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“In this enfeebled condition, without men, or ships, or ordnance, or resources
placed at its disposal, the department was called upon to establish and enforce the most
extensive blockade that was ever undertaken to be effectually maintained by any
nation.1” With those words Secretary of the Navy, Gideon Welles, described the
formidable challenge that faced the Union Navy on April 19th, 1861 when President
Lincoln called for a blockade of the entire southern coastline in an attempt to strangle the
Confederacy by cutting it off from the supplies it desperately needed to fight the Civil
War. When Lincoln called for the blockade, the Navy had only 12 ships in its home
waters and had lost 322 of its naval officers to the Confederacy. Even after the Navy
successfully recalled the seventy percent of its forces on deployed elsewhere back to
home waters it could only count on 42 sea-worthy ships and 7,600 men to enforce the
blockade.2
Over the next four years the Union Navy was able to expand to a fighting force of
over 600 ships and 51,500 men who effectively blockaded the south and crippled the
South economically long before the war could be officially won.3 This paper hopes to
examine the changes brought on by the demands of such an extensive blockade. What
changes did the Navy make with its sailors, with its organization, with its ship
acquisition, and with its technology in order to meet the demands of the blockade?
Would these changes help to carry the navy into the 20th century? By examining a
number of these changes, answers to these questions will become evident.
Gideon Welles, “Annual Report of the Secretary of the Navy,” 38 Cong., 2 sess., H.Rep., exdoc.1
(December 5, 1864 ), III.
2
Dennis J. Ringle, Life in Mr. Lincoln’s Navy (Annapolis MD: Naval Institute Press, 1998) 9.
3
Ringle, 145.
1
1
Most of the literature on the Union navy during the Civil War is about operations,
with a much smaller amount of literature on the ships themselves, and the political and
strategic aspects of the war. Very little scholarly work has been done on the changes that
were caused by the war and the blockade. Most work like Mindell’s and Roberts tends to
focus more on the ironclad aspect of the Union navy and how that relates to the public
economy. Ringle’s work on the common sailor’s life during the war did discuss some
changes caused by the war but they were focused towards the impacts on sailors and not
the department as a whole. However Secretary Welles’ annual reports to Congress are
filled with a wealth of information on how the Navy Department met and responded to
the demands of the blockade. This paper has only briefly scratched the service of the
information available and there is certainly a lot of interesting research that could still be
done on the Union Navy and the changes caused by the effects of the blockade.
The demands of the blockade were responsible for accelerating changes already
underway in the day to day activities of the naval seamen. Prior to the war, efforts were
begun to improve the every day life of a sailor aboard the naval ship. There was a
growing religious movement that had some congressional backing, which pushed to see
the end of both lashing sailors as a punishment and the handing out of the grog ration to
sailors at sea. Grog was a mix of alcohol and water given to sailors in the belief that it
increased their fighting spirit. The movement had previously been thwarted in Congress
when they tried to pass legislation on the issue however with the removal of the Southern
representatives at the start of the war, the Republican majority gained the power to enact
the changes. Thus the life of a sailor began to change for the better thanks in part to the
indirect impact of the Civil War.
2
Three other technological innovations that came about thanks to the war, helped
with the every day comforts of life at sea. One seemingly minor, but surprisingly
effective change was the institution of a new seamen’s cap.
The caps made of wool
were a vast improvement over the prior straw hats that were constantly falling apart.
They were more comfortable, durable, and protective. Many sailors decorated them with
embroidery or their names.4 This change would carry over after the war.
Another innovation that improved every day life was the installation of the
flushing toilet on board the new ironclad ships. On the original sailing ships sailors went
to the bathroom in holes near the front of the ship called the “head,” which dumped their
waste directly into the sea. The problem with the Ironclad ships was that they were to
low to the water for a head to be installed. So the flushing toilet was added for the
comfort of the sailor. These were eventually added to many other ships, as more and
more were converted to become ironclads.
A final improvement to every day life aboard warships was fresh water. With the
new steam engines, came the ability to purify salt water into freshwater. Ships no longer
had to carry all their freshwater with them on voyages. Not only did this expand a ships
range but it also helped to improve their overall health. While unknown at the time, the
desalinization process also killed off the harmful microbes and bacteria, which caused
disease. The navy recognized the improved health of sailors’ who drank water purified
by the steam engines and ordered that all ships were to get their water from steam engine
purification systems.5 This improvement obviously continued after the war and the direct
effect greatly improved sailors’ health.
