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Hegel on Conscience: E§503A “ethical...determinations ought not to lay claim to the obedience of the human being merely as external laws or as the dictates of an authority. Instead, they ought to find assent, recognition, or even justification in his heart, disposition [Gesinnung], conscience, insight, etc.” §EPR132 The right of the subjective will is that whatever it is to recognize as valid should be perceived by it as good... R The right to recognize nothing that I do not perceive as rational is the highest right of the subject... True versus formal §EPR 137 True conscience is the disposition to will what is good in and for itself; it therefore has fixed principles, and these have for it the character of determinacy and duties which are objective for themselves. In contrast to its content - i.e. truth - conscience is merely the formal aspect of the activity of the will, which as this will, has no distinctive content of its own. §EPR 137A “Conscience expresses the absolute authority of subjective self-consciousness, namely to know what right and duty are both within oneself [in sich] and as proceeding from oneself (aus sich), and to recognize nothing other than what it knows as the good; it also includes the claim that what it thus knows as the good; it also includes the claim that what it thus knows and wills is in truth right and duty.” §EPR 137A “The state cannot recognize the conscience in its distinctive form, i.e. as subjetive knowledge, any more than science can grant any validity to subjective opinion, assertion, and the appeal to subjective opinion.” §147 (Notes - not in English edition) The Greeks had no conscience. “they were] unable to give an account; [they had] no conscience, no conviction - [their affirmative stance was] unmediated by reasons.” “It was in the time of Socrates that a moral standpoint first arose. The Athenians accused him of the crime of no longer following the laws of the fatherland and believing in his country’s - of no longer being so immediately ethical [Sittlich]. Socrates established the standpoint of inner reflection, of thinking over whether something is true. [His principle was] that the concept of God, of good and evil... is not immediately binding [gültig] in itself but, in order to be recognised, must first have made its way through the interior of the human being.” VPR4 301 For the good will is something particular, based on the morality of the individual, on the conviction and interiority. The very subjective freedom, which constitutes the absolute basis of our state and our religious life, could only manifest itself to Greece as a destructive principle. The Greek spirit was not far away from subjectivity (interiority) but had to attain it; but subjectivity led to the demise of the Greek world, for the constitution of the Greek world was not commensurate with this side of things and unfamiliar with it, because subjectivity was not present. Of the Greeks in the first and true form of their freedom we can assert that they had no conscience. The habit of living for the fatherland, without further reflection, was the dominant principle among them. They did not know the abstraction of the state, which for us is what is essential; their purpose was the living principle of the fatherland: this Athens, this Sparta, this temple, these altars, these ways of living together, this circle of fellow citizens these manners and customs. to the Greek, the fatherland was a necessity without which he could not live.” Lectures on the Philosophy of History, part II, chapter 3, The Political Work of Art. G.W.F.Werke XII 309 Hegel On The Antigone “Thus there is immanent to both Antigone and Creon, exactly that against which each turns, so that each is gripped and shattered by something intrinsic to their own sphere of existence. (15 549) “The collision between the two highest ethical powers is enacted in plastic fashion in that absolute exemplum of tragedy, Antigone...Creon is not a tyrant, but an ethical power just as much as Antigone. Creon is not wrong; he claims...that, the law of the state, the authority of government should be preserved, and that punishment follows its transgression. Both these sides realize only one of the ethical powers, has only one of these as its content. This is the one-sidedness, and the meaning of eternal justice, is that both do wrong because they are onesided, and thus both do right.” (17, 133) Hegel on Antigone (the character) Phenomenology of Spirit Sophocles’ Antigone acknowledges them as the unwritten and infallible law of the gods. “They are not of yesterday or today, but everlasting/ though where they came from, none of us can tell.” They are. If I inquire after their origin and confine them to the point whence they arose, then I have transcended them;...§437 The ethical consciousness must, on account of this actuality and on account of its deed, acknowledge its opposite a its own actuality, must acknowledge its guilt. “Because we suffer, we acknowledge we have erred.” §470 “If this be pleasing to the gods, we acknowledge, that since we suffer, we acknowledge we have erred.” (18, 509) Antigen’s words “If this be pleasing to the gods, we acknowledge, that since we suffer, we acknowledge we have erred. If, however, the error lies with my judges, I could wish them no fuller measure of evil than they do, unjustly, to me” The Antigone in Sophocles: the Plays and Fragments tr. R. Jebb, Cambridge, CUP, 1906, p. 166.