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The Russian Navy Corbett Centre for Maritime Policy Studies The Corbett Centre launched its first naval roundtable of a dozen experts on 23 march 2009.This initiative was inspired by our general interest in navies, the way they work, the effect they have on the strategic context in which they operate. Navies are often windows into national policy. Their size and shape, what they say, have and do, tell us about national foreign policy purposes. They represent state resources so they tell us about the financial and institutional strengths and weaknesses of the state and the people they serve. We thought the Russian Federation Navy particularly interesting because Russian naval developments may give us insights into the country’s future trajectory. This is of great concern to the rest of us Europeans because Russia remains a major, if sometimes rather neglected, factor in our local strategic environment. Recent headlines over the past couple of weeks indicate an on-going debate about whether Russia is likely to be a partner or a competitor, raising questions about its likely trajectory and its implications for Europe. Will Russia prove a full partner or will its attempt to preserve its ‘sovereign space in the international system’ lead to rivalry, a lack of cooperation and political conflict? The Russian economy is in a bad state as a result of the frailties of fast track capitalism in an age of recession and excess reliance on high commodity prices for oil and gas. The Ruble is down 35% against the dollar, the Russian stock market lost 75% of its value through 2008 and the official forecast for 2009 is a -6% growth in GDP. Past deficiencies in defence procurement remain and many in the military resist reform. This is all likely to mean that despite financial forecasts, the Russians will be less able to spend on defence unless its rulers see such expenditure as a way of re-invigorating the economy and compensating for Russia’s present financial weakness. 2 Corbett Centre Russian analysts often refer to the country’s ‘exceptionalism...This may well be especially the case when it comes to defining the roles of the Navy. Alongside this, some commentators have discerned some stirrings of the bear, quite apart from its invasion of Georgia. Russia’s evident military interest in Venezuela and its recent exercises with China imply a rooted dislike of what it sees as Western containment of Russia in Europe and an American-dominated international system. The Kuznetsov has been active, long-range Bear flights have resumed in the North Atlantic and the North Pacific, new submarines have been ordered, and their seem to be plans for a military upgrade from 2011 which concentrates on the Navy and the Air Forces. Russian analysts often refer to the country’s ‘exceptionalism,’ arguing that while all the above may be true, Russia should not be judged by the standards of other countries. This may well be especially the case when it comes to defining the roles of the Navy. Russian naval experience is radically different from the standard Western maritime powers by virtue of its geographic and strategic circumstances, its way of government and what some have termed the Russian way of warfare. The old Soviet Navy certainly started differently, especially with its initial emphasis on submarines and aircraft rather than large warships, and its different terminology and ways of doing business. But during the Cold War there was a gradual process of convergence as Soviet practices began to seem to mirror Western ones. So there is room for debate about the standards against which we should be judging Russian naval aspirations and performance and what we should think about what they say and do. During the Cold War, the famous RUKUS [Russia, UK, US] talks launched in 1989 were an attempt to understand Soviet thinking and practice rather better and to seek an improvement in maritime relations. These linkages have developed, and now include France; they have become less academic in tone and composition and are now more of a venue for practitioners to come together. Perhaps it is time to revive the original idea? The future trajectory of the RFN may also be deduced from a look at the evolution of Russia’s National Security Concept, Military Doctrine and Maritime Doctrine. The identification of the US and NATO as the principal military threats to Russia, the associated stress on preparation for high intensity conflict, and the placing of the navy and air force, behind the strategic nuclear forces but ahead of the army is worthy of note. The increasing stress on the importance of the Arctic likewise suggests increasing prominence for the Navy. As far as the actual performance of the RFN is concerned the its forces were actively involved in the invasion of Georgia, sinking Georgian ships, attacking Georgian ports and supporting landing operations in the classic Soviet manner in the Black Sea theatre of the Great Patriotic War. But, recently, they have shown a much greater concern for the defence of shipping than they did then, In recent months, the nuclear battle cruiser Pyotr Velikiy, the frigate Neustrashimy and the destroyers Admiral Vinogradov and Admiral Panteleyev have been active in the troubled waters off Somalia defending Russian and other flagged merchant shipping against pirate attack. Russian naval forces have not been subsumed within Operation Atalanta or CTF 150 or 151, but their ships have participated in joint operations against pirates with the Indian and Royal Navies and they do attend regular coordination meetings in Bahrain. In similar vein, the RFN is making every effort to maintain and extend its forward diplomatic presence in the Caribbean, the Indian Ocean and the Far East.1 But whether such activity should really be seen as evidence of the imminent re-appearance of a powerful and global navy despite the ambitious declaratory plans occasionally announced in Moscow is open to considerable doubt. Over the past 15 years or so, the RFN has not been spared from the neglect that was so obvious from the lumbering performance of Russian forces in Georgia, much of their hardware is antiquated and rusty and recent customers of Russian military equipment – such as India- have frequently complained of unexpected price hikes, delays in production and poor quality. The RFN certainly faces a major problem in the Black Sea area where their leases on port facilities at Sebastopol are up for renewal with the Ukrainian authorities in 2017. The current Ukrainian regime is most unlikely to renew this agreement. The Black Sea Fleet is weak, and its strategic position exposed. Russia’s apparently perverse up-grading of its facilities (such as the Black Sea Fleet sailor’s Club] in the area, and support for the legions of Russian military who have retired to the area, should probably be seen as largely as part of a political campaign to prevent the Ukraine from ‘going West’ for fear of its consequence for the near abroad, and indeed for Russia itself. Nor should the emotional importance of the base, founded by Catherine the Great to act as a gateway to the south in rather the manner that Petersburg was expected to do in the Baltic be forgotten. The Roundtable came to no conclusions about the extent of a prospective Russian naval revival, although most were sceptical that this would be dramatic in the foreseeable future. We did, however, resolve to follow this session up with further studies. The topic clearly deserves more attention than it is currently getting. Moreover the format of this session – small groups of selected and invited people worked well and will be repeated, alongside larger more orthodox gatherings on this and other topics of concern. Further ����������������������������������������� details of this are available in Lee ����������������� Willett‘ The Navy in Russia’s ‘Resurgence’ RUSI Journal February 2009. Dr Willett was one of the Roundtable experts. 1 Russian Navy Seminar Report Corbett Centre 3