Download Atomic Bomb: Ultimate Failure of Diplomacy

1993
Executive Research Project
$25
Atomic Bomb:
Ultimate Failure of Diplomacy
Sandy Frank
Defense Information Systems Agency
Faculty Research A dvisor
Commander Richard R. Arnold, USN
The Industrial College of the Armed Forces
National Defense University
Fort McNair, Washington, D.C. 20319-6000
DISCLAIMER
This research report represents the views of the author and does not necessarily
reflect the official opinion of the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, the National
Defense University, or the Department of Defense.
This document is the property of the United States Government and is not to be
reproduced in whole or in part for distribution outside the federal executive branch
without permission of the Director of Research and Publications, Industrial College
of the Armed Forces, Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, D.C. 20319-6000.
Aq[~C
] ~ :
I.]LII~TE
] ~ l J ~
OF
D I P ~ C ~ f
Introduction
Hiroshima
and N a g a s a k i !
These
two
words have
come
to symbolize
the
unmitigated horror brought about by the terribly destructive power of atomic
weapons.
If war represents the failure of diplomacy, then modern thinking would
dictate that the use of nuclear weapons is the ultimate failure of diplomacy.
However, when viewed during World War II through the eyes of American and British
military and political leaders who had shown little moral anguish over the
firebombing of German and Japanese cities, the question of whether to use the
atomic bombs was never really an ethical issue.
Seen as "just bigger bombs",
there was little doubt that the atomic weapons would be used against either
Germany or Japan if they became available during the war.
With the surrender of
Germany in May 1945, Japan was targeted for the bombs which were expected to be
ready within months.
At the same time, there was also a growing realization
among these same leaders that the future adversary of the United States and Great
Britain would be their "Grand Alliance" ally, the Soviet Union.
Unknown to newly sworn President Harry Truman, Franklin Roosevelt and British
Prime Minister Winston Churchill had developed an agenda that was significantly
broader than merely bringing an expeditious end to the war with Japan.'
Use of
the atomic bombs would consummate their secret grand strategy for shaping the
political landscape of the postwar world.
In their vision of the "new world
order" of that era, the atomic bomb would serve as the diplomatic hammer to
' As documented in detail by Martin Sherwin in his book A World.Destroyed,
this agenda was formulated in conjunction with the signing of the Quebec
Agreement in August 1943. Further discussion is provided on pages 7-8 of this
paper.
ensure that Anglo-American global political objectives would not be seriously
challenged by Joseph Stalin's desire for hegemony over Eastern Europe and the Far
East.
While
Roosevelt
had
never
taken
his
new
Vice
President
into
his
confidence, Truman would soonlearn about the existence of the atomic bomb and
its potential use as a coercive diplomatic tool from his aged Secretary of War,
Henry L. Stimson.
As Stalin continued to renege on agreements made at the Yalta
Conference in February 1945, the new American president began to understand his
predecessor's concerns about dealing with the recalcitrant Soviet dictator.
By the time Truman
sailed
for the Potsdam Conference
in July
1945,
he had
essentially made up his mind to use the atomic bombs (assuming that the upcoming
ground test at Alamogordo, New Mexico proved successful)
first priority was to compel the Japanese to surrender
least cost of American lives.
He considered
to end the war.
His
unconditionally at the
a full-scale
invasion
of the
Japanese homeland as an undesirable contingency to be employed only if the atomic
bombs were not viable weapons.
Concerned that the American people would not
accept anything less than unconditional surrender from the perpetrators of the
sneak attack on Pearl Harbor, he rejected the idea of providing the Japanese
hierarchy assurances that Emperor Hirohito could be retained.
mindful of the Churchill/Roosevelt
designs
under control.
attitude over
Truman was also
strategy for keeping Stalin's expansionist
He was already concerned with Stalin's
the administration
of Eastern
Europe,
especially
belligerent
Poland.
The
President must have realized that despite his best efforts, Soviet domination of
Eastern Europe would be difficult to prevent.
war
expected
recognized
to
take
the need
to
place
within
terminate
potential foothold in the Far East.
the
Thus, with Soviet entry into the
first
two weeks
the war before
of
August,
Stalin could gain
Truman
another
In my estimation,
Conference.
Truman made
two serious mistakes
while
at
the
Potsdam
Almost fifty years later, the world still suffers for his failure
to employ better diplomacy towards our Soviet ally and our Japanese enemy.
I believe that Truman should have told Stalin of the bomb's existence at the
Potsdam Conference after he learned that it had been successfully tested and
before it
was actually
used.
He would
have sacrificed
little,
since
the
potential diplomatic value of the bomb was predicated on its actual use during
the war.
weeks.
Indeed, Truman was already set on a course to use the bombs within two
If Stalin already knew about the bomb (which, in fact, he did), Truman
had nothing to lose.
If Stalin was ignorant of its existence,
then it was
unlikely that merely finding out would jeopardize any strategic advantage already
enjoyed by the United States and Great Britain.
In either case, Truman could
have demonstrated good will towards the Soviet dictator in hopes that it would
be reciprocated.
Instead, he was extremely coy with Stalin.
Keeping the
existence of the bomb an Anglo-Amerlcan secret perpetuated the paranoiac Stalin's
worst suspicions of his Grand Alliance partners and was arguably responsible for
precipitating the Cold War and the nuclear arms race.
It is also my opinion that Truman made an egregious error in judgement when he
decided not to rescind his demand for the Japanese to surrender unconditionally.
The Potsdam Declaration was the culmination of a seriously flawed diplomatic
strategy.
~ad Truman attempted to negotiate the continuance of the Imperial
System with Japanese leaders, the end of the war might have been accomplished
before the Soviets had the opportunity to have any significant impact in the Far
East and without the use of atomic weapons.
I will offer my own blueprint for
how this might have been done in the section entitled "In Retrospect: Should We
Have Used the Atomic Bombs?"
The First Nuclear Arms Race: Buildinq the Atomic Bomb
From Science Fiction to Reality
The genesis of the first nuclear arms race was a science fiction novel written
in 1913 by H.G. Wells.
Set in 1956, The World Set Free describes how a global
nuclear war using "atomic bombs" destroys 200 of the world's cities, leading to
the establishment of a world government. ~
Twenty years later, Hungarian-born
physicist Leo Szilard whimsically recalled Wells' idea as he imagined how the
process of transmuting one element into another could simultaneously generate a
vast amount of nuclear energy.
Szilard theorized
A recent emigre' to London from Nazi Germany,
that such an atomic
bombardment of an element by neutrons.
reaction could be effectuated
through
He shared his theory with a small group
of colleagues in the scientific community, hoping that this special element could
be identified through laboratory experimentation.
