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PROJECT INFORMATION DOCUMENT (PID)
APPRAISAL STAGE
Project Name
Region
Sector
Project ID
Borrower(s)
Implementing Agency
Environment Category
Safeguard Classification
Date PID Prepared
Date of Appraisal
Authorization
Date of Board Approval
Report No.: AB1306
Innovation for Competitiveness 1st phase APL
LATIN AMERICA AND CARIBBEAN
General industry and trade sector (50%);General education sector
(30%);Central government administration (10%);General finance
sector (10%)
P089865
Secretaría de Hacienda y Crédito Público
Palacio Nacional, Primer Patio Central, Piso 4
Colonia Centro, D.F., México, 06000
Tel: 52 55 9158 1100 Fax: 52 55 9158 1216
ricochoa.shcp.gob.mx, www.hacienda.gov.mx
CONACYT -Consejo Nacional de Ciencia y Tecnología
Av. Insurgentes Sur No. 1582, Col. Crédito Constructor, Del.
Benito Juárez,
Distrito Federal, México, 03940
Tel: 52-55-5322-7700
[email protected], www.conacyt.mx
[ ] A [ ] B [X] C [ ] FI [ ] TBD
[ ] S1 [ ] S2 [X] S3 [ ] SF [ ] TBD
March 2, 2005
February 18, 2005
May 19, 2005
1. Country and Sector Background
The competitiveness of the Mexican economy is declining.
The decline in Mexico’s competitiveness takes place against a backdrop of strong benefits of
integration into the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in the last half of the
1990s. Growth in Mexico was driven by labor force growth and capital accumulation, with
minimal contribution from total factor productivity growth (0.12% in the period 1991-2000). As
the global economy continued to open, the weak competitiveness of the Mexican economy was
exposed. In 2003, China surpassed Mexico as the United States’ second largest trading partner
after Canada (Country Partnership Strategy -CPS-, 2004). In the World Economic Forum’s
Global Competitiveness Report, Mexico slid from a position of 34 in 1998 to 48 in 2004 (out of
a total of 104 countries). In addition, the World Bank’s Concept Paper for Mexico:
Programmatic Competitiveness and Trade AAA (2004c) identifies the following recent
challenges for the Mexican economy: (i) decrease in exports; (ii) job losses and migration of
firms; (iii) decrease in FDI flows; and (iv) limited industrial production with high value-added
and high R&D intensity. However, the prospects for higher growth in the US economy in 2005
and 2006 are widely expected to spillover into higher growth of the Mexican economy in the
short run. But without sustained improvements in the competitiveness of the Mexican firms,
medium and long-term growth rates will remain lackluster.
Mexico’s innovation system relies heavily on foreign technology. In 2002, Mexico earned the
negligible amount of US$ 48 million from technology intangibles (patent acquisition, technology
licensing payments, protected knowledge and know-how transfer services), compared to the US$
664 million it had to buy from abroad (a payments deficit of US$ 615 million or 93%). With a
technology coverage rate of only 7%, Mexico is at the bottom of OECD countries. Further,
Mexico is highly dependent on foreign know-how in sustaining strong technology export growth,
in particular on US technology: the USA buys 90% of Mexico's total exports; maquiladoras
(assemblers of foreign technology intermediate goods) in external industrial trade represented
about 70% of Mexican exports of goods with a high integration of technology; and Mexico
acquires 35% of all technology intangibles from USA.
Therefore it is important to focus on how to strengthen the Mexican innovation system, which
should play a central role in improving factor conditions and thereby restoring the long term
competitiveness of the Mexican economy.
The Mexican innovation system performs below par compared to economies of its income
level.
Mexico has one of the least effective and efficient innovation systems in Latin America, with a
low ability to translate investments into innovation. In other words, Mexico shows a relative
poor output from its R&D investment, resulting, for instance, in very low patenting activity
(Lederman and Maloney, 2003). The low performance stems from a combination of factors:
(i) Inadequate total investment in R&D. At 0.4% of GDP, the R&D investment level appears
very modest compared to the OECD average (2.2%) and inferior to those of other emerging
economies such as Brazil (1.1%), Chile (0.6%), or China (1.0%). Therefore, total R&D
investment level should be gradually raised. The increase should come from both the public and
private sector with an increasing proportion coming from the private sector. Public R&D
remained constant from 1998 to 2004 at 0.3% of GDP with a slight downward tendency.