4
5
Ringle, 31.
Rignle, 119.
3
Sailors’ living conditions were positively changed for the better by the operational
demands of blockade duty, helping to prepare the navy for future years. Grog rations and
whipping were abolished. New hats were issued and flushing toilets placed on ships.
The steam engine provided clean water to sailors for the first time. All of these
innovations helped to modernize how the navy treated and cared for the backbone and
core of its strength, the sailors.
With the increase in naval size came a corresponding increase in navy operational
organizations. The demands of the blockade forced the Navy Department into a betterorganized operation. Some of the improvements included a better system of re-supplying
ships, improved recruiting, new support offices, and personnel changes. All of these
improvements were instrumental in helping the navy to prepare for the 20th century.
The first organizational change was the improvement of the re-supply system.
With Lincoln’s blockade order, came the new challenge of determining how to supply
ships without having them constantly return to port for re-supply. Secretary Welles
expressed the problem to Congress when he said, “It would be inexpedient and attended
with much loss of time, as well as great additional expense, to compel the steamers when
short of fuel to leave their stations and proceed to the nearest depot, distant in most cases
several hundred miles, to obtain a supply.”6 The solution was to create and deploy
supply ships that would base out of Union controlled ports.
These supply ships would routinely travel from their home ports to each ship on
their circuit and then back again. They would replenish stores for each blockading ship
and squadron as they passed both going away and returning to the home port. That way
Gideon Welles, “Annual Report of the Secretary of the Navy,” 37 Cong., 2 sess., Sen., exdoc.1
(December 3, 1861) 91.
6
4
each blockading ship and squadron could stay out on blockade for much longer periods of
time. The supply ships would bring fuel, fresh meat, ice, vegetables, other foods, mail,
spare parts, and replacement sailors on their outgoing voyages. When the ships reached
the end of the line they would return to the homeport stopping again this time to pick up
sick or wounded sailors and mail.7 This supply system not only kept the ships well
supplied but also helped to maintain sailors health with fresh foods as well as keep up
morale with regular mail delivery. This shift in operational focus to utilize supply ships
would help to make the US Navy a more far reaching military force then it was ever
capable of before.
Another area that saw organizational improvement thanks to the demands of the
blockade was recruiting. Initially at the start of the war recruitment was not a problem.
Secretary Welles was so impressed that he said, “At no period of our history has the
naval force had so great and rapid an increase, and never have our seamen come forward
with more alacrity and zeal to serve the country.”8 It had seemed that the three recruiters
in the six major cities of the nation had done an admirable job.9 However as the war
effort threatened to bog down and more ships were added to the fleet manpower
shortages occurred. New efforts were necessary to keep up with the demand of the
growing wartime navy.
The navy used six induction stations along the Atlantic seaboard as the centers of
their recruitment. Recruits were paid for their travels to the stations and there they signed
the enlistment papers that admitted them to the navy. These were also used as dispatch
7
Ringle, 65.
Gideon Welles, “Annual Report of the Secretary of the Navy,” (December 3, 1861) 93.
9
Gideon Welles, “Annual Report of the Secretary of the Navy,” 36 Cong., 1 sess., Sen., exdoc.2
(December 2, 1859) 1198.
8
5
stations to assign recruits throughout the navy. Civilian contractors were paid to supply
seamen and newspaper ads and posters were also used to encourage recruitment. With all
these efforts more men were still needed. The Navy turned to accept African Americans
well before the army did, as well as foreigners, the Union army, and captured
confederates who had taken an oath making them galvanized Yankees. Even with all of
these new sources the navy was still forced to take some ships off the blockade and send
them to Northern ports to help in recruiting efforts.10 The fact that the navy was still able
to maintain a sufficient fighting force throughout the war testifies to the success of this
combination of sources that helped to provide ample manpower to the navy. Clearly the
blockade forced the navy to drastically increase its efforts in recruitment.
A third area of organizational improvement in the navy was the creation of new
supporting offices. One such office was the hydrographic office. This operational
support function was responsible for bringing together and maintaining all the charts,
sailing directions and nautical books.11 The blockade had demonstrated a need for
uniformed charts. The need for surveyors to survey large sections of the American
coastline was also clear. Another creation was the permanent commission to advise the
department on questions of science and art which was created on February 11, 1863. The
commission’s role was to appraise new inventions for navy use because the Navy was
trying to design many new technological inventions for use on its ships.12 A final
organizational improvement was the creation of the General Inspectors office. This
10
Ringle, chapter 2 and 3.