It was not until late 1938 that German physicists Otto Hahn and Fritz Strassmann
discovered
that
uranium,
the heaviest
transmuted
into
barium when
subjected
of
the
92 elements
to neutron
then
bombardment.
known,
The
atomic
reaction also generated radioactive elements as an unexpected by-product.
wrote
to
a
former
colleague,
Lise
Meitner,
interpreting the results of his experiments.
asking
for
her
was
assistance
Hahn
in
She and her nephew, Otto Frisch,
an experimental physicist at the Neils Bohr Institute for Theoretical Physics in
Copenhagen, confirmed that nuclear fission had, in fact, occurred.'
1939,
the first of several
papers was published
informing
In January
the rest
scientific world that nuclear fission was indeed a new verity.
of the
Using Albert
Einstein's famous equation, E = mc z, scientists calculated that fissioning of
just one pound of uranium would release as much energy as 8,000 short tons of
TNT. a The successful splitting of the uranium atom had made H.G. Wells' vision
published on
the
eve of
the First
World War
a potential
reality
-
the
actualization of which would prove to be decisive in ending the Second World War
and fomenting the start of the Cold War.
Race to Beat Germany
Szilard and his tightly-knit group of fellow physicists, now located in the
United States, soon surmised that Hitler's Germany had the wherewithal to develop
an atomic bomb.
In addition to possessing the scientific knowledge to begin
research, Germany could gain access to the world's largest reserves of high-grade
uranium ore from the Belgian Congo.
Szilard and members of his "association"
decided that the United States must win the race to build the first atomic bomb.
In the spring of 1939, Enrico Fermi unsuccessfully tried to interest the U.S.
Navy in performing atomic research (Navy officials were ignorant of Fermi's
scientific credentials and suspicious of the motives of the Italian emigre'). ~
In July,
Szilard enlisted the help of Princeton physicist Eugene Wigner in
visiting the eminent Professor Einstein.
Szilard had hoped that Einstein, who
knew the Belgian queen, would sign a letter warning her of the danger of German
seizure of the Congo's uranium reserves.
Einstein signed the letter and it was
agreed that a copy would be sent to the U.S. State Department.
Later, Szilard
had
that
second
thoughts
about
sending
the
letter
and
decided
approaching President Roosevelt was the preferable tactic.
wrote another letter for Einsteln's signature.
directly
In August, Szilard
It was delivered to the president
by Alexander Sachs (a Russian emigre' with access to the White House) in October,
six weeks after the outbreak of war in Europe.
After reading this now famous
letter, Roosevelt told his personal aide, General "Pa" Watson: "This requires
action. ''~ Soon thereafter an ad hoc Uranium Committee was formed to study the
possible military applications of recent discoveries in nuclear fission.
With the creation of the National Defense Research Committee (NDRC) in June 1940,
atomic research began to acquire its own impetus.
Under chairman Vannevar Bush,
the purpose of the NDRC was to seek new opportunities to exploit science for the
prosecution of the war.
While atomic research would have to compete with other
weapons research for funding,
the means to investigate the feasibility of the
atomic bomb was now established. ~
A year later, in June 1941, Bush created the Office of Scientific Research and
Development (OSRD), an umbrella organization under which the NDRC would operate.
James Conant was named the new chairman of the NDRC.
reported directly to Roosevelt.
Under this guise, Bush
In July, he advised the president that if it
were technically feasible to develop the atomic bomb, use of the weapon might
have a decisive effect not only on the war, but in shaping the future peace as
well.
In January
1942, a month after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor,
Roosevelt gave Bush the go-ahead to proceed with developing the atomic bomb. ~
The Nanhattan ProTect
The Manhattan
Project
was born in March
scientists was put under Army direction.
1942 when the work of the
atomic
Brigadier General Leslie Groves was
selected to head the project, and his official appointment came on 17 September.
Groves was directed to coordinate his activities with Conant at the NDRC.
two
days
later,
as
Fermi
and
Szilard
continued
their
experiments
at
Just
the
University of Chicago, the site for the uranium separation plant was acquired in
Oak Ridge, Tennessee.
In December, Robert Oppenheimer was appointed director of
the newly constructed bomb laboratory at Los Alamos, New ~exico. j
Meanwhile, on 2 December the watershed event in the development of the bomb took
place.
the
Under Fermi's leadership, the University of Chicago scientists produced
first
self-sustaining
chain
reaction
in
history.
This
landmark
accomplishment effectively demonstrated the feasibility of the atomic bomb and
ended the basic research phase of the project.'
Bush advised the president that
the first atomic bombs would likely be ready for use in early 1944. I° Bolstered
by proof that atomic bombs could eventually be produced i, Franklin Roosevelt
turned his attention to formulating a new grand strategy to meet the wartime and
postwar objectives that had been alluded to by Vannevar Bush some 18 months
earlier in July 1941.
Use of the Atomic Bomb: The Rationale is Developed
Atomic Monopoly I: The Seed is Planted
Since the summer of 1940, the United States and Great Britain had agreed to share
secret technical information to be used for the conduct of the war.
While the
British specialized in radar systems and codebreaking techniques, the Americans
performed the vast majority of the research and development of the atomic bomb.
Bush and Conant strongly pursued the open exchange with the British until the
breakthrough on 2 December 1942.
Enlisting Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson as
an ally, they now advised the president that there was "no reason for a joint
enterprise as
far as development and manufacture
(of the atomic
bomb)
is
concerned. ''Lt As expected, the British objected vehemently to this change in
the relationship with their American counterparts.
Discussions culminated with
the signing of the Quebec Agreement on 19 August 1943 by President Roosevelt and
Prime Minister
Churchill.
With
this
pact,
the
bases
for
Anglo-American
i Solving the remaining technical problems fabricating, and testing of a
working bomb would take until July 1945 at a total project cost of some S2.5
billion. (Cardinal Choices: 15)
cooperation on atomic energy policy as well as general diplomatic and military
matters relating to the atomic bomb were established.
In particular, Roosevelt
tacitly endorsed Churchill's view that Anglo-American control of the atomic bomb
and the means of its production should be used as a powerful coercive instrument
to thwart Soviet hegemony in Europe following the winning of the war. u
The seed was now planted for an Anglo-American atomic monopoly.
but "two policemen" to rule the postwar world.
There would be
As Churchill had hoped,
the
development of the atomic bomb would be kept secret from the French he despised
and the Soviets he feared.
Atomic MonoDolv II: The Die is Cast
A month
following
the
signing of
the Quebec
Agreement,
the
world-renowned
physicist Neils Bohr escaped to England from Nazi-occupied Denmark.
Once he
learned of the Manhattan Project, he embarked on an effort to encourage American
and British diplomats to adopt an atomic policy that could be used to shape
postwar relations with the Soviet Union.
Bohr argued that the Soviets should be
informed of the existence of the Manhattan Project, but that they should not be
provided any technical details until such time as they guaranteed "common safety
against the unprecedented dangers."
