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6.11.2012 Philosophy of Science: Values in science Kristina Rolin 2012 Logical empiricism In order to serve the society at large, scientific knowledge should be value-free. Scientific knowledge is value-free insofar as it is grounded on empirical evidence and logical reasoning alone (hence, logical empiricism). 1 6.11.2012 The ideal of value-free science What is meant by value-free science? 1. What kinds of values should science be free from? 2. What in science should be free from these values? Constitutive versus contextual values Constitutive (or epistemic) values are values generated from an understanding of the goals of scientific inquiry (e.g., significant truth or empirical success). Contextual (or non-epistemic) values are values generated from other goals (e.g., value judgments that concern a desirable social order). Longino, Helen. 1990. Science as Social Knowledge. 2 6.11.2012 Discovery and application It is uncontroversial to suggest that contextual values are allowed to influence what topics are considered important in science (the context of discovery) and what practical goals research is expected to serve (the context of application). discovery application Justification It is controversial to suggest that contextual values are allowed to influence what hypotheses and theories should be accepted (the context of justification). discovery justification application 3 6.11.2012 The traditional ideal of value-free science Epistemic justification of hypotheses and theories should be based on constitutive values, and not on contextual values. Is this ideal feasible? What are constitutive values? Theoretical virtues are desirable features of scientific theories. Communal values are desirable features of scientific communities. Intellectual virtues are desirable features of individual scientists. 4 6.11.2012 What are theoretical virtues? Thomas Kuhn: Helen Longino: accuracy, simplicity, internal and external consistency, breadth of scope, fruitfulness. empirical adequacy, ontological heterogeneity and complexity, novelty, applicability to human needs, diffusion of power What are communal values? 1. 2. 3. 4. Public venues Uptake of criticism Public standards Equality of intellectual authority The four norms are epistemic values because they facilitate transformative criticism which is part of the epistemic justification of scientific knowledge. Longino, Helen. 2002. The fate of knowledge. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 5 6.11.2012 Robert Merton (1910-2003) “The ethos of science is that affectively toned complex of values and norms which is held to be binding on the man of science.” The so called CUDOS norms: communism, universalism, disinterestedness, and organized skepticism. Merton, Robert. 1942. “Science and Technology in a Democratic Order.” Journal of Legal and Political Sociology 1: 115-26. What are intellectual virtues? honesty competence conscientiousness capability of epistemic self-assessment Hardwig, John. 1991. The role of trust in knowledge. Journal of Philosophy 88 (12), 693-708. 6 6.11.2012 Trust in science Many beliefs scientists accept are so called second-hand beliefs, that is, their epistemic justification is based on the assumption that other scientists are trustworthy testifiers. A scientist is a trustworthy testifier insofar as she has the above mentioned virtues. Basic and applied research Basic research is knowledge-seeking primarily for the sake of knowledge itself without a demand to deliver immediate solutions to practical problems. Applied research is knowledge-seeking that aims to deliver solutions to practical problems. The basic/applied distinction is not clear-cut; the line is shifting depending on how immediately we expect research to deliver solutions to practical problems. 7 6.11.2012 Basic and applied research The distinction is based on how scientists themselves understand the goals of their research. The actual societal impact of research can be evaluated only with hindsight. For an example, see ”Civilization cannot be imported: Research Commentary on the Impact of Cultural and Social Research.” Publications of the Academy of Finland 3/2007. Technical norms “If you want A, and you believe that you are in a situation B, then it is rational to do X.” The claim that A is worthy of pursuit is a value judgment. Underlying causal hypothesis: Doing X will bring about A in a situation B (ceteris paribus). Niiniluoto, Ilkka. 1993. The aim and structure of applied research. Erkenntnis 38, 1-21. 8 6.11.2012 The ideal of value-free science in applied research? The normative ideal of value-free science requires that the epistemic justification of theories and hypotheses (e.g., causal hypotheses) is based on constitutive values, and not on contextual values. Contextual values are allowed to play a role in determining whether research results are useful (value relevance). Problem Can applied research measure up to the traditional ideal of value-free science (epistemic justification of hypotheses and theories should be based on constitutive values, and not on contextual values)? 9 6.11.2012 Argument #1 1. The acceptance of hypothesis is underdetermined by evidence. 2. Scientists have to decide how high degree of evidential warrant is required for the hypothesis to be acceptable. 3. This decision depends on the risks involved: (a) the “cost” of accepting a false hypothesis, and (b) the “cost” of rejecting a true hypothesis. 4. The identification and assessment of risks is a matter of moral judgment. 5. Therefore, the acceptance of hypothesis involves moral judgments. Rudner, Richard. 1953. The scientist qua scientist makes value judgments. Philosophy of Science 20 (1), 1-6. Decision making and risks H Not H I accept H U1 x P(H) U2 x P(not H) I do not accept H U3 x P(H) U4 x P(not H) 10 6.11.2012 Argument #2 Theoretical virtues can be interpreted in different ways (e.g., consistency with rational choice theory versus consistency with social psychology). They can be weighed in different ways (e.g., accuracy versus broad scope and simplicity). Therefore, theoretical virtues can be intertwined with contextual values. Longino, Helen. 1995. Gender, politics and theoretical virtues. Synthese 104 (3): 383-397. Argument #3 In order to be able to assess the evidential warrant of a hypothesis, a scientist will have to decide what kind of evidence is relevant for the hypothesis. In some cases, a decision concerning relevance is value-laden. Longino, Helen. 