Download Band-Aids and Bullhorns: Why California`s Drug Policy

Band-Aids and
Bullhorns: Why
California’s Drug Policy
Is Failing and What
We Can Do to Fix It
Criminal Justice Policy Review
23(1) 108­–135
© 2012 SAGE Publications
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DOI: 10.1177/0887403410397185
http://cjp.sagepub.com
Christine Gardiner,1 Darren Urada,2
and M. Douglas Anglin2
Abstract
California voters had high hopes when they passed the Substance Abuse and Crime
Prevention Act of 2000 (SACPA, a.k.a. Proposition 36). The law, one of the most
extensive diversion-to-treatment laws to date, was intended to divert and treat 36,000
drug offenders annually. Unfortunately the law has not lived up to voter or practitioner
expectations. Insufficient funding derailed the legislation by making it impossible to
provide offenders either appropriate substance abuse treatment or adequate probation
supervision. Stakeholders expressed consternation with aspects of the legislation that,
in their view, led to SACPA being less successful than it could have been. Specifically, the
universal application of the treatment-in-lieu-of-incarceration law forced stakeholders
to accommodate offenders unmotivated-to-change and unsuitable for many treatment
settings; and prohibiting shock incarceration removed a deterrent to violating program
rules. Based on information gathered through stakeholder surveys and interviews,
four policy recommendations are offered to improve the effectiveness of SACPA.
Keywords
Proposition 36, SACPA, drug policy, diversion to treatment, drug offender sentencing
1
California State University, Fullerton
University of California, Los Angeles
2
Corresponding Author:
Christine Gardiner, California State University, Fullerton, 800 N. State College Blvd.,
Fullerton, CA 92887
Email: [email protected]
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The Substance Abuse and Crime Prevention Act (SACPA) of 2000, commonly known
as “Proposition 36,” mandates that adults convicted of nonviolent drug-possession
offenses in California be offered drug treatment in the community in lieu of traditional
sentencing. It applies to all adults convicted of a nonviolent drug-possession offense,
including probationers and parolees, who are not disqualified by prior criminal history
or by a concurrent offense. It is one of the largest drug offender diversion programs in
the nation—almost 50,000 drug offenders participate annually1 (Evans, Hunter, &
Urada, 2009a).
This California law is one of many diversion-to-treatment laws recently passed in
the United States (Rinaldo & Kelly-Thomas, 2005; VanderWaal, Chriqui, Bishop,
McBride, & Longshore, 2006). From 1996 to 2004, 14 states passed diversion-totreatment laws, including the following states: Alabama, Arizona, California, Connecticut,
Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, Maryland, Massachusetts, Missouri, Texas,
and Washington State (VanderWaal et al., 2006). Although the provisions of each law
vary, what makes some of these laws unique from earlier diversion laws is their broad
scope and near-universal applicability. Whereas these laws are spreading quickly
throughout the nation, our knowledge of their impact is very limited. This article adds
to the literature by describing stakeholders’ criticisms of SACPA and suggesting
improvements.
Diversion-To-Treatment
Diversion-to-treatment (a.k.a. treatment in lieu of incarceration) laws are not new—
they have existed (in one form or another) since at least the 1960s (Klein, 1976;
Marlowe, 2003). Historically, these diversion laws have taken the form of prosecutorinitiated pretrial diversion for first time, nonviolent offenders (VanderWaal et al.,
2006). For example, California’s PC 1000 and Michigan’s MCL 333.7411 allow for
dismissal of charges pending successful completion of treatment. Postconviction
diversion laws are another popular option—these laws require a guilty plea prior to
and as a requirement for diversion. Drug courts, as well as the new genre of diversionto-treatment laws typically utilize this postconviction model.
Treatment Alternatives to Street Crime (TASC) and drug court are examples of
treatment in lieu of incarceration programs offered throughout the United States. TASC,
which has existed since the 1970s, is a criminal justice-treatment system collaboration
that incorporates community-based drug treatment into (or in lieu of) criminal justice
imposed sanctions. The drug court model, begun in 1989, features a collaborative team
of practitioners focused on helping convicted drug offenders reduce their reliance on
drugs in a therapeutic judicial setting (Wenzel, Longshore, Turner, & Ridgely, 2001).
Like most diversion-to-treatment laws, TASC and drug court models have eligibility
criteria which vary by jurisdiction to screen offenders and limit participation. SACPA
and many other new diversion-to-treatment laws are distinctive because they apply to
almost all low-level drug offenders (regardless of amenability to treatment). This is
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important, as SACPA has demonstrated that who participates can determine program
success and practitioner support (Urada & Evans, 2008b).
In California, three diversion options are available for drug offenders: PC1000,
Prop36 (SACPA), and drug courts. PC1000 allows drug offenders to attend treatment
in lieu of jail for their first drug offense, provided they have no felony arrests in the
prior five years. Offenders eligible for PC1000 generally accept it because it is the
least onerous of all drug diversion programs. In addition, most counties operate collaborative drug courts. Eligibility and suitability requirements vary by county but all
require a significant level of commitment by drug offenders to treatment and the drug
court program. Prior to SACPA, if an offender was not eligible for PC1000 or drug
court (which was the case for most offenders), they were most often sentenced to 30,
60, or 90 days in jail and 3 years on probation. Now most of these offenders are sentenced to probation with treatment but without jail time. Essentially, offenders traded
30 to 90 days in jail for community-based drug treatment. Unlike drug courts which
require participants to meet both eligibility and suitability criteria, SACPA is available
to all offenders convicted of a drug-possession offense and not disqualified due to
prior criminal history or concurrent crimes, regardless of desire for treatment.
Research shows that substance abuse treatment offered through the criminal justice system can be effective in reducing drug usage and criminal behavior; however,
it also indicates that the collaborative relationships required for effective diversionto-treatment models can be difficult to establish and maintain (Anglin, Longshore, &
Turner, 1999; Bull, 2005;Peyton & Gossweiler, 2001; U.S. Office of Drug Court
Programs, 1997). Common barriers that exist in developing these multiparty linkages
include the following: Funding limitations, staffing shortages, coordinating management
information systems, and sharing information between agencies (Wenzel, Turner, &
Ridgely, 2004).
Components of Successful Treatment Programs
Treatments that are the most effective at reducing drug use are also the most effective
at reducing future criminal activity (California Department of Alcohol and Drug
Programs 1992/2000; Longshore et al., 2005). Effective treatment programs have four
things in common, they (a) occur in the community, (b) reward successful completion
of treatment by removing criminal justice imposed sanctions (such as imprisonment or
conviction), (c) include close monitoring and supervision of offenders, including drug
testing and regular progress reports, and (d) include swift and certain punishments for
noncompliance that do not require additional, formal hearings (Marlowe, 2003).