(ii) Insufficient private investment in R&D, both as a proportion of GDP and as a percentage of
total national R&D expenditures. Mexican firms invest a little above 0.1% of GDP in R&D,
which compares to 1.5% in the OECD area, 0.4% in Brazil, 0.3% in Chile, and 0.8% in China. In
2001, the Mexican private sector financed only 30% of total R&D expenditures (the Government
of Mexico provided 59%, higher education institutions 9%, and foreign investment, about 1%).
As expected for the level of income in Mexico, the level of private sector R&D expenditures is
below that of the other OECD countries (68% of total R&D expenditures). However the Mexican
firms also under-invest compared to other emerging economies, such as Brazil (44%) and China
(61%).
(iii) Limited international participation and linkages. Despite being one of the ten largest
economies, Mexico only funds 0.25% of the world’s R&D, and its science base produces only
0.7% of new global S&T knowledge, as measured by publications in top S&T journals.
Currently Mexico has relatively few and scattered links with foreign knowledge centers, and the
exchange of advanced students and researchers is low. Without sufficient contribution to the
global pool of science and technology based knowledge, and full integration with other OECD
countries’ innovation systems, the Mexican business sector will remain a distant follower and
adaptor of foreign technology. Some initiatives aiming at networking academic and research
communities between the United States of America, Canada and Mexico have been developed
following the integration of Mexico into NAFTA, but with uneven and overall disappointing
results.
(iv) Inadequate business innovation in part due to inadequate linkages between public R&D
and the productive sector, and few Science and Technology (S&T) based start-ups. Large
companies account for over 80% of private R&D, however few have links with public R&D
institutions and universities. This implies limited private sector access to basic and applied
research, reduced relevance and commercialization of R&D, and a low return to public R&D
investments. Technology-based start-up companies are relatively uncommon, because of lack of
innovative capacity within the firms, insufficient public support to technology development in
companies, a lack of entrepreneurship culture, unfavorable regulations for starting up businesses,
and scarce venture capital funding. Recent government initiatives are successfully addressing
these barriers. However, these programs are too limited in scope to impact the national
innovation system as a whole, and scaling up is required. A recent study on Mexico by RAND
Europe (Kahan, James; 2003) suggested that it would be important to consolidate monitoring and
evaluation mechanisms in order to monitor the private sector response, draw lessons, and apply
them gradually to improve and expand the programs.
(v) Insufficient innovation capacity due to low science and technology skill base. Brains are
at the core of the innovation process. Firms with a higher level of skills are more likely to
innovate, and benefit from S&T knowledge existing elsewhere. Mexico counts 0.7 researchers
per 1,000 economically active persons. This compares to 1 researcher in Brazil; 4 in Spain; 6 in
Korea; and 14 researchers in the USA. This gap in advanced human capital impairs the scientific,
technological and innovative capacity of the Mexican innovation system (NSF, 2003; HolmNielsen, Thorn, Balan, and Brunner, 2004). Further, the small number of professors holding a
doctorate will remain a serious impediment for the development of internationally significant
research, and up-to-date and relevant study programs in the next decade (CONACYT, 2001).
The gap originates from a deficit of quantity, quality and relevance of graduate and post-graduate
education, particularly in science and engineering. Mexico produces approximately 1,000
doctoral graduates (PhDs) per year in comparison to 4,000 in Korea; 6,000 in Brazil; and 45,000
in the USA.
2. Objectives
Mexico’s 2001-2006 National Development Plan outlines a “Vision of Mexico in 2025.” A
component of that vision is quoted by the CPS as follows: “It will be a dynamic nation, with
leadership in the world, with a stable and competitive growth and with an all-inclusive
development process in harmony with the environment.” The program will contribute to the
borrower’s vision and higher level objectives (as stated in the National Development Plan) of
“increasing and expanding the country competitiveness,” and “improving levels of education and
well being,” with its interventions that will strengthen the national innovation system, improve
total factor productivity, and ultimately impact on growth. The Government of Mexico
envisions the national innovation system evolving to a “dynamic networked system” with
increased internationalization, with multiple public-private partnerships, national and foreign,
and with a particular focus towards strengthening Mexico position in NAFTA.
