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SCHOOL OF HISTORY, CULTURE AND COMMUNICATION
ERASMUS UNIVERSITY ROTTERDAM
An Informal Imperialism
U.S. Foreign Policy 1898-1912
Student Name: Lochlann Egan
Student Number: 364145
Email address: [email protected]
Supervising Lecturer: Dr. F.M.M. de Goey
Second Reader: Dr. B. Wubs
Contents
Outline of Thesis Chapter Structure
1. INTRODUCTION
1.1
Defining Imperialism .............................................................................................. 4
1.2
Existing interpretations of American Imperialism ………………………........ 8
1.3
Role of Germany ……....……………………………………………………………………
13
1.4
Historiography on Roosevelt’s Diplomacy ………………………………………
14
1.5
Historiography on Taft’s Diplomacy ………………….……………………………. 18
1.6
Research Question(s) ……………………………………………………………………….. 21
1.7
Method & Sources …………………………………...……………………………………….. 21
1.8
Thesis Structure ……………………………………………………………………………… 22
2. ROLE OF THE PRESIDENT IN FOREIGN POLICY FORMULATION …. 24
2.1
The Domestic Context ……………………………………………………………………… 24
2.2
Pre-Roosevelt ………………………………………………………………………………….. 26
2.3
Rooseveltian Statecraft ……………………………………………………………………. 31
2.4
Post-Roosevelt ………………………………………………………………………………… 34
2.5
Taft’s Dollar Diplomacy …………………………………………………………………. 37
3. THE NAVY- AN INSTRUMENT OF AMERICA’S STRATEGIC VISION…44
3.1
T.R.’s Motivations …………………………………………………………………………….. 44
3.2
State of the Navies/Spending Figures ……………………………………………… 46
3.3
The Great White Fleet ……………………………………………………………………… 49
4. CASE STUDIES ………………………………………………………………………….. 53
4.1
The Panama Canal …………………………………………………………………………… 54
4.2
Cuba ………………………………………………………………………………………………... 57
4.3
The Philippines ………………………………………………………………………………. 60
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5. INFLUENCE OF THE EUROPEAN AND PACIFIC POWERS ……………. 65
5.1
Britain ……………………………………………………………………………………………. 65
5.2
Germany ………………………………………………………………………………………….. 66
5.3
Japan ………………………………………………………………………………………………. 71
6. CONCLUSIONS …………………………………………………………………………. 74
7. BIBLIOGRAPHY ……………………………………………………………………… 80
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Chapter 1: Introduction
To suggest that the United States was “expansionist” in the nineteenth century does not
spark much controversy. America’s history of expansion, from the push overland to the
Mississippi, further sprawls to the Western continental limits and then beyond, to the north
and the acquisition of Alaska from Russia in 1867 is clearly representative of an era of
expansion. To suggest that the United States has been “imperialist” for much of its history is
entirely different however, and is not a tag that the American people have been willing to
acknowledge or embrace. Americans have long espoused a belief that their nation is
different, an assumption that also infers that the United States is better. Take for example
the following offering from The National Review Online, in relation to American
exceptionalism:
‘Our country has always been exceptional. It is freer, more individualistic, more
democratic, and more open and dynamic than any other nation on earth. These
qualities are the bequest of our Founding and of our cultural heritage. They have
always marked America as special, with a unique role and mission in the world: as a
model of ordered liberty and self-government and as an exemplar of freedom and a
vindicator of it, through persuasion when possible and force of arms when
absolutely necessary’. 1
It is the intention of this thesis to seek to disprove the prevailing assertion that the United
States has enjoyed a history devoid of imperialism, to disprove the consensus that regards
the United States as having behaved in an upstanding and conscientious manner towards
lesser states while other ‘Great Powers’ plundered and colonized vast tracts of the globe.
However it will also seek to demonstrate in what ways, if any, this American brand of
imperialism differed from the preceding European models.
While it would not be wholly unreasonable to suggest that the “Continental expansion” into
Louisiana, the Floridas, Texas, California, and Oregon and the elimination or incarceration
1
Richard Lowry & Ramesh Ponnuru, “An Exceptional Debate: The Obama administration’s assault on American
identity,” National Review Online URL :
http://www.nationalreview.com/nrd/article/?q=M2FhMTg4Njk0NTQwMmFlMmYzZDg2YzgyYjdmYjhhMzU=
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of Native Americans was an imperialist era, I do not subscribe to this train of thought. The
period may have demonstrated some imperial characteristics but this cannot be classed as
a carefully plotted, conscious phase of imperialism, in my view.
It is a later period, namely events occurring at the dawn of the 20th century, which will be
the primary concern and object of focus for this master thesis. While this period was
technically not imperialist in the sense of a limited definition- one that encompasses only
the formal colonization of areas not part of the American continent- the hypothesis that
this project worked with and towards is that the United States did behave in an imperialist
manner during the presidencies of William McKinley (1897-1901), Theodore Roosevelt
(1901-1909) and William Howard Taft (1901-1913). Therefore, a key element to this
debate is definition. There has been an abundance of theories and definitions pertaining to
imperialism, spanning generations. One of the central goals of this introduction is to
analyze some of the perspectives and theories offered so far, and to precisely determine
which definition is most apt and will be utilized in my treatment of the research material. I
will first outline the method, sources and structure of the thesis.