Placing a client into the most appropriate treatment program initially improves outcomes and is less costly in the long run because it decreases treatment duration and the
number of treatment episodes (Sharon et al., 2003). Not surprisingly, research finds
that individuals with dual diagnosis (mental health and substance abuse), those with
more severe addictions, and those with little social support do best in residential
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treatment facilities (Gastfriend & McLellan, 1997; Magura et al., 2003; McLellan,
Woody, Luborsky, O’Brien, & Druley, 1983). Undertreating these clients increases
their dropout rates and worsens their outcomes (Hawken, Anglin, & Connor, 2007;
Gastfriend, 2003).
SACPA
Each year, approximately 50,000 drug offenders in California agree to participate in
SACPA (Evans et al., 2009b). Of these, approximately 70% to 75% actually begin
treatment (Evans et al., 2009b). Of those who enter treatment, approximately one third
complete their prescribed treatment (Evans et al., 2009b). This is similar to treatment
completion rates of other programs, including drug court (Urada & Evans, 2008b).
Clients who enter treatment are predominately young (70% are between ages 26 and
35) males (75%), of which 44% are non-Hispanic White, 32% are Hispanic, and 16%
are African American (Urada & Evans, 2008a). In addition, more than half of SACPA
clients are long-time users (have used their primary drug for more than 10 years),
more than 50% are methamphetamine users, and at least half report that they are
entering treatment for the first time (Urada & Evans, 2008a). The population is much
more severely addicted than was originally anticipated and has presented many challenges for practitioners (Longshore et al., 2003).
SACPA evaluations have found that 37% of residential clients and 45% of outpatient clients received at least 90 days of treatment (Urada & Evans, 2008b). More,
offenders who completed treatment were much less likely to be rearrested during
follow-up periods (which ranged from 12 months to 6 years posttreatment; Urada,
Fan, & Anglin, 2009). Studies that tracked offenders over 30- and 42-month follow-up
periods found that SACPA saved US$2.50 (US$4 for treatment completers) for every
US$1 spent, mainly because of reduced incarceration costs (Hawken, Longshore,
Urada, Fan, & Anglin, 2008; Longshore, Hawken, Urada, & Anglin, 2006).
Method
The current multimodal research incorporates data collected from two parallel studies
of the implementation of Proposition 36 (SACPA). The first study, conducted by
UCLA researchers as part of the statewide evaluation, surveyed stakeholders2 throughout the state about their perceptions of the law, responses to budget cuts, and suggestions for improvement. The second study, conducted by the first author, interviewed
criminal justice practitioners in one focus county (Orange County [OC]) about their
experiences implementing and adapting to the law and their suggestions for improvement. Both studies utilized open-ended questions as a means to explore practitioners’
thoughts about the law and/or implementation of the legislation and ascertain any
shared views.
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Study 1: UCLA Survey Data3
Sample and procedure. Using separate survey instruments, county administrators,
criminal justice practitioners, and treatment professionals were solicited for their opinions. Surveys included a variety of open-ended questions, of which this article will
address responses to two questions: (a) stakeholder adaptations to recent budget cuts,
and (b) suggestions for improvement. The county stakeholder survey was emailed to
lead agencies4 in all 58 counties on December 19, 2008; lead agencies then distributed
the surveys to the appropriate criminal justice practitioners (court, probation, district
attorney, public defender) in the county. The treatment professional survey was mailed
to a random selection of 105 treatment program directors on December 18, 2008.
A simple random sample selection procedure was utilized to choose the programs
from all treatment programs that served more than five SACPA clients in the most
recently available statewide treatment data at the time of selection.5
Response rate. County administrators and criminal justice practitioners from
41 counties (out of 58) returned completed or partially completed surveys. These
41 counties represent approximately 90% of the state population and roughly the
same proportion of SACPA participants. The response rate varied by agency, with
the largest number coming from lead agencies (39 counties responded), followed by
probation (22), court administrators (21), public defenders (14), and district attorneys
(10). The 17 counties that did not respond, by and large, have small populations and
had very little to report because their SACPA programs are quite small. Of the treatment providers, 67 out of 105 responded (63.8%). Four treatment professionals
responded that they no longer provide services for SACPA clients. Therefore, results are
based on 63 surveys from treatment providers in 25 counties and 106 surveys from
county administrators and practitioners in 41 counties.6
Study 2: Focus County Interview Data7
Sample—Agencies. Every criminal justice agency in Orange County, California (the
focus county) that has sole responsibility for carrying out a specific criminal justice
function at the county level was identified and asked to be part of the research (probation, court, city and district attorneys, public defender, jail, and parole). Also all local
law enforcement agencies were identified; and based on the size and demographics of
the population served, size of the department, and geographic location within the
county, nine law enforcement agencies (out of 20) were purposively selected to participate in the study. These nine agencies which combined, serve 77% of county residents,
represent small, medium, and large departments from all regions of the county (north,
south, central, and coastal) and provide services to a wide variety of demographic populations. Every agency agreed to participate, except the District Attorney’s Office. In all
14 agencies, representing every stage of the criminal justice system, participated.
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Table 1. Number of Interviews Conducted in Focus County by Agency
Law enforcement
Agency 1
Agency 2
Agency 3
Agency 4
Agency 5
Agency 6
Agency 7
Agency 8
Agency 9
Total
Interviews
conducted
Court
7
4
3
8
4
3
1
5
4
39
Judges
Public defender
City attorney
Total
Interviews
conducted
5
1
1
7
Corrections
Probation
Parole
Jail
Total
Interviews
conducted
7
4
3
14
Sample—Practitioners. A variety of methods were employed to identify appropriate
practitioners to interview. To begin, purposive sampling was used to identify and
interview those practitioners that had a key role in implementing Proposition 36 or had
specific knowledge of SACPA due to work assignment (such as probation officers
assigned to Prop36 caseloads). Snowball sampling was used to identify practitioners
with special knowledge of Prop36.8 For example, one person from the Orange County
Probation Department who had a significant role in the planning stage identified other
key players in the planning process. Most practitioners were chosen by the researcher
to be interviewed due to their current assignment (for example, supervisor of the narcotics
unit; judge of Prop36 court); some practitioners volunteered to be interviewed when
asked (parole and police in particular), and yet others (usually patrol officers) were
chosen simply because they (a) were on duty, (b) had a beat partner (or someone to
cover their area in their absence), and (c) were not on a call at the time the researcher
was ready to interview someone. Every person approached to be part of the study
agreed to be interviewed. Results are based on semistructured interviews with 60 criminal
justice practitioners from 14 different criminal justice agencies in Orange County
(see Table 1).
As with any research that relies on a sample, there is the potential for sampling bias
in this study. The possibility of sampling bias was decreased by seizing opportunities
to engage numerous criminal justice practitioners (mainly police officers and parole
agents) who were not part of the study in informal discussions about the law. The
viewpoints expressed in informal discussions echoed the opinions reported during
interviews; thus increasing the reliability and external validity of the study.