The Program seeks to support the Government’s efforts to improve the competitiveness of the
Mexican economy by strengthening the innovative capacity of the private sector, accelerating
advanced human capital formation, and increasing the international integration of the innovation
system.
To achieve the program’s development objectives, a first phase operation is proposed with two
major lines of investment, in addition to supporting the policy framework for and
internationalization of Mexico’s innovation system. First, on the demand side, the program
would increase support to business innovation; while, second, on the supply side the program
would accelerate the formation of human capital (through strategic and coordinated use of the
scholarship fund); and finally it would support the cohesion and effectiveness of Mexico’s S,T&
I system.
3. Rationale for Bank Involvement
The Mexican Government invited the Bank to support the on-going reforms in the Science,
Technology and Innovation (S,T&I) sector, and to accelerate progress in their implementation,
through the preparation of a follow-on operation to the current Knowledge and Innovation
Project (KIP).
The Government and the Bank included the enhancement of the Mexican economy’s
competitiveness as one of the four pillars of the recent Country Partnership Strategy (CPS). This
project is an integral element in the Bank’s support for strengthening of innovation, training and
education, one of the five areas that compose Mexico’s competitiveness agenda as defined by
Presidencia (the others being infrastructure, investment climate, energy and the financial sector).
The project would have significant synergies with other Government and Bank activities, since it
would: (i) benefit from the reduction of administrative red tape pursued within the investment
climate area of the competitiveness pillar, through easier start-up of high tech companies; (ii)
scale-up the venture capital and thereby contribute to a financial deepening, which is another
goal of the competitiveness agenda; and (iii) invest into a well designed scholarship program,
which would increase the quality and relevance of post graduate education, another important
factor for competitiveness.
Finally, the project is also aligned with the Bank’s strategy for middle-income countries (World
Bank, 2004b) which emphasizes the need to assist governments in improving the
competitiveness of their economy. Therefore, the project would have important learning aspects
for the Bank’s support to other middle income countries.
4. Description
The proposed duration of the program is ten years divided into an initial four-year phase and two
subsequent three-year phases.

The first phase (2006-2009) would help consolidate ongoing S&T sector reforms by
strengthening business innovation and human capital development programs and building
a strong system-wide policy and M&E system. In addition, evaluations and studies will
be carried out, which will help identify areas of further investment in the following
program phases.

The second phase (2010-2012) would address the next steps in the building of a coherent
innovation system, including: (i) further scaling-up of programs (particularly technology
development and venture capital programs); (ii) building on the first phase’s proposed
internationalization policies, by financing activities that strengthen the integration of the
Mexican innovation into the global innovation system; (iii) enlarging the focus and
sphere of the collaborative R&D networks funded in phase 1 in order to establish regional
innovation clusters, and (iv) strengthening state-level innovation sub-systems, possibly
piloting decentralized lending for S,T&I.

The third phase (2013-2015) would emphasize the consolidation of funding mechanisms
and incentives for the National Innovation System (across all areas and levels of
government), with increased decentralization and therefore increased importance of the
roles played by the state-level economic development agencies and science and
technology councils.
The first phase of the program would have two main investment components: (i) CONACYT
Program to Promote Business Innovation, and (ii) CONACYT Program to Finance Scholarships
for Excellence and Relevance; and a smaller capacity building component: (iii) Support for
Policies to enhance Innovation and Internationalization.
Component 1: CONACYT Program to Promote Business Innovation.
The first component, CONACYT Program to Promote Business Innovation, would support the
following of CONACYT’s competitive funding lines: (A) Consortia and Research Networks;
(B) Venture Capital Fund; (C) Pre-competitive Fund; (D) Sectoral Fund for Economic
Development (managed by the Ministry of Economy), and (E) Researchers and Technologists in
Industry. These funds would support established and start-up companies, and public research
centers integrating consortia, according to the operational guidelines for each fund. Subprojects
would be funded on the basis of project proposals selected under the following competitive lines,
and transfers would be made on the basis of signed grant agreements and implementation
progress.