Gideon Welles, “Annual Report of the Secretary of the Navy,” 39 Cong., 2 sess., H.Rep., exdoc.1
(December 3, 1866).
12
Nathan Reingold, “Science in the Civil War: The Permanent Commission of the Navy Department,”
The History of Science Society, Vol. 49, No. 3. (Sep., 1958), 307-318.
11
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office was charged with the task of inspecting ironclads under construction to assure that
the “contractors did not deviate from the specifications and that they used only good
materials and workmanship.”13 Thus the demands of the blockade led to the creation of a
number of new organizational bodies in the navy.
Finally, the blockade challenges forced the navy to make organizational changes
in certain personnel areas. The first of which was the Marine Corp. With the increase in
the number of ships came a demand for Marines to serve on these ships as well as
officers to command them. Secretary Welles said, “It became necessary to enlarge the
Marine Corp, in order that it should correspond in some degree with the general increase
of other branches of the service.”14
Corresponding with this change was a change in the
rank of the Marine Corps Commandant from colonel to brigadier general. This was also
in response to the enlargement of the Army and the need to give the Commandant power
appropriate with his position of command.15 Thus the Marine Corps strength and
leadership was strengthened as a result of the demands of the blockade.
A second personnel change came with the increased demand for competent steam
engineers and steam engineer training for the commanding officers of the line. Secretary
Welles asked Congress to allow midshipmen to also be taught how to run a steam engine
as part of their course of studies. He said, “…as preparatory to the future of the navy, to
teach the midshipmen steam-engineering, as applied to running the engine.” 16 Each
steam and sail warship had two sets of officers. One for the steam engines and one set to
run the ship. However each could not at the tie perform the functions of the others job.
13
William H. Roberts, Civil War Ironclads: The U.S. Navy and Industrial Mobilization (Baltimore, MD:
Johns Hopkins University Press, 2002),39.
14
Gideon Welles, “Annual Report of the Secretary of the Navy,” (December 3, 1861) 95.
15
Gideon Welles, “Annual Report of the Secretary of the Navy,” (December 3, 1866).
16
Gideon Welles, “Annual Report of the Secretary of the Navy,” (December 5, 1864 ) XXXVII.
7
This change allowed the navy to build more redundancy into its chain of command and it
helped move the navy towards a fully steam powered fleet.
A third personnel change to come about as a direct result of the demands of the
blockade were rewards for heroic measures. Prior to the war, navy men could only
expect to receive a Certificate of Merit and little else if they performed a heroic action
during combat. The navy recognized that extra incentives for heroic deeds during combat
would help to encourage better morale and motivate the troops to perform well in
combat. On December 21, 1861 President Lincoln signed the bill authorizing the navy to
award the Medal of Honor. They further strengthened the award on April 16, 1862 by
adding a hundred dollar payment and a promotion to the award.17 It was hoped that these
awards would work to keep the heroic sailors in the navy and that they might provide
examples of valor to other sailors. The demands of the blockade helped to create the
most prestigious honor in the American military.
A final personnel change was the addition of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy
and three new bureaus because of the additional demands caused by the expanding navy.
The Assistant Secretary of the Navy position was created first in 1861 to take the
responsibility for civilian personnel and shore facilities away from Secretary Welles and
let him concentrate more fully on the blockade and conduct of operations. The first man
to hold this position was Gustavus Fox.18 Then on July 5, 1862 Congress created the
bureaus of navigation, steam engineering, and equipment to meet the increased
challenges and demands in these three functional support areas. 19 For example the bureau
17
Ringle, 97.
David A. Mindell, War, Technology, and Experience aboard the USS Monitor, (Baltimore, MD: Johns
Hopkins University Press, 2000), 1.
19
Gideon Welles, “Annual Report of the Secretary of the Navy,” (December 3, 1866).
18
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of steam engineering was added because more ships were using steam engines and a new
office was necessary to deal with the unique supply and maintenance problems associated
with steam usage. As a result, additional positions were added to the navy department as
a response to the growing demands of the navy’s expansion to meet the unique needs of
the blockade and the direct impacts on the Navy’s structure and functions.
