Download emergence and complexity in austrian economics

EMERGENCE AND COMPLEXITY IN AUSTRIAN ECONOMICS
J. Barkley Rosser, Jr.
James Madison University
[email protected]
March, 2011
Acknowledgements: The author wishes to acknowledge useful comments from Paul
Lewis and participants in an SDAE session at the 2010 Southern Economic Association
meetings where an earlier version of this paper was presented.
1
“The totality is not, as it were, a mere heap, but the whole is something besides the
parts.”
-
Aristotle, Metaphysics, Book H 1045a, 8-10.
Introduction
A deep theme of Austrian economics has been that of spontaneous order or selforganization of the economy. The origin of this theme dates to the putative founder of
the Austrian School, Carl Menger, with his theory of the spontaneous emergence of
money for transactions purposes in primitive economies being archetypal example
(Menger, 1892). Menger drew this approach from the Scottish Enlightenment figures
David Hume, Adam Ferguson, and Adam Smith, with the latter’s Wealth of Nations
(1776) particularly important. The most important developer of this idea within the
tradition after Menger was F.A. Hayek (1948), who would identify this self-organization
phenomenon with emergence, later expanding upon this into the broader concept of
complexity (Hayek, 1952, 1967). Caldwell (2004) argues that this became an
increasingly important focus of Hayek’s thought in the later years of his life. Among
those examining this development in more detail besides Caldwell have been Koppl
(2006, 2009), Rosser (2010a),1 and Lewis (2010).
This essay will consider more thoroughly the relationship between the concepts of
emergence and complexity and the roles that they have played in Austrian economics as
well as more broadly in philosophy and science. An important point is that both of these
concepts do not possess precise meanings; they are “terms of art” within philosophy.
1
Rosser (2010a) in particular identifies Böhm-Bawerk as the leading example of an Austrian economist
whose models involve essentially no complexity at all. A number of other Austrian figures exhibit
elements of complexity at times, although less so than Menger or Hayek, with von Mises and Kirzner being
examples.
2
However, while closely linked through the general idea of a whole being “greater than
the sum of its parts” (or at least not equal to that sum), they are not identical, with
complexity being the broader concept. It must also be recognized that focusing on such
concepts has not been central to, or even particularly a part of, certain branches of
Austrian economics or of much concern to some of its adherents.
Aspects of the Emergence Concept
The concept of emergence is a subject of considerable controversy within
philosophy from where it initially emerged into many other disciplines, ranging from
chemistry to psychology through biology into economics and others, although often with
these applications merging together across disciplines. A sign of this is that most
discussions of emergence identify the modern founder of the idea to be the economistphilosopher, John Stuart Mill (1843) in one of his works of philosophy rather than
economics, although he identified what was later identified as emergence with what he
called heteropathic laws (to be distinguished from homeopathic and did not use the term
“emergence.” Rather in the spirit of the quotation above from Aristotle, Mill saw
heteropathic laws operating in a process when the resultant of the process could not be
viewed simply as the sum of its parts as in vector addition. While it may have clearly
identifiable parts that combine, this combination generates something substantially
different from the parts.2 His original example was from chemistry, involving the
following equation:
This somewhat resembles Hegel’s (1842) distinction between quantitative change and qualitative change,
formulated just prior to Mill’s work and independently of it. Hegel’s classic example of a quantitative
change to a qualitative one is how water undergoes major changes of state at certain critical temperatures,
an example Lewis (2011) presents as an archetypal example of emergence, although he notes that the
2
3
CH4 + 2O2 => CO2 + 2H2O,
(1)
that is, methane combined with oxygen yields carbon dioxide and water, a distinct
transformation of one pair of entities into two quite different ones.
Inspired by Mill’s discussion, the psychologist, George Henry Lewes (1875, p.
412) coined the term “emergent,” from which the modern scientific “emergence” would
emerge, as being something arising from “cooperation of unlike kinds” with the resulting
emergent being such that “it cannot be reduced to their sum or difference.” This
irreducibility aspect of emergence has since come to be identified with what is called
strong emergence (Bedau, 1997), with weak emergence more readily reducible to its
basal components (or more easily deduced from them). Lewes’s strong emergence would
go on to become the foundation of the later British emergentist movement, whereas the
more recent concept of weak emergence has been used in modern computational
complexity theory and is identified with patterns that arise from computer simulation
systems such as the Game of Life of Conway (Gardner, 1970).3
The British emergentist movement reached a peak of influence in the 1920s,
albeit with the divisions between strong and weak emergence already visible at that time.
