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BACK TO THE FUTURE?
PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION
IN ALBERTA AND CANADA
By Phil Elder and Alvin Finkel
www.drproject.ca
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For the past decade or so, Canada has been in the grip of a democratic malaise
evidenced by decreasing levels of political trust, declining voter turnout, increasing
cynicism toward politicians and traditional forms of political participation, and growing
disengagement of young people from politics.
- Executive Summary of Law Reform Commission Report of Canada,
Voting Counts: Electoral Reform for Canada (2004)
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
About the Democratic Renewal Project
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Introduction
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Changing the First-Past-the-Post-System
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Assessment of PR
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Recommended Form
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Why not the Single Transferable Vote?
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Implementing Electoral Change
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Conclusion
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Appendix A
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Appendix B
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Bibliography
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ABOUT THE DEMOCRATIC RENEWAL PROJECT
This document has been prepared by the Alberta Democratic Renewal Project (ADRP), a
grassroots organization devoted to reducing our “democratic deficit.” Its genesis was the
realization that under the first-past-the-post (single-member plurality) voting system, the 39 yearold Conservative government of Alberta has had a free ride into power. Too many parties have
been splitting the opposition vote and perpetual one-party rule is not healthy for democracy. As
political scientist and Conservative strategist Tom Flanagan says, “A party that can always count
on winning is likely to become unresponsive and even corrupt.” (Flanagan, in Howe et al, 99 at
101)
The ADRP’s proposed remedy is to encourage Alberta parties with similar platforms (the
Green, Liberal, and New Democratic Parties) to run agreed-upon (sole) candidates with the best
chance of winning in selected ridings. If the parties insist on presenting a full slate in every
riding, the fallback strategy would be for the ADRP to encourage the three parties in the medium
term, to run only token candidates where another of the trio’s contender is stronger in the
constituency. The DRP would publicly endorse the strongest candidate in each riding and
recommend that supporters of all three parties vote strategically for that candidate. Under any of
these scenarios, if the parties’ combined seat totals were to exceed that of the Conservatives, a
one-term coalition government would be formed to enact an agreed-upon program, including
some form of Proportional Representation. (For more details, see drproject.ca)
INTRODUCTION
This report recommends that the first-past-the-post (FPTP) electoral system be replaced
in Alberta and Canada by some form of proportional representation, to be decided upon after
expert analysis, widespread public participation and a referendum. The citizens’ assembly
process used recently in British Columbia provides a useful precedent. At present, we favour a
mixed member proportional system (MMP) with an open list, which we believe it is the best
form of PR for the Canadian context, but the Single Transferable Vote system which was
proposed in B. C. also has great appeal. MMP is the system currently in use in New Zealand,
Germany, Scotland, and Wales.
The British Columbia assembly’s report highlighted its neighbour’s legacy:
Alberta has been the most adventurous province in terms of electoral system
experimentation. It not only used preferential voting to elect its MLAs far longer than
any other province (1926-1959), but used proportional representation by the single
transferable vote method (PR-STV) to elect member (sic) from the urban areas of
Calgary and Edmonton over the same period . (“Electoral Experimentation in British
Columbia and Canada,” 2005, paper for the British Columbia Citizens’ Assembly,
Weekend 2, Session 3, Internet)
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However, in considering changes to FPTP – including a return to some form of
Proportional Representation – caution is necessary. The fundamental principles of our
Westminster style of democracy should not be eroded. Our democratic system has many interrelated features and pulling on only one string can result in unintended and unpredictable
consequences. Therefore, studies of representation systems might best be accompanied by an
overall review of our democratic processes and institutions. If politicians and the practice of
politics are to rise in public esteem, perhaps other aspects of Canadian democracy also need
improvement. (See, e. g., the sterling work by the New Brunswick Commission on Legislative
Democracy (Wm. Cross, ed., 2007)).
According to one commentator,
[a]dopting a PR system would have direct consequences on the shape and size of
electoral districts, on the work of members of the House of Commons, and on the
representation of political parties and minorities. But it would also likely affect the
position of the prime minister, as well as alter the way cabinets are formed and operate,
their composition, and their relation with both Houses of Parliament. The federalprovincial balance might be affected as well. We should make no mistake about it: along
with responsible government and disciplined parties, the first-past-the-post system is one
of the three crucial variables that have shaped Canada’s Westminster system of
government, both federally and provincially, and replacing it with PR is likely to have
sweeping consequences. (Massicotte, “That Bleak? Fathoming the Consequences of
Electoral Reform in Canada” in Milner (2004, at 65-6)
This may be overly alarmist, however, because it has been said that, other than the UK, at
the national level “... Canada remains the only significant Westminster country with elections
limited to FPTP.” (Milner, 2004, at 22) It would appear, therefore, that the problems predicted
by Massicote either did not materialize or were handled without constitutional crises. As we
shall see later, he ended up recommending PR himself.
O’Neal (1993), citing other scholars, suggests the following criteria for evaluating
electoral systems, while acknowledging that probably no system can achieve all of them:
(i) A parliament reflecting the main trends of opinion within the electorate.
(ii) Government according to the wishes of the majority of the electorate.
(iii) The election of representatives whose personal qualities best fit them for the
function of government.
(iv) Strong and stable governments.
(v) An outcome which is acceptable to those who have lost the election and community
acceptance of the voting system as the best possible basis for running the country.
(vi) Fostering of respect for different points of view.
(vii) Fair representation of minorities and other significant groups in society, such as
business people, women, and labour.