He further argued that only by promptly
inviting Soviet participation in postwar atomic energy planning (before the bomb
was a certainty and before the war was over) could mutual mistrust between the
Anglo-Americans and their Soviet allies be avoided.
In Bohr's view, failure to
bring atomic energy planning under international control would inevitably lead
to a dangerous nuclear arms race. ts
On 16 May 1944, Bohr was finally granted an audience with the British Prime
Minister.
Preoccupied with planning the invasion of Europe scheduled for the
first week in June,
Churchill impatiently greeted the famous scientist and
allowed him little time to present his ideas.
He terminated the short meeting
by making it clear to his visitor that he did not want to hear any more of his
political opinions anytime in the future.
Not a man to be derailed easily, Bohr continued to press for acceptance of his
views.
of
On 26 August, Bohr met with Franklin Roosevelt.
the
Normandy
invasion,
the
president
cheerfully
presentation and even indicated that he agreed in concept.
Elated by the success
listened
to
Bohr's
He told Bohr that the
details would be worked out when he met with Churchill the following month.
On 18 September, the meeting was held at Roosevelt's estate in Hyde Park, New
York.
The outcome was an aidelemoire rejecting Bohr's ideas for international
control of atomic energy.
Further, in light of the optimism about the end of the
war in Europe, the potential target of the atomic bomb was changed from the
Germans to the Japanese.
However, the memorandum cast doubt, for the first time,
on whether the bomb would be used in the war at all. t~
The matter should continue to be regarded as of the utmost secrecy; but when a
'bomb' is finallyavailable, it might perhaps, after mature consideration, be
used against the Japanese, who should be warned that this bombardment will be
repeated until they surrender, ts
In addition, the die was now firmly cast for extension of the Anglo-American
atomic monopoly for an indefinite period after the end of the war.
Full collaboration between the United States and the British Government in
developing Tube Alloys for military and commercial purposes should continue after
the defeat of Japan unless and until terminated by joint agreement. ~*
Thus the Quebec Agreement was reaffirmed.
As history would prove, Neils Bohr's
worst fears of a dangerous postwar nuclear arms race would become the reality of
the Cold War.
9
Yalta: Prelude to Atomic Diplomacy:
As the defeat of Germany became inevitable during the autumn and winter of 1944,
tensions between the Grand Alliance partners were heightened.
Churchill sought
the expeditious termination of the European war as British manpower and financial
resources dwindled to critically low levels.
He realized that attainment of that
objective mainly hinged upon the continued-4uccess of the powerful Soviet army
now moving westward towards Germany.
At the same time, Roosevelt was most
anxious for Soviet intervention against the Japanese, especially in light of the
recent failures of Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist forces on the Chinese mainland.
The shrewd Marshal Stalin astutely recognized how deeply his two allies depended
on his cooperation in achieving their own strategic goals.
As the end of 1944
approached, Stalin understood that he was in a uniquely advantageous position of
strength in demanding political and territorial concessions in the Baltic States,
the Balkans, and most of Eastern Europe.
With the Yalta Conference scheduled for February 1945 fast approaching, the Big
Three and their respective diplomatic
operatives struggled to reach mutual
agreement in five areas of policy:
1. The treatment of Germany;
2. The future of Eastern Europe;
3. The restoration of colonial empires;
4. The nature of the international security organization to be established;
5. The nature of postwar diplomacy.
c The material for this section was primarily drawn from The Semblance of
Peace, pages 188-213.
10
With respect to the treatment of Germany,
the~e was general consensus that
Germany would be demilitarized and that some sort of joint occupation would be
required for some indefinite future.
The major issues to be resolved mostly
related to how the process would be implemented.
Pre-conference discussions of the political-and territorial interests of Great
Britain and the Soviet Union soon became paramount.
Much to the displeasure of
President Roosevelt, Churchill had already made inroads with Stalin over the
connected issues of Eastern Europe and the Balkans.
greatly feared
The British Prime Minister
that the loss of Greece to communism could
domination over Mediterranean countries such as Italy.
lead to Soviet
While continuing to show
resistance to Stalin's plans to subjugate Poland, Churchill offered to allow
Stalin to take the lead in determining the political fate of Bulgaria and Rumania
in exchaage for the Soviet dictator's assurances that the issue of Greece would
be left to the British.
Further, the Soviet Union would be given a 50% share of
the responsibility for the control 9f Hungary and Yugoslavia, with the AngloAmericans retaining the other half. I~
Meanwhile, Roosevelt was receiving mixed advice from his own foreign policy team.
Secretary of State Cordell Hull and his Deputy Director for European Affairs,
John D. Hickerson, argued
that Soviet absorption of the Baltic States
domination of Eastern Europe was almost a £ait accompli.
and
Instead of trying to
forestall the inevitable, they advised the president to make the best of the
likely new alignment in Europe.
They urged
Roosevelt to ensure that
any
political settlement made with the Soviets safeguarded the commercial interests
of the United States In Eastern Europe.
In addition, they further suggested that
the president afford no special accommodations to the Soviets until guarantees
were provided on the subjects of free elections and peacekeeping through a world
11
organization for maintenance of international peace and security.
Strongly
opposed to these views was Roosevelt's personal Chief of Staff, Admiral William
D. Leahy, who argued that the United States should maintain an isolationist
posture that would have the French, British, and Soviets work out their own
agendas for settling Europe's political boundaries.
It was
in this
atmosphere
of
conflicting
allied
concerns
that
the
Yalta
Conference took place from 4 February to ii February. d As to be expected given
Stalin's position of strength, the Soviet Union's objectives were the driving
force during many of the discussions.
The major outcomes of the conference were
as follows:
i.
A "United Nations" conference would be held in San Francisco in April
1945 to establish the charter for a world organization for the maintenance of
international peace and security;
2.
Germany would be completely disarmed, demilitarized, and dismembered
with the details to be worked out in committee by representatives of the Big
Three; the French would be invited to occupy a portion of the Anglo-American
zone; Germany would pay reparations to the Allies with the details again to be
worked out by committee representatives of the Big Three;
3.
The Soviets would enter the war against Japan "in two or three months
after Germany has surrendered, and the war in Europe has terminated ''I' provided
that the:
(a) status quo in Outer Mongolia would be preserved;
(b) territories and commercial/military rights "violated by
the
treacherous attack of Japan in 1904 ''~'would be restored;
(c) Kurile Islands would become part of the Soviet Union.
d The "Protocol of the Proceedings of the Yalta Conference" appear on pages
625-632 of The Semblance of Peace.
12
4. The portion of Poland east of the "Curzon Line" would be in the Soviet
sphere of influence; as compensation, Poland would gain territory to itswest,
the delimitation of which would be decided at the eventual peace conference;
5.