(A) Consortia and Research Networks: the government strategy stresses the importance of the
establishment of medium to long term agreements for collaborative R&D between public
institutions and enterprises as a general mechanism to stimulate the National Innovation System.
This subcomponent would increase support to linkages between groups of enterprises with
existing R&D absorption capacity, and public R&D centers. Consortia and Research Networks
would operate within the framework of strategic areas defined in the government strategy:
information and communication technologies, biotechnology, material sciences, industrial design
and manufacturing processes, infrastructure, and urban and rural development. Priority would be
given to Consortia with international participation in order to advance the internationalization of
the Mexican innovation system. This subcomponent builds on CONACYT’s pilot experiences
from the formation of consortia in medical information technology and manufacturing of
electrical transformers, where research is carried out both, within companies and at the public
research centers. Companies cover 50% of total project costs with their own resources, the other
50% being transferred from CONACYT to the public centers.
(B) Venture Capital Fund: (Emprendedores): this program for technology based start-up
companies is being piloted under the current Knowledge and Innovation Project, and was
designed with light bureaucratic requirements where the private entrepreneur assumes most of
the risks. CONACYT partially funds a trust fund established with NAFIN (A Mexican
development bank), and provides technological evaluation of start-ups requesting financing.
NAFIN administers the fund and convenes private sector investors (e.g. angel investors, private
venture capital firms) to leverage public funds. Five companies are being funded during the pilot
stage.
(C) Pre-Competitive Fund: also started during the current Knowledge and Innovation Project,
the objective of this program known as Ultima Milla (Last Mile) is to help transform scientific
and technological developments into viable high value products and services, bridging the gap
between proof-of-concept and commercialization. Types of activities supported by Precompetitive Fund include prototype development, marketing studies and patent processing.
Proposals for funding are evaluated on a competitive basis and come from companies and
researchers in public institutions.
(D) Sectoral Fund for Economic Development: this Fund is co-financed by CONACYT and the
Ministry of Economy, and administered by the latter with technical evaluations and supervision
carried out by CONACYT. The Fund provides matching grants targeted to SMEs, with larger
companies being able to participate, provided they include SMEs in their proposals. Demand has
steadily risen during the three funding rounds already completed, exceeding available resources
by a factor of eight. Enterprises cover at least 50% of total project costs. This fund was inspired
by a similar fund under the on-going KIP project.
(E) Researchers and Technologists in Industry: this is a labor market insertion program, with
the dual purpose of strengthening innovative capacity within firms, and creating linkages
between the universities and private R&D sector through the “transfer” of advanced human
resources. Program participants would include recent doctoral and masters graduates (i.e.
beneficiaries of the scholarship program) co-financed in decreasing proportion to work within
companies.
Component 2: CONACYT Program to Finance Scholarships for Excellence and Relevance.
The second component, CONACYT Program to Finance Scholarships for Excellence and
Relevance, would support CONACYT’s scholarship programs, to increase both quality and
relevance of human resources to society. In Mexico the availability of advanced S&T skills is
low, and an improved supply of such skills pared with well targeted incentives would lead to
improved innovative capacity. The scholarship program would support graduate studies at the
doctoral, master and specialization levels, in accredited national programs and foreign programs
in centers of excellence.
This component’s activities would support the on-going reform of the scholarship program that
seeks to better link supply of skills with demand from society, notably the private sector.
Scholarships would be better targeted towards graduate programs of high relevance and excellent
quality to improve Mexico’s S&T skill base. Therefore, scholarships would be demand driven,
in the sense that they are increasingly allocated to students that participate in projects meeting
the needs of states (implemented through the S&T funds jointly administered by CONACYT and
the individual states of Mexico, the so-called Fondos Mixtos); the needs of sectors, like health
and environment (through the S&T funds jointly administered by CONACYT and the federal
line ministries, the so-called Fondos Sectoriales); and the needs of the private sector (through the
Sectoral Fund with the Ministry of Economy, collaborative R&D projects and researchers and
technologists in industry program).