1990. Science as Social Knowledge: Values and Objectivity in Scientific Inquiry. 11 6.11.2012 Example Classification and diagnosis of depression: A continually depressed mood, diminished interest in most activities, a large increase or decrease in appetite, insomnia or excessive sleeping, loss of energy, feelings of worthlessness, inappropriate guilt, indecisiveness, and recurrent suicidal thoughts. The different symptoms that are thought to constitute depression have one thing in common: they impair the functions most essential to human well-being. This is a moral value judgment. Intemann, Kristen. 2001. Science and values: Are value judgments always irrelevant to the justification of scientific claims? Philosophy of Science 68: S506-S518. Example Case study: Research on divorce has been focused on negative effects on children and their parents. An alternative research design allows researchers to discover positive outcomes. Lesson: Moral and social values are allowed to enter into decisions concerning the background assumptions of scientific reasoning (Longino 1990). Yet, some uses of values to select background assumptions are illegitimate. The use of values is illegitimate when they drive inquiry to a predetermined conclusion (e.g. “divorce is a loss”). Anderson, Elizabeth. 2004. Uses of value judgments in science: A general argument, with lessons fro a case study of feminist research on divorce. Hypatia 19 (1): 1-24. 12 6.11.2012 Example Case study: The term “rape” in evolutionary psychology is used as if it is appropriate to describe human behavior without value judgments. The moral and legal content of the term is ignored. Lesson: Many terms in language are both descriptive and evaluative. The attempt to separate the factual from the normative is futile. Dupré, John. 2007. Fact and value. In Kincaid, Dupré, and Wylie (eds.), Value-free science? Ideals and illusions. Oxford. Oxford University Press. Conclusion In (applied) scientific research it is not always possible to hold onto the principle that the acceptance of hypothesis should be based merely on constitutive values, and not on contextual values. However, saying this does not mean that contextual values are allowed to displace constitutive values. Contextual values cannot be eliminated from epistemic justification insofar as they are embedded in constitutive values. 13 6.11.2012 Epistemic responsibility A scientist has an epistemic responsibility to defend not only constitutive values but also contextual values. Epistemic responsibility requires that one provides reasons for value judgments (both constitutive and contextual) when requested. For example, a scientist should explain why she chose a particular method for the study of poverty or pollution. Normative approaches to values in science What alternatives do we have for the traditional ideal of value-free science? Miriam Solomon’s social empiricism Heather Douglas’s conception of scientific integrity Helen Longino’s social account of objectivity Janet Kourany’s ideal of socially responsible science 14 6.11.2012 Solomon on values in science Instrumental approach to values in science: Any scientific practice that leads to empirical success or truth deserves to be called scientifically rational. Given an instrumental perspective, even those values that have traditionally been conceived as non-epistemic can play a rational role in science. They can play a rational role by distributing research efforts in the community among those theories that have some empirical successes. Social empiricism: part I A normative theory of values in science should not discourage the influence of non-empirical decision vectors at the individual level in determining a scientist’s choice of one theory over another. For an individual scientist, social empiricism gives only one guideline. A scientist should work with empirically successful theories. We should accept such a minimally constraining policy with respect to individual scientists’ reasoning and decision-making because nonempirical decision vectors can play a rational role in science. 15 6.11.2012 Social empiricism: part II A community of scientists should distribute research efforts when different theories have different empirical successes and none of the theories has all available empirical successes in a domain of inquiry. A rational distribution of research effort requires two things: (1) empirical decision vectors be equitably distributed in proportion to the empirical successes of the various theories under consideration, and (2) non-empirical decision vectors be equally distributed among those theories that have some empirical successes. Scientific integrity Scientific integrity consists in keeping social and moral values to their proper roles in scientific reasoning, not in keeping them out of scientific reasoning. Values play a direct role when they act as reasons to accept a hypothesis or a theory and an indirect role when they act as reasons to accept a certain level of uncertainty. Social and moral values are not allowed to play a direct role in scientific reasoning but they can legitimately play an indirect role. Douglas, Heather. 2009. Science, Policy, and the Value-free Ideal. Pittsburgh: The University of Pittsburgh Press. 16 6.11.2012 Douglas’s arguments A direct role is not acceptable because it would undermine the value of science itself, its basic integrity and authority. An indirect role is acceptable because scientists are morally responsible for the potential harm caused by their making overly strong knowledge claims and downplaying the risk of error. Indirect role for values in science Scientists should make value judgments concerning the acceptable level of uncertainty, and these judgments require social and moral values. Value judgments should be made as explicit as possible because the public has a right to understand the social and moral values behind scientists’ assessment of the acceptable level of uncertainty. 