On the Initial Allocation of Tradeable Pollution Permits Ian A
... The objective of this thesis is to investigate the initial allocation of pollution permits in a dynamic tradeable market. Tradeable pollution permit markets are an increasingly common method of environmental regulation and it is apparent that future schemes may have a number of repeated compliance p ...
... The objective of this thesis is to investigate the initial allocation of pollution permits in a dynamic tradeable market. Tradeable pollution permit markets are an increasingly common method of environmental regulation and it is apparent that future schemes may have a number of repeated compliance p ...
A Brinkmanship Game Theory Model of Terrorism
... constraints” define the equilibrium solution in this game: an “Effectiveness constraint” and an “Acceptability constraint.” (In a different context, see Dixit & Skeath 1998) To be “effective” the threatened risk of retaliation, 0≤q≤1, must be high enough to at least deter the Soft terrorist from acq ...
... constraints” define the equilibrium solution in this game: an “Effectiveness constraint” and an “Acceptability constraint.” (In a different context, see Dixit & Skeath 1998) To be “effective” the threatened risk of retaliation, 0≤q≤1, must be high enough to at least deter the Soft terrorist from acq ...
Stock-Based Compensation and CEO (Dis)Incentives
... induces full revelation, such that there is no information asymmetry in equilibrium. While we also find the contract that induces full revelation and the first best, the main focus of our paper is to study the properties of the dynamic pooling equilibrium in which the manager does not reveal the true ...
... induces full revelation, such that there is no information asymmetry in equilibrium. While we also find the contract that induces full revelation and the first best, the main focus of our paper is to study the properties of the dynamic pooling equilibrium in which the manager does not reveal the true ...
Lecture notes - Xiang Sun | 孙祥
... This theorem is the first theorem of game theory asserts that in any finite two-person game of perfect information in which the players move alternatingly and in which chance does not affect the decision making process, if the game can not end in a draw, then one of the two players must have a winni ...
... This theorem is the first theorem of game theory asserts that in any finite two-person game of perfect information in which the players move alternatingly and in which chance does not affect the decision making process, if the game can not end in a draw, then one of the two players must have a winni ...
chapter on automata on infinite trees
... node in the tree. Alternating automata relax this restriction: It is possible to send several states to the same successor or to ignore some subtrees by not sending states to the corresponding node at all. To generalize nondeterministic automata we also allow nondeterministic choices. For example, i ...
... node in the tree. Alternating automata relax this restriction: It is possible to send several states to the same successor or to ignore some subtrees by not sending states to the corresponding node at all. To generalize nondeterministic automata we also allow nondeterministic choices. For example, i ...
Measuring Inconsistency through Minimal Inconsistent Sets
... We consider a propositional language L built from a finite set of propositional symbols P. We use a, b, c, . . . to denote the propositional variables, and Greek letters α, β, ϕ, . . . to denote the formulae. An interpretation is a total function from P to {0, 1}. The set of all interpretations is d ...
... We consider a propositional language L built from a finite set of propositional symbols P. We use a, b, c, . . . to denote the propositional variables, and Greek letters α, β, ϕ, . . . to denote the formulae. An interpretation is a total function from P to {0, 1}. The set of all interpretations is d ...
average equilibrium points
... This intuitive motivation is essential for taking the equilibrium point concept as fundamental in game theory. However several authors explain as a second important aspect, the stability fact. This is explained as follows: Assuming that all the decide to play σ = (σ1 , . . . , σn ) and this point is ...
... This intuitive motivation is essential for taking the equilibrium point concept as fundamental in game theory. However several authors explain as a second important aspect, the stability fact. This is explained as follows: Assuming that all the decide to play σ = (σ1 , . . . , σn ) and this point is ...
Suggested Solutions to Assignment 3
... produce an identical product. But Firm 1 does it at a lower cost than Firm 2. Firm 1 has a constant marginal cost of $15 and firm 2 has a constant marginal cost of $30. The market demand for the commodity is p = 120 − y , where y is aggregate output. (a) Suppose that firms choose quantities. Find bo ...