The component would build on ongoing reforms, which are supported by the Knowledge and
Innovation Project, and the evaluations of graduate programs under the policy component
(component 3). Further, it would prioritize the funding of scholarship towards international
programs in order to utilize the scholarship program (and the students) as strategic human
“knowledge bridges” between top foreign and national R&D institutions. Component 3 would
support this component with actions geared towards the strengthening of the national graduate
programs, not only assuring that all national programs are accredited under current national
procedures, but also facilitating international accreditation for the best programs and promoting
linkages with relevant foreign graduate programs.
Component 3: Support for Policies to Enhance Innovation and Internationalization in
Mexico.
The third component, Support for Policies to enhance Innovation and Internationalization, would
improve the innovation system by strengthening Mexico’s S,T&I policy framework, and
increasing international integration. Further the component would support professional
international exchange with strategic partners, and analytical work in order to raise awareness,
share knowledge and experiences and promote learning for continuous improvement of
CONACYT’s programs and Mexico’s innovation system. Activities under this component
would therefore be of capacity building nature, and are grouped as follows: (A) Governance and
Policy Development; (B) Support for Business Innovation Policies; (C) Support for Scholarship
Policies; (D) Promotion and Diffusion Activities; and (E) Project Implementation Unit.
(A) Governance and Policy Development: supporting policy background work and the
consolidation of an OECD standard level national M&E system, which would provide feedback
to the governing bodies, helping create policy development cycles. More specifically it would
support performance evaluation of components 1 and 2, and include annual stakeholder
workshops in order to solicit feed-back for improvement of program performance. Also, support
for the reform process through the institutional strengthening of the S,T&I governing bodies,
established by the new S&T Law, is included.
(B) Support for Business Innovation Policies: including the review of the rules for intellectual
property rights for public-private collaborative R&D and establish actions to bring IPR in
Mexico up to international standard.
(C) Support for Scholarship Policies: including actions for increased internationalization of the
graduate programs, international accreditation of the best graduate programs, and a tracking
system for graduates.
(D) Promotion and Diffusion Activities: to assure enough outreach to potential beneficiaries,
particularly those outside the Federal District.
(E) Project Implementation Unit: will cover staff salaries and associated expenses of the
implementation unit.
5. Financing
Source:
BORROWER
INTERNATIONAL BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND
DEVELOPMENT
($m.)
191
191
Total
382
6. Implementation
Institutional and implementation arrangements would be continued from the current Knowledge
for Innovation Project (KIP), as they are performing on a highly satisfactory manner.
CONACYT is the implementing agency through its Project Implementation Unit (PIU), in
coordination with relevant Directorates of CONACYT. The PIU is housed within the
Directorate for Administration and Finances, Dirección Adjunta de Administración y Finanzas,
which reports directly to CONACYT’s General Director, and the PIU has excellent working
relationships with the different CONACYT’s Directorates. CONACYT, and its PIU, have
demonstrated high capacity for project implementation, including smooth interfaces with other
important Government entities, such as NAFIN and the Ministry of Finance (SHCP, Secretaría
de Hacienda y Crédito Público), which are critically important for project implementation, since
these organizations are involved in the fiduciary aspects of multilateral projects. Institutional
and implementation arrangements are constantly improving, as CONACYT is proactively
participating in “Intragov”, a general government program for continued quality improvement of
the public administration
7. Sustainability
Sustainability is closely linked to government and beneficiary ownership. First, Government
ownership is high, since the project would scale-up ongoing programs and enhance programs
that are currently being piloted, within a context of non-additionality for loans, which guaranties
budget support though budget line number 38 (specific for CONACYT). Second, beneficiary
ownership has been rapidly growing, as there has been increased demand for the new partnership
programs, particularly from the private sector but also from CONACYT’s research centers and
public and private universities throughout the country.
8. Lessons Learned from Past Operations in the Country/Sector
In addition to the lessons learned from the current Mexico Knowledge and Innovation Project,
the technical design reflects lessons from various relevant Bank projects, particularly from three
sets of S,T&I projects: in Brazil, Chile and Korea, where the Bank has had a long term
involvement through sequential interventions in the sector. Further, the design incorporates
experiences from the World Bank Institute’s work on the Knowledge Economy in Mexico, the
Bank’s (2004e) “Science, Technology and Innovation Toolkit”, the up-date of the Review of
World Bank Lending for S&T (2004f), and the Bank’s S&T stocktaking workshop in November
of 2004. Finally the team has taken the evaluation of IDB’s S&T lending program and its
strategy (2001) into account. The following major lessons learnt are reflected in the design:
(i) Long term strategic planning and a coherent vision is a prerequisite for effective lending in a
sector that depends on the development of complex national innovation systems and access to
advanced human capital. Hence, it is necessary to provide continuity through changes in
government, for example by maintaining a decade long program horizon. For this reason a three
phase APL has been suggested for Mexico in this case.