1.1 Defining Imperialism
Before approaching the primary and secondary sources at my disposal for this project, it is
essential that I clarify the analytical framework and precisely define what I mean by
‘imperialism’. This is not as straightforward a task as it might first appear given the array of
interpretations offered on the topic. The word imperialism has seen its meaning shift many
times. Understanding these shifting meanings is made doubly difficult by the many theories
of imperialism which have been invented in the twentieth century. A theory of imperialism
is an attempt to find in the apparent chaos of international relations a regular pattern
which arises from one or a few basic causes.2 In this section, I will explore a variety of texts
that have all dealt with the issue of imperialism and its offshoot theories. They offer
differing interpretations and analyses. However, they are broadly united in acknowledging
that the common element in almost all the present and past uses of the word “imperialism”
is a reference to domination- domination of man over man, country over country.
2
Norman Etherington, Theories of Imperialism: War, Conquest and Capital (London, 1984) pp.3-4
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The aim of this thesis is essentially twofold. It is to demonstrate that the United
States international conduct at the dawn of the 20th century was of an imperialist nature,
thus shattering the illusion of American “exceptionalism”. It will also ask whether this was
a unique form of imperialism, different from the classical methods carried out by earlier
metropoles, namely Britain during the 19th century. To facilitate this, I will now proceed to
explore some differing perspectives on the study of imperialism, including the economic
and capitalist. Alternative theories- including Marxist theories amongst others- are not
included in this paper. That should not suggest that I deem these theories invalid but that
they are not as suitable as others for this particular thesis.
An analysis of imperialism would be lacking if it did not explore the writings of John
A. Hobson, who published his celebrated Imperialism in 1902. Some scholars decree that no
other book has been so influential in spreading the doctrine of economic imperialism.3
While scholars universally acknowledge the influence of the text, there are contrasting
interpretations of Hobson’s work. This is attributable to the fact that Hobson never offers a
categorical definition of imperialism but rather offers a number of statements which
appear to be definitions but which differ among themselves. For instance, at one juncture,
he says imperialism ‘is a depraved choice of national life, imposed by self-seeking interests
which appeal to the lusts of quantitative acquisitiveness and of forceful domination
surviving in a nation from early centuries of animal struggle for existence’. Yet at another
point he says that imperialism represents the growing tendency of the wealthy classes to
‘use their political power as citizens of this state to interfere with the political conditions of
those States where they have an industrial stake’.4 Sometimes he writes of imperialism as
virtually the same thing as the drive to acquire and retain colonies yet just as often he
writes as though imperialism as a policy could be practiced without any territorial
acquisitions. Etherington ultimately attempts to paraphrase Hobson by offering the
following definition of imperialism, which he sees as embracing all of Hobson’s various
uses of the word. It asserts that ‘imperialism is the deliberate use of the power of the state,
including its military power, in order to advance alleged economic interests in the world at
large. This includes not only grabbing colonies but a great deal of other aggressive and
3
4
See E.M. Winslow’s The Pattern of Imperialism: A study in the theories of Power (New York, 1948) pp. 94-95
J.A. Hobson, Imperialism, A Study (London, 1902) pp. 379-381
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coercive activity.’5 Winslow suggests that to Hobson, economic imperialism was merely one
kind of expansion, and represents a particular type of motive, of which there can be manyincluding military, religious and other “non-economic” motives.6 Interestingly, some
proclaim that Hobson did not regard finance as the “motor-power” of imperialism, but
instead regarded patriotism, adventure and political ambition as the engine of expansion.7
This would seem a misinterpretation however as there can be little doubt that the core of
Hobson’s message was that the fundamental causes of imperialism and international
conflict are economic.
Etherington argues that Hobson contributed two new theses to the theoretical
discussion of imperialism. The first pertained to the past growth of the British Empire,
which is of lesser importance to this thesis. The second however, concerned the future and
the possibilities for imperialism at the dawn of the 20th century, the period in which this
topic is steeped. In contrast to those who said that surplus investment capital made
imperialism a present and future necessity, Hobson offered his thesis that a redistribution
of income and a diversion of more money to worthwhile state projects at home would
relieve most of the pressure for aggressive foreign policies.8 In retrospect, such a thesis
may appear utopian, for we now know that the coming decades would see carnage on an
almost unimaginable scale. The nucleus of Hobson’s economic imperialism theory –stating
that capitalists will benefit from imperialism- will remain of use in this master thesis
however given the undeniable importance of economic factors in shaping U.S. foreign
policy in the period.