The strong emergentist camp was lead by C.D. Broad (1925) who was more directly
inspired by Mill. In the depiction of a multi-layered reality, the higher emergent levels
would be ontologically distinct and relate to each other in a direct causal manner at the
higher levels.4 In much of this literature the levels are eventually across disciplines, with
appearance of any of water’s emergent states involves a substantive difference from the state of an isolated
H2O molecule from a sufficient aggregation of them to produce one of the standard forms of water..
3
Inspired by work of John von Neumann, Conway’s “Life” introduced cellular automata, the basis for
many later simulation models and systems.
4
Broad was particularly focused on the mechanist versus vitalist debate, taking the side of vitalism, which
was viewed as being defeated by the emergence of reductionist quantum mechanics in the 1930s, often
viewed as being the death knell of the broader British emergentist movement. Given this link to vitalism, it
4
physics being viewed as the foundation, out of which emerge chemical phenomena, out
of which emerge biological ones, then the psychological, and then the social sciences,
with some going beyond that to more metaphysical levels such as theology.5
In contrast, Samuel Alexander (1920) and C. Lloyd Morgan (1923) put less
emphasis on the distinct operations at the higher level and more on the element of novelty
of what emerged at the higher level. While Lewes and Broad were more concerned with
the theory of mind, Morgan in particular was more focused on biology and evolution, a
point we shall return to later, given the concern of Hayek in particular for evolutionary
processes. Hayek (1967) specifically noted this line of influences from Mill to Lewes to
Morgan in his own discussion of emergence within complex systems.
Within the more current philosophical literature there have been efforts to pin
down more precisely the concept of emergence, with various debates arising from these
efforts, with many of them involving invoking various terms to define it, with the result
being that the debates then shift to arguing about the definitions of these terms. Thus,
one of the more prominent such efforts was due to James van Cleve (1990, p. 221). He
posed the following:
“If P is a property of w, then P is emergent if and only if P supervenes
with nomological necessity, but not with logical necessity, on the properties of the
parts of w.”6
is not surprising that the “Father of Medicine,” Galen, is sometimes viewed as a precursor of emergentism
along with Aristotle.
5
Harper and Endres (2010a) emphasize use the levels approach to consider layers within the structure of
the capital stock. Extending this to emergence, they (Harper and Endres, 2010b) focus on the ideas of
novelty, uncertainty, and irreducibility. They note the focus of O’Driscoll and Rizzo (1985) on uncertainty.
6
Van Cleve felt that this definition is so strong that it rules out almost any form of emergentism except
possibly for mental conscious properties.
5
Needless to say, this raises the question of what does one mean by such terms as
nomological and supervenes? The former is clearer than the latter and refers to laws.
Thus, whatever phenomenon emergence is it is fundamentally due to physical or
scientific laws, not some logical relationship (Popper, 1934; Hempel and Oppenheim,
1948). It is a phenomenon of the material world, which distinguishes it from some of the
more vitalistic and theological viewpoints lurking in the discussions by some of the
British emergentists, notably Alexander. This does not mean that logic is ruled out of
nomological necessity. Indeed, Hempel and Oppenheim (1948) in particular discuss
“deductive-nomological” systems in which logical deduction plays a crucial role for
much of the system building, although always deriving from some fundamental scientific
law or laws. This approach is not inconsistent with Hayek’s approach to psychology in
The Sensory Order (1952) in which the mind operates by sets of rules that are eventually
based on the physical laws governing the behavior of the neurons in the brain, even as
Hayek tends to favor a more inductive view than a deductive one.
This leads us to the arguably more problematic concept of supervenience, which
has engendered considerable controversy that lies at the heart of the issues of the nature
of emergence, including the division between strong and weak emergence. The term
comes from the Latin supervenire, which in turn was used to translate the term
epiginomenon from Aristotle in the Middle Ages (McLaughlin, 1997, Appendix). The
term has been argued to imply that something “extra” or “unexpected” or, to use a term
associated with Morgan and the weak emergence school, “novel” is involved in what is
emergent (McLaughlin, 1997; Welshon, 2002).