(ii) Matchmaking is necessary. Effective support of private sector R&D is difficult to design,
first because of widespread lack of R&D capacity in the private sector, and a concomitant lack of
in-depth understanding of R&D issues. For these reasons, Bank operations have included for
example “platforms” between the public and private sectors, providing space for partnership
building, improving communication and mutual understanding of issues, and “matchmaking.”
This approach is suggested and integrated in the design of component one of the new operation
for Mexico.
(iii) The Bank’s S,T&I projects had a tendency to be overloaded with specific components to
address specific constraints, and to satisfy multiple stakeholders of the NIS. Operations benefit
from a simple structure (that supports the policy framework), monitoring and performance
evaluation activities, and adjustable funding mechanisms which are linked to outcomes and
performance. Therefore components one and two of this operation have been designed as
program support for two CONACYT programs, which will contain the previously mentioned
(sub-components) activities.
(iv) It is important to reach balance between establishing critical mass in the science and
engineering base, and creating incentives for private R&D, because it takes attractive and
engaged partners to bridge the gap between science and business. International experience
suggests that the private sector is not likely to take the lead in R&D investments at the current
low levels of critical mass in a country such as Mexico. Therefore the new operation would
balance the needs for increased advanced human capital with state-of-the-art incentives for
private sector take off.
(v) A venture capital component is key when there is a lack of other sources of technology
finance, and enjoys positive returns if properly managed, as shown by India’s Industrial
Technology Project. According to this project’s ICR, many technology ventures would not have
happened in the absence of venture capital financing, or it would have taken much longer to take
off, or their scope would have been significantly curtailed. Average returns were around 20%.
(vi) Fiduciary and safeguard procedures should be as responsive to the beneficiaries as possible
in order to attract the private sector. Traditional Government and Bank fiduciary guidelines
have been overly bureaucratic, and have deterred firms from participating. The Bank’s increased
flexibility on fiduciary arrangements provides new opportunities for more responsive
investments in S,T&I.
9. Safeguard Policies (including public consultation)
Safeguard Policies Triggered by the Project
Environmental Assessment (OP/BP/GP 4.01)
Natural Habitats (OP/BP 4.04)
Pest Management (OP 4.09)
Cultural Property (OPN 11.03, being revised as OP 4.11)
Involuntary Resettlement (OP/BP 4.12)
Indigenous Peoples (OD 4.20, being revised as OP 4.10)
Forests (OP/BP 4.36)
Safety of Dams (OP/BP 4.37)
Projects in Disputed Areas (OP/BP/GP 7.60)*
Projects on International Waterways (OP/BP/GP 7.50)
Yes
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No
[X]
[X]
[X]
[X]
[X]
[X]
[X]
[X]
[X]
[X]
10. List of Factual Technical Documents
Background Studies and Reports
Acemoglu, Daron; Philippe Aghion, and Fabrizio Zilibotti, 2002. Distance to Frontier,
Selection, and Economic Growth. NBER Working Paper Series 9066, Cambridge,
Massachusetts.
CONACYT, 2004 Informe 2001-2003 y perspectivas para el 2004 (2001-2003 Report and
perspectives for 2004).
*
By supporting the proposed project, the Bank does not intend to prejudice the final determination of the parties' claims on the
disputed areas
________
, 2003. Informe General del Estado de la Ciencia y Tecnología (General Report on
Science and Technology).
________
, 2001. Consejo Nacional de Ciencia y Tecnología. Retos actuales en materia de
capacidad científica y tecnológica, y competitividad. Diagnóstico 2001-2006 (Challenges
on scientific and technological capacity and competitiveness. Diagnostic 2001-2006).
________
, 2001b. Innovation Survey on Manufacturing.