Instruments and interviews. Grounded theory guided the development of interview
instruments as well as the interview and analysis processes (Glaser and Strauss,
1967/2006; Glaser, 1978; Strauss, 1987; Strauss and Corbin, 1990). Interviews, which
were audio recorded then transcribed, lasted between 33 min and 2 hr and 13 min,
most lasted 50 min. Interview instruments contained between 22 and 44 open-ended
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questions specifically designed to encourage practitioners to describe their understanding
and experience with the law. At the conclusion of the interview, interviewees were
asked for their personal opinions about the effectiveness of SACPA and what changes
they felt would be beneficial and would make it more effective.
The current project pulls together responses from (a) 169 statewide stakeholders
(treatment providers, county administrators, and criminal justice practitioners) to openended survey questions posed by UCLA researchers and (b) 60 criminal justice practitioners in Orange County, California to open-ended interview questions about SACPA.
The inductive research style used in both studies was intentional, as it afforded practitioners the opportunity to identify the significant issues, as they saw them.
Results
Three major themes emerged from practitioner surveys and interviews. First, insufficient funding resulted in treatment gaps and inadequate supervision. Second, prohibiting short-term incarceration for noncompliance inadvertently led many offenders to
shirk their treatment program. Third, the universal application of SACPA to all drug
offenders, regardless of amenability to treatment, posed a challenge to treatment providers and criminal justice professionals alike. Each of these issues will be explored
in detail below. The themes were echoed by practitioners throughout the state, and at
least one illustrative quote is presented from a county other than Orange County for
each theme.
Insufficient Funding
Insufficient funding has plagued SACPA since the law’s inception. The ballot measure required that US$120 million from the state’s general fund be allocated annually
(for 5 years)9 to California’s 58 counties to cover SACPA expenses. This amount
proved problematic from the beginning; as there were more offenders than expected
and the offenders’ addictions were much more severe than anyone had anticipated or
planned for (Longshore et al., 2004; Urada et al., 2009). The budget shortfall was felt
most severely by probation departments tasked with supervising offenders, and health
care agencies obligated to provide treatment. Although surveys and interviews were
open ended, 54% of survey respondents and 72% of nonpolice interviewees10 mentioned
insufficient funding as a major problem.11 In the words of one practitioner,
Proposition 36 funding for agency and treatment provider participants has never
been sufficient. Every year, the budget has been reduced and the court, probation
and other justice agency partners have never been compensated for the additional workload that the intensive court monitoring requires. Budget reductions
have also dramatically changed the type and amount of treatment and [drug]
testing that is available for the defendants, which decreases the success rate of
the program. (Court Practitioner [UCLA survey])
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SACPA was vague in terms of how the program should run. Consequently stakeholders in each county designed their own infrastructure for processing SACPA
offenders, established their own treatment requirements, and allocated SACPA funds
between the relevant agencies in their county. Hence, treatment and supervision duration and intensity varied by county. Surveys and interviews revealed that almost all
counties had service delivery problems due to inadequate funding, but that the extent
and scope of the problems was not always identical. For example, one respondent suggested that some counties had more issues because they were more idealistic in their
treatment and/or supervision plans.
Treatment gap. Practitioners throughout the state (one third of survey respondents12
and two thirds of nonpolice interviewees) complained that inadequate funding limited
the availability of residential treatment, decreased treatment duration, and created a
situation in which offenders were undertreated for their addictions. Scarce resources
resulted in a mismatch between the level of treatment that an offender needed and the
level of treatment the offender received. Specifically, practitioners reported they had
to place highly addicted offenders in outpatient treatment instead of in residential
treatment because that was all their county could afford; previous UCLA analyses
confirm this (Hawken, 2008a, 2008b).
Case in point, Orange County chose to provide clients with treatment for the maximum
duration allowed by law, one year plus aftercare treatment. According to managementlevel probation officers involved in implementation, this decision was grounded in
best practices research that found the longer a person was in treatment, the better the
outcomes. Toward this end, Orange County created a menu of treatment options that
would apply to the vast majority of clients they expected to encounter. Unfortunately,
Orange County (like many counties) found itself dealing disproportionately with
offenders with severe addictions and other co-occurring disorders. As a result, treatment durations were shortened because the county could not afford to provide offenders with the appropriate level of treatment. For example, Level 1 outpatient treatment
was originally 6 months long but was reduced to 4 months, Level 2 was reduced from
9 to 6 months, and Level 3 was reduced from 12 to 9 months. “We realized that if we
funded those people for all that time, we’re going to run out of money” (DAK,13 OC
Probation Officer).
What we didn’t anticipate was how many people needed residential (treatment).
We expected it to be kind of like a bell curve, so the levels and the way the
providers were selected was [sic] kind of designed around that idea—that the
majority of the people would be in the middle. Really, the number of people that
needed residential surpassed what we expected. (DAK, OC Probation Officer)
Despite the desire to provide clients with the most appropriate treatment for their
addiction need, Orange County was not able to do so consistently due to budget and
system limitations. The number of clients requiring residential treatment severely constrained the system. Triaging strategies were utilized to provide services to those with
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the greatest need. This story was repeated throughout the state and hit a critical point in
2008 when California Governor Schwarzenegger reduced the statewide SACPA allocation from US$120 million (2007-2008) to US$108 million (2008-2009). Stakeholders
throughout California said that they dealt with the 2008-2009 budget cuts by further
decreasing treatment duration and reducing residential/sober living beds, eliminating
staff positions; increasing caseloads, and instituting waiting lists.14 Practitioners that
responded to UCLA’s survey expressed that the treatment system is severely strained
and that SACPA is essentially a shell of a program with little substance left.
We are now limited to providing only a small percentage of Prop36 clientele with
services and have a very long waiting list. (Lead Agency/Treatment Provider
[LA/TP; UCLA])
It made a 6 month program into 90 days, 90 days isn’t enough time! (LA/TP
[UCLA])
Quality of care has dropped/decreased due to high case loads. (LA/TP [UCLA])
We are under-treating clients and do not have enough treatment spaces for those
who are eligible. Treatment is shorter than the needs of the clients. (Public
Defender [UCLA])
Inadequate treatment is a major concern because prior research has found that it
can have significant adverse outcome consequences, including increased relapse and
recidivism rates (Marlowe, 2003). Furthermore, inadequate treatment costs more in
the long run due to increased treatment duration and the need for repeated episodes
(Hawken, Anglin, & Connor, 2007 and Hawken, Urada, Anglin, & Longshore, 2007).
Thus, undertreating clients to save money in the short term is actually more costly in
the long term.
Inadequate supervision. Sixty one percent of OC court and corrections practitioners
and several survey respondents stated that offender supervision and monitoring need
to be improved. All offenders sentenced to SACPA are on probation, yet only a fraction of the money was allocated for supervision. On average, counties commit 79% of
SACPA funds to treatment and only 21% to criminal justice activities (Ford, Brookes,
& Houser, 2005). Like other probation departments across the state Orange County
Probation Department’s (OCPD) ability to process and supervise SACPA offenders
was severely constrained by an inadequate budget and an unanticipated large number
of SACPA offenders (Gardiner, 2008).