17 6.11.2012 Criticism Social and moral values can play other roles in scientific reasoning besides direct and indirect roles. Social and moral values can be “encoded” in background assumptions that are necessary to establish the relevance of evidence for a hypothesis or a theory (Longino 1990). Insofar as social and moral values enter into scientific reasoning via background assumptions, their role is not direct because they do not act as evidence in scientific reasoning. Also, their role is not indirect because they do not concern the question of how much evidence is sufficient to render the risk of error acceptable. Douglas’s normative theory of values in science does not provide guidance for such a situation. Longino’s account: part I Social and moral values can legitimately play a role in individual scientists’ choice of background assumptions. Objectivity cannot be realized in an individual scientist’s reasoning and decision-making because both the status of observation reports as empirical evidence, as well as the plausibility of evidential reasoning is dependent on a context of background assumptions which may include assumptions encoding moral and social values. Individual scientists are not always capable of identifying such assumptions on their own. 18 6.11.2012 Longino’s account: part II A social account of objectivity is needed because “there are no formal rules, guidelines, or processes that can guarantee that social values will not permeate evidential relations” (2002, 50). A social account of objectivity is needed to make sure that background assumptions as well as the social and moral values that have motivated their choice can be articulated and criticized. ”Social” in Longino’s social account of objectivity Longino’s approach differs from Douglas’s approach in that it does not assume that individual scientists are capable of realizing the ideal of objectivity on their own. Longino’s approach differs from Solomon’s approach in that it does not assume that scientific communities are capable of realizing the ideal of objectivity without assigning epistemic rights and obligations to individual scientists. The four norms imply epistemic rights and obligations for individual scientists. 19 6.11.2012 Kourany’s ideal of socially responsible science “According to this approach, sound social values, as well as sound epistemic values, must control every aspect of the scientific research process, from the choice of research questions to the communication and application of results, this to be enforced by such political means as funding requirements on research” (viii; see also 106). Questions: What does it mean to say that social and epistemic values “control” scientific research process? Kourany, Janet. 2010. Philosophy of Science after Feminism. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press. Sound social values? “Like the social value management ideal of science, on the other hand, the ideal of socially responsible science recognizes that social values inevitably enter into science, but unlike the social value management ideal of science, the ideal of socially responsible science also recognizes that we, as a society, have a definite say—through funding priorities and restrictions, for example—as to what these social values will be. Indeed, given that science is both a profound shaper of society and a profound beneficiary of society, these social values should be chosen so as to meet the needs of society, including the justice-related needs of society.” (68) 20 6.11.2012 Sound social values? “And finally, like the empiricist ideal of science, the ideal of socially responsible science recognizes that scientific rationality must be defined in terms of scientific success, but unlike the empiricist ideal of science, the ideal of socially responsible science also recognizes that scientific success must be defined in terms of social success—human flourishing, what makes for a good society—as well as empirical success.” (68) Moral versus social values Let us assume that there are universal moral values (e.g., the central human capabilities as they are defined by Martha Nussbaum 2000). Even if we assume that there are universal moral values, there will be a diversity of social values (conceptions of good life) because the value of liberty urges us to respect different individual choices and the value of national sovereignty urges us to respect different political choices (aiming to realize the central human capabilities). Question: How do scientists receive information about the many needs of their society? 21 6.11.2012 The needs of society? The market model: The market is the best place to find out about the needs of society and a socially responsible scientific community should aim to respond to the demand in the market. The political model: Politicians and policy makers are in the best position to articulate the needs of society (at least in liberal democratic societies). The hybrid model: Collaboration between corporations and publicly funded research groups is the best way to pool information about the needs of society. Limitations – and a solution? The market model: The flaw in the market model is in the assumption that the market is the best place to find out about the needs of society. The political model: Even though the political model has advantages over the market model, it has its own shortcomings. Politicians and policy makers have often merely a partial picture of what the needs of society are. Science as the third model: Scientific research can compensate for the shortcomings of the market model and the political model. 22 6.11.2012 Summary Scientists should be given the opportunity and resources to engage themselves in an on-going debate about the needs of society because both the market model and the political model (and the hybrid model) have their shortcomings. Scientists should not be expected to take at face value the “needs” that are expressed in the market or articulated by politicians, policy makers, and nongovernmental organizations. Longino’s social value management ideal of science is capable of meeting the needs of society better than Kourany’s ideal because it does not accept different articulations of needs dogmatically; instead, they are subjected to critical scrutiny. Today’s message The traditional ideal of value-free science: Social and moral values are not allowed to play any role in the reasoning and decision-making that scientists are engaged in when they decide to accept something as scientific knowledge, either individually or collectively. Whereas many philosophers of science seem to be unanimous about the need to replace the traditional ideal, their views diverge on the question of what the successor to the traditional ideal should be. 23