 After Dingiswayo’s death and Shaka’s ascension to the height of Zulu power, Shaka continued the use of age regiments in order to unify the Zulu and incorporate groups under a signal political authority. The amabutho system allowed the Zulu king to extend his authority over all young men.20 The change in loyalties from local chiefs and local army units to the Zulu king and to an assigned impi regiment was vital to effectiveness of the amabutho system.21 An age regiment, or ibutho, was created every three to four years and consisted of all eighteen and nineteen-year-old men. As a right of passage, assignment into an ibutho marked a young man’s coming of age. Members of an ibutho were required to leave their local homesteads and join their regiment at the royal kraal (homestead). This residence continued over the next ten years as the ibutho provided the king with active military * Amabutho: (plural) age regiments Housworth 5 service. Active service was not complete until the king granted the entire regiment the right to marry. In Zulu society, marriage marked the completion of a man’s transition into adulthood.22 Once married, his focus turned to creating his own households, acquiring wives and cattle, and creating the next Zulu generation. Hence, the age regiments were an integral feature of Zulu society, since they provided Shaka and successive Zulu Kings with a vehicle to maintain order and control. Through his age regiments and a climate of fear, Shaka was able to demand complete allegiance and obedience to his rule as King of the Zulu. However, the political cohesion Shaka had created was fragile because of the numerous enemies he had made during his claiming of the Zulu crown and subsequent reign. In 1828 his half-brother, Dingane, murdered him and succeeded him in ruling the Zulu.23 Over the next fifty years, similar kinds of factionalism continually worked to undermine Zulu kings. Factions developed in Zulu society because royal succession was not a linear process. Unlike most western European royal successions, the eldest male heir did not automatically inherit the kingdom from his father. For the Zulu, succession was contingent on which member of the royal family could raise the most military support for his claim to the crown. As a result, rival members of the royal family repeatedly created personal forces to challenge current kings.24 This factionalism illustrates an inherent weakness in the Zulu political structure in which kings did not necessarily have complete control of their armies and kingdoms. This factionalism played an important role in the establishment of the Zulu political leadership present during the Anglo-Zulu War. Actually, it was through this factionalism that King Cetshwayo Ka Mpande claimed the throne in 1872 after defeating his brother, Mbuyazi.25 Two of Cetshwayo’s objectives dominated all the years of his reign: his desire to maintain military superiority over potential rivals, and his desire to maintain amicable relations with the British in Natal. These two objectives appeared together during the Anglo-Zulu War and led to Cetshwayo’s downfall. To achieve his first objective, Cetshwayo needed allies. John Dunn, a white trader raised in the frontier environment around Algoa Bay, provided the political and military assistance that Cetshwayo needed to secure his reign. In an analysis of the relationship between Dunn and Cetshwayo, historian Charles Ballard argues that problems with Zulu succession allowed white frontiersmen like Dunn to advance their careers. Dunn in particular provided Cetshwayo with such vital resources as strategic trade routes and firearms, which were essential to his securing his authority.26 Cetshwayo was able to use the guns obtained through Dunn to intimidate his rivals into accepting him as King. Housworth 6 Cetshwayo’s second objective, to maintain amicable relations with British Natal, also involved Dunn. For the Zulu king, once he was in power, “Dunn preformed the duties of a de facto foreign minister and private secretary,” writes Ballard.27 It was through correspondence between Dunn and Sir Theophilus Shepstone, Secretary of Native Affairs in Natal, that Cetshwayo accepted Shepstone’s offer to preside over Cetshwayo’s 1873 coronation ceremony.28 For Cetshwayo, Shepstone’s presence at the coronation gave greater recognition to his right to the Zulu crown, while establishing a friendly relationship with the British official. For Shepstone, the ceremony allowed him to proclaim “coronation laws,” which proclaimed, “‘indiscriminate shedding of blood’ should cease,” all Zulu should be given the right to appeal to the king before execution, and minor crimes should be punishable only by fines.29 Cetshwayo’s acceptance of these laws marked the beginning of a period of Zulu cooperation and goodwill towards Britain and Natal. This cooperation and goodwill did not last however, British colonists in Natal came to view the Zulu kingdom as a threat, and British foreign policy quickly fell in line with such thinking. In order to remove this perceived Zulu threat, the colonial government had to propose several justifications for an invasion of Zululand by forces of the larger British Empire. British officials soon began criticizing Cetshwayo’s reign for failing to uphold the human rights guarantees of the coronation laws. The colonial government maintained that this gave the British government the right to declare war against the Zulu. Direct responsibility for the start of the Anglo-Zulu War falls of the shoulders of Frere. An experienced imperial proconsul, Frere was assigned the task of implementing the British government’s confederation policy in southern Africa.30 This charged the High Commissioner for Southern Africa with extending an indirect form of British rule to the two Boer Republics—the South African Republic (or the Transvaal) and the Orange Free State— and areas of African occupation. 