Michael F. Crawford; C. César Yammal, Hongyu Yang, and Rebecca L. Brezenoff, 2004.
Review of World Bank Lending for Science and Technology, 1980-2004; unpublished.
World Bank. Washington, DC.
Dahlman, Carl and Yevgeny Kuznetsov, 2004. Mexico’s Challenge of Knowledge-based
Competitiveness: Toward a Second-Generation NAFTA Agenda. World Bank Institute.
De Ferranti, David et al., (2003). Closing the Gaps in Education and Technology, World Bank,
Washington, DC.
________
, 2002. From Natural Resources to the Knowledge Economy - Trade and Job Quality,
World Bank Latin American and Caribbean Studies - Viewpoints, World Bank,
Washington, DC
de Roquefeuil, Alexis, 2004. Mexico – Science, Technology and Innovation System. LCSHD
Background Paper, Department of Human Development, World Bank.
Government of Mexico, 2004. Agenda de Competitividad: 2004-2006 (Competitiveness Agenda:
2004-2006).
Holm-Nielsen, Lauritz; Kristian Thorn, Jorge Balan, and José Joaquín Brunner, 2004. Regional
and International Challenges to Higher Education in Latin America. IMHE/OECD/WB, in
press.
Inter-American Development Bank, 2001. Science and Technology for Development – an IDB
Strategy. Washington DC.
Kahan, James, 2003. Technology Use and Productivity in Mexico: A Feasibility Study. RAND
Europe. The Netherlands.
Lederman and Maloney, 2003. NAFTA study.
López-Acevedo, Gladys, 2001. “Mexico Technology, Wages and Employment”. Volume I and
Volume II. World Bank, Washington D.C.
López-Córdova, J. Ernesto, 2002. “Nafta and Mexico’s Manufacturing Productivity: An
empirical Investigation Using Micro-level Data.” Paper presented at the LACEA Meeting,
Madrid.
Mayorga, Román, 1997. Closing the Gap. Inter-American Development Bank. Washington DC,
National Science Foundation, 2003. Science and Engineering Indicators.
OECD, 2004. Main Science and Technology Indicators.
________
, 2004b. Science, Technology and Industry Outlook 2004.
World Bank, 2004. Memorandum of the President of the International Bank for Reconstruction
and Development and the International Finance Corporation to the Executive directors on a
Country Partnership Strategy of the World Bank Group with the United Mexican States.
Report No. 28141-ME. Washington, D.C.
________
, 2004b. Memorandum from the President, Enhancing World Bank Support to Middle
Income Countries, Revised Version. SECM2004-0071/1. Washington, D.C.
________
, 2004c. Mexico: Programmatic Competitiveness and Trade Analytical and Advisory
Services Concept Paper. Washington, D.C.
________
, 2004d. Mexico: Programmatic Competitiveness and Trade Analytical and Advisory
Services Concept Paper. Washington, D.C.
________
, 2004e. World Bank Science, Technology and Innovation Projects, A toolkit for Task
Managers”, Washington, D.C.
________
, 2003. Project Appraisal Document on a Proposed Loan in the Amount of US$25.26
Million to the Republic of Chile for a Project: Science for the Knowledge Economy, in
Support of the Program to Improve the Innovation System. Report No.25324. Washington,
D.C.
World Bank Institute, 2004. Knowledge Assessment Methodology, unweighted knowledge
economy indexes: http://info.worldbank.org/etools/kam2005/unweighted/map.asp
Project Processing
Letter of Invitation to the Bank from the Ministry of Finance (SHCP); February 6, 2004. Mexico
D.F.
Preliminary project concept document written by the Mexican counterpart.
Mexico D.F.
March 2004.
Aide-memoires for project preparation missions: April 2004, September 2004, November 2004.
Mexico D.F.
11. Contact point
Contact: Lauritz B. Holm-Nielsen
Title: Lead Education Specialist
Tel: (202) 473-6712
Fax:
Email: [email protected]
12. For more information contact:
The InfoShop
The World Bank
1818 H Street, NW
Washington, D.C. 20433
Telephone: (202) 458-5454
Fax: (202) 522-1500
Web: http://www.worldbank.org/infoshop