The European peoples liberated from domination by Nazi Germany would
be given the rights assured by the Atlantic Charter - namely the rights of
political self-determination and the restoration of sovereignty; however,
To foster the conditions in which the liberated peoples may exercise these
rights, the three governments will jointly assist the people in any European
liberated state or former Axis satellite in Europe where in their judgment
conditions require (a) to establish conditions of internal peace; (b) to carry
out emergency measures for the relief of distressed peoples; (c) to form interim
governmental authorities broadly representative of all democratic elements in the
population and pledged to the earliest possible establishment through free
elections of governments responsive to the will of the people; and (d) to
facilitate where necessary the holding of such elections."
In summary, the plans agreed to at Yalta paved the way for continued mistrust
among the members of the Grand Alliance.
While each of the Big Three could claim
that their major objectives had been met, it was an even stronger Stalin who
emerged from the conference.
In the coming months, the Soviet dictator would
exploit the vagaries of the language concerning Poland and the "liberated
peoples" of Eastern Europe to further his agenda for subjugating Eastern Europe
to Soviet rule.
His willingness to test the resolve of his Anglo-American
allies, especially the new American president, would prove to be a determining
factor in the timing of Truman's decision to use the atomic bomb against Japan.
Truman
Franklin Roosevelt died suddenly on 12 April 1945, just two months after the
conclusion of the Yalta Conference.
The new President, Harry Truman, had been
elected to the Senate in 1934 where he served until his selection as Roosevelt's
running mate on
the 1944
ticket.
Truman's foreign policy
experience was
extremely limited and Roosevelt had neglected to discuss national security issues
with his new vice president.
At this most critical juncture in history, the
13
American president knew almost nothing of his predecessor's grand strategy for
ending the war and shaping the postwar world.
In particular, he was ignorant of
the pact between Roosevelt and Churchill which was consummated by the signing of
the Quebec Agreement in August 1943 and reaffirmed at Hyde Park in September
1944. zt
Further, Truman was a virtual
stranger to both Churchill
and,
more
importantly, Stalin.
In the days following Roosevelt's death, Ambassador Averill Harriman informed
Truman from Moscow that Stalin was planning to recant on the spirit of the Yalta
agreements by recognizing
a puppet communist
government in Poland.
It also
appeared that Stalin was being recalcitrant on his commitment to the formation
of the United Nations.
Truman and Stalin would continue to discuss these and
other issues over the next several
months, but the net effect was
that
the
inexperienced American president soon hardened his resolve to show the Soviet
leader that he would not be bullied into allowing the Russians to renege on the
agreements made at Yalta.
Secretary of War Stimson briefed President Truman on the status of the atomic
bomb project on 25 April.
be ready for use within
He informed the president that the bomb would likely
four months.
Stimson never mentioned
the possible
targeting of Japan, and generally avoided discussion of specifics.
Rather, he
urged Truman to appoint a committee that would address the questions of how, when
and
to
what
effect
the
bomb
might
be
used.
Truman
approved
Stimson's
recommendation and the Interim Committee was established with Stimson as its
chairman.
Vannevar Bush and James Conant were also assigned to serve on the
committee.
14
The Interim Committee
The Interim Committee met several times in May with Army Chief of Staff General
George
Marshall
and
General
Leslie
Groves
attending
as
time
permitted."
Discussions centered more on how the twd bombs expected to be ready by August
should be used rather than if they should be used.
With the unconditional
surrender of Germany on 8 May, the committee determined that Japan should be
targeted.
The idea of merely demonstrating the bomb was rejected.
felt that the Japanese
First, it was
hierarchy would view such a demonstration as an idle
threat - they would never believe that the United States would actually employ
the bomb as a weapon against them.
Second, even the project's scientists could
not guarantee that the bomb would work as advertised.
Giving the Japanese prior
warning of either the date or location of an attack was also rejected.
Committee
members feared that the Japanese might intercept the American B-29 enroute to its
target, thereby jeopardizing the success of any attack.
the Japanese would move American prisoners-of-war
There was also fear that
into the target area.
morality of dropping the bombs on Japanese cities was hardly an issue.
the committee
determined
that
the expected
number of
casualties
The
In fact,
would
not
substantially exceed those of the 9-10 March firebombing raids on Tokyo. f
The committee next discussed the postwar implications of using the bomb.
They
realized that its effectiveness as a coercive diplomatic lever against the Soviet
Union would only last until the Soviets had acquired their own atomic bombs.
Also of concern was whether continuing to keep the bomb's existence from the
Soviets would lead to future difficulties in maintaining cooperative relations.
' Truman's decision to use both bombs was a single decision that would be
based on the recommendation of the Interim Committee.
f The Tokyo raids killed 85,000 persons and injured 40,000. Over 1 million
people were left homeless (The Great Decision: 77).
The February 1945
firebombings of Dresden, Germany, killed an estimated 135,090 people
(Truman: 393).
15
The committee vigorously debated how long it would take the Soviet Union to
develop their own nuclear capability once the "secret" of the bomb was out.
General Groves, who had taken the strictest measures to maintain security in the
Manhattan Project W, estimated that it would be twenty years before the Soviets
were able to build their own atomic bomb.
Far more conservative and, as it
turned out, accurate was the estimate of only four years made by Bush and
Conant."
The Interim Committee's work was finished on 1 June 1945" and its report was
presented to President Truman on 6 June by Stimson."
The report i unanimously
recommended that:
1. The bomb should be used against Japan as soon as possible.
2. It should be used against a military target surrounded by other
buildings.
3. It should be used without prior warning of the nature of the weapon."
Stimson also discussed the idea of possibly using the bomb as a lever in postwar
negotiations with the Soviet Union. z'
Thus,
the president was now
fully
cognizant of his predecessor's plans for achieving the dual objectives of winning
the war and demonstrating the new Anglo-American power to Stalin.
The impetus for the decision to use the atomic bomb had grown immeasurably
stronger with the work of the Interim Committee.
Once the military and political
' Much to the displeasure of the scientists working on the Manhattan
Project, Groves compartmentalized most of the information pertaining to bomb
development. The scientists' objections that such compartmentalization hampered
the exchange of ideas and actua]ly lengthened the development process seems, in
retrospect, to be valid (A World destroyed: 58-63).
Even with the strict security imposed by General Groves, the Soviets had
already learned many of the secrets of the Manhattan Project. Klaus Fuchs, a
Russian spy working at Los Alamos, had been feeding information to Moscow through
Anatoli Yakovlev, the Russian vice consul in New York (Day One: 217-220).
J The entire Interim Committee report may be found on pages 295-304 of
World Destroyed.
16
costs of
a full-scale invasion of Japan were
added
to the weight
of
the
committee's recommendations, the advantages of using the bombs against Japan
would prove impossible for the president to counterbalance.