31 Great Britain’s reasons for wanting to unify southern Africa fell into three categories. The first is apparent in an 1879 Colonial Office dispatch: “The scheme of confederation… affords the only hope of establishing a safe and coherent native policy, and so avoiding periodical wars, [that could endanger]… the British….”32 The British government and many of its white settlers in the colonies feared an uprising from within their colonies. Frere was convinced that the existence of a strong and independent African kingdom emboldened, other Africans to rebel within the colonies.33 Constant uprisings would threaten the white political establishment and drain away valuable resources from the governments’ economic development plans. These plans were at the center of Britain’s second reason for supporting confederation. Through a unified southern Africa, Britain could fully exploit the region’s mineral wealth, such as the recently discovered diamonds in Kimberley and suspected gold on the highveld.34 This exploitation of course, would greatly enhance the wealth and prestige of the British Empire. The third reason Britain sought confederation was to ensure that southern Africa Housworth 7 was secure from a newly posed Russian threat. The Balkan Crisis of 1876-78 highlighted the inadequacies of the British defense of their African colonies. Natal and Cape Colony would again become vital to the British Empire if a war with Russia closed the Suez Canal, since British traders and transports would need a secure harbor to replenish provisions as they steamed around Africa to the Indian Ocean. These three lines of reasoning convinced Frere and the Colonial Secretary, Lord Carnarvon, that unification was vital to the defense of British interests.35 Frere’s view of the Zulu was thus colored to the point that he viewed their kingdom as the major obstacle to the success of confederation and British defense. Frere determined that the forceful neutralization of the Zulu Kingdom—a euphemism for overcoming and subduing the Zulu army— was necessary for the removal of the obstacle the Zulu presented. He knew, however, that the British government was extremely reluctant to become embroiled in an African war, a position he learned of through his correspondence with the government’s Colonial Office. In one directive, his supervisors ordered him explicitly to “avoid taking any decided step [in regards to the Zulu Kingdom]… until you have received instructions from Her Majesty’s Government.36 This put Frere in the position of having to find a way to justify to the British government and public the invasion of an independent kingdom. He found his justifications in missionary testimony on Cetshwayo’s tyrannical behavior, a Transvaal-Zulu border dispute, and the so-called Sihayo affair. Missionaries provided Frere with stories of atrocities that Cetshwayo supposedly committed. In 1877, the Natal Mercury reported, “‘abundant evidence to prove that Kafir residents at mission stations are being constantly killed in cold blood.’” The historian R. L. Cope explains that other reports claimed “Cetshwayo was killing his heathen subjects too, at a rate of fifty a day,” and that Cetshwayo had promised his reign would shed more blood than Shaka and Dingane combined.37 One missionary, Robert Roberson, was particularly vocal in denouncing Cetshwayo’s rule. In The Natal Colonist (1877), he wrote: “Ever since the present King [Cetshwayo] came to power– I mean undivided power – things here have steadily been going from bad to worse. For many years before the death of his father he was the de facto ruler of the country, but his father’s court acted to a certain degree as a drag upon him. Now that he has the reins altogether in his own hands he has come out in his true colours. It is difficult to give you an accurate idea of the state of misrule and terrorism which prevails here.”38 Missionaries like Robertson argued that Britain had a moral duty to end this wanton and unjustified destruction of human life.39 Frere latched onto these reports, since they gave him the evidence he needed to convince the British of their obligations. On moral grounds, he argued that the British had to intercede on behalf of suffering Africans. Frere characterized the history of Cetshwayo’s rule as one “‘written in characters of blood’” and labeled the Zulu king an “‘irresponsible bloodthirsty despot.’” This stirred British Housworth 8 spirit and rationalized the Anglo-Zulu war as a humanitarian mission.40 The missionaries also gave Frere an argument for Britain’s political obligations in Zululand. They claimed that Cetshwayo’s “misrule” and “terrorism” were a violation of his coronation promises.41 If the British did not intercede and enforce those coronation laws, British authority in southern African would be tarnished. Thus, Frere was able to move the idea of a Zulu war onto a higher plane, which provided the British a moral and political rationalization for invading an independent kingdom. Another means Frere found to justify the Anglo-Zulu War involved a border dispute between the Transvaal and Zululand. Since the Boers had begun migrating northeastward from the Cape Colony in the 1830s, they had been in conflict with various African groups, particularly the Zulu, for control of land and cattle. Once the South African Republic (or Transvaal) was established, a piece of land north of the upper Mzinyathi River became a source of contention for both sides.42 