Intro to Metaphysics
... Let us consider some very basic feature of our being. We sit for instance on a chair. We can see the chair, we can touch it, and the other senses can as well perceive of the chair. Now these perceptions all occur within our brain, where the input data of the sensory organs come together, and form an ...
... Let us consider some very basic feature of our being. We sit for instance on a chair. We can see the chair, we can touch it, and the other senses can as well perceive of the chair. Now these perceptions all occur within our brain, where the input data of the sensory organs come together, and form an ...
Dualism
... You will have two take-home writing exercises based on assigned readings. You are expected to summarize, paraphrase, and respond critically to the arguments in these texts. You will have three examinations that will assess your basic knowledge of concepts and theories in the philosophy of mind. ...
... You will have two take-home writing exercises based on assigned readings. You are expected to summarize, paraphrase, and respond critically to the arguments in these texts. You will have three examinations that will assess your basic knowledge of concepts and theories in the philosophy of mind. ...
Chapter 1 - The Philosophical Enterprise
... 2. Aristotle defined a human being as a rational animal. This theory can be tested by considering its implications. If true, it would seem to imply that infants are not human beings, for they are not rational. The theory can be modified to deal with this counterexample by amending it to state that h ...
... 2. Aristotle defined a human being as a rational animal. This theory can be tested by considering its implications. If true, it would seem to imply that infants are not human beings, for they are not rational. The theory can be modified to deal with this counterexample by amending it to state that h ...
Identity Theory 1
... Identity of Human Nature Counter: Identity Theorists and all branches of physicalism have a hard time answering the question proposed by Frank Jackson. Whether or not a women released into the world after having learned everything physical would experience secondary reactions not able to be learned ...
... Identity of Human Nature Counter: Identity Theorists and all branches of physicalism have a hard time answering the question proposed by Frank Jackson. Whether or not a women released into the world after having learned everything physical would experience secondary reactions not able to be learned ...
Intro PowerPoint for Metaphysics
... by the natural sciences, such as those regarding First Causes; Laws of the Universe; Mind/Body; Freedom/Determinism. First used by Aristotle who wrote first his Physics (concerning the physical world) and the Metaphysics (beyond the physical world). ...
... by the natural sciences, such as those regarding First Causes; Laws of the Universe; Mind/Body; Freedom/Determinism. First used by Aristotle who wrote first his Physics (concerning the physical world) and the Metaphysics (beyond the physical world). ...
What to make of near death experiences? By Rev. James Coleman
... what Alexander experienced and then proceeds to offer a materialistic explanation of the phenomena. His explanation of all near death experiences is that they are nothing but dreams generated by brain cells starved of oxygen. Is that right, and why the anger? The mind- body problem is an intractable ...
... what Alexander experienced and then proceeds to offer a materialistic explanation of the phenomena. His explanation of all near death experiences is that they are nothing but dreams generated by brain cells starved of oxygen. Is that right, and why the anger? The mind- body problem is an intractable ...
BRAIN AND MIND
... of the sciences of biology and psychology, which had been descriptive, particularist, fuelled by unguided observation, and concerned with cataloguing phenomena and tlie inductive, atheoretical search for regularities. Instead biology and the evolved content of the mind dealt with by psychology could ...
... of the sciences of biology and psychology, which had been descriptive, particularist, fuelled by unguided observation, and concerned with cataloguing phenomena and tlie inductive, atheoretical search for regularities. Instead biology and the evolved content of the mind dealt with by psychology could ...
Buddhist View of Mind_home
... Is it possible to observe mental states and processes with the mind? Even with no mental training, we can detect: • Emotional states • Observe thoughts and images arising in the mind • Introspectively recognize from moment to moment whether our minds are calm or agitated • Perceive that we are cons ...
... Is it possible to observe mental states and processes with the mind? Even with no mental training, we can detect: • Emotional states • Observe thoughts and images arising in the mind • Introspectively recognize from moment to moment whether our minds are calm or agitated • Perceive that we are cons ...
Introduction to Cognitive Science
... Memory / knowledge : storing representations Thinking : causal sequence of representations ...
... Memory / knowledge : storing representations Thinking : causal sequence of representations ...
Introduction to Metaphysical Terms
... Even a person’s thoughts, consciousness and personality is composed of matter by-products of the brain. ...
... Even a person’s thoughts, consciousness and personality is composed of matter by-products of the brain. ...
Philosophy of mind
Philosophy of mind is a branch of philosophy that studies the nature of the mind, mental events, mental functions, mental properties, consciousness, and their relationship to the physical body, particularly the brain. The mind–body problem, i.e. the relationship of the mind to the body, is commonly seen as one key issue in philosophy of mind, although there are other issues concerning the nature of the mind that do not involve its relation to the physical body, such as how consciousness is possible and the nature of particular mental states.Dualism and monism are the two major schools of thought that attempt to resolve the mind–body problem. Dualism can be traced back to Plato, and the Sankhya and Yoga schools of Hindu philosophy, but it was most precisely formulated by René Descartes in the 17th century. Substance dualists argue that the mind is an independently existing substance, whereas property dualists maintain that the mind is a group of independent properties that emerge from and cannot be reduced to the brain, but that it is not a distinct substance.Monism is the position that mind and body are not ontologically distinct kinds of entities (independent substances). This view was first advocated in Western philosophy by Parmenides in the 5th century BC and was later espoused by the 17th century rationalist Baruch Spinoza. Physicalists argue that only entities postulated by physical theory exist, and that mental processes will eventually be explained in terms of these entities as physical theory continues to evolve. Physicalists maintain various positions on the prospects of reducing mental properties to physical properties (many of whom adopt compatible forms of property dualism), and the ontological status of such mental properties remains unclear. Idealists maintain that the mind is all that exists and that the external world is either mental itself, or an illusion created by the mind. Neutral monists such as Ernst Mach and William James argue that events in the world can be thought of as either mental (psychological) or physical depending on the network of relationships into which they enter, and dual-aspect monists such as Spinoza adhere to the position that there is some other, neutral substance, and that both matter and mind are properties of this unknown substance. The most common monisms in the 20th and 21st centuries have all been variations of physicalism; these positions include behaviorism, the type identity theory, anomalous monism and functionalism.Most modern philosophers of mind adopt either a reductive or non-reductive physicalist position, maintaining in their different ways that the mind is not something separate from the body. These approaches have been particularly influential in the sciences, especially in the fields of sociobiology, computer science, evolutionary psychology and the various neurosciences. Other philosophers, however, adopt a non-physicalist position that challenges the notion that the mind is a purely physical construct. Reductive physicalists assert that all mental states and properties will eventually be explained by scientific accounts of physiological processes and states. Non-reductive physicalists argue that although the mind is not a separate substance, mental properties supervene on physical properties, or that the predicates and vocabulary used in mental descriptions and explanations are indispensable, and cannot be reduced to the language and lower-level explanations of physical science. Continued neuroscientific progress has helped to clarify some of these issues; however, they are far from being resolved. Modern philosophers of mind continue to ask how the subjective qualities and the intentionality of mental states and properties can be explained in naturalistic terms.