SACPA almost doubled the number of new offenders OCPD was accustomed to
handling each month. The single most significant impact of SACPA on the probation
department was the effect it had on individual probation officers’ caseloads. Because
the nuances of the law (e. g., treatment requirements, reporting requirements, special
rules regarding violations) obligated the probation department to have specially trained
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staff supervise SACPA clients, “one-quarter of the officers in the department were supervising one-half of all the cases” (DLJ, OC Probation Officer). The problem was exacerbated because the Orange County CEO refused to allow the probation department to
spend county funds on SACPA-related expenses. Thus, officers accustomed to supervising 100 cases prior to the law had caseloads of up to 300 offenders after the law. This
unmanageable caseload prohibited officers from going into the field to check on their
clients or providing any meaningful services (or supervision). As a result, the department
instituted many triaging strategies to relieve caseload pressure, including establishing
field monitored caseloads (Gardiner, 2008).15 According to one probation officer, banking offenders “became a necessary survival tool” (DAK, OC Probation Officer).
The county wouldn’t fund any more officers to supervise Prop36 clients outside
what’s provided by the state. We were funded, when I was there, for 18 officers.
18 officers had to deal with whatever amount of cases they had. . . . It was a
complete mess. I sat down with the other supervisor and we tried to brainstorm
a way . . . to manage this flood of cases that are coming in every month. . . . We
decided we can have ten officers doing actual field supervision with 100 cases
each. The rest of them we’ll put on a monitored caseload. That’s the overflow
that we just can’t handle. (DLJ, OC Probation Officer)
The decision to bank offenders parallels similar efforts by treatment providers
throughout the state to triage offenders according to need. Based on UCLA stakeholder surveys and conversations with practitioners involved in implementation, large
numbers of highly addicted offenders and budget problems were typical but not universal
around the state.
In Orange County, we made a commitment to supervise these [SACPA] cases,
to try to supervise these cases. Some counties didn’t, they just banked them and
played strictly an administrative role from their probation standpoint. We made
a decision to try and actually provide supervision to them, which exacerbated our
problems because the numbers were such that we couldn’t effectively supervise
them in the same way that we had other cases. (DDA, OC Probation Officer)
Although it would be instructive to ascertain the local practices that either exacerbated or minimized fiscal problems at the county level, the current data do not allow
for such an analysis. What we do know is that 7 years later, probation caseloads across
California were still high; averaging over 200 in 2007-2008 according to the most
recent UCLA survey. Furthermore, there is a large range of average caseload sizes;
from 41 in a small, rural county to 773 in a large county that banks (field monitors) all
of its cases. Thus, how an offender experiences SACPA probation varies widely based
on the commitment county.
As a result of 2008-2009 budget cuts, “Probation has been phasing out their involvement in the program based on budgetary problems. So over the last few months testing
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by probation and supervision has stopped” (District Attorney, UCLA survey). Moreover,
anecdotal evidence suggests that widespread banking of offenders is becoming a
common practice throughout the state due to the drastic budget cuts for 2009-2010.
Monitoring the effect that very large caseloads has on offender outcomes is important,
as research demonstrates that (a) close monitoring and supervision are important
components of successful drug programs (Marlowe, 2003) and (b) large probation
caseloads are associated with higher property crime rates (Worrall, Schram, Hays, &
Newmann, 2004).
Noncompliance Goes Unpunished
SACPA prohibits the use of short-term jail sentences as a response to treatment noncompliance, despite research that indicates that the best substance abuse programs
include swift and certain punishment for noncompliance (Marlowe, 2003). Some
criminal justice practitioners and treatment providers stated that the lack of a proverbial
“stick” led to a large segment of SACPA probationers’ not taking probation or treatment
seriously and increased the failure rate (and practitioner dissatisfaction with SACPA).
Both survey respondents and interviewees argued for more flexibility in sanctioning
noncompliance to hold offenders accountable and encourage program participation.
According to probation officers, their inability to sanction offenders led to more
offenders not showing up to meetings with their probation officer and/or treatment and
not taking probation seriously. Judges and treatment professionals in Orange County
agreed that offenders’ behavior was negatively affected by the common knowledge
that jail sanctions were not permitted in SACPA.
[There were] higher numbers of drug addicts that didn’t take probation seriously. That was an absolute effect and I personally believe that that was a function of the fact that we couldn’t take them into custody, we couldn’t arrest them
and things, and they learned that very quickly. (DDA, OC Probation Officer)
[P]eople were going into Prop36 thinking it was a joke, they would say, “oh,
well” to the officers on the street, . . . so they went in with this mindset, knowing they couldn’t go into custody, knowing there were no repercussions for their
conduct so naturally when you go in with a mindset like that and you’re already
an addict, you’re not gonna [sic] do well and they didn’t. (EBQ, OC Judge)
Criminal justice practitioners were not the only ones who wanted to institute shock
incarceration for recalcitrant offenders—treatment providers also wanted brief jail
sanctions incorporated into the program. In fact, 77% of treatment providers that
responded to the 2007 UCLA survey agreed that “jail sanctions for treatment noncompliance would improve treatment completion rates.” In the words of one treatment
provider (UCLA survey), “Flash incarcerations promote program compliance and
motivate change.”
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“Jail sanctions are essential.” (Court Practitioner [UCLA survey])
That’s probably the single most important thing that they should be doing is
sanctioning . . . I think short-term custody, we call it “dunking,” dunking them
back in to give them a taste of the loss of freedom again. . . . They have to lose
something in order to get the message they can’t continue to do what they’ve
been doing. (TAL, OC Treatment Provider)
Treatment Providers Must Accommodate Unsuitable Offenders
One of the common complaints of practitioners at every stage of the criminal justice
system was that sophisticated career criminals are being allowed to enroll in SACPA,
despite being disqualified due to their past criminal history.16 Every law enforcement
officer and 94% of OC court and corrections practitioners brought up the universal
application of Prop36 and expressed dismay that criminals are benefitting from Prop36.
Judges (as well as treatment professionals and probation officers) in Orange County
stated that these offenders are not suitable for SACPA and furthermore that their presence negatively impacts the noncriminally sophisticated users enrolled in SACPA. This
population causes problems for other offenders as well as some practitioners.
Well when you mix those kind of people [violent offenders] with the PC1000
fallout people, it’s not a good match. It’s not a good match at all. And the health
care people were complaining and still do that those worn prison people come
in there and basically swear and cuss and have a bad attitude and it’s like a bad
apple in the Prop36 barrel that the public had no idea was going to be there. And
that’s another problem I mean, for starters to clean this thing up they need to get
rid of all of those violent people. They don’t belong in that program [Prop36].
(EBQ, OC Judge)
Prop36, you can have gang members and [people with] gang ties . . . as long as
they qualify and that’s a huge difference [from drug court] ‘cause [sic] that kind
of mentality should not be in your therapy sessions. (ECV, OC Judge)
Practitioners complained that offenders want to get out of jail, but that many do not
really want treatment. Probation officers, judges, attorneys, and treatment professionals
complained that SACPA is wasted on some offenders unmotivated to rehabilitate.