During this dispute, the British Empire under Shepstone’s direction had supported Zulu claims against the Boers. All that changed in 1877 when Shepstone annexed the Transvaal, ostensibly in order to save it from being invaded by the Zulu. Shepstone then undermined British support of the Zulu by claiming to have found new evidence to support the Boer claim to the land.43 This shift in support spread Zulu distrust from their Boer neighbors to their British neighbors. With Zulu-British relations in decline, Frere could stress the tenuous position the British would hold if the Zulu and Russians attacked simultaneously.44 After British-Zulu relations declined and Cetshwayo’s character had been ravished, Frere needed only an inflammatory incident to justify going to war. This came in the form of a minor border transgression that Frere unilaterally declared a “violation of British territory.” This violation was the work of the sons of the Zulu Chief Sihayo, who sought to take revenge on two of their father’s wives who had committed adultery. In the official notification of the basis for military operations to be undertaken in Zululand, Frere explained that the men entered British Natal and “took away two refugee women… [who] were dragged over the border into Zululand” to be killed.45 Frere reacted aggressively to this perceived violation of Natal sovereignty. On the 6th of January 1879, the Natal Colonist reported Frere’s presentation to Cetshwayo with an ultimatum that demanded he surrender the perpetrators for trial in Natal. Particularly galling, Frere gave the Zulu king thirty days to pay a non-compliance fine, dismantle the Zulu amabutho system, fulfill his coronation promises to end killings, allow missionaries complete freedom to preach in Zululand, and accept a British resident at his royal homestead.46 Compliance would have inevitably led to the destruction of Cetshwayo’s kingdom, and to no one’s surprise, the Zulu king allowed the deadline to expire. On January 11, British troops invaded Zululand and the Anglo-Zulu War was on. At the beginning of the Anglo-Zulu War, geographical features defined the borders of the Zulu kingdom. It stretched between the eastern coast of Southern Africa and the Housworth 9 Kahlamba Mountains.* The Pongolo River, the Lebombo Mountains, and the Maputaland flats created the kingdom’s northern border; while, the Tugela and Buffalo or Mzinyathi Rivers mark most of the southern border. The Intelligence Branch of Britain’s Quartermaster General Department provided these geographical definitions, which are important for understanding the tensions between the Zulu and white settlers, which Frere had used to justify the war. 47 The two European political entities, which also defined Zululand’s borders, each played its own role in the Anglo-Zulu War (map 2). The South African Republic shared Map 1: Southern Africa, 187048 Zululand’s northwestern border, and as discussed, the Republic provided Frere with one of his reasons for declaring war. The other European entity, Natal, shared Zululand’s southern border. Bishop Colenso, an outspoken opponent of the British invasion of Zululand, argued that Natal had always maintained friendly relations with the Zulu, unlike the South African Republic. Colenso further argued that it was only after 1878, when Frere began his push for war, that relations soured. 49 Once war was declared, Frere mobilized British troops, and Baron Chelmsford, otherwise known as Lieutenant-General Sir Frederic Augustus Thesiger, led the invasion. A shortage of transportation and slow supply lines limited Chelmsford’s war strategy. Since the British Army always carried with it all of its equipment, ammunition, medical supplies, and food, it was imperative that Chelmsford secured enough transport vehicles to maintain his field force. 50 Unluckily for the Lieutenant-General, the army stationed in * White explorers and settlers referred to these as the Drakensberg or Dragon Mountains. Housworth 10 southern Africa did not maintain enough transport wagons to make the campaign successful. In addition, the transport wagons it did possess had problems navigating the undulating African veld. Chelmsford was forced to use large quantities of civilian transport wagons, large, steady, and sturdy vehicles that each required a minimum of 16 oxen to pull a full load.51 Such a large number of livestock caused delays and grass shortages along the trail, resulting in the death of many oxen. These supply complications forced the British invasion to progress at a snail’s pace, which made the British army especially vulnerable to attack. The inability of the Zulu military to exploit this weakness reveals the fissures that led to their kingdom’s demise. For his invasion of Zululand, Chelmsford’s offensive strategy involved a three-column attack (map 2). Under the command of Colonel C.K. Pearson, the first column was assigned to the British right flank and ordered to invade not far in from the eastern coast. The center column was to provide the main thrust of the assault by invading Zululand at the Rorke’s Drift mission station. Although Colonel R.T. Glyn of the 24th Regiment technically commanded the center column, Chelmsford chose to accompany this column and made all the column’s command decisions. The last part of Chelmsford’s offensive strategy involved the left flank, under the command of Colonel H.E. Wood, invading northern Zulu territory. Each column would proceed through Map 2: Three-columned British Invasion of Zululand, 187952 Zululand until their forces joined at Ulundi,* Cetshwayo’s royal residence.53 Through this approach, Chelmsford sought to entice the Zulu to attack a position in which