Download SITUATION REPORT: SPRING

SITUATION REPORT: SPRING-EARLY SUMMER, 1945
THE MILITARY SITUATION
Hitler's Germany surrendered on May 8, 1945; the Japanese Empire
stood alone against the combined forces of the Allies. Japan's
ability to wage war was declining fast. Her mighty air fleets were
now reduced to a few thousand kamikaze (suicide) pilots piloted by
young, inexperienced volunteers. The once formidable Imperial Navy
had been almost totally destroyed. The Army could still muster large
numbers of men, but its supplies of modern mechanized equipment were
growing scarce. Fuel for planes and vehicles was critically low. The
great industrial plants that might formerly have supplied these
shortages lay in ruins under the almost daily bombing raids of the
U.S. Air Force.
Three years of savagely fought island battles had brought the
American Armies to within 350 miles of Japan. Looming ahead was the
final battle — the invasion and conquest of the Japanese home
islands. American military intelligence estimates predicted a long
and bloody campaign against an enemy who had demonstrated on
countless battlefields that he would rather die fighting than
surrender.
But a new factor had entered the picture. On July 16, 1946, the
first atomic bomb was tested successfully at Alamagordo, New Mexico.
Possibly this awesome new weapon might shock the Japanese into
accepting the constantly repeated American demand: unconditional
surrender. American leaders differed regarding how the bomb should
be used, or even whether it should be used at all. These options
were being considered:
1. Use the bomb without warning, in such a way as to
achieve the maximum possible shock effect.
2. Use the bomb only after giving the Japanese a clear
warning and even demonstrating its power in some
spectacular but harmless way. For example, invite Japanese
observers to witness an atomic explosion on some desert
island, or perhaps in some uninhabited area of Japan. Then,
if Japan still refused to surrender, use the bomb against
her cities.
3. Instead of becoming the first nation to use this
dreadful new weapon, continue the naval blockade and
conventional bombing of Japan. American naval and air
operations were meeting little opposition from the Japanese
and were having a devastating effect on Japan's war making
capacity.
4. Continue the conventional bombing and blockade, then
invade Japan as soon as possible in order to force the
Japanese to accept our demand for unconditional surrender.
5. Find some way to convince the Japanese to end the war
without either the invasion or the A-bomb. Two such
possibilities existed. First, some American leaders argued
that we should promise to allow the Emperor to remain on
his throne. To the highly nationalistic Japanese this might
be acceptable as an "honorable" peace, avoiding the
disgrace of total surrender. Second, the Soviet Union had
secretly promised to enter the war against Japan as soon as
possible. This development alone might convince the
Japanese of their course's hopelessness. (Persons within
our government opposed both of these alternatives, as we
shall see.)
THE POLITICAL SITUATION
The end of the war in Europe confronted the Americans with many
urgent new problems, but two were most pressing. First, decisions
had to be made affecting the European nations recently liberated
from German occupation. The chief difficulty lay in Eastern Europe.
Throughout that area the Red Army had driven the Germans back and
replaced them as the occupying force. Despite earlier pledges to
allow free elections in these countries, the Russians were rapidly
installing communist-dominated governments. America's statesmen were
desperately searching for some means to compel the Soviets to behave
more reasonably. To some, the atomic bomb seemed to be the
instrument they needed.
Soviet-American relations were further complicated by the prospect
of the U.S.S.R. coming into the war against Japan. United States
leaders had been seeking this since at least 1943. Our information
was that a large and well-equipped Japanese Army was stationed in
Manchuria, facing the Soviet Far Eastern Army. If it were
transferred back to Japan, it would dangerously strengthen the
forces available to combat the planned American invasion. Therefore,
the U.S. had obtained a Soviet promise to attack the Japanese in
Manchuria within 90 days after the German surrender. The Soviet
pledge had been renewed at the Yalta Conference in February, 1945,
but since then American desire for Soviet assistance had cooled
considerably. The obvious weakening of Japan, the ability of the
U.S. Air Forces to bomb Japan with little resistance, our unopposed
naval blockade, and above all, the successful test of the atomic
bomb had persuaded our leaders that they could obtain a Japanese
surrender within a short time and without Soviet intervention. This
would have to be accomplished quickly, however; the deadline for the
Soviet declaration of war against Japan was August 8.