Plans for the Invasion of Japan
By all military intelligence estimates in the spring of 1945, Japanese forces
were seen to be in dire straits,
but there was little evidence that their
political masters were inclined to surrender unconditionally. Thus, during April
and May of 1945, General Douglas MacArthur and Admiral Chester Nimitz made plans
for an attack on Japan.
The Navy leadership in Washington (primarily Admiral
Leahy and U.S. Fleet Commander Admiral Ernest King) favored continued aerial
bombardment and naval blockade of the Japanese islands.
They believed that such
pressure would bring about Japan's collapse without the cost of a massive
invasion.
The Army strategists, heavily influenced by MacArthur's views, argued
that the Navy's strategy could extend the war for years at no less a cost in men
and materiel than an invasion.
To further make their case, they pointed to the
fact that unrelenting air bombardment had previously proven unsuccessful in
breaking the will of the Germans to continue fighting in the European war.
The
debate ended when Admiral King finally agreed to a large-scale invasion after
Nimitz sided with MacArthur. z'
The Joint Chiefs of Staff presented their plans for the invasion of Japan to
President Truman on 18 June.
250,000 and 1 million men. z'
They indicated that casualties could range between
The plan tentatively approved by Truman called
for:
1. A i r bombardment and b l o c k a d e of J a p a n from b a s e s i n Okinawa, Iwo J i m a ,
t h e M a r i a n a s , and t h e P h i l i p p i n e s .
2. A s s a u l t of Kyushu on 1 November 1945, and t h e i n t e n s i f i c a t i o n
of
blockade and air bombardment.
3. Invasion of the industrial heart of Japan through the Tokyo Plain, in
central Honshu, tentative start date 1 March 1946."
17
Soviet entry into the war was still desired as a means of assuring that Japanese
forces fighting elsewhere, especially those on the mainland of Asia, would also
surrender.
If the Soviets held
to the commitment they made at Yalta,
their
intervention against Japan could be expected within three months from the date
of Germany's surrender.
Hence their entry into the war would be no later than
8 August 1945. As it would turn out, fear of the future implications of Soviet
entry into the war would contribute to President Truman's decision to use the
atomic bomb as soon as possible after the conclusion of the Potsdam Conference.
Potsdam
With the winning of the war now in sight, efforts were in progress to arrange a
meeting for Truman with Churchill and Stalin at Potsdam, near Berlin.
that
ground
testing
of
the
atomic
bomb
was
planned
rescheduled the Potsdam Conference to begin on 15 July.
his Grand Alliance partners,
for
mid-July,
Knowing
Truman
Before he conferred with
the president wanted to be sure that the atomic
bombs would be ready for use against Japan.
As he contemplated
difficult issues.
the upcoming
parley,
Truman was faced with a myriad of
He realized that even under the most optimistic conditions,
invasion of Japan would commit
campaign to end the war.
the United States
to a prolonged
and costly
It was certainly not clear that the American people
would support such an undertaking once they became aware of the existence of a
weapon that could quickly bring the hated Japanese to their knees.
was also mindful of the potential
billion atomic bomb project
for congressional
not demonstrate
effort.
18
The president
inquiry should the $2.5
significant
utility
to the war
Truman was also cognizant of recent attempts by the Japanese leadership to begin
peace talks with the Allies.
making unofficial
Urged by their Emperor,
peace overtures
to Moscow in hopes
rescind their demands for unconditional surrender.
the Japanese had been
that
the Allies would
It seemed that they were
ready to discuss an end to the war if only continuance of the Imperial System
were to be assured.
The Americans had
intercepted and decoded the messages
between Tokyo and Moscow and were aware of the potential
settlement.
However,
Truman's
appropriate for the Allies
he had
were
divided
on
a negotiated
whether
it
was
to back away from their position of demanding
unconditional Japanese surrender.
on 7 July,
advisors
for
rejected
an
By the time the president set sail for Potsdam
the idea
of
offering
Washington urging the Japanese to surrender.
any
proclamation
out
of
He would discuss the future of the
Japanese Emperor and the terms for Japan's surrender with Churchill and Stalin with the hope that a successful test of the atomic bomb at Alamogordo; New Mexico
would provide leverage in the negotiations. ~t
Working sessions at the Potsdam Conference began on 17 July due to S t a l i n ' s
delayed arrival, t
Washington
success.
On t h e p r e v i o u s e v e n i n g , Stimson had r e c e i v e d a t e l e g r a m from
stating
Truman
that the test of the atomic bomb had apparently
showed little excitement
been a
until 21 July when he received
detailed report of the Alamogordo test from General Groves.
a
He immediately
informed Churchill and the two determined that Stalin should be told no more than
absolutely necessary.
On 24 July, Truman, Churchill, and their respective Chiefs
of Staff mutually agreed that, barring any unforeseen circumstances, the atomic
bomb would be used within a few weeks. I~ Later that same day, Truman approached
Stalin and "'casually mentioned'
that the United States
'had a new weapon of
J Stalin's delay was allegedly due to a mild heart attack (The Semblance
of Peace: 369).
19
unusual destructive force.'"
As Truman later wrote, the Soviet dictator
(who
already was well aware of the existence of the bomb through the spying of Fuchs)
replied that "he was glad to hear it and hoped we would
against
the
Churchill,
Japanese.'"
When Truman
both men were convinced
later recounted
that
'make good use of it
this conversation
to
Stalin had been fooled and that he
remained ignorant of the importance of Truman's casual remark. '~
In fact, the
offhanded way in which Truman brought up the subject undoubtedly did little to
allay Stalin's suspicions of his hnglo-hmerican allies, j
President Truman officially issued the Potsdam Declaration on 26 July 1945.
The
joint proclamation contained stern language: "The following are our terms.
We
shall not deviate from them.
delay."
There are no alternatives.
We shall brook no
The Japanese were advised that "the full application of our military
power, backed by our resolve, will mean the inevitable and complete destruction
of the Japanese forces,
Japanese homeland."
was made.
and just as inevitably
the utter devastation of the
No mention of any new weapon (specifically the atomic bomb)
Nor was there any language that might have offered some hope to the
Japanese that the Imperial System of government would be retained.
there was an implicit
threat that
In fact,
the Emperor could be prosecuted as a war
criminal:
We do not intend that the Japanese shall be enslaved as a race nor
destroyed as a nation, but stern justice will be meted out to all war criminals,
including those who have visited cruelties upon our prisoners.
The Japanese
Government shall remove all obstacles to the revival and strengthening of
democratic tendencies among the Japanese people. Freedom of speech, of religion,
and of thought, as well as respect for fundamental human rights, shall be
established.
Stalin greatly resented Truman's coy avoidance of telling him directly
of the existence of the atomic bomb.