they would be exposed to concentrated rifle and artillery fire. * Ulundi is also referred to in sources by the following spelling: oNdidi. Housworth 11 The Zulu were well aware of the British preparations for war occurring on their borders. Cetshwayo and his counselors prepared to defend their kingdom by amassing most of the 40,000 man Zulu Army at the royal homestead of Ulundi. Cetshwayo’s strategy involved the distribution of his army to the areas of the kingdom under attack, after the British had revealed their points of invasion.54 The first major battle of the Anglo-Zulu War occurred at Isandhlwana on the 22nd of January, 1879. It was an unmitigated disaster for the British. Chelmsford and the rest of his command failed to “laager” their wagons and entrench their position at the bottom of the Isandhlwana hill.55 Boers had introduced the laager in the early nineteenth century and the tactic had been particularly successful during the 1838 Zulu attack on an encampment at what the Boers came to call Blood River. Laagering involved all wagons being drawn into a connected circle with all the animals and human inhabitants housed inside the ring. Once the ring was formed, brush was used to fill in areas under and around the laager. From this secure position, a small group of Europeans armed with rifles could effectively defend against thousands of charging Africans through concentrated firepower.56 Without a laager and entrenchment, the British army at Isandhlwana was unable to hold off the large Zulu force. Consequently, when the British line began to collapse, the lack of obstacles in their path allowed the Zulu impi to pour into the camp and use the assegai on most of the British soldiers. Ironically, during the battle, both Chelmsford and Glyn were on a reconnaissance mission to locate the Zulu army. In the aftermath of the British defeat, Chelmsford reported that the destruction of the British center column was so complete that “every record connected with the several corps…” at Isandhlwana had been lost, so “an absolutely correct list of all those who perished” was difficult to determine.57 The Battle of Isandhlwana provides compelling evidence of the Zulu’s capacity to defeat the British. Superior technology could not in itself repel the Zulu Army when engaged in an open field dominated by hand-to-hand combat. The “horns of the beast” attack formation effectively surrounded the British position, resulting in the Zulu victory. The Zulu capacity to win a battle did not automatically translate into an overall Zulu victory, however. Within a matter of months the Zulu would lose the Anglo-Zulu war. They lost because they were unable to capitalize on their victory, even though the British army had been decimated and Natal was left in an extremely vulnerable position. This inability was the result of the unstable Zulu political and military structure, which fragmented their war effort. The shadow of political instability had darkened Cetshwayo’s reign from the beginning. The factionalism that had brought Cetshwayo to power now threatened the existence of his kingdom. The king’s position was so tenuous, according to John Dunn, that “‘he Housworth 12 [Cetshwayo] knew that he had not the whole nation on his side, but only a small portion, and that if he suffered the slightest defeat the whole country would turn on him….58 Such uncertainty and powerlessness led Cetshwayo to pursue a conservative military strategy. Instead of taking advantage of the Zulu victory at Isandhlwana by orchestrating an attack on the now vulnerable Natal border, Cetshwayo sought to maintain his authority by presenting himself as “a victim of British aggression.”59 He hoped that such a moderate stance would prevent the British from further retaliation against his people and allow him to reach peace with the British before the war progressed. This strategy was not enough. His efforts were thwarted by the actions of his own impi warriors, who demonstrated his lack of control over his kingdom in several key engagements when they disobeyed his direct orders. The first instance of this was at Isandhlwana. The battle began as an impulsive attack in response to a British scouting party stumbling onto the encampment of 25,000-impi warriors.60 Even though the Zulu won the day, the Zulu army acted contrary to the king’s and his commanders’ instructions, for they had planned an attack for the following day that was never carried out. Isandhlwana was only the first example of the breakdown of political authority in the Zulu kingdom. In two other significant battles, royal authority would be further eroded as Zulu regiments continued to disregard Cetshwayo’s orders. Only in these cases, the Zulu were decisively defeated. After the battle of Isandhlwana, Zulu reserve forces attacked the Rorke’s Drift mission station after they had been ordered to quit the field of combat and return home.61 These regiments sought to enhance their own glory, since they had largely missed out on the victory at Isandhlwana. The New York Times reported that about eighty British soldiers, who barricaded themselves within the station and used their firepower to repeal the Zulu attack, were successful in guarding the station. As a result, the “…Drift was strewn with Zulu dead, 351 bodies lay thick about the barrage,…bodies further away were estimated at between 600 and 700.”62 Although this defeat was important in reviving British military confidence, it is more significant to note that these Zulu impi who attack at Rorke’s Drift defied Cetshwayo’s instructions. Cetshwayo had lost firm control of his military forces, resulting in a sharp decline in his effectiveness as Zulu political leader. Without the obedience of his army, any military strategy he intended to carry out was doomed to failure. At the battle of Kambula, again the Zulu attacked a British encampment against the orders of the king. Cornelius Vijn, a Dutch trader during the British invasion of Zululand, who was with Cetshwayo when the king learned of his army’s disobedience and subsequent defeat, wrote: “When the King heard of the lost battle, he was exceedingly angry, and asked: ‘Who had given the word for his people to be allowed to fight against the Whites who had already entrenched themselves, since even in the open field one White Housworth 13 man was nearly as good as ten Zulu?’ …for the King’s plan had always been, whenever the Whites entrenched themselves, to make his army pass them, in order to bring the Whites into the open field, or else surround them from a distance, and make them die of hunger. But his people had not the patience for all this….”63 The historian J.J. Guy explains that if the Zulu had carried out these instructions the “effect on the British would have been disastrous,” since Chelmsford’s supply problems continued to hamper his progress through Zululand. 64 If the Zulu Army had followed the king’s plan, the Zulu would have been able to attack the slowly moving supply trains instead of having to charge the entrenched position. This would have allowed the Zulu to take full advantage of their larger numbers, fighting techniques, and knowledge of the land. Unfortunately for the Zulu and Cetshwayo, this did not occur. It was Cetshwayo’s own people, rather than his foreign enemies, who neutralized his authority. Thus, the battles of Rorke’s Drift and Kambula demonstrate the breakdown of Cetshwayo’s command. His inability to force his people to uphold his political authority ultimately led to defeat. In addition to Cetshwayo’s loss of political control, the conservative military structure of the Zulu Army failed to take advantage of available firearms and incorporate those weapons into its military tactics. Firearms had been present in southern Africa since before the time of Shaka. For all his insight as a military innovator, Shaka failed to recognize the advantages of European guns and continued to advocate the use of his “horn of the beast” attack formation with the assegai as the primary offensive weapon. He only advocated the use of firearms as a means of instilling fear in his subjects and enemies—through smoke and noise. 65 Shaka’s successor, Dingane, was also aware of this fear as seen in his statement, “if the white people were to come here to fight us, they need not fire at us, as the report from their pieces would strike you with terror, and while you ran one way, the Malongoes [whites] would drive off your cattle the other.”66 In spite of this fear, Zulu kings were able to amass their own arsenals, as firearms became known throughout the kingdom. The Zulu process of collecting weapons began in earnest in the late 1860s when great numbers of firearms began to enter Zululand. These were usually outdated weapons discarded by European militaries as they rearmed with metallic-cartridge breechloaders.67 Sources differ, but anywhere from 8,000 to 20,000 firearms were present in Zululand at the beginning of the Anglo-Zulu War.68 What is significant is that even these inferior weapons, if actively employed in the Zulu war effort, could have done considerable damage to the British. But, Zulu military leaders were unwilling to view firearms as a primary offensive weapon. This unwillingness was shaped largely during Cetshwayo’s initial reign. At this time, firearms were assigned a specific purpose in Zulu society. This did not involve Housworth 14 replacement of the Zulu’s main offensive weapon, the assegai, in the larger actions of the army. Instead, it involved Cetshwayo monopolizing firearms so they would become a status symbol of his wealth and power. To create this symbolism, Cetshwayo prohibiting firearms sales to his brothers’ rival fractions.69 The symbolism of firearms can be seen at the Battle of Isandhlwana, in which firearms were mostly carried by older, experience impi who had the wealth (cattle) to purchase weapons.70 After his coronation and his brothers’ recognition of his authority, Cetshwayo allowed Dunn to sell firearms throughout his kingdom. But by then it was too late. Thus, the Zulu military remained grounded in the half-century-old weaponry and tactics of Shaka. In every battle of the Anglo-Zulu War, the Zulu employed their “horns of the beast” attack formation against the onslaught of British firepower, with their own firearms regulated to secondary status, similar to the way they relied on the long spear. Firearms for the Zulu merely augmented the assegai. The Zulu discharged their firearms at the British in order to give their regiments a chance to rush forward until they could engage the enemy in close combat. 71 A British survivor of the attack at Isandhlwana wrote, “Every ten or fifteen yards the first line would halt and a shot would be fired, and then with an unearthly yell, they would rush on with a sort of measured dance.”72 Although this tactic provided the Zulu with a means to fight their traditional style of warfare, it came at a horrendous human cost. At Isandhlwana alone, just reaching the British lines cost the Zulu 1,000 men.73 Their failure to implement tactics that took advantage of their firepower was a major contributor to their defeat. Even the infusion into the Zulu firearm arsenal of 1,000 Martini-Henry rifles (the most superior firearms of the time) and 500,000 rounds of ammunition from Isandhlwana had only a minor affect on Zulu military strategy.74 Admittedly, on a few exceptional occasions, the Zulu used these advanced weapons to engage in guerrilla warfare. But, Zulu military training did not focus on marksmanship, so the result in each case was ineffective fire. Guerrilla warfare most likely could have been a successful tactic if the Zulu had fully integrated it into their strategy, especially with the long, slow supply lines for the British troops. Instead, the Zulu used this type of warfare merely to harass the British from a distance, when they could not mount a massive attack. 