Given the nature of this thesis topic, it is also worth exploring Etherington’s analysis
of what he titles “America’s first Capitalist Theory of Capitalist Imperialism”, in which he
dissects the editorials of the United States Investor during the period of the SpanishAmerican War of 1898. The Investor was a weekly newspaper that he regards as being an
ideal source for contemporary American notions about imperialism.9 Given that their
editorials had a sudden change in their tone as regards imperialism, this can be seen as
mirroring the shift in wider U.S. policy. As Etherington notes, the editor of the Investor
5
Etherington, p 82
Winslow, p 94
7
Ibid. p 98
8
Etherington, p 82
9
Ibid, p 6
6
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changed his mind about imperialism when he realized that contrary to almost everyone’s
expectations it was good for business.10 In May of 1898 the Bostonian editor of the paper
announced his sudden conversion to the cause of ‘imperialism.’ The Investor re-iterated
that imperialism was a ‘necessity’ -given the surpluses of goods and capital generated by
industrial development- and the case it made for necessity deserves to be called a theory of
imperialism to Etherington.11 While acknowledging that a Boston financial paper with a
small circulation cannot be regarded as the beginning of an imperialist sentiment in
America, Etherington is correct in highlighting the path taken by the Investor. It was
symbolic of an alteration in mood and mindset amongst Americans to imperialism in a
changing world, an era when businessmen and politicians began to search for a new
frontier, now that continental expansion was complete. With fears heightening that the USA
would face a shrinking home market for products, penetration of Latin America and the
broader Pacific region assumed an even greater urgency. Frederick Jackson Turner’s 1893
publication “The Significance of the Frontier in American History” had been an important
stimulant to this view.
With the entire international relations landscape dramatically altered by World War
I, discussions on imperialism took a new course. Imperialism came to mean little more than
colonialism.12 Leonard Woolf’s Empire and Commerce (1920) stands as an important
addition to the field of economic imperialism. Though he restricted his study to colonial
questions, his definition of ‘economic imperialism’ is of interest to this thesis:
‘Economic Imperialism’: Under this term I include the international economic policy
of the European States, of the U.S.A., and latterly of Japan, in the unexploited and
non-Europeanised Territories of the world. The policy of Economic Imperialism
includes colonial policy and the acquisition by the Europeanised State of exploitable
territory, the policy of spheres of influence, and the policy of obtaining economic
control through other political means. These various kinds of policy are all
distinguished by one important characteristic; they all aim at using the power and
the influence of the European form of the State in the economic interests of its
inhabitants in lands where the European form of State has not developed. I call it
10
Ibid, pp. 7-9
Ibid, p 14
12
Ibid, p 178
11
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imperialism because the policy always implies either the extension of the State’s
territory by conquest or occupation, or the application of its dominion or some form
of political control to peoples who are not its citizens. I qualify it with the word
economic because the motives of this imperialism are not defense nor prestige nor
conquest not the ‘spread of civilization’, but the profit of the citizens, or some of the
citizens, of the European State.13
While Woolf’s study primarily revolved around the role of the European metropoles in the
race for acquisitions in Africa, his theory also name checks the American position at the
outset of the 20th century and is thus applicable to my analysis.
Before concluding, it is also worth noting the definition offered by the Dictionary on
American Foreign Affairs. It remarks that ‘Imperialism is a concept in international relations
of the forcible extension by a nation of its control over foreign areas and their peoples. The
term is often used more broadly to describe any significant extension of a nation’s influence
and power over other societies through such means as economic exploitation and cultural
domination.’14 This definition, in tandem with those offered by Woolf and Hobson,
encapsulates my concept of imperialism for this master thesis. Henceforth, this thesis will
regard imperialism as being: ‘the deliberate use of the power of the state, including its
military power, in order to advance alleged economic interests in the world at large, to
extend that state’s power over peoples who are not its citizens and to safeguard and/or
create spheres of influence’. The broader, overarching question of this research topic asks
whether the United States exhibited imperialist traits under Theodore Roosevelt and
William H. Taft. It is against this definition of imperialism that the question will be gauged.
1.2 Existing interpretations of American imperialism
Given that he central research question of this master thesis asks whether the foreign
policy endeavors of Theodore Roosevelt and William Howard Taft were of an imperialistic
nature, it is therefore necessary to consider what has already been written on the subject.
There exists a vast quantity of secondary literature on this topic, especially on the career of
Theodore Roosevelt given his lofty standing in American history. Unsurprisingly, Taft’s
administration has been the subject of less focus, though there remains a wealth of
13
14
Leonard Woolf, Empire & commerce in Africa : a study in economic imperialism (London, 1920) pp. 14-15
Stephen A. Flanders, Carl N. Flanders, Dictionary of American foreign affairs (New York, 1993) p 281
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secondary source material on aspects of his presidency. In this section, it will only be
possible to mention a fraction of the literature that pertains to this research area. However,
the titles and authors I have read and examined represent a fair cross-section of the field.