Soon after the first atomic bomb was
dropped, Stalin told big own atomic scientists "'Provide us with atomic weapons
in the shortest possible time. You know that Hiroshima has shaken the whole
world. The balance has been destroyed.
Provide the bomb - it will remove a
great danger to us.'" (Day One: 226)
20
While there was some lively debate among Japanese leadersover accepting the
terms of the proclamation k, it came as no surprise to the Allies when, on 28
July, Japan rejected the terms of the Potsdam Declaration. i
The "unforeseen
circumstances" vaguely alluded to on 24 July at Potsdam had not occurred.'
Use of the Atonic I ~ :
The Decision is Made
Move to Preempt the Soviets
With the rejection of the Potsdam Declaration, Truman now took the last steps
k The entire text of the Potsdam Declaration may be found on pages 376-378
of The Semblance of Peace.
t The actual wording of the Japanese response continues to cause a great
deal of interpretive debate. It is possible that their use of the word mokusatsu
was intended to convey the notion that they "took no notice" of the proclamation.
However, American translators believed that the Japanese had stated that they had
chosen to "ignore" it. (The Semblance of Peace: 379-380)
While certain historians agonize over whether the dropping of the atomic
bombs could have been avoided had mok,satsu not been interpreted as a rejection
of the Potsdam Declaration, I am of the opinion that it would not have mattered
in any case. The confluence of reasons for using the atomic bombs had all but
made the attacks against Japan a foregone conclusion that could only have been
avoided had the Japanese imediately and fully accepted the terms of the
proclamation.
• On 25 July, Truman ordered Lieutenant General Carl A. Spaatz, Commander
of U.S. Army Strategic Air Forces in the Pacific, to drop the "first special bomb
as soon as weather will permit visual bombing after about 3 August 1945 on one
of the targets: Hiroshima, Kokura, Niigata, and Nagasaki." Spaatz delegated the
decision of when to conduct the actual bombing to Major General Curtis E. LeMay.
Thus, the military was given ample time to prepare to execute the order Truman
felt he would likely issue if, as he probably anticipated, the Japanese rejected
the terms of the Potsdam Declaration. (Command Decisions: 514)
During June and July, General Groves had been working on a target list for the
atomic bomb drops. He had preferred the cities of Kyoto (the holy city which had
once been the Japanese capital} and Tokyo for the devastating psychological
effect that could bring about the rapid capitulation of the Japanese. Stimson
overruled the General, not for humanitarian concerns, but because he feared that
such a mortifying blow to the Japanese might make them turn to the Soviets rather
than the United States during the long postwar reconciliation period. (Day One:
227)
21
towards finalizing his decision to use the atomic bombs against Japan.
With the
atomic bombs ready to be used, Truman's military advisors had convinced him that
Soviet
intervention
against
Japan
was
not necessary.
Further,
there was
consternation over the political implications of the Soviets' 8 August date for
entry into the war.
During the Potsdam Conference, Stalin had belligerently
pressed for an increased Soviet presence in Europe (including bases in Turkey)
and it was clear that intervention against Japan would enable Moscow to exercise
control over Manchuria and Outer Mongolia.
After three years of urging Stalin to declare war against Japan, culminated by
the concessions to the Russian made by Roosevelt at Yalta, Truman could not
reasonably ask Stalin to stay out of the war.
Even if he had done so, there was
scant reason to believe that Soviet intervention could have been precluded."
Only one thing could prevent the Soviets from playing a major role in concluding
the war against Japan.
On 31 July, as the call for unconditional surrender
continued to be met with silence, Truman ordered the first nuclear strikes in
history.'
While it would be the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki that
would suffer the terrible destruction wrought by the atomic bombs, the secondary
target of the bombs was the Soviet Union.
niroshima and Nagasaki
On 6 August 1945, Colonel Paul Tibbets, commander of the 509th Composite Group,
piloted the Enola Gay over Hiroshima.
atomic bomb, at 8:15 A.M.
The B-29 dropped its payload, a single
Forty-five seconds later, the city of Hiroshima was
leveled in a searing flash of heat, light, shock, and fire.
Nearly 100,000
'
The president issued the following handwritten message: "Suggestions
approved. Release when ready but not sooner than August 2. HST." Truman was
scheduled to leave Potsdam on 2 August and it was likely that he intended to
avoid having to explain the dropping of the bomb to Stalin.
(Day One: 230)
22
people were killed instantly, with thousands more to perish later of burns,
shock, and radiation poisoning.
A statement was issued from the White House
within hours announcing the existence of the atomic bomb and warning the Japanese
to surrender immediately or "they may expect a rain of ruin from the air, the
like of which has never been seen on this earth. ''u
In Tokyo, Japanese Foreign Minister Togo, War Minister Anami, and Prime Minister
Suzuki debated the meaning of the Hiroshima attack
August.
for the remainder of 6-7
They could not be sure whether Hiroshima had been victimized by an
atomic bombing as claimed by the Americans or merely a massive firebombing raid
such as had been seen previously.
Their worst fears were confirmed on the
evening of 7 August when a scientific team dispatched to Hiroshima reported that
the city had, in fact, been devastated by an atomic bomb. u
During
the
afternoon
of
8
August,
Togo
briefed
Hirohito
and
the
Emperor
instructed the Foreign Minister to hasten his efforts to gain Suzuki's acceptance
of the terms of the Potsdam Declaration:
"'Since
the nation can
no longer
continue the struggle with this weapon opposing it, Japan should not miss the
chance for peace by vain efforts to secure better terms.'"
A meeting of the
Supreme War Council was scheduled for the morning of 9 August.
As t h e m e e t i n g opened a t 11 A.M., Togo i n f o r m e d t h e c o u n c i l t h a t on t h e p r e v i o u s
e v e n i n g t h e S o v i e t s had d e c l a r e d war and had i n v a d e d M a n c h u r i a .
Suzuki u r g e d
the assembled
t e r m i n a t e t h e war.
announced t h a t
leadership
to
accept the
Prime M i n i s t e r
Potsdam D e c l a r a t i o n
As t h e d i s c u s s i o n s c o n t i n u e d , an o f f i c e r
e n t e r e d t h e room and
a s e c o n d a t o m i c bomb had been d r o p p e d on N a g a s a k i - j u s t
minutes b e f o r e t h e c o u n c i l m e e t i n g had begun, st
t h e o p p o s i t i o n o f t h e most f a n a t i c a l
military
23
and
two
The n e x t d a y , 10 August 1945,
stalwarts
c o l l a p s e d when H i r o h i t o
directly intervened.
The Japanese surrendered and World War II was over.
In Retrospect: Should We Have Used the ltomic Bombs?