75 Ironically, it was in this manner that the Prince Imperial of France, who had joined the British army to gain military experience, was killed. Special correspondent of the Daily Telegraph Phil Robinson described how deadly Zulu firepower could be when combined with ambush tactics: “…Concealed by the deep donga…some 40 or 50 Zulu were…completely concealed by the rank vegetation, along the water’s edge…the word [order for the British to mount] was hardly spoken when, with a startling crash, there burst through the cover a volley from some 40 rifles…” Housworth 15 In the ensuing chaos, the prince lost his horse. Twelve or thirteen assegai-armed Zulu thereupon chased the prince, on foot, until catching him and stabbing him to death.76 The case of the Prince Imperial demonstrates how effective Zulu firepower could be when engaging the British. In this incident, the British party was routed and their leader killed without loss of a single Zulu life. Nevertheless, the conservative structure of the Zulu failed to adopt this strategy into their main military plan. The British were fully aware that the Zulu had not incorporated firearms into their basic military tactics. An 1879 British Intelligence report, issued to all officers before the invasion of Zululand, stated, “…the Zulu ‘method of marching, attack formation, etc., remain the same as before the introduction of firearms among them.”77 With this knowledge, the British set out, after Isandhlwana, to force the Zulu to attack their fortified positions. Cetshwayo was forced to pursue a defensive strategy in response, not only because of the political fissures in Zulu society, caused by the undermining of his authority, but also because of the failure of his military to use firearms effectively to break through British defenses. The underlying weakness of the Zulu military tradition in 1879 amounted to its inadaptability to the demands of the Anglo-Zulu war. The amabutho system still worked well when the Zulu were engaged in isolated battles with white settlers or in wars with African groups who had similar military traditions; however, this system was not effective in dealing with the prolonged war required to repel Britain’s invasion. Bishop Colenso summed up the Zulu military’s weakness in his observation that the Zulu “‘were merely an armed people, not a standing army.’”78 As an armed people, young Zulu men had responsibilities outside military service that were also pivotal to their kingdom’s survival. This meant that, typically, the Zulu army dispersed after every battle. This dispersal was ingrained in the amabutho system, since an impi was only required to provide a finite amount of military service. After an engagement, that service was completed and warriors returned home. There they attended to their cattle-keeping duties, helped bring in the harvest, and performed important purification rituals.79 According to this defined system, if the king wished to fight another battle, this cycle had to be repeated with a recall of service obligations and the inevitable dispersal of the army after the battle. As a result, Cetshwayo could win a particular engagement, as he did at Isandhlwana, without leading to a larger military victory. 80 A full military victory required winning consecutive battles, but the Zulu amabutho system was not designed to accommodate that need. By the time the army reassembled, the opportunity to build on a pervious victory had been lost. As the Zulu political and military structures failed, Cetshwayo hoped to hold back the British advance long enough to reach a peace settlement. He was unsuccessful, and by July 1879, Chelmsford, pushing his dangerously thin supply lines, engaged and soundly defeated the Zulu at Ulundi Cetshwayo’s capital.81 News of the probable termination of the war was carried to Europe and the United States on steamers. The New York Times’ Housworth 16 account of the defeat declared, “Lord Chelmsford defeats the savages, causing great loss to them—Ulundi burned— Zulus surrendering—Reported flight of Cetshwayo.”82 Chelmsford’s victory restored the British Empire’s prestige in the eyes of much of the world. It also upheld the European belief that their superior technology would ultimately triumph, no matter how numerous and brave the enemy. Not surprisingly, historians have long supported this thinking as the main reason for the Zulu defeat. An example of this is found in Leonard Thompson’s A History of South Africa, published in 2000. Thompson explains that although several leading Zulu chiefs defected to the British during the war, technological factors were decisive in the ultimate British victory over the Zulu. His evidence comes from the Zulu’s inability to make “effective use of their guns....”83 While this statement is based in fact, J.J. Guy argues it is simplistic and misleading “to emphasize the role of firearms… in the Anglo-Zulu War, and to ignore the broader social and political issues involved.”84 Analysis of the political and military structures of Zulu society shows that the superiority of European technology is only a mitigating factor in Britain’s defeat of the Zulu. Zulu society was mired