Others suggest, however, that objectives like numbers iii, iv and vii could be handled
within the present system, if party loyalists so wished and if the electorate punished those who
ignored such desirable outcomes. But the proof is always in the pudding, and in spite of the
critics, our commitment to PR remains firm. There is a great deal of evidence that the current
system creates unacceptable distortions that may be structural, rather than simply the result of
bad faith behaviour on the part of the existing political parties.
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CHANGING THE FIRST-PAST-THE-POST SYSTEM
Many efforts have been made in Canada to change the traditional FPTP (single-member
plurality) voting system to some form of Proportional Representation (the Law Reform
Commission of Canada (2004), referenda in Prince Edward Island, British Columbia (twice) and
Ontario, a draft bill in Quebec and a Commission on Legislative Democracy in New Brunswick).
None of this impressive work, however, has brought about the recommended changes to FPTP.
The defects of FPTP are glaring and well-known. It often creates artificial majorities,
resting on a mere plurality of votes, with grotesque over-representation for the winning party and
virtual shut-outs of others - e. g., Liberals winning every seat in New Brunswick (1987),
Progressive Conservatives winning all but four seats in Alberta (1982), near-sweeps in BC
(2001) and PEI (1989, 1993, 2000), Kim Campbell’s federal Progressive Conservatives winning
only two seats with 16 % of the vote (while 19 % of the vote earned the Reform Party 52 seats
because of that party’s regional strength in the west) and a mere 13.5 percent giving the Bloc
Québécois 54 seats). Milner (1999, at 38) claims that with PR, the PC’s would have won 46
seats in that 1993 election.
Shutouts of minority parties are common, too - in the 2008 federal election, the Green
Party received about 940,000 votes nationally, but won no seats, while 813,000 votes in Alberta
elected 27 Conservatives.
Perhaps most seriously, from the standpoint of Canada’s national existence, FPTP in
federal elections takes regional differences in voting, that reflect somewhat different local
political cultures, and turns them into absolute chasms. So, for example, the Bloc, while it has
never won as much as half the votes of the Québécois, has at times taken as many as 70 percent
of the Quebec seats and made it appear falsely that the Québécois are far more united in favour
of sovereignist politicians than they really are. It has also limited the ability of federal
governments, both Liberal and Conservative, during this period to have a plentiful and talented
group of Québécois who can be called upon to participate in federal governments.
The vagaries of FPTP are even more stunning in Alberta. In most federal elections in
Alberta since 1957, every seat has gone to the Conservatives or to Reform. This reflects the
importance of conservative thinking in Alberta, but greatly exaggerates it. Albertans appear to
other Canadians as a rather conservative lot because almost all the province’s M. P.s are
conservatives, though in fact, a large minority of Albertans do not think like them at all. In
almost all of these one-sided elections, centre and left parties have accounted for over one third
of the votes of Albertans. But those who voted for these parties have rarely had any
representative at all.
All plurality systems tend to exaggerate the parliamentary representation of the strongest
party, to penalize the second party and to devastate third parties whose support is thinly
spread across the breadth of the country. (Irvine, 1979, at 11.)
This sort of skewed result seems to offend the principles requiring “effective
representation” or “relative parity of voting power” which the Supreme Court of Canada
enunciated in a Charter of Human Rights challenge to electoral boundaries (Reference re
Provincial Electoral Boundaries (Sask.) [1991] 2 S.C.R. 158). Indeed, in 2001 the Green Party
prepared a Charter challenge to FPTP under the Canada Elections Act, although it appears never
have gone to trial. (Personal communication, Professor Ed Morgan, Faculty of Law, University
of Toronto, Oct. 16, 2009) In late 2010, a group of Quebec voters, l’Association pour la
Revendication des Droits Democratiques, launched a similar challenge against the Quebec
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Elections Act and Fair Vote Canada is being allowed to participate. (It should be noted,
however, that significant evidentiary problems exist in this type of challenge: “both the
attribution of causality and the prediction of results are far more problematic than advocates of
electoral reform customarily recognize.” (Katz, 2004, in Milner at 97)).
In 2003, the Supreme Court of Canada, in striking down sections 24 and 28 of the Canada
Elections Act because they offended s. 3 of the Charter, seemed to realize its reasons provided a
possible foundation for challenging FPTP, but opined, in dicta, that “[t]he Charter aside, the
choice among electoral processes is ... a political one – and not one in which the Court should
involve itself.” (Figueroa v. Canada (Attorney General) [2003] 1 S. C. R. 912, para. 82) But of
course, the Charter is NOT “aside” in a case alleging a Charter right has been breached and one
legal expert believes that this statement was “at odds with the whole thrust of the majority’s
decision.” (Gordon, Larry, “Prospects for Federal Voting Reform in Canada” in Milner, 2004,
291 at 298.) Statements like the following from the majority of the Supreme Court seem to back
this up:
[S]. 3 imposes on Parliament an obligation not to enhance the capacity of one citizen to
participate in the electoral process in a manner that compromises another citizen’s
parallel right to meaningful participation in the electoral process. (per Iacobucci J., for
the majority, para. 50)
Beatty (2005) argues that because elected representatives are usually so reluctant to
contemplate electoral reform, the courts may have to do it. And they can, he says, because of ss.
3 (the right to vote) and 15 (the right to equality) of the Charter.
When they are measured against a principle of “equal, meaningful representation,” it is
hard to imagine how any of our federal or provincial election laws would be able to meet
the test. ...