The navy was forced to adjust the way it handled its own organization in response
to the demands of the blockade. They created a new system of re-supply designed with
the needs of the blockade in mind. They increased their recruiting and turned to new and
varied sources of sailors. The navy opened new offices in technical and marine areas that
saw large increases and demands during the war such as steam engineering and maritime
mapping. Organization of personnel changed in the Marine Corps, in steam engineering,
with the recognition of heroic deeds, and the creation of the assistant secretary of the
navy and three new bureau chief positions. Organizationally, the navy department was
expanding its services to prepare itself for future challenges on the high seas.
While the naval department itself underwent organizational and sailor comfort
changes the most significant change to come about as a result of the demands of the
blockade was in the fleet itself. The blockade forced the navy to change how it acquired,
and upgraded its ships as well as changed the types of ships it needed. The demands of
the blockade exposed the shortcomings, and in some cases the flaws of old systems. It
also battle tested new ways of operating and doing battle and helped the Navy lay the
groundwork for the needs of years to come.
One of the most significant changes to come about because of the demands of the
blockade was ship acquisition for the navy. Secretary Welles saw the need to increase
9
the navy size and said, “The attention of this department was turned to the subject of
….the adoption of measures for the enlargement of the navy.”20 So the navy instituted a
program that combined construction, purchasing, and contracting that allowed it to
greatly expand the fleet in a short order. In a little more then a year and half after
Lincoln’s inauguration the navy was added 353 ships to the Union fleet. 136 ships were
purchased in 1862 alone with another 123 constructed during the same period.21 Other
ships were contracted out for construction or were captured from the confederacy. One
of the reasons why the navy struggled to have enough sailors to fill all of the ships was
because they were acquiring them so fast. What many saw as the greatest problem the
navy had to overcome at the start of the war quickly became an afterthought as the Navy
met the challenge with an aggressive and effective acquisition and expansion program.
Another benefit that came out of the demands of the blockade was the
modernizing of the ships already in the fleet. Prior to the war most of sailing ships were
25-30 years old and costing the country thousands of dollars in upkeep costs each year
just to keep them at fighting levels.22 The war demands mandated that the older ships be
repaired and upgraded during the war. Some upgrades were easy to make, such as the
use of gray camouflage paint on naval ships or the switch from hemp rope to wiring.
Both of these improvements were battle tested and put into use during the years of the
blockade.23 However, as discussed, the most significant upgrade was the large scale
implementation of the steam engine, which was one of the major technological changes
to occur during the war. Prior to the war, the navy saw steam-power as only “auxiliary to
Gideon Welles, “Annual Report of the Secretary of the Navy,” 37 Cong., 3 sess., H.Rep., exdoc.1
(December 1, 1862 ), 28.
21
Gideon Welles, “Annual Report of the Secretary of the Navy,” (December 1, 1862 ), 26-27.
22
Gideon Welles, “Annual Report of the Secretary of the Navy,” (December 2, 1859) 1224.
23
Gideon Welles, “Annual Report of the Secretary of the Navy,” (December 3, 1866).
20
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sails”. In the years prior to the war some limited steam ships were purchased. However
in 1859 the Secretary of the Navy was debating with Congress over acquiring additional
funding to purchase more steam-powered ships for the navy. 24 Congress had also not
appropriated enough money to adequately build and supply machine shops capable of
doing full repair work on steam engines at most of the naval yards. Only Washington’s
naval yard had that capability. Prior to the war steam power was not considered
important enough to make it a funding or operational priority.
One reason why steam was not made a priority in the pre-blockade navy was that
ships were built with firepower in mind, as opposed to speed. The primary ships of the
navy were built to be, “cruisers on foreign stations as flag-ships.”25 It was not until the
demands of the blockade, and more specifically the need to be able to patrol coastal
areas, rivers, and bays, and respond quickly that exposed the need for steam powered
ships of lighter draft. Another benefit to steam was that it gave the navy the ability to no
longer be fully dependent on wind. As Secretary Welles said in his report to Congress,
“Each succeeding year of this war has produced from foreign ship yards steamers of
greater speed to run the blockade, and the reliable preventive of this illicit trade must be
found in vessels of increased steam-power.”26 Steam gave the navy’s ships the speed
necessary to catch most rebel blockade runners. Thus the benefits of steam were brought
to light in part because of the very nature of the blockade and the challenges of
enforcement.