... produce an identical product. But Firm 1 does it at a lower cost than Firm 2. Firm 1 has a constant marginal cost of $15 and firm 2 has a constant marginal cost of $30. The market demand for the commodity is p = 120 − y , where y is aggregate output. (a) Suppose that firms choose quantities. Find bo ...
Putting free-riding to work: A Partnership Solution to the common
... structure is stable (i.e., part of a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium) turns out to depend on the disadvantages of solo production relative to team production. This follows since the principal source of first-stage instability is going into business for oneself (deviating unilaterally to a new partne ...
... structure is stable (i.e., part of a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium) turns out to depend on the disadvantages of solo production relative to team production. This follows since the principal source of first-stage instability is going into business for oneself (deviating unilaterally to a new partne ...
Trade, Tragedy, and the Commons
... a fishery, forest stock, aquifer, etc., and we assume it is local and therefore contained within one country. The government sets rules limiting harvests but agents may cheat on these allocations and risk punishment. Property rights are endogenous in this framework because the government must accoun ...
... a fishery, forest stock, aquifer, etc., and we assume it is local and therefore contained within one country. The government sets rules limiting harvests but agents may cheat on these allocations and risk punishment. Property rights are endogenous in this framework because the government must accoun ...
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES TRADE, TRAGEDY, AND THE COMMONS Brian R. Copeland
... a fishery, forest stock, aquifer, etc., and we assume it is local and therefore contained within one country. The government sets rules limiting harvests but agents may cheat on these allocations and risk punishment. Property rights are endogenous in this framework because the government must accoun ...
... a fishery, forest stock, aquifer, etc., and we assume it is local and therefore contained within one country. The government sets rules limiting harvests but agents may cheat on these allocations and risk punishment. Property rights are endogenous in this framework because the government must accoun ...
Optimal Auctions for Correlated Bidders with Sampling
... der is zero in expectation, and all the value created by the auction is extracted by the payments made to the auctioneer. Both Myerson’s and Crémer and McLean’s auctions are subject to the criticism of the “Wilson’s principle” [Wilson 1987], which proposes that auction design should rely as little ...
... der is zero in expectation, and all the value created by the auction is extracted by the payments made to the auctioneer. Both Myerson’s and Crémer and McLean’s auctions are subject to the criticism of the “Wilson’s principle” [Wilson 1987], which proposes that auction design should rely as little ...
The Binarized Scoring Rule Tanjim Hossain Ryo Okui University of Toronto
... also extend the results to a setting under the non-expected utility paradigm. For speci…c problems, several previous studies developed scoring rules that do not require assumptions on utility function. Bhattacharya and P‡eiderer (1985) show that the quadratic scoring rule can elicit the mean of a r ...
... also extend the results to a setting under the non-expected utility paradigm. For speci…c problems, several previous studies developed scoring rules that do not require assumptions on utility function. Bhattacharya and P‡eiderer (1985) show that the quadratic scoring rule can elicit the mean of a r ...
Nash Equilibrium in Tullock Contests
... Why should players choose Nash equilibrium? Interpretation #1: Nash equilibrium is the unique action profile that can be justified by common knowledge of rationality. Rationality = maximization of expected payoff given some ...
... Why should players choose Nash equilibrium? Interpretation #1: Nash equilibrium is the unique action profile that can be justified by common knowledge of rationality. Rationality = maximization of expected payoff given some ...
COS 444 Internet Auctions: Theory and Practice
... • max-revenue among all such mechanisms … but not optimal revenue in general, and prices are discriminatory, “murky” ...
... • max-revenue among all such mechanisms … but not optimal revenue in general, and prices are discriminatory, “murky” ...
Negative Externalities and Sen`s Liberalism Theorem
... introduced a new research direction: instead of a direct mechanism approach where individuals report their sincere preferences, Sen’s structures are described in terms of games with an emphasis on strategies and finding a choice; e.g., see the articles in Arrow, Sen, and Suzumura (1996) such as Hamm ...