In the last four federal elections, the differences in the value of votes cast for the major
parties far exceed the differentials between urban and rural ridings that the Supreme
Court approved in the Electoral Boundaries case. ...
Unlike the disparity of voting power between rural and urban ridings, the inequalities ...
of winner-take-all frustrate rather than foster more effective representation of millions of
voters. (Beatty, 2005, in Howe et al, at 131-32)
The skewed election results described above lead to serious regional alienation as well.
Governments as well as the public interest may also suffer from little or no regional input in
Cabinet or the lack of all pertinent opinions in the legislature. Recall that almost 940,000
Canadians voted Green in the 2008 federal election, but they have no right to speak in any
legislative debate. This type of erratic distortion is thought to add to voter apathy, particularly
among the young, and probably also contributes to lower voter turnouts (Milner, “Political
Dropouts and Electoral System Reform”, in Milner (2004), at 17), although facilitated
registration and compulsory voting may have contributed to some of the higher turnouts in other
countries under PR (Rose, “Voting Turnout in Thirty Democracies” in Rose, 1980 at 12).
C. E. S. Franks has suggested that because of frequent large swings in seat numbers with
a comparatively small change in votes, members elected to an FPTP legislature tend to be less
experienced, which renders the body less effective. (MacIvor in Milner, 1999, at 30.)
To be sure, defenders of FPTP can advance some arguments in its favour. It tends to
encourage one-party governments (in 37 federal elections from 1867-2000, all but eight were
majority governments (Courtney, 2004 at 138). That argument is however disappearing in
Canadian federal politics, according to many observers. The ability of the Bloc Québécois to
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win a majority of Quebec seats makes it very difficult for either of the big two federal parties to
capture a majority of seats nationally. Ironically, a party that would receive far fewer seats in a
PR system has the ability to prevent majority governments in an FPTP system.
Although the unfairness of many results is conceded, FPTP is familiar, certain, simple
(although many Canadians mistakenly believe that parties winning a majority of seats must have
had over 50% popular support) and traditional as well. Many also believe it creates greater
stability and fewer elections, although others point out that in Europe under PR the average time
between elections is similar to the three year average reported for Canada.
Another argument in favour of FPTP is that it is superior in representing constituency
interests. It is also claimed that there is usually greater accountability to the voters, as failures
cannot be blamed on a coalition partner.
There is no doubt that FPTP helps broad-based, accommodative centrist parties, as well
as regionally strong ones like the Bloc Québécois. Minority parties with thin national support,
however, are often almost frozen out, in spite of their impressive cumulative vote totals.
Canadian history has demonstrated that the principal incentive for any party intent on
winning a federal election under plurality voting has been to bridge the country’s
regional, linguistic, and racial cleavages with policies, leaders, and candidates that appeal
to a wide cross-section of voters. ...
[I]t is not known how proportional voting would impact on our parties’ capacity or
willingness to fashion intra-party coalitions of diverse interests and regions. This could
have profound implications for parties and, ultimately, for governance in Canada
(Courtney, in Milner, 2004, at 104).
ASSESSMENT OF PR
a) Advantages
Low voter turnouts, especially among young people, are of increasing concern in Canada.
There could be many reasons for this: a decline of a sense of civic duty; a decline in political
knowledge; the fact that votes for parties more likely to appeal to youth, such as the Green, New
Democratic or even Libertarian Parties, will not help choose a government; and that often only
one, mainstream, traditional party has a chance to win.
Milner’s “research shows that countries in PR-based political institutions consistently
show a greater proportion of politically informed citizens ... . And, of course, politically
informed citizens are more likely to vote.” (Milner 2004, at 26.)
Milner suggests that low turnouts can be raised by other policies as well: for example,
civics courses, which he recommends for the last year of high school. If combined with a lower
voting age of 16, when most teenagers are still somewhat influenced by their parents, and when
recently-acquired civics information could be applied, he believes that higher turnouts and a
heightened sense of civic duty would percolate into the electorate over a period of time.
We mention this, not only because a PR system appears to offer hope of increasing voter
participation, but also to underscore the point that the entire democratic system has to be
considered when tackling problems.
“ ... [T]he political science literature ... is quite definitive. PR systems elicit higher voter
turnout and representation of women and minorities, and are, on balance, more effective
in providing government performance that is both efficient and linked to commitments
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made in electoral campaigns.” (Milner in Milner 1999, at 44. See Courtney, however, in
Milner 2004, at 107-10)
On page five of this brief, we mentioned that Massicote, in spite of his misgivings,
ultimately ended up endorsing PR:
On balance, in this country and at this time, I believe the benefits of PR outweigh its
disadvantages. Party caucuses would become regionally more balanced, no region would
appear to have an overwhelming say within the government party, and the formation of
regionally representative cabinets would be facilitated. The chief downside – that large
electoral districts would be less appropriate for constituency work as Canadian MPs
traditionally practice it – would be offset to a large extent by ... a German-style mixed
system, with 50 or 60% of members being elected in single-member districts (Massicotte,
in Milner 2004, at 82)
We support an “open party list” MMP system. This would allow voters to vote for one or
more specific members on a party list or vote for individuals across party lines. List candidates
with significant personal support would then move up the party list, increasing their chance of
election.
b) Disadvantages
PR’s details and vocabulary are daunting: “largest remainder system” with Droop, Hare,
Hagenbach-Bischoff and Imperiali quotas; 2 versions of “highest average systems” (d’Hondt and
Saint-Lague divisors) and so forth. (O’Neal, Electoral Systems (Library of Parliament, 1993))
We will leave such arcane analysis to experts, but this complexity can be a significant obstacle to
adoption of PR.