These individuals are taking services away from the people that want treatment and,
according to probation officers, motivated offenders are the ones losing out because of
what they called “the fatal flaw in the law.” SACPA “assumes that everybody eligible
for the program wants to kick their addiction, and that’s simply not the case” (DLJ, OC
Probation Officer).
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It’s become a revolving door. Participants not interested in recovery are just
using it to stay out of jail—doing their time in [treatment] instead of jail.
(Treatment Provider [UCLA survey])
Many individuals seeking Prop 36 are doing so to avoid immediate punishment—
they simply want to get out of custody and delay their cases as long as possible. . . .
Amenability is a true issue that should be looked at carefully in every case so that
we don’t waste our precious resources on those who are insincere in their efforts.
(District Attorney [UCLA survey])
I think those who are not eligible for Prop 36 should be properly screened in
court and not allowed into the Prop 36 program. I don’t believe Prop 36 was
initially intended for drug dealers and those with violent crimes in their past.
They often require more supervision and time of the probation officer, diverting
from those probationers who seek to change and require assistance.(Probation
Officer [UCLA survey])
It became apparent we weren’t dealing with the college-age kid who had a little
bit of meth in his pocket who didn’t have a drug-addiction problem. You were
talking about the dumpster-diving, motel-hopping, ID-thieving person, that’s
their whole life. They’re not interested, I shouldn’t say all but, a vast majority
of them aren’t interested in rehabilitation or kicking their habit. They’re interested in getting out of jail. We had any number [who] would come into the
office and tell the officer, “Now I have three chances to blow this program
before I go to jail, right?” We used to get that. You were faced with that mentality.
(DLJ, OC Probation Officer)
Survey respondents and interviewees argued that amenability to treatment is a
legitimate concern that should be incorporated as criteria for participation. Research
supports this contention, and has found that motivation to change and treatment
engagement are important factors in program success (Sung, 2010; Wanberg & Milkman,
1998). However, research also has found that coerced drug treatment can work (Belenko,
1990; Hepburn & Harvey, 2007).
Discussion and Policy Recommendations
SACPA is broken, but not irreparable. The funding provided by the state has been
insufficient to provide a larger-than-expected number of severely addicted participants
with either adequate treatment or supervision, and the prohibition of incapacitative
sanctions has made achieving success difficult, at best. Synthesizing practitioners’
critiques and best practices research, we propose the following four solutions to
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improve the program:17 (a) allocate more money to provide appropriate treatment and
adequate supervision; (b) strengthen treatment component; (c) allow graduated sanctions, including short-term jail sanctions; and (d) allow judicial discretion regarding
participation.
An Orange County Grand Jury report (2003) found that insufficient funding was a
large problem in Orange County and that agencies tasked with implementing SACPA
had to absorb additional costs associated with the program. Based on responses to
UCLA stakeholder surveys as well as earlier UCLA reports (Longshore et al., 2003),
many other counties experienced the same fiscal issues which adversely affected both
supervision and treatment, and with that, the overall success of SACPA. The authors
of the legislation asked for US$120 million for statewide implementation of SACPA.
This amount was not based on an estimate of the projected costs to provide treatment
and supervision to the 36,000 offenders expected to be diverted each year; but rather
represented the amount that, based on public opinion polls, the sponsors of the bill
believed voters would be willing to support (Zimmerman, 2005). Sponsors of the legislation contend that they were surprised by the level of addiction severity displayed
by SACPA clients and underestimated the funding required to treat and supervise
these offenders (Zimmerman, 2005). The accounts that this population was a complete
surprise to all interested parties (except law enforcement) confound one of the authors.
Regardless, one thing is certain—without proper funding, failure is guaranteed (the
deinstitutionalization of mental hospitals in the 1970s without allocating appropriate
funds for community care taught us that).
Increase Funding to Provide Appropriate
Treatment and Adequate Supervision
The other reason that Prop36 is so negative is that people read what a failure it
is and they think that rehab is a failure. Rehab isn’t a failure. It’s this program
that is a failure.
(EBQ, OC Judge)
Although it is true that SACPA has increased the treatment spots available throughout
the state (Longshore et al., 2003; Percival, 2004), it is also true that addicts are being
undertreated for their addictions due to insufficient funding (Hawken, Urada, Anglin,
& Longshore, 2007.) Additional resources are absolutely necessary to enhance supervision, increase the number of residential treatment beds and improve the quality of
treatment provided. Many high-quality treatment facilities are not willing to take
SACPA clients because the compensation is insufficient. SACPA clients are “never
going to get what they need there because there’s not enough money to pay for the
right treatment” (TAL, OC Treatment Provider). Insufficient resources set participants
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up for failure, increase recidivism rates, decrease program success, and damage the
perception of rehabilitation and the reputation of SACPA.
I feel clients are placed in [outpatient drug free] when residential treatment is
needed due to there not being enough residential treatment beds contracted.
Programs such as mine would be willing to provide more residential treatment
but funding is not available. (Treatment Provider [UCLA Survey])
In addition to making more money available for residential treatment, practitioners
need access to money that can be used to serve individuals with mental health disorders. As it currently stands, SACPA funds cannot be used to treat mental illness and
this creates a barrier to properly serving clients with co-occurring disorders and ultimately lowers their success rates.
. . . Channeling of other funds . . . to mesh specifically with Prop 36 and OTP
[Offender Treatment Program] funding. It is virtually impossible for [the alcohol
and other drug treatment agency] to induce any other division or department of
county government to share resources for the purpose of helping addicts, much
less addicts in the criminal justice system. That kind of assistance only happens
if the State directs it. (Lead Agency [UCLA survey])
Potential funding sources. Although challenging, a dedicated funding source to
increase (and stabilize) SACPA funding would likely be helpful, as the state general
fund has proven to be neither an adequate nor predictable funding source. One option,
although highly unlikely to garner support during the current budget crisis, is a dedicated SACPA tax such as Proposition 63 (which taxes wealthy Californians an additional 1% to support mental health services). Another option that has intuitive appeal
and that was proposed by California Governor Schwarzenegger is a tax or fee on alcoholic beverages (Schwarzenegger, 2009). Although it failed to gain legislative support,
such a tax could pay for treatment for alcohol-dependent clients, and thus free up existing treatment funds to be used for SACPA offenders. An additional proposal, suggested
by treatment providers, is to allow defendants to use their private health insurance to
cover treatment expenses. There is much confusion about whether this is currently an
option. It appears to vary by county. Depending on how many participants have private
health insurance; this could potentially augment treatment coffers appreciably.18
Californians are flirting with the idea of taxing marijuana, which if done could
provide extra money for treatment. Although Californians recently voted down the
“Regulate, Control, and Tax Cannabis Act” (RCTCA) in November 2010, proponents
of the legislation stated that they plan to place another, similar referendum before
California voters in 2012 (Hoeffel, 2010). Should such a proposition pass, it could
generate funds that could be used for substance abuse treatment. Also, AB390 an
unconnected bill introduced in the state assembly that would place a flat tax on marijuana
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purchases could be passed by the legislature in 2010-2011. Though of questionable
accuracy, the California State Board of Equalization (2009) estimates that AB390
could generate state revenue of US$1.4 billion annually for use “exclusively for drug
education, awareness, and rehabilitation programs.” Alternatively, one could reallocate state funds earmarked for other purposes to SACPA.
