Download Rettus

Intimate Friends as Authority in Personal Identity
Despite the difficulty in defining what constitutes personal identity, personal
identity and its connection to friendship has a long history. Aristotle’s writings on
friendship viewed the highest level of friendship as a friendship in which our friend was a
mirror, a mirror in which we could, to be frank, admire our own virtue. More recent
work, such as Dean Cocking’s and Jeanette Kennett’s, contend that accepting aspects of
our friends’ interpretation of our identity is necessary to a deep friendship (1998). While
the friends in these examples play a role in forming our identity, friendship has an even
deeper role to play. Intimate friendships, I will argue, not only play a role in our
identities, but are necessary for any stable and authentic notion of personal identity.
Intimate friendship as a necessary condition for personal identity stems from a need for
an appropriate authority to set the boundaries of another’s identity, and to bring into
existence an objective recognition of that person’s identity. While there are many
definitions of intimacy, for the purposes of this paper, necessary to intimate friendship
are mutual and robust knowledge of the individual’s engaged in the friendship, mutual
love, and a desire, and ability, to be engaged with each other, which must include
physical proximity at least some of the time. As for romantic love, which is often
associated with intimacy, it is neither required nor excluded in an intimate friendship.
While the proposed characteristics are not sufficient for intimate friendship, these traits
put an intimate friend in the unique position of satisfying the above needs for personal
identity.
The constitution and existence of personal identity has often been contentious.
However, from a phenomenological standpoint, we recognize ourselves as having certain
1
Intimate Friends as Authority in Personal Identity
dispositions and traits. We view ourselves as being a separate entity from others, and this
separation constitutes more than a physical space or body. Our tendency towards
personal identity exhibits itself in our refusal at times to associate with certain thoughts
and actions, which emanate from us. That some thought, which we recognize as existing
in our mind, is in some way not our thought, just some random idea that doesn’t cohere
with how we view ourselves. Thus, my concern in this essay is not whether we take a
memory, fission, or psychological approach to identity. Instead my focus is how this
identity becomes constituted, and its relationship to intimate friendship.
The creation of our identities can be viewed as a combination of genetic factors,
social factors, and self-construction. As for the former, it is hard to deny that some of
what we like and dislike, and that some of our dispositions, are due in part of our
genetics. While my likes and dislikes are by no means the whole of my identity, they
constitute part of it. In its most simple form, for example, if you are allergic to
strawberries, your inability to eat them will have some bearing on your liking and
interaction with this item. Thus, even if you enjoy strawberries, and would endure
breaking out in order to eat them, this action tells us something about your characteristics.
Genetics, however, do not play the only role in our identity. The notion that we
are, at least, in part self-constructed results from what we choose to associate or
dissociate ourselves with. Harry Frankfurt, for example, views our sense of self, in this
fashion, as a series of higher order desires. Our higher order desires are those that we
choose to associate with, often denying our more immediate desires (1988). However, it
is difficult to deny that the choices we associate ourselves with result from our social
environment. If the social norm, for example, is one of intolerance towards sexual choice,
2
Intimate Friends as Authority in Personal Identity
your acceptance or rejection of this norm is a noted characteristic of your identity. At the
same time, were we to live in a society in which sexual choice was fluid and not an area
of any focus we would lack anything to associate or dissociate with because it is not a
focal point of choice, anymore than pepperoni or sausage is a noted choice to a nonvegetarian.
Beyond our inability always control the choices we are offered, our identity also
relies on the actions and thoughts we are willing to take responsibility for. Meir DanCohen explains that there is often a tension between what we think we are responsible
for, and what others think we are responsible for (2006). So for example, if you have a
migraine headache and are short with one of your students, you might not associate those
actions as your own, but instead as the result of your migraine. However, despite our
desire to create our own boundaries, as Dan-Cohen explains, it is a process of
negotiation.
In illustrating this negotiation, Dan-Cohen examines a criminal trial. The
prosecution has an interest in drawing the boundary of responsibility widely, while the
defendant has an interest in drawing the boundary of responsibility narrowly. This,
however, leaves open the potential for conflict in terms identity. Individuals will not
always agree on the boundaries of identity. In which case, according to Dan-Cohen,
incompatible versions of one’s identity persist with no clear determining authority. This
view coheres with the way in which we sometimes view ourselves. Our speech acts often
construe the notion that we are different persons in different environments. Yet, in
tension with this idea of multiple selves is the idea of a “real self.” The notion of a “real
self” exhibits itself in our declarations or desires to hide or expose our “real selves.” We
3
Intimate Friends as Authority in Personal Identity
also communicate the belief that someone close to us knows the “real us.” This notion of
a “real self” sometimes motivates the acceptance of psychopharmaceuticals. As noted by
Neil Levy in “Enhancing Authenticity,” taking certain drugs may afford us the
opportunity to voluntarily identify with different ways of being that might not be possible
without these drugs (2011). Levy in his paper, posits that the voluntary identification is
what constitutes the authentic self. Thus, Dan-Cohen’s understanding of identity and the
theory posited by Levy create incompatible notions of identity. Do we have multiple
identities, or is there an authentic or real self?