Ballot spoilage under PR is said by some to be high, a possible sign of voter confusion
about the multiplicity of choice. (Pilon at 124 cites studies that spoilage rates are not
disproportionately high under PR.)
PR systems may allocate seats to parties with extreme views, especially if the seat
threshold percentage is low. This tends to legitimize them.
Because PR systems generally produce coalitions, typically formed after elections, voters
are not directly electing a government when casting their ballots and they may be dismayed by a
particular combination resulting from negotiations (e. g., the recent Conservative-Liberal
Democrat coalition in Great Britain). Some also believe that coalition governments tend to be
less stable. Compromises can be reached, but negotiations often produce rifts that cannot be
resolved, leading to new elections.
One popular criticism is the perceived instability of coalition governments. There are,
however, counter-examples; Switzerland’s coalition government has lasted more than fifty years
and post-1945 Germany has been governed by two coalitions, from 1949-66 and 1982-98.
To these general criticisms can be added advantages and disadvantages characteristic of
specific forms of PR.
Some commentators deny that proportionality is the most important goal of an electoral
system:
In my view ... proportionality is a purely abstract value of little importance in the real
world of politics. I believe that what is important is to have governments capable of
taking decisive action when needed and to give the voters an effective choice between
government coalitions. (Tom Flanagan, “The Alternative Vote” in Howe et al, 2005
at 104)
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Professor Flanagan uses the Liberal Party’s national victories from 1993-2003 to make
his point. PR enthusiasts might see these majority governments with only about 40% of the
votes as a distortion, but Flanagan supports this result. Polling data showed that in a series of
two-way contests between the Liberal Party and each of the four other contenders, each other
party would have been soundly beaten. Arguably then, an artificial Liberal majority was a
“Concordet winner” and was therefore justified.
RECOMMENDED FORM
The simplest form of PR would be to present one ballot with only party names on it, then
to allocate seats in the percentage received by each party. Because the preparation of the list’s
names and order would probably rest on the party leadership (although there could be a primary
allowing party members to rank order candidates), this model has been criticized for the
excessive power given to the party leader, who could hold everyone’s future hostage. In an era
where representatives already chafe under party discipline, this model seems unlikely to gain
sufficient support, although it is used in several countries.
Another problem with this approach is the lack of geographically identifiable
representatives to deal with constituents’ problems. Most Canadian voters would insist that this
feature continue as an integral part of any electoral system.
The Canadian literature favours the mixed member proportional system (MMP) used by
Germany, Scotland, Wales and New Zealand. This involves some single member seats (50% in
Germany) and the rest arithmetically calculated to reflect the overall percentage support for each
party above a threshold (often 5%) and taken from a rank-ordered party list. Voters cast two
ballots and some jurisdictions allow a name to appear on both ballots.
“The list-PR systems are designed to produce the greatest proportionality in translating
seats into votes, thus avoiding wasted votes and creating legislatures which closely mirror the
political preferences of the electorate.” (H. MacIvor, “A Brief Introduction to Electoral Reform”,
in Milner1999, at 26)
The Law Reform Commission of Canada in 1994 also recommended this approach, as
described by Henry Milner:
In the system proposed for Canada, each province constitutes an electoral region, except
Ontario and Quebec; Ontario is subdivided into four regions and Quebec, into two.
Voters in each region would cast two ballots, one for a candidate in a single-member
constituency (just under 2/3 of seats), the other for a "flexible" party list (just over 1/3 of
seats), with candidates permitted to run both in a constituency and on the list.
...
As demonstrated here, adopting an MMP system as proposed by the Law Commission
(sic) of Canada would have produced election results that are arguably fairer in a number
of ways: representation of parties, regions and women. For these reasons, we can only
hope that the current minority government situation proves to be an opportunity to
consider electoral reform, and not a stick with which to beat it. (“A Mixed-Member
Proportional System Applied to the 2004 Election,” Electoral Insight, January 2005
(Elections Canada)) (Footnotes removed)
Milner also said this:
The New Brunswick Commission was instructed to “... make recommendations on
implementing a proportional representation system ... that ensures fairer representation,
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greater equality of votes, an effective legislature and government and a continued role for
directly-elected MLAs representing specific geographic boundaries.” Only one electoral
system ... mixed-member plurality (MMP) ... corresponds to this mandate. ... only MMP,
which retains the relationship between the voter and a single representative, has any
realistic chance of being accepted by the people in a country like Canada ... . (Milner,
“Political Dropouts and Electoral System Reform” in Milner (2004), 17 at 18)
(It should be noted, however, that contrary to his opinion, the B. C. Citizens’ Assembly
recommended the single transferable vote (STV) and the referendum on it barely missed
approval by the required 60 %.)
Because of the leadership’s control over the list, some jurisdictions have opted for an
open list, allowing voters to support their favourites directly and thus elevate their position on the
party list ballot.
The DRP, although admittedly non-expert, supports this MMP system both for federal
and Alberta elections, with a national or provincial threshold of 5% for a party to qualify for
proportional seats, and an open list. Perhaps the province should also be divided into regions for
the purpose of allocating the list candidates - possibly Edmonton, Calgary and Rest of Province.
Consideration should also be given to requiring party lists to alternate male and female
candidates.