Warren Zimmermann’s First Great Triumph (2002) is an analysis of five figures that
he regards as the instigators of America’s ascendency to the status of a world power at the
turn of the 19th century. Theodore Roosevelt is a key player in the book, and Zimmermann
actually labels his tenure as ‘The Imperial Presidency’.15 The book is notable because while
it is critical of American atrocities in the Philippines conflict and of the questionable ethics
of Roosevelt in relation to Panama’s separation from Colombia, Zimmermann doubts
whether any of the peoples affected would have been better off in the long run had the
United States not interfered. Zimmerman ultimately states that the era saw the creation of
an authentic American imperialism “that was confident in its objectives but modest in its
application”,16 thus asserting that the USA was imperialistic, but different. The book is also
of particular interest to this thesis because it brands Theodore Roosevelt “a sphere of
influence realist”17, suggesting that he had a broader strategic blueprint for the U.S.
Akira Iriye (1977) castigates Theodore Roosevelt’s handling of the Panamanian
uprising as an embarrassment to the U.S., ‘which seemed to engage precisely in the same
kinds of gun-boat diplomacy and secret machinations that were associated with European
imperialism.’18 He later concludes that U.S. interventionism in the Caribbean ‘was a
particular form of imperialism, without involving colonization or territorial seizure.
Instead, the United States turned the region into its sphere of influence through its military
presence, canal construction and economic influence. While the use of force and the
establishment of colonies were kept to a minimum, there was a distinct departure from the
traditional approach which had generally emphasized informal control of the Caribbean
region. The United States was little different from the other imperialist powers in thus
having various kinds of approach and maintaining several levels of control over foreign
lands…..The United States was now a full-fledged member of the community of
15
Warren Zimmermann, First Great Triumph: How Five Americans Made Their Country a World Power (New York,
2002) p 418
16
Ibid, p 493
17
Ibid, p 500
18
Akira Iriye, From Nationalism to Internationalism: U.S. Foreign Policy to 1914 (London, 1977), p 177
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imperialists.’19 It also bears noting that for Iriye there was no European style imperialism,
because it was much varied and diverse in reality.
Iriye’s assessment of U.S. imperialism is not shared by all in the scholarly
community however. The central argument of Richard H. Collin’s Theodore Roosevelt’s
Caribbean: The Panama Canal, the Monroe Doctrine, and the Latin American Context (1990)
is essentially that encouraging capitalist development was not ominous but a means of
applying North American principles to other cultures as a way of ending the region’s
revolutions, wars, and instability.20 Collin uses “context” as a historiographical device
through which to defend the ideological determinants of United States policy. The book
therefore represents a point of view, and is one in a long line of texts that have as their
central goal the defense and justification of U.S. policy in the period. His study is derived
from a single context: the North American one. Latin historiography is almost universally
ignored. Latin American archival records are largely left ignored, except for a few token
references. The reader does not therefore get a truly useful representation of the Latin
American context. This is also true of a great deal of the literature pertaining to this topic.
Too often, they offer only one vantage point- the North American- and ignore the
indigenous perspective. This has meant that the historiography in this area has often been
partisan and concerned with justifying U.S. conduct.
Sentimental Imperialists (1981) by James C. Thomson is further evidence of this.
When seeking to trace the roots of later American expansionism, it states that by the final
decades of the 19th century, imperialism had become normal for the major Western
powers-and even Japan.21 It was this, he argues, that gave America its impetus for overseas
expansion and that the U.S. foray into the imperial stakes was justified by earlier European
endeavors. This text also broadens the debate on whether the United States newfound
interest beyond its own continental limits was driven by economic factors, stating that it
would be mistaken to conclude that from the late nineteenth-century ‘American
expansionism was wholly- or even primarily- economic in motivation. The returns are not
yet in from the historiographical debate on this question. For every scholar who ranks
19
Ibid, pp. 181-182
Richard A. Collin, Theodore Roosevelt’s Caribbean: The Panama Canal, the Monroe Doctrine, and the Latin
American Context (Baton Rouge, 1990)
21
James C. Thomson Jr., Sentimental Imperialists: The American Experience in East Asia (New York, 1981) p 96
20
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economic causes first, there is another who finds the picture more complicated.’22 Indeed,
Sentimental Imperialists goes much further than most when suggesting that ‘morally,
politically, and strategically, the heart of the new expansionism was the acquisition of a
large colonial empire, the projection of American military and naval power into Asia and
Latin America on a permanent basis, and the deliberate emergence of the United States as
one of the key forces in the international balance of power.’23 This assertion goes further
than the majority of writers on this topic, most of who dispute that America ever had any
real designs on accruing vast colonial acquisitions.