The demands of the blockade demonstrated the positives of steam usage but it
also gave the navy a chance to experiment with increasingly more complex steam
Gideon Welles, “Annual Report of the Secretary of the Navy,” (December 2, 1859).
Gideon Welles, “Annual Report of the Secretary of the Navy,” (December 5, 1864 ) XXV.
26
Gideon Welles, “Annual Report of the Secretary of the Navy,” (December 5, 1864 ) XXVII.
24
25
11
engines. Using the multitude of designs found through out the nation as well as designs
from foreign countries that were captured in rebel blockade runners, the steam bureau
tested a plethora of different engine and drive combinations. Secretary Welles described
the process as such, “So far as the exigencies of the war would permit, the different types
of machinery have been submitted to careful experiment to ascertain their relative
merits.” The navy was also able to test a variety of coals and even experiment with
petroleum as a means of fueling the steam engines. 27 Thus the benefits of steam could be
fully examined thanks in large part to the demands and direct results of the blockade
operations. The navy’s shift towards steam power opened the door for another new
technological change, the Ironclad.
The most recognized change to the U.S. Navy to come out of the Civil War was
the introduction of the ironclad vessel to the navy’s inventory of ships. Its importance
was recognized early in the war as evidenced by Secretary Welles who said, “The
attention of this department was turned to the subject of ironclad vessels immediately
after the commencement of hostilities.”28 Not only did the ironclad change the way that
the navy fought but it also changed the way in which the navy built ships.
The navy department recognized very early in the war that the Confederacy would
try and create ironclad ships as a way of breaking the blockade. Secretary Welles said on
this subject, “the department had heard with great solicitude of the progress which the
insurgents had made in armoring and equipping the large war steamer Merrimack.”29
With this rebel construction as their motivation it took the Union navy only six months
from the start of the war to recognize the need for iron ships, gain authority and money to
Gideon Welles, “Annual Report of the Secretary of the Navy,” (December 5, 1864 ) XXIX.
Gideon Welles, “Annual Report of the Secretary of the Navy,” (December 1, 1862 ), 28.
29
Gideon Welles, “Annual Report of the Secretary of the Navy,” (December 1, 1862 ), 29.
27
28
12
build them, obtain and evaluate proposals, and sign contracts to have them be built.30
The navy “contracted for the construction of three iron-clad ships of different models.”31
These three ships were built primarily for defensive reasons in order to counter the
confederacies construction of ironclads. However once the Monitor, the first of three
ironclads ordered, met the Merrimac in battle and proved to be a successful design, the
navy began to investigate how to use ironclads in an offensive manner.
Writing to Congress in 1863 Secretary Welles said, “The Monitor class of
armored ships,… have shown themselves to be efficient and serviceable in offensive
operations.”32 The most important offensive benefit that the ironclads brought to the war
was their protective layer which kept both the ship and sailors safe. Thus the navy, after
the approval of the Senate on February 7, 1862, set out to construct twenty more
ironclads. Secretary Welles argued the ship’s positive characteristics in river warfare
when he said, “in order to afford all possible protection to the gallant men who encounter
these dangers, the department considered it a duty to provide armored vessels of light
draught for their security.”33 Ironclads would be used throughout the war to attack
various coastal and river forts with varying degrees of success.
The demands for ironclads exposed the deficiencies in the navy’s ship
construction program. Prior to the war ship construction was done almost entirely under
naval control since wooden sailing ships were not too difficult to construct. Ships were
built in shipyards at navy facilities. Even when shipyards received the same plans
differences in supply and engineering could turn out different products from each naval
30
Roberts, 10.
Gideon Welles, “Annual Report of the Secretary of the Navy,” (December 3, 1861) 16.
32
Gideon Welles, “Annual Report of the Secretary of the Navy,” 38 Cong., 1 sess., H.Rep., exdoc.1
(December 7, 1863 ), XII.
33
Gideon Welles, “Annual Report of the Secretary of the Navy,” (December 5, 1864 ) XXVI.
31
13
yard. Ships were also usually built in ones or twos and designed with feedback from the
line officers who used them.34 The complexities of both the steam engine and the
ironclad meant that the navy was forced to look outside of the naval yards in order to
construct them.
Even before the war the navy had been contracting out most work on steam
engines since they did not have the facilities or expertise to do it themselves in the naval
shipyards. The contracting process was expanded with the ironclad project from just the
steam engines to include the whole boat. This process however had its drawbacks.