[a] recent Canadian Royal Commission on electoral reform pointed out that levels of
women's representation in elected assemblies are often attributable to variables other than
the electoral system, for example political parties' adoption of quotas for women
candidates. In this respect, the behaviour of political parties, especially in party-list PR
systems, is crucial to women's ability to gain seats in elected assemblies. More careful
analysis reveals that PR jurisdictions that do not use a quota system for women
candidates have records similar to Canada's in this regard - and sometimes worse. (Brian
O’Neal, Electoral Systems (Library of Parliament, 1993) text accompanying fn. 26)
It should be noted, however, that it is easier under PR for each party to ensure that those
of its candidates likely to be elected are gender balanced because a multi-candidate list in order
can make accommodations that mere selection of one candidate per riding cannot. Usually it
takes only one party leading the way to get all the parties to recognize the need to have gender
parity in their candidate list. In Norway, for example, in the 1980s, the Socialist Labour Party, a
relatively small party, took the initiative. The Social Democratic Party, fearing that left-wing
women voters might shift their support to the smaller left-wing party, announced that they would
follow the same practice of insuring gender parity. Soon, all the parties fell into line on this
issue.
Other under-represented groups, such as aboriginals, could be given some preference as
well. Indeed, New Zealand has created a separate electoral map with seven constituencies for
electing Maori members. (Nagel, in Milner ed. 2004, at 119)
It is time we joined many other stable democracies in the world by adopting PR. It would
appear that we are ready for this, according to a Canada West poll in 2001: “Slightly more than
71 per cent of western Canadians support PR.” (Gordon, in Milner, 2004, at 299).
But let us conclude this discussion with a tactical note:
Japan’s experience ... warns us that “reform” has many shades of meaning. ... When
parties or leaders negotiate a package of proposed reforms they invariably act to protect
their own partisan interests ... . If and when the major political parties in Canada begin
to get serious about electoral reform ... we should not be surprised if they seek to discard
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the ... mixed-member proportional model. ... Supporters of electoral reform in Canada,
and in the provinces, should weigh these risks carefully. (Leduc, in Milner, 2004, 175 at
188.)
Whatever decision is made, it should be accompanied by an updating of the electoral list
before any referendum or election is called. Our experience in an Alberta by-election indicates
that some people remain on the list for up to three years after moving, while their successors at
their former address remain unregistered. (See Black, in Howe et al, 2005.)
WHY NOT THE SINGLE TRANSFERABLE VOTE?
Debates over which form of PR is better or worse suffer from many problems. These
include overstatement, institutional determinism, romanticism, reductionism, misplaced
emphasis and many more. ... [T]he various PR-system partisans ignore how politics can
affect the results that emerge from institutions. (Pilon 2007, at 120)
A description of various electoral systems will be found in Appendix A, but some
clarifying notes here may be worthwhile:
1. The Alternative Vote system does not purport to offer proportionality, although since winners
have obtained at least an indirect majority when second choices of voters supporting the lowest
vote-getters are redistributed, they are thought to have more legitimacy than FPTP plurality
winners. Since most first-ballot leaders end up winning, AV may not be a very important
improvement, although Tom Flanagan likes it, either on its own or as part of a PR system. (e. g.,
Flanagan, 2005)
2. The Single Transferable Vote (called Alternative Vote in Australia) creates proportionality by
usually electing three to six members per constituency, after redistributing excess votes by
winners who obtain the quota necessary for victory and successively dropping the lowest votegetter and re-distributing her votes among the remaining candidates until all seats have been
won. (If there were only single-member constituencies, it would be like the AV, as the quota
would be 50% plus 1.) No list candidates are involved. While STV offers proportionality, it also
offers a complicated math that makes it difficult for electors to understand why a given candidate
has won or lost in her campaign for a legislative seat.
3. MMP would involve larger constituencies and a bigger legislature, as non-constituency
candidates on parties’ lists would be awarded seats to raise their total number of seats to about
the same percentage as their popular vote. Often a large jurisdiction is divided into regions, so
that the percentages upon which electoral allocations are based are more localized. Thus, the
system is said to involve multi-member constituencies because a number of list candidates will
represent regional groupings.
According to Pilon, STV supporters (tending to be centre-right) think that it will
empower the people over parties, since no list generated by party leaderships will be involved,
while MMP partisans (usually centre-left) stress the advantages to constituents of single-member
ridings. After an urbane discussion which is too long to summarize here, Pilon concludes that
either system is superior to FPTP, although “[a]s academic- and politician-authored studies piled
up ... in Canada, the balance swung firmly into the MMP camp.” (2005, at 122)
Although we are also in this camp, the main point of this report is to stimulate public
debate in Alberta on the merits of PR. Both MMP and STV would have to be studied in detail in
a review of electoral system alternatives.
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IMPLEMENTING ELECTORAL CHANGE
“[t]he factors that persuade politicians to accept change are quite easy to identify but
difficult to reproduce ... . ” (Mendelsohn et al, “Getting from Here to There: A Process for
Electoral Reform in Canada” in Howe et al, 137 at 141)
Mendlesohn’s list includes scandal or institutional paralysis which leads to a serious
crisis of public confidence. However, “unpopular political leaders, recessions or general
declines in confidence in the government are not sufficient conditions for change. ” (Ibid.) We
would add public rage at the sort of skewed electoral results, mentioned above, which can result
from FPTP. Interestingly, linking electoral reform with other democratic reforms may increase
public interest and this point is reflected in the present brief.