It’s not a totally isolated viewpoint however. William Appleman Williams led the
revisionist charge, authoring a dozen books including The Tragedy of American Diplomacy
(1959) and Empire as a Way of Life (1980). His portrayal of the United States as an
imperialist power bent on forcing its economic and political will around the world was a
seismic shock to the traditionalist accounts which emphasized the role of political factors
such as hemispheric defense, public opinion, the new navalism and the rise of racist
expansionist ideologies as being the chief motor of overseas acquisitions.24 In his 1980
work Empire as a Way of Life, Williams sets out to attack American militarism as the
product of a drive for empire, first over Indians and blacks, then over Mexicans, and finally
over the whole world excepting the USSR and Eastern Europe. Imperialism, he argues, has
been the main force in American history. His disdain for American conduct against Spain in
the war of 1898 is made plain by his description of the conflict as a “crusading, punitive,
and imperial war”, a “gratuitous attack” upon the Spanish Empire, motivated by a desire for
the Philippines.25 Until that point, historians had traditionally viewed American ascendancy
as haphazard, a chance product of Manifest Destiny or of events beyond American control,
such as the Spanish-American War. However scholars increasingly began to argue that
expansion was a rational, pragmatic response to internal tensions and conflicts dramatized
by the Panic of 1893, when America was hit by an economic depression, the greatest to
have affected the country in its history to that point.26
22
Ibid, p 101
Ibid, p 102
24
See Julius William Pratt, Expansionists of 1898: the acquisition of Hawaii and the Spanish islands (Baltimore, MD:
John Hopkins Press 1936)
25
William Appleman Williams. Empire as a Way of Life (Oxford, 1980), pg. 112
26
See Thomas J. McCormick China Market: America’s Quest for Informal Empire, 1893-1901 (Chicago, 1967)
23
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Appleman William’s works were a dramatic rebuttal of the traditional exceptionalist
narrative that had been dominant in the historiography on American imperialism.
Traditional exceptionalism had determined that America’s unique values of democracy,
liberty, and self-government had led the United States to be a distinctive global power,
compelling the American state to behave differently than European powers: America’s
values and democratic institutions thus meant that the United States never constructed an
empire.27 The influence of Appleman William’s writings would become one of the primary
motors behind the emergence of a new counter trend in the historiography on American
imperialism. This revisionist school, aptly branded by Go (2011) as Liberal
Exceptionalism,28 stressed that while the United States practiced imperialism, it was a
special and unique form, benign and liberal in comparison to the preceding European
metropoles. Liberal exceptionalist historiography thus surmises that the U.S. empire has
been distinctly democratizing, liberal and tutelary rather than repressive because that is
how America does things.29
According to others, the connection drawn in the 1890s between expansion and
naval power was central to the emerging American imperialism. Influential naval strategist
Alfred Thayer Mahan and other exponents of an imperialist foreign policy held that
America’s dynamic economic growth demanded new overseas markets, sources of raw
materials, and investment opportunities- partly in response to the shock of the Turner
Thesis, as mentioned above. The United States, they contended, needed a large merchant
marine protected by a great navy to compete commercially with the European powers,
which were busy acquiring colonies in Africa, Asia, and among the islands of the Pacific. To
support its expanded sea power, the argument continued, America would also need to
acquire overseas strategic bases and colonies and construct an isthmian canal in Central
America to ease naval and commercial movements between the Atlantic and Pacific oceans.
The Spanish-American War was thus the translation of these imperialist ideals into action.
Imperialists defended the decision to annex the Philippines on the grounds that the
Filipinos needed enlightened U.S. rule and that the island chain’s proximity to China would
27
Julian Go. Patterns of Empire The British and American Empires 1688 to the Present (New York, 2011) pg. 15
Ibid, pg. 68
29
Ibid.
28
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facilitate American commercial penetration of what was anticipated to be a vast market in
the future.30
Flanders also states that it was the ‘extension of U.S. influence, rather than
territorial aggrandizement, that characterized American imperialism after 1900’31, largely
due to the fallout from the bloody Filipino campaign. In the early 20th century, this
approach focused on the Caribbean region, where U.S. policy was concerned with
safeguarding the strategically key Panama Canal (completed in 1914) and preventing the
expansion of European influence. The United States feared that the chronic fiscal and
political instability of the Central American and Caribbean nations would invite European
intervention. The Roosevelt Corollary then asserted pre-eminent U.S. influence in the
America’s and invested the United States with a right of intercession in the Western
Hemisphere to keep order and repel foreign interference. U.S. military interventions and
the establishment of American financial protectorates in Cuba, Panama, the Dominican
Republic, Haiti and Nicaragua expanded American hegemony in the Caribbean up through
WW1. Washington installed U.S. customs collectorships in several Latin American
countries, placing their government revenues under American control, and pursued a
policy of dollar diplomacy to secure economic and political leverage.32
What these texts help to highlight is that there remains a debate within the
historiography on this topic. Debate still rages over whether the United States was truly an
imperial player in this era and if so, what its motivations and intentions were. As
demonstrated earlier, the traditional exceptionalist school was largely dominant in the
subject’s historiography until the intervention of the revisionists, whose charge was chiefly
led by the writings of Appleman Williams. Resultantly, the liberal exceptionalist school was
borne as a reaction. This school has had a substantial effect on the historiographical debate
and “remains a central paradigm in American imperial studies.”33 And while American
conduct in Iraq post-9/11 has led to an increase in radical accounts of American foreign
policy- claiming that America has always been an imperial power intent on accruing an
30
Flanders, p 282
Ibid, p 283
32
Ibid, p 283
33
Modern Imperial Formations and the End of American Exceptionalism. Clara Altman (Brandeis University);
Published on H-Empire (May, 2012) Retrieved on 7/7/12 from http://www.hnet.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=35292
31
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empire- the traditional exceptionalist school remains the chief challenger to the dominant
liberal exceptionalist paradigm.