in the political and military institutions implemented by Shaka five decades before the war. This resulted in a polarized political climate and conservative military strategies. The polarized climate prevented Cetshwayo from having complete control of his army. His regiments continually disregarded his instructions, a fact which led to the disastrous battle of Rorke’s Drift and Kambula. If his soldiers had followed his strategy and obeyed his commands, Cetshwayo and the Zulu could have had a greater opportunity to turn the conflict into a long and costly war. Public pressure may have resulted in the British government agreement to peace terms. Most likely, such terms would not have insisted on the “unconditional surrender” of the Zulu and the payment of an “indemnity to England for the cost of the war.”85 More equal peace terms could have provided the Zulu with a means to maintain their independence. In the eyes of Cetshwayo, a stable political structure was more essential to the survival of the Zulu. Therefore, the fact that such a structure did not exist caused more damage to the Zulu War effort than British firepower. The conservative Zulu military organization also handicapped their war effort. They needed an adaptive structure that would use the large supply of firearms at their disposal. There is truth in Thompson’s argument that the Zulu failed to integrate guns into their military strategy; however, this fact is not the main reason for the Zulu’s defeat. The amabutho system simply was unable to fight against an army employing tactics suitable to late-nineteenth century firearm technology; the system did not allow commanders to adapt. Housworth 17 The Zulu were victorious over the British at Isandhlwana and at several other isolated, smaller engagements, but could not capitalize on these victories and win the war. The struggle strained the already fragile internal structure of the kingdom. This allowed the British unconsciously to exacerbate the fissures in Zulu society created by an instable political structure and conservative military organization. Thus, the British Empire’s role in 1879 in the demise of the Zulu kingdom is most correctly viewed as a catalyst. An instable political structure and conservative military organization already existed before the British invasion. The Empire’s war effort, however brief, set in motion a chain of events that revealed these significant problems and inadequacies. Once revealed, the Zulu political and military structure made it nearly impossible for the Zulu to claim victory in the Anglo-Zulu War, and to survive as an independent kingdom. Housworth 18 1 Ian Knight, Isandlwana: The Great Zulu Victory, ed. Lee Johnson and David G. Chandler (Oxford: Osprey Publishing Ltd, 2002), 86. 2 Knight, 86. 3 “A British Column Routed, Disastrous Fighting in South Africa: The Zulus Annihilate a Strong Column of British Troops, and Capture Large Quantities of War Material – Forty-nine English officers and 500 men killed – The Loss of the Zulus 5,000 – Lord Chelmsford Forced to Retire,” New York Times, February 11, 1879, Pp. 1, column 7. 4 Knight, 82. 5 “Causes of the Zulu War: Sir Bartle Frere’s Official Notification of the Course to be Taken,” New York Times, February 23, 1879, Triple Sheet edition, Pp. 5, column 4. 6 The Kipling Society, http://www.kipling.org.uk/kip_fra.htm, Two lines of which read, “We’ll come and have a romp with you whenever your inclined” 7 Lamar, Howard and Leonard Thompson ed., The Frontier in History: North America and Southern Africa Compared (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1981): 19. 8 Lamar, 18. 9 Thompson 21-28. 10 Adam Kuper, “The ‘House’ and Zulu Political Structure in the Nineteenth Century,” Journal of African History 34, no. 3 (1993): 496. 11 Lamar, 18. 12 Leonard Thompson , A History of South Africa (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2000), 82-83. 13 Knight, 23. 14 Knight, 26. 15 Knight, 26. 16 N.E. Davis, A History of Southern Africa (Essex: Longman Group Ltd, 1978): 60. 17 Knight, 26. 18 Knight, 26. 19 Thompson, 83. 20 Knight, 23-27. 21 Knight, 23. 22 Knight, 24. 23 Thompson, 85. 24 Thompson, 123. 25 Thompson, 97. 26 Charles Ballard, “John Dunn and Cetshwayo: The Material Foundations of Political Power in the Zulu Kingdom, 1857-1878,” The Journal of African History 21, no.1 (1980): 91. 27 Ballard, 89. 28 Cope, R.L. “Written in Characters of Blood? The Reign of King Cetshwayo Ka Mpande 1872-9,” The Journal of African History 36, no. 2 (1995). 249. 29 Cope, 249. 30 Knight, 11. 31 Rebecca Fraser, The Story of Britain – From the Romans to the Present: A Narrative History (New York and London: W.W. Norton & Company, 2003): 580-581. 32 United Kingdom. Colonial Office. “The Annexation of the Transvaal,” by R.G.W. British Foreign and State Papers, African, no. 171, 879: 15. 1879. 33 Ballard, 249. 34 Thompson, 110-111. 35 O’Connor. 36 United Kingdom. Colonial Office. “Draft to Sir Bartle Frere,” British Foreign and State Papers, African, no. 172, 879: 15. 37 Cope, 253. 38 Cope, 254. 39 Cope, 253. 40 Cope, 347. Housworth 19 41 Cope, 254. Knight, 11. 43 United Kingdom. Colonial Office. “The Annexation of the Transvaal,” by R.G.W. British Foreign and State Papers, African, no. 171, 879: 15. 44 O’Connor. 45 New York Times – Triple Sheet, “Causes of the Zulu War: Sir Bartle Frere’s Official Notification of the Course to be Taken,” February 23, 1879, Pp. 5, column 4. 46 New York Times – Triple Sheet, “Causes of the Zulu War: Sir Bartle Frere’s Official Notification of the Course to be Taken,” February 23, 1879, Pp. 5, column 4.; Knight, 11. 47 United Kingdom. Intelligence Branch. Military Map of Zulu Land: compiled from most recent information, Quarter Master General Department, March 1879. 