Well-organized pressure groups, such as Fair Vote Canada, especially if led by wellknown people, could kick-start the campaign, particularly if backed with significant financial
donations.
Of course, sponsorship by leaders of parties which have been systematically punished by
FPTP results can also stimulate public debate. This happened in New Zealand with the Labour
Party and in B. C. with the Liberal Party, which lost the 1996 election in spite of gaining a
greater share of the popular vote than the victorious New Democrats.
Once the debate is underway, Mendelson et al support an independent commission of
inquiry with a broad mandate, followed by a broadbased, participatory citizens‘ forum and a
referendum based on the forum’s recommendations (the B. C. model started directly with the
citizens’ assembly).
In Appendix B, we reproduce Courtney’s outdated but still useful chart (2005 at 157)
assessing what it would take to reform Canada’s electoral system.
CONCLUSION
Many Canadians think that the defeat of PR initiatives in B. C., Ontario and Prince
Edward Island means the idea, if not dead, is consigned to lengthy hibernation. Various case
studies (Milner 2004) and Mendlesohn make it clear that an alignment of several stars must
occur for PR to be adopted, as “the new system must be adopted by a parliament elected under
the old rules” (Derriennic, in Howe et al. at 107) and therefore most politicians, even those who
supported PR when in opposition, tend to oppose or benignly neglect the idea when in power due
to FPTP (with the exception of incoming Liberal Premiers in B. C. and Ontario).
The idea may re-surface, however, if future skewed FPTP results outrage a significant
portion of the electorate. Probably the leadership of at least one party represented in the
legislature will be required to keep the ball rolling. In Alberta, this would mean the Liberal Party
or the NDP. If these parties wished, of course, they could jointly undertake an initiative, and
even run a general election campaign on it. A motion in the legislature for a study of the
alternatives to FPTP, or for a reference to the courts about FPTP’s constitutionality, might
stimulate labour, environmental, women’s and minority groups to climb on the bandwagon,
demanding more diverse representation, which the present political culture and power
relationships in society have failed to provide.
The Democratic Renewal Project will continue to support the creation of a transparent
public process in Alberta to consider replacing FPTP with PR. Our federal results are incredibly
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skewed, and not in ways that are good for either national unity or for the interests of progressive
politics.
Prepared by Alberta’s Democratic Renewal Project, February, 2010 (updated, November, 2010)
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APPENDIX A
HOW PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION
ELECTIONS WORK
Douglas J. Amy, Professor of Politics, Mount Holyoke College
We in the United States are very used to our single-member district, winner-take-all style of
elections. We've all grown up with a system where we elect members of our legislatures one at a
time in small districts, with the winner being the candidate with the most votes. This system
seems so "natural" that proportional representation (PR) elections may at first appear a bit
strange to us. Adding to the potential confusion is the fact that there are several different kinds of
PR systems in use around the world. But in reality, the principles underlying proportional
representation systems are very straightforward and all of the systems are easy to use.
The Basic Principles of PR
The basic principles underlying proportional representation elections are that all voters deserve
representation and that all political groups in society deserve to be represented in our legislatures
in proportion to their strength in the electorate. In other words, everyone should have the right to
fair representation.
In order to achieve this fair representation, all PR systems have certain basic characteristics -characteristics that set them apart from our current election system. First, they all use multimember districts. Instead of electing one person in each district, as we do here in the U.S.,
several people are elected. These multi-member districts may be relatively small, with only three
or four members, or they may be larger, with ten or more members. (The figures below illustrate
districting maps for a hypothetical 50-person state senate. Figure 1 shows 50 single-seat
districts, as is common with plurality-majority systems. Figure 2 depicts 10 five-seat PR districts,
and Figure 3 shows 5 ten-seat PR districts.)
Figure 1
Figure 2
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Figure 3
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The second characteristic of all PR systems is that they divide up the seats in these multi-member
districts according to the proportion of votes received by the various parties or groups running
candidates. Thus if the candidates of a party win 40% of the vote in a 10 member district, they
receive four of the ten seats -- or 40% of the seats. If another party wins 20% of the vote, they
get two seats, and so on.
That, in a nutshell, is how proportional representation works. But while all PR systems have the
same goals of ensuring that all voters receive some representation and that all groups are
represented fairly, various systems do have different ways of achieving these goals. So it is
helpful to see how different kinds of PR systems work in practice.
Types of PR Systems
Party List Voting
Party list voting systems are by far the most common form of proportional representation. Over
80% of the PR systems used worldwide are some form of party list voting. It remains the system
used in most European democracies and in many newly democratized countries, including South
Africa.
How It Works. Legislators are elected in large, multi-member districts. Each party puts up a list
or slate of candidates equal to the number of seats in the district. Independent candidates may
also run, and they are listed separately on the ballot as if they were their own party (see below).
On the ballot, voters indicate their preference for a particular party and the parties then receive
seats in proportion to their share of the vote. So in a five-member district, if the Democrats win
40% of the vote, they would win two of the five seats. The two winning Democratic candidates
would be chosen according to their position on the list.
There are two broad types of list systems: closed list and open list. In a closed list system--the
original form of party list voting--the party fixes the order in which the candidates are listed and
elected, and the voter simply casts a vote for the party as a whole. This is shown in the first ballot
below, which illustrates an election for the House of Representatives in a five-seat district.