1.3 Role of Germany
Another issue pertaining to this thesis that has been the subject of much debate and
disagreement is the role played by Germany in shaping U.S. policy in this period. David
Healy remains convinced that German actions played a pivotal role in the formulation of
American policy in the Caribbean, writing that Roosevelt feared the Germans would find
ways to acquire the Dutch and Danish possessions in the Americas to use as bases for the
insertion of their power.34 Healy also suggests that ‘between 1897 and 1905, German naval
staff officers elaborated a series of war plans involving an attack upon the east coast of the
United States.’35 This interpretation contrasts starkly with Raimund Lammersdorf’s, who
believes that Roosevelt viewed the Kaiser at this time as ‘a nuisance rather than a danger’
and that the idea of a contiguous development of German-American antagonism from
1889-1917 is the result of a teleological vision of foreign relations developing inevitably
towards World War I.36
1.4 Historiography on Roosevelt’s diplomacy
Historiography on American foreign relations was for most of the 20th century divided
amongst three major groupings: “traditionalists”, “realists” and “New Left”. The
traditionalists were near-unanimous in assessing nineteenth-century American diplomacy
as "successful," and, if having more doubts about the twentieth century, still felt that the
United States had achieved world leadership while simultaneously following policies
supportive of other nations' aspirations to self-determination, democracy, and prosperity.
The realists gave nineteenth-century American diplomacy high marks for the pursuit of
generally limited and attainable objectives, but lamented the tendency in the twentieth
century to embrace abstract and universalistic goals without regard to power realities. The
rise of the New Left school in the 1960s would cut a wide swath through the study of
34
David Healy, Drive to Hegemony: The United States in the Caribbean 1898-1917 (Wisconsin, 1988) p 72
Ibid, p 74
36
Raimund Lammersdorf, The Advantages of Cooperation: German-American Friendship as a Fundamental
Principle of German Weltpolitik and Theodore Roosevelt’s Big Stick Diplomacy; in Confrontation and Co-operation:
Germany and the United States in the Era of World War I: 1900-1924 ,edited by Hans-Jürgen Schröder,(Oxford
1993) pp. 90-91
35
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American diplomacy. Reacting in part to the catastrophes of the Vietnam War, their model
emphasized economic factors as the driving force behind American foreign policy. The
major thrust of New Left revisionism has been toward rewriting the history of the Cold War
to place major responsibility upon the United States, but there was also an accompanying
reading back into the past to enhance the image of an expansionist and aggressive
America.37
The dominance of these three groupings was challenged in the twilight of the 20th
century however, as the historiographies of Theodore Roosevelt and William Taft
demonstrate. In 1990, it was judged that William Appleman Williams’s economics-oriented
“Open Door” thesis was the “dominant interpretive paradigm in American diplomatic
history”38 and that a hegemony paradigm had emerged as the consensus in relation to the
literature on Roosevelt and Taft. This paradigm was regarded as originating from the
common emphasis on Roosevelt’s “big stick” method of diplomacy and placed a keen
emphasis on dependency theory.39 Yet as the twentieth century drew to a close, there
began to emerge a challenge to the consensus.
Richard H. Collin was one of the chief proponents of this challenge. In a 1995 article
of significant importance to the debate on Roosevelt/Taft historiography, he identified
weaknesses with the hegemony paradigm and put forward his own competing concept of
“symbiosis”, which emphasizes cultural affairs more than strategic and economic ones and
looks for contextual interrelations in a broad international perspective to help explain
conflicts between specific nations.40 Collin actually argues that scholars of the hegemony
paradigm recognize the importance of cultural relations between peoples but choose to
emphasize power contests either among great powers or between imperial powers and
weaker ones. His concept, by contrast, more centrally emphasizes cultural interaction and
corrects what he sees as a blemish in the hegemony approach.41
37
John Braeman, The New Left and American Foreign Policy during the Age of Normalcy: A Re-Examination The
Business History Review , Vol. 57, No. 1 (Spring, 1983), pp. 73-104
38
John Lewis Gaddis, “New Conceptual Approaches to the Study of American Foreign
Relations: Interdisciplinary Perspectives,” Diplomatic History 14 (Summer 1990): 407.