... introduced a new research direction: instead of a direct mechanism approach where individuals report their sincere preferences, Sen’s structures are described in terms of games with an emphasis on strategies and finding a choice; e.g., see the articles in Arrow, Sen, and Suzumura (1996) such as Hamm ...
Context$Dependent Forward Induction Reasoning
... Continuing along these lines, we get that, for each m, (i) there are states consistent with “rationality and mth -order strong belief of rationality,” and (ii) at any such state, Bob plays Out and Ann plays either Up or Down. ...
... Continuing along these lines, we get that, for each m, (i) there are states consistent with “rationality and mth -order strong belief of rationality,” and (ii) at any such state, Bob plays Out and Ann plays either Up or Down. ...
financialIntermediation_KeisterPaper
... small, a no-bailouts commitment is strictly inferior to a discretionary policy regime – it lowers equilibrium welfare without improving financial stability. For higher probabilities of a crisis, a no-bailouts policy may or may not be preferable, depending on parameter values, but it will never achi ...
... small, a no-bailouts commitment is strictly inferior to a discretionary policy regime – it lowers equilibrium welfare without improving financial stability. For higher probabilities of a crisis, a no-bailouts policy may or may not be preferable, depending on parameter values, but it will never achi ...
Tracking Error Volatility Optimization and Utility Improvements
... creates a classical incentive problem where the additional incentives that affect the agent, the delegated manager, are not completely consistent with the incentives of principal. It is generally accepted and consistently asserted through theory that this delegated incentive leads to suboptimal, les ...
... creates a classical incentive problem where the additional incentives that affect the agent, the delegated manager, are not completely consistent with the incentives of principal. It is generally accepted and consistently asserted through theory that this delegated incentive leads to suboptimal, les ...
ELECTIONS AND DIVISIVENESS: THEORY AND EVIDENCE
... Voter uncertainty about politician preferences on divisive issues, coupled with the potential for policy disagreements in the next period, motivates politicians to try to signal that their policy preferences are aligned with their electorate. They do this by focusing effort on divisive rather than c ...
... Voter uncertainty about politician preferences on divisive issues, coupled with the potential for policy disagreements in the next period, motivates politicians to try to signal that their policy preferences are aligned with their electorate. They do this by focusing effort on divisive rather than c ...
Dynamic Limit Pricing - Athens University of Economics and Business
... making entry less appealing. In turn, this may imply that in equilibrium, the incumbent charges a price higher than the monopoly price and also deters entry. Jun and Park (2009) consider a dynamic setup where the incumbent faces a sequence of entrants that can be either weak or strong, of which only ...
... making entry less appealing. In turn, this may imply that in equilibrium, the incumbent charges a price higher than the monopoly price and also deters entry. Jun and Park (2009) consider a dynamic setup where the incumbent faces a sequence of entrants that can be either weak or strong, of which only ...
Verifiable and Nonverifiable Information in a Two
... In this paper, I analyze the question of whether and when the firm benefits from the verification of its subjective assessments of a manager’s performance. More specifically, I ask for properties of a verification process that the firm prefers over another alternative. I ask whether a compensation c ...
... In this paper, I analyze the question of whether and when the firm benefits from the verification of its subjective assessments of a manager’s performance. More specifically, I ask for properties of a verification process that the firm prefers over another alternative. I ask whether a compensation c ...
Walrasian Lemons Markets
... value of a good of type θ is vθs for sellers and vθb > vθs for buyers. So, gains from trade are positive for all types of good. Moreover, vθs and vθb are strictly increasing in θ.1 Finally, preferences are quasi-linear. The payoff to a buyer who pays price p ∈ R+ for a good of type θ is vθb − p. The ...
... value of a good of type θ is vθs for sellers and vθb > vθs for buyers. So, gains from trade are positive for all types of good. Moreover, vθs and vθb are strictly increasing in θ.1 Finally, preferences are quasi-linear. The payoff to a buyer who pays price p ∈ R+ for a good of type θ is vθb − p. The ...