6
However, more has been put on the plate of this concept than just these items. In
particular, there has been much debate about its relation to downward causation from the
higher emergent level to the lower basal one from which it emerged. Lewis (2011)
argues that Hayek’s views imply downward causation, with emerged institutions and
spontaneous orders in economies strongly influencing lower level entities in their
decisionmaking and actions, even he did not support it strongly. But some philosophers
of emergence argue that supervenience does not imply such downward causation,
particularly Jaengwon Kim (1993, 1999), Humphreys (1997a,b) and O’Connor and Wong
(2006). In essence they argue that anything going on at the higher level must be due to
things going on at the lower levels, and so the idea that the higher level is independently
influencing the lower level is an epiphenomenon.
For Kim this becomes the basis for a broader critique and doubt about the concept
of emergence in philosophical or metaphysical terms, although Humphreys is more
willing to accept that emergence occurs in the physical world through fusion at the lower
levels. For Kim, emergence and supervenience imply physical non-reductionism, with
Kim thus ultimately siding with the reductionist position seen as having overthrown
British emergentism when quantum mechanics fully appeared in the 1930s. However, in
economics it does not seem unreasonable to argue the Mengerian emergence of money
does supervene upon substantially upon agents in the economy in a serious way such that
they behave very differently when money exists compared with when it does not. Of
course, the form of emergence that is accepted by the most skeptical who will accept
emergence at all, such as van Cleve (1990) is the mind, with this fitting in perfectly with
7
Hayek’s (1952) view from The Sensory Order, with of course emergence in economic
systems ultimately arising further out of the mental operations of individuals.
The definitions of emergence that emphasize the appearance of something novel
or unexpected at a different level from the initial also includes special cases in which the
emergence involves the actual appearance or creation of the new level itself. This is
implied in the evolutionary history of the universe from sub-atomic particles in physics
that aggregated into atoms, then later into chemical molecules, then into more
complicated organic molecules, into life, into multi-cellular organisms,7 and so on. This
process of the emergence of entirely new levels has been labeled anagenesis by Boulding
(1978) and Jantsch (1979), and has been analyzed by Rosser et al. (1994). Such
processes exhibit not only emergence, but at the biological and social levels involve
complex evolutionary processes, much as in the view of the British emergentists, a theme
covered more fully below.
Emergence and Complexity
As noted above, emergence can be seen as a part of the broader complexity
concept. Indeed, it is hard to conceive of an example of emergence that could not also be
viewed as representing a complex dynamic. This may be a matter of “complexity”
simply having even more definitions than “emergence,” but it is also because at a very
general level, one of the things that is associated with the concept of complexity is the
linking together of parts into wholes that are greater than the sum of the parts, which is
also how emergence has been described almost from its beginning. However, complexity
7
Eigen and Schuster (1979) describe this particular emergence as the hypercycle. Rosser (1991, 1992)
extended this idea to broader systemic processes with the concept of hypercyclic morphogenesis.
8
has been used in ways that do not so clearly reflect this characteristic, so while it is very
hard to conceive of an emergence process that is not also a complex one, there are almost
certainly complex systems or processes that do not necessarily involve emergence.
Over a decade ago, Seth Lloyd proposed a list of 45 definitions of complexity
(Horgan, 1997, p. 303), and this list is not exhaustive by any means. Rosser (2009a)
identifies this level of complexity as being meta-complexity. Below this are the various
categories of complexity. Most important for our discussion at this stage are the broad
categories of computational complexity and dynamic complexity.
The former has many definitions itself, with Velupillai (2009) providing useful of
the many varieties. This involves considering a system from the standpoint of
computability, with complexity being tied roughly to the length of algorithms needed to
solve the programs that characterize the system.8 Some consider true computational
complexity to hold only for systems that are not computable at all, that suffer from an
inevitable halting problem (Blum et al., 1998; Koppl and Rosser, 2002). Others focus on
degrees of computational complexity involving levels, such as the matter of the relation
between N and NP in solvability, with the exact relation of these an ongoing matter of
dispute (da Costa and Doria, 2010). The potentially precise measurability of
computational complexity is something that is stressed by those advocating its use in
economics as the supreme definition of complexity (Markose, 2005; Velupillai, 2009).
Some defenders of this complexity concept (McCauley, 2004) denounce the concept of
emergence as being poorly defined and thus inferior. He extends this criticism even to
those who study computable systems exhibiting emergence that can be used to study
evolutionary dynamics (Crutchfield, 1994). Instead McCauley particularly favors the
8
The first to study computational complexity in economics was Albin (1982).
9
work of Moore (1990) that emphasizes the role of novelty as crucial to complexity, one
of the ideas stressed by many students of emergence as discussed above.