The morality
of
using
the atomic
bombs
was
never
really
an issue
for
political and military leaders of the United States and Great Britain.
the
While
some, such as Admiral Leahy, questioned whether the bombs would actually work,
virtually none had doubts that the bombs should be employed as military weapons
against the Japanese - especially if so doing obviated the need for a long and
costly invasion.'
There are two key questions to be addressed.
First, was destroying
two more
Japanese cities with bombs that were expected to be as dreadful in their effects
as
the terrible
conclusion?
firebombing
Second,
was
raids
using
necessary
the
atomic
to
bring
bombs
an
the
war
to
effective
a
means
swift
for
controlling Stalin's expansionist designs in the postwar world?
My
answers
respectively.
to
these
questions
are
"probably
not"
and
"definitely
not",
I contend that Truman would have done better by pursuing a well-
conceived policy of diplomacy with both Japan and the Soviet Union.
Before I
present my case, however, it is important to step back and revisit the AngloAmerican atomic monopoly.
' Churchill later wrote of the meeting on 24 July at Potsdam: "The historic
fact remains, and must be judged in the after-time, that the decision whether or
not to use the atomic bomb to compel the surrender of Japan was never an issue.
There was unanimous, automatic, unquestioned agreement around our table; nor did
I ever hear the slightest suggestion that we should do otherwise."
Truman later said: "The final decision of where and when to use the atomic bomb
was up to me.
Let there be no mistake about it.
I regarded the bomb as a
military weapon and never had any doubt that it should be used. The top military
advisors to the President recommended its use, and when I talked to Churchill he
unhesitatingly told me that he favored the use of the atomic bomb if it might aid
to end the war." (Truman: 442)
24
Churchill and Roosevelt Revisited
It is difficult for me to quarrel with historically great men such as Winston
Churchill and Franklin Roosevelt.
If they believed that the best way to ensure
Anglo-American control over the Soviets in the postwar world was to keep their
atomic monopoly a secret from Stalin,
challenge their decision.
I would not be so presumptuous as to
If they rejected the concerns of the scientists and
diplomats who warned of an impending Cold War and nuclear arms race, I could
understand how they might have believed that the Cold War had already begun
despite
their
efforts
to
placate
Stalin
with
concessions
made
at
Yalta.
Certainly, Stalin's intransigence following the conference gave little indication
that he could be trusted.
Further, Roosevelt and Churchill could not have known
that it would take only until 1949 before the Soviets developed their own atomic
bomb.
P
Perspective on Truman
Truman's decision to use the atomic bombs against Japan must be evaluated in the
context of how well it accomplished two very differe.t strategic objectives.
The
first objective was to compel the Japanese to surrender unconditionally without
incurring the costs of a massive invasion.
This objective was £.]]y achieved.
The second objective, essentially a legacy of the Churchill/Roosevelt atomic
monopoly, was to demonstrate a uniquely powerful military weapon as a means for
creating future political advantages over the Soviet Union.
This objective was
partia]lyachievedin that Stalin was prevented from making a great impact in the
Far East.
However, the extent to which the United States was able to exploit any
political advantages following the conclusion of the war must be balanced against
the loss
of
Eastern Europe
to the
Soviets
{necessitating the
policy
containment) and the inception of the Cold War and the nuclear arms race.
25
of
Returning to the second of the two questions raised above, using the atomic bombs
was definitely not an effective
designs in the postwar world.
means
for controlling
Stalin's
expansionist
Nor was Truman wise to keep the existence of the
bomb a secret from Stalin at Potsdam in so far as it perpetuated Soviet mistrust
of the United
States and,
at the very least,
exacerbated Cold War tensions
between the East and West.
Many revisionist historians (most prominently Martin Sherwin) claim that Truman's
primary reason for using the bomb was to achieve postwar diplomatic leverage over
the Soviet Union.
In his recent book,
Truman,
David McCullough
disagrees,
arguing that Truman's goals coincided exactly with what actually occurred. With
the successful test of the bomb at Alamogordo, the invasion contingency was all
but moot.
McCul]ough stresses that Truman's sole objective was to compel the
Japanese to unconditionally surrender before the Soviets could enter the war.
He rejects the notion that Truman wanted to send an atomic message to Stalin.
He states that Truman looked upon himself as being an extremely persuasive man
who, unlike his irascible British counterpart Churchill, thought he could deal
with Stalin's intransigence.
Let's assume that McCullough's suppositions are accurate. ~
accomplished
his objective
without
using
Could Truman have
the atomic weapons
against
Japan? ~
Probably not, unless he were willing to back away from adamantly refusing to
' It is entirely possible that McCullough is wrong. It must have been very
difficult for Truman to completely reject the Churchill/Roosevelt strategy for
controlling Stalin's expansionist designs in the postwar world. There is no way
of actually knowing how important this goal was for Truman, but if he was
committed to trying to achieve it, then demonstrating the bomb at Hiroshima was
probably the only way he could have done it.
' Obviously, Truman achieved this objective and the United States became
the sole arbiter of Japan's postwar reconstruction - but at what cost to our
moral credibility among the nations of the world?
26
provide assurances to the Japanese leadership that Emperor Hirohito would be
retained.
First,
In my view, that is precisely what President Truman should have done.
the language in the Potsdam Declaration should have more specifically
addressed Japanese concerns over the future of their Emperor.
"Unconditional
surrender" was a term that should not have been so lightly used with the Japanese
hierarchy.
As it was worded, the Potsdam Declaration left open the possibility
that Hirohito could be prosecuted as a war criminal.
While this approach was
certainly appropriate for the political and military leaders of the defeated
Germany, it was inconceivable that the Japanese would countenance such a veiled
threat to their god-likeEmperor.
Second, the Potsdam Declaration should have set a fixed date (perhaps 1 August)
for Japanese acceptance of a cease fire with peace negotiations scheduled to
immediately follow.
If possible, Truman should have tried to get Stalin to agree
to dates that would delay Soviet entry into the war.
It should have been made
clear to the Japanese
to be concluded
that negotiations would need
to the
satisfaction of the Allies within a short period of time (perhaps 15 August),
otherwise the United States would resume the war with all the resources at its
disposal.
The threat of total destruction should still have been made,
but
should have been contingent on Japan's failure to conclude a peace agreement
acceptable to the Allies within the specified time.
The Japanese should have
been told that they must deal directly with the United States and not try to work
through intermediaries in Moscow.
Third,
if the plan described
surrender,
Truman
should
above did not result
have ordered
that
Hiroshima (perhaps as early as 16 August).
27
the
in the desired
atomic
bomb
terms of
be dropped
on
He should not have issued a single
order authorizing t h e use of b o t h bombs.
Fourth, following Hiroshima, Truman should again have been more specific in his
language rather than merely threatening Japan with continued destruction from the
air.
He should have set reasonable deadlines for Japanese compliance with his
demands for an end to hostilities and a peried of negotiation.