The latter cases, cases where one admits multiple ways of being in relation to
one’s environments, can be interpreted as expressing how different facets of our
personality are environmentally dependent. Thus, by denying a literal interpret of a
different identity manifesting itself in different environments, we avoid a chasm in selfunderstanding. The former case, however, where there is conflict over the boundary of
identity, can be viewed as an identity in limbo, instead of multiple identities, with each
identity having no more weight than the other. The refusal of each party to accept the
others’ version creates a difficulty for a theory of multiple identities. The defendant and
prosecutor do not agree that there are two different identities at play. Instead each thinks
the other is mistaken, which results from desires not necessarily concerned with the truth
of an identity. The prosecutor, in wanting to win the case, has a vested interest in
drawing the defendant’s identity in a particular way, while the defendant, in wanting to
avoid punishment, has an interest in rejecting the picture. In each case, we have no
reason to give either party the authority to claim that she has the true understanding of the
identity in question.
4
Intimate Friends as Authority in Personal Identity
Who can stand as the authority for drawing the boundary of an identity stands at
the heart of the issue. Lack of authority might lead one to think that we need world
agreement in order to actualize any identity. However, if world agreement is necessary,
instead of finding consensus, we are more likely to find ourselves with a finitely large
number of identities, with no one identity being any more accurate than any other, or an
identity that will always be in limbo. Neither of these possibilities is very appealing. The
former leaves us in a situation in which our own understanding of ourselves, and the
understanding of our close companions, holds no more weight than someone who barely
knows us, while the latter leaves us in a situation in which there is no possibility for
identity at all.
We can, however, resolve this dilemma if we can find an appropriate authority to
determine where the boundary of any particular identity lies. Because we need the “buy
in” of the person whose identity is in question, this authority will need the acceptance of
the person whose identity is in question. At the same time, the standards for this
authority must go beyond this acceptance. Imagine John is on trial for murder. Because
of certain circumstances, say a drug binge the night before, he denies those actions as
being his own. We can also imagine that Jane is in a similar situation. In such a case, it
benefits Jane to view John as not responsible for his actions so that she too can refuse to
identity with similar actions.
This, however, would be unsatisfactory. Jane might know nothing else about
John, setting up a situation in which the identity Jane confers upon John lacks any real
connection to John, except as a way of conferring her own desired identity. Nevertheless,
this situation can be averted by requiring that an authority’s acknowledgement of an
5
Intimate Friends as Authority in Personal Identity
identity result from knowledge of the other person, and a commitment to recognizing this
reality as being separate from her own desires. In return, the person who accepts the
other’s view of herself must have reason to believe that this person also desires to know
the truth of who she is.
Thus, our criterion for what constitutes an identity are: Agreement between an
authority and the person whose identity is in question; an authority with enough
knowledge of the other to make an appropriate assessment of the identity in question; the
authority’s interest must not be the result of her desires for certain characteristics, but
instead the result of her desire to know the truth. An intimate friend is the only one who
would find herself in a situation in order to gain such a robust knowledge of the other
person. While others might know much about some person, only an intimate friend will
be privy to thoughts, intentions, desires, associations, self-deceptions, actions, of her
intimate. Anyone who is not an intimate friend will lack the time, proximity, trust, or
types of engagements in which to gain this kind of knowledge. Additionally, the intimate
friend will also be privy to her intimate’s own lack of self-knowledge, which we none of
us are completely aware of.
While it is true that the intimate has a vested interest in her friend, this interest is
not an interest in creating a desired identity, but in knowing the actual identity of her
intimate. In loving her friend, she is required to love who her friend is, and not who she
wants her friend to be. If she merely loves what she wants her friend to be, then her friend
becomes irrelevant to the relationship. The only contribution her friend brings to the
creation of how her identity is viewed is that which her friend can tolerate in terms of
self-deception. This picture presents something more like imaginary friendship than
6
Intimate Friends as Authority in Personal Identity
intimate friendship.
Presenting the intimate friend with such an authority does not mean that whatever
the intimate views as the identity of her friend is automatically accepted as the case.
Instead we need to view the agreed upon identity as a negotiation in which each intimate
takes into consideration the other’s views. While you might not recognize some trait
about yourself, you trust that your intimate has an interest in knowing who you really are,
not who she wants you be. By the same token, your intimate, in wanting to know you,
must take into consideration how you view yourself, as part of her judgment will be
based on what you provide as your intentions, desires, and your claims of association.
Eventually some mutually agreed upon identity will come to pass, an agreement, which is
necessary to the continuation of an intimate friendship. A failure to agree presents a
situation in which the intimate loves a person that the intimate’s friend does not
acknowledge as constituting her identity. Each intimate can then ask in what sense a
mutual love can exist, as one individual does not identify with whom the love is bestowed
upon, and that same individual’s love for the other does not emanate from an identity her
intimate acknowledges.