48 Davis, 81. 49 New York Times, “The Petty Causes of the Zulu War,” July 21, 1879, Pp. 8, column 6. 50 Knight, 30. 51 Knight, 30. 52 Knight, 32. 53 Knight, 31-32. 54 Knight, 33. 55 D.C.F. Moodie. Zulu 1879: The Anglo-Zulu War of 1879 from contemporary sources: First Hand Accounts, Interviews, Dispatches, Official Documents and Newspaper Reports. compliers Leonaur Editors, (Leonaur Ltd, 2006):35-36. 56 Thompson, 71,90-91. 57 United Kingdom. War Office. “From the Lieutenant General Commander in South Africa, Lord Chelmsford, to the Secretary of State for War,” British Foreign and State Papers, African, 8 February 1879, 2: 776. 58 Ballard, 84. 59 Knight, 90. 60 Knight, 48. 61 Knight, 89. 62 New York Times, “The Disaster at the Cape: The Gallant twenty-fourth. The terrible affair at Rorke’s Drift – Eighty Soldiers Resist a Zulu Army and Kill Ten Times Their Own Number – Pervious Record of a Heroic Regiment,” March 6, 1879, Pp. 5, column 1. 63 Guy, 566. 64 Guy, 566. 65 J.J. Guy, “A Note on Firearms in the Zulu Kingdom with Special Reference to the Anglo-Zulu War, 1879,” The Journal of African History 12, no. 4 (1971): 557-558. 66 Guy, 557. 67 Guy, 559. 68 Ballard, 89. ; Guy, 560. 69 Ballard, 89. 70 Knight, 26. 71 Guy, 563. 72 Guy, 562. 73 Knight, 86. 74 Guy, 562. 75 Guy, 563. 76 Moodie and the Leonaur Editors, 171-174. 77 Guy, 561. 78 Guy, 564. 79 Knight, 90. 80 Guy, 565. 81 Knight, 91. 82 New York Times, July 24, 1879, Pp. 5, column 1. 83 Thompson , 124-125. 42 Housworth 20 84 Guy, 570. New York Times, “Zulu Peace Negotiations: Unconditional surrender and Indemnity Demanded by the British – The Success of the Negotiations Hoped for,” July 4, 1879, The Latest Foreign News section. Pp. 1, column 3. 85 Bibliography Primary Sources: Public Records Office: United Kingdom’s National Achieves. United Kingdom. Colonial Office. “The Annexation of the Transvaal,” by R.G.W. British Foreign and State Papers, African, no. 171, 879: 15. CO 879/15. United Kingdom. Colonial Office. “Draft to Sir Bartle Frere,” British Foreign and State Papers, African, no. 172, 879: 15. C0 879/15. United Kingdom. Intelligence Branch. Military Map of Zulu Land: compiled from most recent information, Quarter Master General Department, March 1879. United Kingdom. War Office. “From the Lieutenant General Commander in South Africa, Lord Chelmsford, to the Secretary of State for War,” British Foreign and State Papers, African, 8 February 1879, 2: 776. WO 32/7726. New York Times: “A British Column Routed, Disastrous Fighting in South Africa: The Zulus Annihilate a Strong Colum of British Troops, and Capture Large Quantities of War Material – Forty-nine English officers and 500 men killed – The Loss of the Zulus 5,000 – Lord Chelmsford Forced to Retire,” New York Times, February 11, 1879, Pp. 1, column 7. Available on microfilm at SUNY Cortland’s Memorial Library. “Causes of the Zulu War: Sir Bartle Frere’s Official Notification of the Course to be Taken,” New York Times, February 23, 1879, Triple Sheet edition. Pp. 5, column 4. Available on microfilm at SUNY Cortland’s Memorial Library. Housworth 21 “The Disaster at the Cape: The Gallant twenty-fourth. The terrible affair at Rorke’s Drift – Eighty Soldiers Resist a Zulu Army and Kill Ten Times Their Own Number – Pervious Record of a Heroic Regiment,” New York Times, March 6, 1879, Pp. 5, column 1. Available on microfilm at SUNY Cortland’s Memorial Library. “The Petty Causes of the Zulu War,” New York Times, July 21, 1879, Pp. 8, column 6. Available on microfilm at SUNY Cortland’s Memorial Library. “The Zulus Badly Whipped: Probable Termination of the War – Lord Chelmsford Defeats the Savages, Causing Great Loss to Them – Ulundi Burned Zulu’s Surrender – Reported Flight of Cetywayo,” New York Times, July 24, 1879, Pp. 5, column 1. Available on microfilm at SUNY Cortland’s Memorial Library. “Zulu Peace Negotiations: Unconditional surrender and Indemnity Demanded by the British – The Success of the Negotiations Hoped for,” New York Times, July 4, 1879, The Latest Foreign News section. Pp. 1, column 3. Available on microfilm at SUNY Cortland’s Memorial Library. Other: D.C.F. Moodie and the Leonaur Editors, compliers. Zulu 1879: The Anglo-Zulu War of 1879 from contemporary sources: First Hand Accounts, Interviews, Dispatches, Official Documents and Newspaper Reports. Leonaur Ltd, 2006. Secondary Sources Ballard, Charles. “John Dunn and Cetshwayo: The Material Foundations of Political Power in the Zulu Kingdom, 1857-1878.” The Journal of African History 21, no.1 (1980). Cope, R.L. “Written in Characters of Blood? The Reign of King Cetshwayo Ka Mpande 1872-9.” The Journal of African History 36, no. 2 (1995). Davis, N.E. A History of Southern Africa. Essex: Longman Group Ltd, 1978, 60. Fraser, Rebecca. “Gladstone and Disraeli (1868-1886),” in The Story of Britain – From the Romans to th e Present” A Narrative History. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2003. Guy, J.J. “A Note on Firearms in the Zulu Kingdom with Special Reference to the Anglo Zulu War, 1879.” The Journal of African History 12, no. 4 (1971). Housworth 22 Knight, Ian. Isandlwana: The Great Zulu Victory. Lee Johnson and David G. Chandler ed. Oxford: Osprey Publishing Ltd, 2002. Kuper, Adam. “The ‘House’ and Zulu Political Structure in the Nineteenth Century,” Journal of Africa History 34, no. 3 (1993). Lamar, Howard and Leonard Thompson ed. The Frontier in History: North America and Southern Africa Compared, New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1981, 3-40. Thompson, Leonard. A History of South Africa. New Haven And London: Yale University Press, 2000.