Dynamic complexity has been defined by Rosser (1999) following Day (1994) as
occurring in dynamical systems that do not converge to a point, a limit cycle, or a smooth
expansion or contraction endogenously.9 This is generally broken down into the “four
C’s” of cybernetics, catastrophe theory, chaos theory, and agent-based complexity.10
This latter is often viewed by many as being the “real complexity,” at least in economics,
with a strong influence on its development from the Santa Fe Institute. Such systems are
generally nonlinear systems, or easily transformed into them,11 although not all nonlinear
dynamical systems exhibit dynamic complexity, and some that do exhibit it only do so
for certain ranges of parameter values and starting values of the system.
While not all of these dynamically complex systems exhibit emergence, some do,
most frequently those associated with the agent-based complexity in which agents
interact locally with these interactions often leading to the emergence of order out of
initially disordered states. The classic example was the model of the emergence of urban
segregation out of an initially integrated urban area, due to Schelling (1971).
Rosser (2009b) presents a variety of approaches to modeling emergence
computationally. Among these, Lee (2005) poses a formulation in which emergence
occurs when a state becomes more computationally complex through a transformational
function in a computable system, although it may not be computable to estimate this
computational complexity. Lee draws on hierarchical models following Langton (1992),
Dhamaraj and Velupillai (2010) refer this as “Day-Rosser complexity.”
Rosser (1999) originally referred to agent-based complexity as “small-tent complexity” in contrast with
the “big tent complexity” of the broader dynamic type.
11
Examples of linear dynamical systems exhibiting this are the coupled linear dynamical systems whose
one equation representations are nonlinear due to Goodwin (1947) and Turing (1952).
9
10
10
who compares the four-level hierarchy of Chomsky (1959) with that of Wolfram (1984).
While Chomsky’s focuses more on levels of language, Wolfram’s is based on cellular
automata. These models are put into computable evolutionary contexts by Kaufmann
(1993) and by Mirowski (2007) in terms of the evolution of market forms into
hierarchies.
While Hayek did not involve himself with computer simulations (or even the sort
of playing on chess boards that Schelling initially did), others such as Vriend (2002) have
seen Hayek’s views as compatible with this view of dynamic complexity. Probably the
first Austrian economist to notice Hayek’s work on complexity and to draw attention to it
as being such was Lavoie (1989)who emphasized the self-organization arguments of
Hayek (1948), arguments echoed by Per Bak (1996) in a more overtly computational
context.
As has already been pointed out, in Hayek’s view, emergence and complexity are
essentially the same thing, given his linking of the concept of complexity to the
emergentist tradition of Mill, Lewes, and Morgan. This emergentist view is consistent
also with Hayek’s view of the emergence of mental properties from the interactions of the
hierarchies of neuronal linkages in the brain. However, Hayek also has links to the
computational complexity view given his references to diagonal proofs in the Gödel
incompleteness theorems, using these to emphasize that the mind cannot fully know
itself, with others emphasizing that this can be applied to the idea of a central planner
also not being able to fully know an economy that contains the central plan within it, the
problem of self-reference (Koppl and Rosser, 2002). Thus, in his deepest analysis of the
mind and its relation to his deepest critiques of economic planning, Hayek combines both
11
the emergentism of dynamic complexity with computational complexity, wherein the
need to go to a higher meta-system to understand fully a particular system can itself be
seen as another form or emergence.
Evolutionary Complex Emergence
It has been much discussed (Caldwell, 2004) that over time Hayek increasingly
moved towards an evolutionary perspective on the economy. This provided the way
through which Hayek more seriously integrated his views on emergence and complexity
into the study of the economy, while leaving his considerations of computational
complexity in the theory of the mind behind. Not only did markets spontaneously
emerge through processes of self-organization out of the interactions of dispersed,
heterogeneous agents, but higher level institutions of society did so as well such as
systems of law and customs of social behavior. He saw these emerging through a
complex evolutionary process in which natural selection operated at the higher level of
the emergent form, as in the strong emergence view where higher level entities interact
directly and in which downward causation operates. Thus, the nature of the emergent
form influences the behavior of the agents, without this being simply an epiphenomenal
manifestation of the agents indirectly influencing themselves, although ultimately the
natural selection is operating at the individual level.