Knowing how long
it takes to make a major decision in our own political system, Truman should have
afforded the Japanese leaders at least a week to respond.
Faced with American
threats of further nuclear destruction and the Soviet's entry into the war,
Japanese leaders would likely have knuckled under pressure from Emperor Hirohito
to surrender within the allotted time frame.
Fifth, and only if the Japanese still refused to capitulate r, Truman should have
proceeded with a new order to drop the second atomic bomb on Nagasaki.
In my estimation,
following
the approach described above would have had a
reasonable chance for quickly winning the war against Japan before the Soviets
could gain a foothold in Manchuria or Outer Mongolia and without having to resort
to using nuclear weapons.
Returning to the first question addressed above, was
decimating two more Japanese cities with bombs that were expected to be as
dreadful in their effects as the terrible firebombing raids necessary to bring
the war to a swift conclusion?
My answer is probably not for Hiroshima, and
almost certainly not for Nagasaki.
r If, in fact, Truman did intend to send an atomic message to Stalin, he
had already done that with the bombing of Hiroshima.
A second bombing at
Nagasaki would have added nothing towards accomplishing that goal.
28
Conclusion
I believe that had Franklin Roosevelt lived, he would have used the atomic bombs
primarily to influence Soviet behavior in the postwar world.
Roosevelt
felt
that
Stalin was
traditional diplomatic means.
too incorrigible
to
Like Churchill,
be dealt
with
using
In their view, "atomic diplomacy" was the only way
to effectively project Anglo-American political power against the vast military
strength of the Soviet Union under the iron-listed leadership of Joseph Stalin.
Unlike his predecessor, the inexperienced Harry Truman of 1945 seems not to have
been a long-range strategic thinker.'
He placed great
trust
in
his
own
abilities to convincingly sway even the most belligerent opponent in face-to-face
confrontations.
This is likely the reason that after Stalin continued to behave
truculently after the war, Truman felt such disappointment that he never again
met with him personally.
In the end, I agree with McCullough's characterization of Truman's motives for
using the atomic bombs.
separate decisions.
However, I would argue that Truman actually made two
The decision to use the bombs was driven by his desire to
force the Japanese to surrender unconditionally.
The timing of when to use the
bombs was driven by his desire to keep the Soviets out of the Far East.
When
viewed in this way, it is clear to see why any bombing delay beyond Potsdam was
not an option for Truman.
While he thought that by force of personality he could
control Stalin's designs on Eastern Europe after the war, he realized that there
was no way to preclude Soviet gains
in the Far East unless the war
ended
immediately.
' As he m a t u r e d i n t h e p r e s i d e n c y , Truman d i d d i s p l a y b r i l l i a n t
strategic
v i s i o n i n t h e f o r m u l a t i o n of t h e M a r s h a l l P l a n , t h e a i r l i f t
to break the Soviet
b l o c k a d e o f B e r l i n , and t h e i m p l e m e n t a t i o n of t h e p o l i c y of c o n t a i n m e n t .
29
The ironic tragedy of the decision to use the atomic bombs cannot be avoided.
In our postwar rebuilding of Japan,
we implemented a new constitution
and
democratic government, yet the ceremonial role of the Emperor has been retained
even unto the present time.
Like a stern, but loving parent disciplining a
rebellious child, Truman had obstinately insisted that the Japanese surrender his
way (unconditionally with no negotiations), only to cede to their wishes (to keep
the Emperor) after they had done so.
In order to get his way, Truman punished
the Japanese most severely, but without considering how their national psyche
made it virtually impossible for them to comply with his wishes.
The l e s s o n s f o r t o d a y a r e o b v i o u s .
Sun T z u ' s a n c i e n t words s t i l l
f o r modern mankind: "know y o u r e n e m i e s as you know y o u r s e l f . "
hold relevance
The U n i t e d S t a t e s
must intimately understand the cultures and motivations of both its friends and
its potential enemies.
Never again should we make catastrophic mistakes born
of ignorance and inexperience - the kind of mistakes that led to the use of the
atomic bomb: ultimate failure of diplomacy.
30
Endnotes
i.
Day One: 20; Cardinal Choices: 4
2.
A World Destroyed: 16
3.
The World Book Encyclopedia.
4.
Cardinal Choices: 7
5.
Cardinal Choices: I0
6.
A World Destroyed: 26-31
7.
Cardinal Choices: 12-13
8.
A World Destroyed: 48
9.
A World Destroyed: 51
10.
A World Destroyed: 71
Ii.
A World Destroyed: 71
12.
A World Destroyed: 85-89
13.
A World Destroyed: 91-98
14.
Day One: 115-124;
15.
A World Destroyed: 284
16.
A World Destroyed: 284
17.
The Semblance of Peace: 198
18.
The Semblance of Peace: 630
19.
The Semblance of Peace: 630
20.
The Semblance of Peace: 631-632
21.
A World Destroyed: 143-145
22.
A World Destroyed: 202-210;
Volume 14: 596.
A World Destroyed: 107-114
The Great Decision: 81-90;
Day One: 156-164
23.
Day One: 157
24.
Command Decisions: 497
25.
A World Destroyed: 210
31
26.
Command Decisions: 497
27.
A World Destroyed: 166-167
28.
Eagles Again@t The Sun: 541-542
29.
Truman: 400-401
30.
Command Decisions: 501-502
31.
Command Decisions: 504-506;
32.
Tr u man:
33.
Day One: 225-226
34.
The Semblance of Peace: 374-375
35.
Eagle Against The Sun: 555
36.
Day One: 297-299
37.
Day One: 298-300
The Semblance of Peace: 364-369
442-444
32
Biblioqravh¥
Amrine, Michael. The Great Decision.
G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1959.
Herken, Gregg. Cardinal Choices.
Oxford University Press, 1992.
Kegley, Charles W., Jr. and Wittkopf, Eugene R.
St. Martin's Press, 1991.
American Foreign Policy.
Kennedy, Paul. The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers.
Vintage Books, 1989.
Kistiakowsky, Vera. The World Book Encyclopedia.
World Book, Inc., 1992.
McCullough, David. Truman.
Simon and Schuster, 1992.
Morton, Louis. Command Decisions.
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1960.
Paret, Peter. Makers of Modern Strategy.
Princeton University Press, 1986.
Sherwin, Martin J. A World Destroyed.
Vintage Books, 1973.
Spector, Ronald H. Eagle Against the Sun.
Vintage Books, 1985.
Wheeler-Bennett, Sir John and Nicholls, Anthony.
St. Martin's Press, 1972.
Wyden, Peter H. Day One.
Simon and Schuster, 1984.
33
The Semblance of Peace.
NATIONAL DEFENSEUNIVERSITY
IMININIINNIIIII
3 0727 0 2 4 4 9 2 3 0