39
See Vincent Ferraro, "Dependency Theory: An Introduction," in The Development Economics Reader, ed. Giorgio
Secondi (London: Routledge, 2008), pp. 58-64
40
Richard H. Collin, Symbiosis versus Hegemony: New Directions in the Foreign Relations Historiography of
Theodore Roosevelt and William Howard Taft Diplomatic History, Vol. 19, No. 3 (Summer 1995): 473
41
Ibid
Page | 15
Collin judges that his “symbiosis” approach is perfectly suited to considering the
context of crisis and global change that confronted Taft and his predecessor. Having
remarked that he regards David Healy’s Drive to Hegemony: The United States in the
Caribbean, 1898-1917 as being the “high point of the hegemonic framework”, Collin
suggests that this overly determinist interpretation of conscious empire can be better
explained by going beyond the hegemonic concepts of power- economic, strategic and
military.42 While economics, strategy and power may explain much in the history of U.S.
relations with Latin America, to Collin these explanations are incomplete and unsatisfying.
In an excellent example, he cites the Caribbean’s love for baseball and Latin America’s
fondness for U.S. comic books. While earlier scholars had regarded this as an instance of
cultural imperialism43, Collin chooses to see it as a natural happening that occurred
without conscious design.
The historiography on the Panama Canal – a much discussed legacy of the Roosevelt
presidency- is regarded by Collin to be a prime area for implementation of his symbiosis
concept. He believes that his new approach can revise the standardly hegemonic consensus
on the subject. The historiography on the Panama Canal had been overwhelmingly
condemnatory of Roosevelt throughout the 20th century, with a 1940 publication even
comparing him to Hitler.44 The standard, hegemonic interpretation was summed up as
follows: Roosevelt and the United States wanted a canal, Colombia objected to giving up its
rights in Panama, and Roosevelt encouraged, fomented, or caused a “revolution” in Panama,
which then was “free” to negotiate its own canal treaty with the United States. The result
gave the United States what it wanted, left Panama in a state of permanent dependency as
an American protectorate, and made Colombia an example of what happens to a small Latin
American nation that tangles with the Colossus to the North. Collin’s symbiosis framework
leads to a radically different interpretation in which he argues that the conflict was cultural,
driven by Colombia’s President Marroquín.45 In choosing to avoid the overemphasis on two
nations in diplomatic conflict that is inherent in the hegemonic framework, he argues that
the religious character of the conflicts between the U.S. and Spain, Latin America and the
42
Ibid, pp. 474-475
Ariel Dorfman and Armand Mattleart, How to read Donald Duck: Imperialist Ideology in the Disney Comic, ed.
and trans. David Kunzle (New York, 1975)
44
Allan Nevins, Introduction to Dwight C. Miner, The Fight for the Panama Route: The
Story of the Spooner Act and the Hay-Herran Treaty (New York, 1940)
45
Collin, pp. 477-478
43
Page | 16
Philippines has been overlooked so far. To him, the U.S. position as a Protestant nation
protecting the Catholic majority of Filipinos from a militant Muslim minority was perhaps
naive progressive paternalism, but it was far different than simple economic or strategic
expansionism.46 Edward Crapol’s essay is further evidence of a broader trend during this
period, one that sought to craft a less moralistic historiography of imperialism.47 His work
is reflective of an attempt to advance the primacy of moral responsibility as a motive,
rather than the economic and strategic policies so stressed by proponents of the hegemonic
network of scholars.
The most substantial disagreements on Roosevelt/Taft-era historiography center on
Latin America and Central America, where the memory of the big stick and of later U.S.
interventions has created a sense and historiography of victimization. There is a consensus
that the United States was paternalistic and insensitive in the region.48 In stressing the
cultural exceptionalism that lay at the heart of Latin American nationalism and its
resistance to foreign domination, these scholars were instrumental in shifting the
historiography on Roosevelt-era diplomacy away from the dominant materialist,
hegemonic framework that had for decades been unchallenged.
It is also worth noting a further splinter group in the historiographical debate over
American diplomacy. This is the corporatism school, which moved away from the
hegemonic diction with its linkage of domestic, diplomatic and economic policies in an
internationalized context. While corporatism’s primary focus is still economic, Collin’s
“symbiosis” uses whatever defines the interactive elements at a particular time, be they
economic, domestic politics etc.49 His is a fluid framework that is not rigidly aligned to
material concepts like the hegemony school. As he concludes, “symbiosis can accommodate
a wider cultural corporatism, internationalized not only in its economic focus but also in its
eagerness to emphasize domestic politics of all nations, imaginative culture, and
intellectual change… Symbiosis is a framework for the new internationalist, modernist,
cultural community that began in earnest with Theodore Roosevelt’s presidency and
46
Ibid p 479
Edward P. Crapol, “Coming to Terms with Empire: The Historiography of Late Nineteenth-Century American
Foreign Relations,” Diplomatic History 16 (Fall 1992) pp. 573-597
48
Collin, p 485
49
Ibid, p 494
47
Page | 17
influenced more of the events and peoples in the world than the receding nineteenth
century’s nationalist economic interest conflicts”.50
Interpretations on the motives and legacy of Roosevelt are still the source of
dispute. While some rush to label Roosevelt an imperialist with an appetite for conflict,
there are scholars who counter with the fact that the country experienced no major war on
his almost eight year watch, a record rarely mentioned by his enemies who represented
him as always bellicose and belligerent.51 Ninkovich refers to the touchstone of Roosevelt’s
diplomacy as being right rather than might.52 There remains no consensus on his
presidency, which is not surprising given the magnitude and fallout from it.