This is really an example of multi-level evolution as modeled by James F. Crow
(1955) and George R. Price (1970). These approaches to natural selection seek to
reconcile the holistic approaches of the rejected British emergentists with the reductionist
approaches that say that all natural selection operates fundamentally at the level of the
12
gene, and not even at the level of the individual, per se (Dawkins, 1976). This really
becomes an effort to reconcile the strong and weak views of emergence, with the process
ultimately operating at the most fundamental level at the base, the gene in biological
evolution, and the individual in socio-economic evolution, but also mediated through the
higher levels of groups in both cases. There is a balancing of both upward and downward
causation in this approach, at least implicitly in the later work of Hayek.
Lewis (2011) points to the Epilogue of the third volume of Hayek’s Law,
Legislation and Liberty (1979, p. 158) as a place where Hayek more specifically endorses
a form of downward causation in terms of evolutionary laws acting on populations,
supporting the views of Campbell (1974) in doing so. He clearly supports the
formulation that lower level entities in the ontological hierarchy become constrained by
emergent properties in the higher level. While he does not clearly do so, his view is
consistent with the stronger position that that higher level emergence might actually
reconstitute the entities at the lower levels rather than merely constraining them.
Since the death of Hayek, others have pushed these ideas of evolutionary
emergent complexity. Hodgson and Knudsen (2006, 2010) have argued vigorously that
evolution is the supreme complex process of them all, with emergence a fundamental
manifestation of it. Kaufmann’s (1993) approach has stimulated great controversy as he
has debated with such figures as Gould (2002) that complex emergence provides an
additional layer of causation and development beyond the conventional neo-Darwinian
synthesis view of evolution. Kaufmann’s approach has the added element of bringing in
computational approaches and issues, which make many more traditional evolutionary
biologists uncomfortable and in many cases outright skeptical.
13
Mirowski’s (2007) controversial approach has all of these elements that resemble
the Hayekian view in many ways, even as Mirowski disagrees with Hayek on various
points. He defines markets overtly as algorithms, throwing the discussion fully into the
realm of the matter of computational complexity.12 However, these algorithms
themselves evolve, this implying an evolution of market institutions, with natural
selection operating on the different kinds of market systems. Furthermore, hierarchical
patterns develop as this evolutionary process leads to the emergence of higher level
market institutions over time out of lower level ones, with the higher level ones very
definitely operating in a downward causation manner to embed the lower level ones
within themselves. Thus, futures markets arose out of spot markets, options markets
arose out of futures markets, and derivatives markets arose out of options markets, with
ever higher orders of derivatives continuing to emerge over time, although with the
possibility of some of these levels disappearing evolutionary in the face of systemic
collapse due to fragility and endogenous breakdowns as in the crisis of 2007-08.
In any case, we see an increasing trend of thinking that sees these processes
linked closely, if not perfectly. Emergence is a special form of complexity, and it is often
the most important and dramatic even that happens in the course of evolutionary
processes. This holds true for both economic and biological evolution.
Conclusion
Austrian economics exhibits a variety of views regarding emergence and
complexity. An important strand emphasizes it strongly, with Carl Menger and Friedrich
12
This has led to criticism from both those who say that markets are human exchange systems rather than
algorithms (Conlisk, 2007) and those who argue that his invocation of the Chomsky hierarchy system
insufficiently maps into proper measures of computational complexity (Zambelli, 2007).
14
Hayek, especially in his later years, being the leading examples of this thread in the
tradition. At the other extreme are such essentially orthodox neoclassical figures as
Eugen von Böhm-Bawerk and others of his period. In between these extremes stand
numerous other figures in the Austrian tradition, notably Ludwig von Mises and his
protégée, Israel Kirzner, whose emphasis on entrepreneurial activities driving the
evolution of the economy in an uncertain environment partake of elements of this view,
even as at times, von Mises in particular may seem more orthodox with his strict a
priorism that seems to rule out such evolutionary emergence or complexity.
However, the idea of complex emergence involving the development at higher
levels of entities that are somehow more than or at least different from the “sum of their
parts” was strongly pursued by F.A. Hayek, especially later in his life. It drew on both
his work in psychology to study the emergence of mind from neurological processes and
structures and rules, with some of his work on this linking to ideas from computational
complexity, while his studies of the emergence of market structures and broader social
structures such as systems of law draws more specifically on evolutionary processes that
operate interactively between the lower and higher levels in both upward and downward
causation in a balancing of strong and weak emergence. In this effort, Hayek’s work
foreshadows more recent work by such figures as Langton, Wolfram, Kaufmann, and
Mirowski who all see complex emergence as profoundly linked to evolutionary
processes.
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