Secretary Welles explained of ironclad construction, “The government itself is
unprepared to execute any such work, having no suitable yard and establishment, and is
consequently wholly in the hands of private parties, to demand what they think proper,
and prescribe their own terms.”35 Contractors could not guarantee on time delivery nor
was their product always of the highest quality. Secretary Welles alluded to these
problems when he wrote about the construction difficulties of the Monitor, “but there was
delay in consequence of the difficulties incident to an undertaking of such novelty and
magnitude,”36 It took the navy most of the civil war to figure out how to best use the
contractor process but they were able to set up a contract system that benefited both sides.
The demands of the blockade played an important role in forcing the navy to
change many aspects of how it dealt with the ships that made up its fleet. The navy was
able to rapidly increase the number of ships in service. This allowed for the navy to
update many of the older ships in the fleet. One upgrade was the steam engine which
increased the speed of ships. The war provided a practical testing ground for the navy to
34
Roberts, 25.
Gideon Welles, “Annual Report of the Secretary of the Navy,” (December 7, 1863 ), XVI.
36
Gideon Welles, “Annual Report of the Secretary of the Navy,” (December 1, 1862 ), 29.
35
14
find the best combinations of steam technology while also opening the door for ironclad
ships. The ironclad was originally intended to be a defensive ship but it also proved its
worth as an offensive platform. Finally, the construction demands of the new ironclads
exposed weaknesses in the ship construction system giving the government a chance to
correct the problems. All of these aspects helped to prepare the navy for a new future in
warfare where iron ship would meet iron ship.
Lincoln’s call for a blockade of the entire southern coastline led to a radical
change in the very nature of the United States Navy. Changes occurred on the level of
the common seamen. Whether through technological improvements, updating old
policies, or improving existing conditions, sailors’ lives aboard ships had been greatly
improved. Organizationally, the navy department was forced to expand to meet
demands. The blockade created new problems in re-supply, recruiting, and steam
engineering that had to be met. On the personnel level the navy department updated the
Marine Corps, its steam engineering training, its recognition of heroic deeds, and created
new bureau chiefs and an Assistant to the Secretary of Navy to help keep the department
organized and motivated. On the level of its ships the Navy department also saw changes
caused by the blockades demands. Secretary Welles described it well when he said, “The
thorough transformation which has taken place in the character of naval warfare is the
result of a change not less complete in the character and structure of naval vessels.”37
Through rapid ship expansion, new upgrades like steam engines allowed for the navy to
modernize and find the optimal combinations for maximum speed and firepower. The
ironclad also changed the face of the U.S. Navy. The civil war gave this new technology
a chance to prove its versatility and gave the navy department a chance to start preparing
37
Gideon Welles, “Annual Report of the Secretary of the Navy,” (December 7, 1863 ), XII.
15
for there more permanent use in years to come. Whether it was men, ships, or technology
the navy department was able to adjust, learn, and adapt. Lincoln asked for the
impossible and the navy came through helping to do its vital part in maintaining the
United States of America.
16
Bibliography
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Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2000.
Reingold, Nathan. “Science in the Civil War: The Permanent Commission of the Navy
Department,” The History of Science Society, Vol. 49, No. 3. September, 1958.
Ringle, Dennis J. Life in Mr. Lincoln’s Navy. Annapolis MD: Naval Institute Press,
1998.
Roberts, William H. Civil War Ironclads: The U.S. Navy and Industrial Mobilization.
Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2002.
Welles, Gideon. “Annual Report of the Secretary of the Navy,” 36 Congress, 1 session,
Senate, executive document 2, December 2, 1859.
Welles, Gideon. “Annual Report of the Secretary of the Navy,” 37 Congress, 2 session,
Senate, executive document 1, December 3, 1861.
Welles, Gideon. “Annual Report of the Secretary of the Navy,” 37 Congress, 3 session,
House of Representatives, executive document 1, December 1, 1862.
Welles, Gideon. “Annual Report of the Secretary of the Navy,” 38 Congress, 1 session,
House of Representatives, executive document 1, December 7, 1863.
Welles, Gideon. “Annual Report of the Secretary of the Navy,” 38 Congress, 2 session,
House of Representatives, executive document 1, December 5, 1864.
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House of Representatives, executive document 1, December 3, 1866.
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