Voters are not able to indicate their preference for any candidates on the list, but must accept the
list in the order presented by the party. Winning candidates are selected in the exact order they
appear on the original list. So in the example here, if the Democrats won two seats, the first two
candidates on the pre-ordered list--Foster and Rosen-Amy--would be elected.
Closed Party List Ballot
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Most European democracies now use the open list form of party list voting. This approach allows
voters to express a preference for particular candidates, not just parties. It is designed to give
voters some say over the order of the list and thus which candidates get elected. One version of
this is illustrated in the ballot below. Voters are presented with unordered or random lists of
candidates chosen in party primaries. Voters cannot vote for a party directly, but must cast a vote
for an individual candidate. This vote counts for the specific candidate as well as for the party.
So the order of the final list completely depends on the number of votes won by each candidate
on the list. The most popular candidates rise to the top of the list and have a better chance of
being elected. In our example, if the Democrats won 2 seats, and Volz and Gentzler received the
highest and next highest number of individual votes, they would rise to the top of the list and be
elected. This example is similar to the system used in Finland and widely considered to be the
most open version of list voting.
Open Party List Ballot
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A variety of different formulas exist for accomplishing the actual allocation of seats to the
parties. One of the simplest seat allocation formulas is the called the "largest remainder formula."
In this approach, the first step is to calculate a quota, which is determined by taking the total
number of valid votes in the district and dividing this by the number of seats. In the example in
the table below, 100,000 votes were cast and ten seats are to be filled. 100,000/10 = 10,000 –
which is the quota. The quota is then divided into the vote that each party receives and the party
wins one seat for each whole number produced. So the Republican party received 38,000 votes,
which is divided by 10,000 to produce three seats – with a remainder of 8,000. After this first
allocation of seats is complete than the remainder numbers for the parties are compared and the
parties with the largest remainders are allocated the remaining seats. In our example, two seats
remain to be allocated and the Republicans and Moll, the independent candidate, have the largest
remainders, so they get the seats. Ultimately all the parties end up with the number of seats that
as closely as possible approximates their percentage of the vote.
Largest Remainder Approach to Seat Allocation
Mixed-Member Proportional Voting
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Mixed-member proportional representation goes by a variety of other names, including "the
additional member system," "compensatory PR," the "two vote system," and "the German
system." It is an attempt to combine a single-member district system with a proportional voting
system. Half of the members of the legislature are elected in single-member district plurality
contests. The other half are elected by a party list vote and added on to the district members so
that each party has its appropriate share of seats in the legislature. Proponents claim that mixedmember proportional voting (MMP) is the best of both worlds: providing the geographical
representation and close constituency ties of single-member plurality voting along with the
fairness and diversity of representation that comes with PR voting.
This system was originally invented in West Germany right after World War Two, though since
then it has also been adopted in several other countries, including Bolivia and Venezuela. It is
still one of the least used PR systems, but in recent years it has begun to garner a great deal of
attention. In fact, it is now one of the "hottest" systems being considered by those involved in
electoral design. In part this growing attention is a result of MMP’s unique claim to be a
"compromise" between the two main rival systems. In the 1990s New Zealand abandoned its
traditional single-member plurality system for MMP. Hungary also adopted this approach. Most
recently, the newly formed parliaments of Scotland and Wales used this system for their first
elections.
How It Works. People cast votes on a double ballot--see the ballot below. First, on the left part
of the ballot, they vote for a district representative. This part of the ballot is a single-member
district plurality contest to see which person will represent the district in the legislature. The
person with the most votes wins. Typically half of the seats in the legislature are filled in this
way. So in a hypothetical 100-member state legislature, the winners of these district contests
would occupy 50 of the seats.
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On the right part of the ballot--the party list portion--voters indicate their choice among the
parties, and the other half of the seats in the legislature are filled from regional lists of candidates
chosen by these parties. The party lists are closed in the German version. These party list votes
are counted on a national basis to determine the total portion of the 100-seat legislature that each
party deserves. Candidates from each party’s lists are then added to its district winners until that
party achieves its appropriate share of seats. The following table illustrates how this process
works for our hypothetical election. The Democrats won 40% of the party list votes in the 100member state legislature, so they would be entitled to a total of 40 of the 100 seats. Since they
already elected 28 of their candidates in district elections, they would then add 12 more from
their regional party lists to come up to their quota of 40 seats.
Allocation of Seats in MMP
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In the German version two electoral thresholds are used, either of which a party must overcome
to be allotted seats in the legislature. A party must either get 5% of the nationwide party list vote
or win at least three district races in order for it to gain any seats in the legislature. In our
hypothetical case, the New Party did not win any district seats, but they did win over 5% of the
nationwide vote, so they deserve their share of legislative seats--which in this case would be six
seats, all of which would be filled from the regional party lists.
Single Transferable Vote Or Choice Voting
This system of proportional representation is known by several names. Political scientists call it
"the single transferable vote." It is called the "Hare-Clark system" in Australia. In the United
States, electoral reform activists have taken to calling it "choice voting." Currently this system is
used to elect parliaments in Ireland and Malta. In Australia it is used to elect the federal Senate,
as well as the legislatures in several states there. It is also the PR system that was used in a
number of cities in the United States during the twentieth century, including New York,
Cincinnati, Cleveland, Toledo, and Boulder. It continues to be used today in Cambridge,
Massachusetts for elections to their city council and school board.