Strengthen Treatment Component
I would increase the resources available to give people the treatment that they
actually need and not what we can afford.
(AFT, OC Public Defender)
Some practitioners (29% of survey respondents19 and 61% of nonpolice interviewees)
believe that SACPA is not firm enough and want to see the treatment component
strengthened. They complained that offenders are frequently provided outpatient treatment when residential treatment would be more suitable and argued that the success of
SACPA is dependent on increasing funding to provide appropriate treatment. For
example, an Orange County Grand Jury report (2003) found that there were only 106
funded residential treatment beds in the entire county in 2003. More than 3,000 offenders annually were sentenced to SACPA in Orange County, 80% of who reported their
drug use was a “serious disruption” to their life (Gardiner, 2008), and according to this
report only 412 could get into residential treatment! Counties throughout the state had
the same problem—residential treatment supply could not keep pace with demand; as
a result SACPA lowered the percentage of criminal justice–involved clients who
received residential treatment (Hawken, Anglin, & Connor, 2007). To comply with
best practices research, improve outcomes, and decrease the cost of repeated treatment episodes (Sharon et al., 2003), the “outpatient first” mentality must give way
to an “indicated need” practice.
Add secure confinement treatment facility. In concert with increasing the number of
residential treatment beds, the state should consider sentencing some offenders with
serious addiction problems to a secure confinement treatment facility for the first
30 days. Primarily, this would serve a detoxification function for high-risk offenders
with high needs. One of the negative repercussions of eliminating jail sentences all
together for drug-addicted offenders on SACPA is that some offenders actually benefit
from the 30 or 60 or 90 days they spend incarcerated. Law enforcement officers and
jail deputies describe the physical transformation that many drug offenders make in
jail. Officers and deputies contend that many offenders gain weight, look much better,
and are significantly more coherent after some time in jail (not using drugs and getting
three regular meals a day).
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They [drug offenders] don’t look the same today as when we put them in jail.
There is absolutely no doubt that helps the vast majority of them. That is definitely a dry out, by putting them in custody. We don’t see people coming out of
jail after an extended period of time looking like they are strung out. (MAY, OC
Police Officer)
It seems like a few days after they’re here they really start to make the biggest
change and then it seems like the longer they’re here, the better they get . . .
more polite, I want to say more coherent, more respectful of the rules, more
understanding of the ramifications if they violate the jail rules. [. . .] Personally,
I think I see a big difference. (FJA, OC Jail Deputy)
Recent research supports deputies’ contentions. According to brain researchers
studying addiction, it takes the brain 90 days to reset after consuming illicit substances
and in some cases of heavy, long-term usage, it can take years before the brain functions normally (if ever; Lemonick, 2007; National Institute on Drug Abuse, 2007).
That is why the standard jail sentence helps to break some of the unhealthy habits and
patterns formed over months or years of drug use, and allows addicts to gain some
clarity on their situation after being drug-free for a period of time. It is likely that many
SACPA clients would benefit from such a facility given that most are heavy, long-term
users who are entering treatment for the first time (Urada & Evans, 2008a).
The forced detoxification time prescribed by this option would allow addicts to
enter treatment clean, and with a higher chance of success. Offenders would be housed
in rooms, not cells, and would be expected to participate in meetings and other activities throughout the day. Facilities would not mimic jails; rather they would be modeled
on similar existing facilities that successfully cater to juvenile delinquents with addiction problems in California (such as the Orange County Youth Guidance Center) and
that subscribe to evidence-based practices shown to work with drug-using offenders.
Facilities could be administered by probation departments throughout the state and
each would include treatment professionals to coordinate and run the treatment
programs.
As part of the intake process, probation officers, treatment professionals, and mental
health professionals (if necessary) would assess each offender’s treatment needs and
motivation to change, along with their various skills. From there, a successful recovery
plan would be developed with the offender’s input, and would include the level and
expected duration of treatment required, as well as the inclusion of other services that
would improve the offender’s chance of success (high school equivalency program,
like skills program, employment services, personal/family counseling, and so on.). The
goal would be to get each offender ready to fully participate in their recovery; which
would require (a) getting the offender’s attention so that they could recognize that they
need to take SACPA seriously and (b) detoxifying the offender so that they would be
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coherent and could make good decisions about their recovery plan. An absolutely critical
part of the program would be to make a successful transition to a community-based
treatment center for the purposes of continuing care after the offender has been released
from the secure facility.
Offenders sentenced to this type of facility would start treatment meetings immediately. This is a significant improvement over the current method which can take
weeks or months to get enrolled. This is very important as motivation decreases over
time, particularly for individuals coerced into taking action. Research indicates that
starting treatment within 14 days improves outcomes (McCorry, Garnick, Bartlett,
Corren, Chalti, 2000). Such a facility would likely decrease the early warrant rate
for no shows, as offenders would be in a secure confinement facility with all the
resources they need (probation officer and treatment and mental health professionals)
on-site.20
Deciding on the proper confinement time should be open for discussion between
addiction treatment professionals, probation officers, parole agents, judges, attorneys,
jail deputies, and possibly law enforcement officers. Defining who gets this intensive
treatment will be tough. It might be based on a short risk/needs assessment and motivational interviewing conducted at or prior to sentencing with severity of addiction
taking precedence. It will be a balancing act between helping those in need of detoxification or intense treatment versus causing additional harm to others who are productive citizens, with stable, prosocial support systems, and not in need of this level of
treatment. Fairness to all will be an important issue that will need to take center stage,
so as to not further privilege high-income offenders or punish low-income offenders.
Continuing care will be critical, as research has shown that it increases treatment success
(Pelissier, Jones, & Cadigan, 2007) and reduces offenders’ return to custody probability
(Burdon, Messina, & Prendergast, 2004).
Importantly, because SACPA specifies “The terms ‘drug treatment program’ or
‘drug treatment’ shall not include drug treatment programs offered in a prison or jail
facility” (Substance Abuse and Crime Prevention Act of 2000) this plan may, without
a change in the law, run into court challenges. Given this, there are two options. One
option is to rewrite the law to allow treatment to occur within a secure confinement
treatment facility during the first 30 days. Another alternative to consider is to offer
these services in a “residential treatment with intensive supervision and monitoring”
setting, in lieu of an institutional setting.
Although such intensive initial treatment would require additional funding, it could
potentially pay for itself in improved success rates. UCLA studies confirm that heavyusing SACPA clients did significantly better in residential treatment than they did in
outpatient treatment. Whereas only 19% of heavy users assigned to outpatient treatment successfully completed the program, 40% of heavy users assigned to residential
treatment successfully completed the program (Hawken, Anglin, & Connor, 2007).