Despite the intimate friend as an authority in the negotiation of personal identity,
identity will still likely conform to the social norms of boundaries for identity. Of course,
the intimate friend might reject those norms, and this is OK. Regardless, it is important
to recognize that outside of an intimate friend there is no fact of the matter regarding
personal identity beyond a conjunction of the social, the genetic, and the negotiation
between the intimate friends. One’s willingness to identity with some set of
characteristics bears on those characteristics. Thus, even if there were some matter of the
7
Intimate Friends as Authority in Personal Identity
fact regarding the boundaries, identification outside of the boundary will have some
influence on identity.
The role of the intimate as an appropriate source of authority may be challenged
on the basis of the intimates’ interest in each other. Individuals often have desires to
identify with desires, actions, etc. that are not their own, and an intimate friend could also
desire these hoped for characteristics to be part of her friend’s identity. If we accept this,
then personal identity becomes nothing more than a negotiation of mutual desire.
However, there are two ways in which to deal with such a possibility. The first is to
recognize how desires, even those which are unfulfilled, bear on the kind of person you
are. Perhaps you desire to be a detail oriented person, but you fail at this task in
actuality. There is still a sense in which a desire to associate with some quality or other,
whether or not it is fulfilled, is itself a characteristic. Part of who we all are is constituted
by what we aim for, even if we cannot achieve it. Secondly, we generally can, if we
make an effort not to be deceived, know the difference between wishing things were a
certain way and having them be that way in actuality. While this paper does not go into
detail regarding what is necessary for love, that we are committed to knowing the other
person beyond our desires is necessary for our love to consist something more than a
projection on an imagined entity.
The result of negotiation for a mutually acknowledged identity creates a situation
in which one’s identity can be both stabilized, and yet still be dynamic. Its stability
results from an acknowledgement of a “real us,” removing our identity from limbo. At
the same time, because our intimate has a vested interest in knowing us, she has a vested
interest in being fluid in her conception of us, allowing it to grow and change as we grow
8
Intimate Friends as Authority in Personal Identity
and change. This fluidity is especially important in escaping Sartre’s concern
surrounding a false set identity brought about by the ego. Sartre’s concern is that once an
ego is fixed in that it identifies as something or other, the person alienates herself from
possibilities that a person outside of that particular role can see as a possibility. However,
Adrian Mirvish, in his interpretation of Sartre’s writings on friendship as explored in
“Notebooks for an ethics,” argues that an authentic friendship, which an intimate
friendship can be considered, aides us in escaping this predicament (2002).
According to Mirvish’s interpretation, we are able to escape this predicament because the
relationship plays two roles. The first role is the objectivity from a third-party sense that
one friend can give to the other’s existence, and vice versa. This is a result of Sartre’s
belief that we cannot be our own foundation. Whether or not we reject Sartre’s belief
regarding the existence or our identity, at least from a phenomenal stand-point there is a
sense in which we need others to acknowledge us to have a sense of being. While
discussion of this is beyond the scope of this paper for now, it helps explain our need to
receive feedback and recognition from others in regards to our own being. In addition,
Sartre’s concerns about a static and inauthentic ego can be captured in the frustration we
often experience when others box us into a static identity where welack any room for
change or growth.
The way in which this situation is avoided, according to Mirvish, is that one’s authentic
friend loves one as an “independent, irreducible being in her own right” (196). She is
willing to accept that her friend can behave in unexpected ways. Each intimate avoids
imposing constraints and categories on the other, instead listening and reacting to the
other in terms of the others’ “projects, aspirations, and goals” (202).
9
Intimate Friends as Authority in Personal Identity
In conclusion, the importance of understanding the nature and relationship
between intimate friendship and personal identity paves the way for understanding these
relationships as vital to the existence of self. Moreover, understanding of this structure
elucidates the pitfalls and dangers of attempting to satisfy our needs for identity outside
of something like an intimate friendship. The growing use of social networking sites for a
sense of self is something that can more easily be examined against the back drop of an
identity secured by an intimate friendship.
10
Intimate Friends as Authority in Personal Identity
References
Cocking, D. and Kennett, J. (1998). “Friendship and the Self,” Ethics, 108, pp. 502-527.
Dan-Cohen, M. (2006). “Socializing Harry,” in Taking ourselves seriously and getting it
right, ed. Debra Satz. Stanford University Press.
Frankfurt, H. (1988). The Importance of what we care about. Cambridge University
Press.
Levy, N. (2011). “Enhancing Authenticity,” Journal of Applied Philosophy,
(DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-5930.2011.00532.x )
Mirvish, A. (2002). “Sartre on the Ego, Friendship and Conflict,” Continental Philosophy
Review, 35, 185-205.
11