How It Works. The voting process is illustrated by ballot below. All candidates are listed in the
same place on the ballot. Instead of voting for one person, voters rank each candidate in their
order of choice. So if you like Campbell best, you would mark the "1" after his name. If you
liked Gomez second best, you would mark "2" by his name, and so on. You can rank as few or as
many as you want. This ballot illustrates the use of the AccuVote system used in Cambridge,
Massachusetts to elect its city council and school board. Voters fill in the ranking numbers as
they would for standardized tests taken in school, which allows for computerized vote counting
and ballot transfers.
Choice Voting Ballot
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As the name "single transferable vote" implies, this systems involves a process of transferring
votes. To understand how the transfer process works, it may be best to start out with a simple
analogy. Imagine a school where a class is trying to elect a committee. Any student who wishes
to run stands at the front of the class and the other students vote for their favorite candidates by
standing beside them. Students standing almost alone next to their candidate will soon discover
that this person has no chance of being elected and move to another candidate of their choice to
help him or her get elected. Some of the students standing next to a very popular candidate may
realize that this person has more than enough support to win, and decide to go stand next to
another student that they would also like to see on the committee. In the end, after all of this
shuffling around, most students would be standing next to candidates that will be elected, which
is the ultimate point of this process.
In the single transferable vote, votes are transferred around just as the students moved from
candidate to candidate in the analogy. The exact order of the transfer process is illustrated in
figure below. An example of how the votes are actually transferred is shown in the table that
follows. For the sake of simplicity, assume that there is a three-seat district in which six people
are running for office. The first step in the process is to establish the threshold: the minimum
number of votes necessary to win a seat. The threshold usually consists of the total number of
valid votes divided by one plus the number of seats to be filled, plus one vote. The formula looks
like this: Threshold = (valid votes/1+seats) +1 vote. So in our three-seat districts with 10,000
voters, a candidate would need 10,000/1+3 (which is 2,500) plus one more vote, for 2,501.
Diagram of Ballot Transfer Process
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The second step is to count all the number one choices to see if any candidates have reached the
threshold of 2,501. As shown on the table below, the Democrat Gomez has 2,900 voters and he
is declared elected. But Gomez actually has 399 more votes than he needs to win. These votes
are considered wasted if they stay with Gomez, so they are transferred to the second choices on
the ballot. (There are several ways to do this, but we needn’t get into those details here.) In the
second count, we see the effect of this transfer. The other Democratic candidate, Campbell, gets
300 of those second choice votes, and the independent candidate, Daniels, gets the other 99. The
vote totals are now recalculated to see if anyone is now over the threshold. No one is, so the next
transfer takes place. The candidate with the least chance to win is eliminated and his or her votes
are transferred to their second choices. This candidate is Higgins, the Republican, and 500 of his
votes are transferred to the other Republican candidate, Dains; and the other 100 votes are given
to Daniels. Again the votes are recounted to see if anyone has reached the threshold. Dains has
reached it with 2,800 votes and so she is declared elected. Once again her excess votes are
redistributed to their second choices--200 to Graybeal, and 99 to Daniels. But still no one has
reached the threshold, so again the lowest candidate is eliminated and those votes transferred.
That candidate is Campbell, the Democrat, and 100 of his votes go to Graybeal, and 600 go to
Daniels. This puts Daniels, the independent candidate, over the threshold with 2,698 votes, and
she is the last one elected.
Ballot Count and Transfer Process
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This transfer process is a bit complicated, so why does it exist? The transfer process was
invented primarily to reduce the problem of wasted votes -- votes that are cast but do not actually
elect anyone. Plurality-majority systems routinely waste large numbers of votes and this is why
they are prone to such problems as party misrepresentation, and the underrepresentation of
political minorities, racial minorities, and women. The transfer process in STV is designed to
ensure that the fewest votes are wasted and that the maximum number of people gets to elect a
representative to office. It acknowledges that there are two kinds of wasted votes: votes for
candidates that stand little chance of winning, and votes in excess of what a winning candidate
needs. Transferring these votes to their next ranked choice makes it more likely that they will
actually contribute to the election of a candidate.
Simpler Than They Look
Again, to American eyes, these various PR systems often appear at first to be overly-complex
and confusing. And while the mechanics of seat allocation can sometimes be complicated, the
actual voting process is not intimidating at all and can be easily utilized by the average citizen.
Voters need not understand all the mathematics of these systems to use them effectively. To use
an analogy: you don't have to understand how all the electronic components in your car radio
work in order to use it to find the kind of music you like.
The party list system, the mixed-member system, and the choice vote have all been used for
decades in other Western democracies. Voters in these countries have had no trouble using these
systems, as indicated by the very high voters turnout rates that these PR countries enjoy.
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APPENDIX B
Variables
Present to what extent?
Support for change from
Media
Public
Academics
Commissions
Moderate but intermittent
Low to moderate but intermittent
Several supportive of change
No support from the Lortie; provincial
underway
Some active federal and provincial groups
Elections Canada not proactive to date
No decisions yet on method of election
Low support on government side; moderate
to high among Opposition parties
Public interest groups
Government agencies
Courts
Elected officials
Agreement on an alternative
No; numerous alternative proposed
Resources on which to draw
Some academic research
No influential pro-reform commissions at
the federal level
Obstacles
Politicians‘ self-interest
Public ambivalence
Unease about implications for government
stability
Impact of federalism
Negative in terms of concentration of
linguistic minorities
Positive if provincial test tubes are created
and reformed electoral institutions are
successful
From John Courtney (2005), “Is Talk of Electoral Reform Just Whistling in the Wind?” in Howe
et al eds.
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