Similarly, SACPA clients who were daily methamphetamine users at program entry
and who participated in residential treatment had fewer arrests (18% fewer felony
arrests and 17% fewer misdemeanor arrests) during a 30-month follow-up period than
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did similar clients who participated in outpatient treatment (Hawken, Anglin, &
Connor, 2007). These findings support the need for expanding the residential treatment
supply and including a secure confinement treatment facility (or residential treatment
with intensive supervision and monitoring program) among the options.
Expand narcotic replacement therapy. Only 14% of SACPA opiate users received
Narcotic Replacement Therapy (NRT), despite the fact that NRT is considered the
standard of care for opiate addicts. This was in comparison to 84% of noncriminal
justice–involved clients that received publicly funded NRT (Hawken et al., 2007).
UCLA studies concluded that SACPA clients placed in NRT had significantly fewer
arrests (13% fewer) and higher treatment completion rates (71% vs. 52%) than did
clients who did not receive NRT (Hawken et al., 2007). Although controversial, NRT
is considered the standard of care for opiate addicts and should be available for all
opiate-using SACPA participants who would benefit (Connor, 2008; National Institutes
of Health Consensus Development Program, 1997).
Allow Graduated Sanctions
Its an easy program, too easy—clients get 3 chances to succeed.
(Treatment Provider [UCLA survey])
As might be expected, both samples of practitioners (11% of survey respondents21 and
72% of nonpolice interviewees) suggested graduated sanctions for probation violations as a method to improve program compliance for SACPA defendants. Their position is based on experience with this population and the belief that graduated sanctions
(including but not limited to the use of shock incarceration) are necessary to encourage
sobriety and persuade offenders to comply with program rules. Best practices research
on substance abuse treatment with criminal justice–involved individuals supports this
contention (Marlowe, 2003).
It is a complete waste of time and money unless provisions are made to impose
sanctions for non-compliance and additional funding is provided. We do our
best but it is inherently ineffective by design and intent. (Court practitioner
[UCLA survey])
If you’re going to force somebody to do something against their will, there’s got
to be a consequence for not doing it. If the judge and court is the ultimate
authority, but you don’t give them any authority to do anything, then what’s the
point? (DLJ, OC Probation Officer)
Practitioners are so adamant about the utility of graduated sanctions that many
actively circumvent the intent of the law and find ways to institute short jail stays
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when they feel it is necessary. Even though SACPA offenders cannot be incarcerated
for treatment noncompliance, courts routinely jail offenders who are failing in treatment using at least three tactics: (a) scheduling a hearing, then jailing the offender for
failure to appear (Gardiner, 2008); (b) jailing a probationer for violations on a separate
nondrug case (Burns & Peyrot, 2008); and 3) imposing jail “by stipulation” if all parties (including the defendant) agree to this in lieu of filing a violation of probation
(Burns & Peyrot, 2008). Current survey data indicate that circumvention is relatively
widespread. Besides the 77% of treatment providers that support the use of flash incarceration for SACPA clients, 40% of court responders (8 out of 20) stated that they
“often” use short jail sanctions in response to noncompliance by SACPA offenders.
A growing body of research indicates that short jail stays and other sanctions for program noncompliance can increase drug offender motivation and improve outcomes,
provided they are consistently applied (Hawken & Poe, 2008; Marlowe, 2003; Taxman,
1999). However, given the indirect methods used to administer shock incarceration, it
is likely that these sanctions are employed in a manner that is inconsistent with the
swift and certain principle established by best practices research (Marlowe, 2003;
Taxman, 1999).
Allow More Discretion Regarding Participation
Judges and other practitioners want more discretion as to who is allowed to participate.
Not only do practitioners want criminally sophisticated offenders with long rap sheets
who are unsuitable for treatment out of the program, they also want the ability to keep
offenders in the program beyond the third violation if they are making progress. All
parolees (and almost all offenders) with serious or violent felonies (“strikes”) are
already ineligible for SACPA; however practitioners also want the ability to exclude
offenders who have several past convictions, especially those who have served
time in prison. More than 60% of nonpolice interviewees from Orange County suggested additional restrictions on the criminal history component. For example, some
suggested that SACPA should only be offered in special cases to offenders who
have served more than one prison term. These offenders would need to articulate to
the court a strong desire to participate in treatment and a willingness to work the
program. Furthermore, treatment providers want the flexibility to remove problematic
clients sooner than is currently allowed. If these changes resulted in a smaller, more
appropriate, and more responsive population of drug offenders, it could decrease the
amount of funding required to treat and supervise participants and also improve other
outcomes (Urada & Evans, 2008b).
Sometimes the folks who have a large history are the people who finally wake
up and go, “I just wasted the last four years of my life and I need help.” I don’t
want to disqualify that person that has that attitude. . . . How do you benefit as
many people that actually want the help and disqualify the folks that don’t want
the help? (DXJ, OC Probation Officer)
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As with any study, this one has limitations. Unfortunately, one limitation of using
an open-ended question format is that it hinders researchers’ abilities to quantify findings. Thus, although the themes that emerged were apparent, quantifying individual
responses was sometimes difficult due to the ambiguity inherent in such data. Future
research should ask closed-ended questions about the themes that emerged in this
study to identify the breadth and depth of these issues for counties statewide. Research
is also needed to identify any local factors that have an impact on successful implementation (e.g., Evans, Anglin, Urada, & Yang, 2011). It would also be instructive if
future research could identify successful programs, strategies, and/or policies in use
throughout the state that could serve as models.
Conclusion
SACPA and other recently implemented diversion-to-treatment laws dramatically
altered how criminal justice systems across the United States processes nonviolent
drug offenders. These laws essentially changed the sentencing focus from retribution
to rehabilitation. Research shows that SACPA has achieved positive outcomes for
drug addicted offenders and has saved the state of California money in the process
(US$4 for every treatment completer and US$2.50 for every participant; Hawken et al.,
2008). SACPA, however, is at a crossroads, severely racked by insufficient financial
and practitioner support.
The law and its funding provisions desperately need to be revised.22 SACPA’s
authors admit that changes are necessary to improve the success of the program (Appel,
Backes, & Robbins, 2006). The overarching problem is that inadequate funding since
inception has rendered SACPA hollow and undereffective. Practitioners circumvent the
intent of the law with “workarounds” attempting to improve program outcomes. Many
California practitioners never truly “bought into” SACPA, in large part because it was
thrust on them—there was no dialogue about best drug-treatment practices, or discussions of essential components for stakeholder support; just a ballot measure put before
the voters by well-financed drug policy advocates that needed to be implemented by the
same practitioners that opposed it.
The most sensible approach for improving SACPA and achieving stakeholder buyin would be to assemble an oversight group with representatives from all stakeholder
groups to design an improved version of SACPA, one that is inline with stakeholders’
visions. Law enforcement, probation, parole, district attorneys, public defenders,
judges, treatment and mental health providers, and researchers should be invited to the
table. There are several areas of broad stakeholder agreement that should serve as a
starting point; including the following: Strengthening the treatment component, incorporating brief jail sanctions, and expanding discretion regarding offender participation. Because SACPA was initially passed as a ballot measure, any attempt to improve
it (for example, by changing eligibility criteria or treatment options, allowing for graduated sanctions, allocating more money, or assigning a dedicated funding stream)
should be put before the voters as a measure to directly replace SACPA.23
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One of the enduring lessons of California’s experience with SACPA is that adequate
funding and stakeholder buy-in are crucial for any diversion-to-treatment law to be
effective. Voter initiatives are very difficult to change, but the alternative (which is to
allow the law to fail due to lack of fiscal resources and stakeholder support) is far more
damaging in the long run. In spite of its faults, from 2001 to 2010 SACPA provided
treatment for and diverted from possible incarceration more than 250,000 offenders;
approximately 85,000 of whom have completed treatment.
Authors’ Note
An earlier version of this article was presented at the annual meeting of the American Society
of Criminology in November, 2009.
Declaration of Conflicting Interests
The author(s) declared that they had no conflicts of interest with respect to their authorship or
the publication of this article.
Funding
The author(s) disclosed that they received the following support for their research and/or
authorship of this article: This research was partially funded by National Institute of Justice
Dissertation Research Grant, 2007-IJ-CX-0031.
Notes
1. A total of 50,000 offenders accept SACPA diversion and are referred to treatment each year,
approximately 36,000 (72%) enroll in treatment each year.
2. In this article, we use the term stakeholder to mean county administrators, criminal justice
practitioners, and treatment professionals whose job entails working with SACPA funding,
agencies, or clients on a regular basis.
3. Survey methods are described in more detail in Urada, Gardiner, and Anglin (2011).
4. As part of the law, every county in the state had to designate a “lead agency” to administer
Proposition 36 funds and coordinate implementation within the county. Most counties chose
the county health agency overseeing treatment of substance use disorders (e.g., health and
human services, behavioral health, public health) to be the lead agency.
5. Fiscal Year 2006-2007 data from the California Department of Alcohol and Drug Programs
California Outcomes Measurement System were used for treatment provider selection
purposes.
6.A comprehensive list of all comments can be found at http://www.uclaisap.org/Prop36/
html/reports.html
7. Study methods are described in much greater detail in Gardiner (2008).
8. Snowball sampling is an effective sampling method to locate and gain access to a small
set of participants with particular knowledge, in this case implementing Proposition 36 in
Orange County. Although their views may not generalize to all practitioners, it is expected
that their experiences may be instructive and somewhat similar to key practitioners involved
in SACPA implementation throughout the state.
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9. When combined with other statewide sources of funding used for SACPA treatment and
supervision (Offender Treatment Program, Byrne Justice Assistance Grant), this amount
has fluctuated and ranged from US$145 million in FY 2006-2007 to US$62.5 million in FY
2009-2010. The Governor’s proposed funding for 2010-2011 has been reduced to zero from
all statewide sources.
10. Police officers are excluded from the analysis because they have no involvement in actual
implementation and are unlikely to know about the sufficiency of funding, adequacy of
treatment, or program compliance.
11. Participants in the UCLA survey are referred to as “survey respondents” and participants in
the Orange County focus study are referred to as “interviewees.”
12. As the UCLA survey asked specific questions about county responses to reduced funding,
it is possible that some respondents did not add the need for more treatment funding to their
“additional comment” response because they felt they had already weighed in on the topic.
13. To ensure anonymity, interviewees were assigned arbitrary three letter codes for identification
purposes.
14. Funding was drastically reduced in 2009-2010 (from US$108 million in 2008-09 to US$62.5
million—an amount that was cobbled together through state Offender Treatment Program
funds and Federal Byrne Justice Assistance Grants). No data yet exist on how practitioners
have responded to the radical reduction of funding in 2009-2010. Funding has been completely eliminated (from all sources) for 2010-2011.
15. Offenders placed on a “field monitored” (a.k.a. “banked”) receive minimal supervision. In
Orange County, filed monitored probationers meet with their Probation Officer once during
an initial visit to review the terms and conditions of their probation but do not report in person beyond that. They still have treatment requirements and all of the customary conditions,
but are not required to report to their probation officer on a regular basis. Instead, contact
between probation officer and probationer is maintained through the telephone or mail and
the probation officer verifies treatment progress through the shared database.
16. In Orange County, this happened for two reasons: (a) some judges had such strong protreatment feelings that they ignored disqualifying criteria, and (b) some judges were unaware of
the disqualifying criteria (Gardiner, 2008).
17. This list represents the major changes that need to be made if SACPA is going to be successful. For a comprehensive list of additional recommended changes, see Urada et al. (2011).
18. Interestingly, if the national health care reform bill survives as currently written, starting in
2014 most offenders substance abuse treatment will be covered; as “substance use disorders
treatment” is on the law’s list of essential benefits to be covered by both Medi-Cal and private
health insurance.
19. It is likely that the existence of previous questions on the survey pertaining to funding and
treatment limited the number of respondents who felt compelled to reiterate their feelings
in the final “other comments” question at the end of the survey, from which this statistic is
derived.
20.One other benefit this has is that it would likely increase the perceived severity of the
sanction in criminal justice practitioners’ eyes. This, however, it not a legitimate reason
to remove an individual’s freedom. Denying an individual’s freedom for the purpose of
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someone else’s satisfaction, although currently popular (e.g., retribution), is not a legitimate
reason to impose a custodial sanction on low-level drug offenders.
21.It is likely that the existence of previous questions on the survey pertaining to sanctions
limited the number of respondents who felt compelled to reiterate their feelings in the final
“other comments” question at the end of the survey, from which this statistic is derived. As
noted earlier, 77% of treatment provider respondents indicated in a closed-ended question
that making sanctions available would increase completion rates.
22.SACPA is currently an unfunded mandate, as the state terminated all financial support
for the law in early 2010. Thus, all monies to support SACPA must come from counties
directly. It is anticipated that this will further reduce treatment and supervision to virtually
nonexistent levels.
23. Proposition 36/SACPA was a constitutional initiative, therefore it can only be changed by
another constitutional initiative; it cannot be changed by the legislature.
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Bios
Christine Gardiner, PhD. is an assistant professor of criminal justice at California State
University, Fullerton. Her doctoral dissertation investigated the effects of SACPA on the case
processing and sentencing of drug offenders in Orange County, California. She also has experience as a sheriff’s department crime analyst and probation officer.
Darren Urada, PhD. is a researcher at the UCLA Integrated Substance Abuse Programs
(UCLA ISAP) and Principal Investigator on a contract with the State of California to evaluate
California’s Substance Abuse and Crime Prevention Act (SACPA). Dr. Urada has been evaluating this law since its passage in 2001.
M. Douglas Anglin, PhD. was the founding Director of the UCLA Drug Abuse Research
Center and is currently Associate Director of UCLA ISAP and a UCLA Professor-in-Residence.
He has been Principal Investigator on more than 25 federal funded studies and involved with
UCLA’s SACPA evaluation since the law’s passage.
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