1.5 Historiography on Taft’s diplomacy
There is a widespread acceptance amongst scholars that William Howard Taft was an
inactive president who largely confined himself to the White House and refrained from
vigorous public engagements.53 This relative unpopularity was reflected in his third place
finish in his presidential re-election campaign of 1912. He failed to escape the shadow of
his titanic predecessor and was succeeded by Woodrow Wilson, another colossus of 20th
century American politics. Given that his largely unremarkable presidency was wedged
between the epochal administrations of two figures whose legacies still resonate today,
Taft has resultantly been reduced to the margins of 20th century U.S. history, his tenure
roundly condemned as being lethargic and directionless. Much criticism centered on his
administration’s approach to foreign affairs, which stressed the importance of the nation’s
rapidly growing capital resources and downplayed Theodore Roosevelt’s emphasis on
military force.54 While Taft argued that such a policy would assist in the creation of orderly
societies by helping to develop the unindustrialized nations while simultaneously earning
profits for American investors, opponents offensively dubbed it ‘Dollar diplomacy’.
However, a journey through the historiography of Taft’s administration reveals a more
50
Ibid, pp. 495-497
Graubard, p 125.
52
Frank Ninkovich, Theodore Roosevelt: Civilization as Ideology. Diplomatic History, Vol. 10, Issue 3 (Summer
1986): pp. 221–245.
53
There are many examples, amongst them: Stephen Graubard, The Presidents: The Transformation of the
American Presidency from Theodore Roosevelt to Barack Obama (London, 2009); Walter LaFeber The American
Age: United States Foreign Policy at Home and Abroad since 1750 (New York, 1989) pp. 241-242
54
Walter LaFeber, The American Age: United States Foreign Policy at Home and Abroad since 1750 (New York,
1989) p 242
51
Page | 18
nuanced picture and suggests that the portrait of him as a failed president with no tangible,
enduring legacy is not wholly accurate.
Dexter Perkins appraisal of Taft provides a much more layered analysis of the
administration. Published shortly after World War II, Perkins Hands Off: A History of the
Monroe Doctrine states that “At the distance of more than a quarter of a century, it can
readily be seen that Mr. Taft, in discharging his high office, was by no means the ghastly
failure which party spirit, and the venom of his predecessor, was to make him seem; his
constructive achievements were many..”55 He also applauds the policy of ‘Dollar diplomacy’
for bearing “no sinister financial aspect”, unlike earlier policies pursued by Roosevelt.56
There were other notable reappraisals of Taft’s foreign policy record as the 20th century
progressed. An analysis of The American Historical Review is a further instance of a
revisionist interpretation of the Taft era. This passage from a 1974 review article- written
at a time when the United States was still reeling from its draining and futile engagements
in Vietnam- offers a fresh take on Taft’s diplomatic dealings; “It remains refreshing, now
that American presidents have got the habit of assuming absolute power to deploy the
military abroad, that Taft felt inescapably constrained by the absence of a formal, legal
sanction. Despite some gross sabre rattling and a personal readiness to intervene….Taft
refused to move because Congress gave him no authority to do so.”57
Paolo Coletta’s narrative from the same period largely follows this tone. His work
offers a gently critical interpretation of the Taft administration, and surmises that Taft “was
not a bad president but a rather good one”58, failing to achieve greatness because he was
incapable of playing the shrewd political games that his predecessor reveled in. In a
publication three years later, Akira Iriye has praise for Taft’s foreign policy, suggesting that
it was universalistic in imagination as well as application and paved the way for the coming
of Woodrow Wilson’s internationalism. Iriye goes further and concludes that the criticism
of dollar diplomacy “tells as much about the accomplishments as about the problem of that
diplomacy. Wilsonian foreign policy was not so much a rejection of Taft’s approach as an
attempt to overcome some of these problems without throwing away the
55
Dexter Perkins, Hands Off: A History of the Monroe Doctrine (Boston 1946) p 248
Ibid
57
Richard M. Abrams, United States Intervention Abroad: The First Quarter Century; The American Historical
Review , Vol. 79, No. 1 (Feb., 1974), pp. 72-102
58
Paulo E. Coletta The Presidency of William Howard Taft (University Press of Kansas, 1973)
56
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accomplishments.”59 While not a categorical endorsement of all of Taft’s foreign policy
decisions, these writings indicate that in an age of catastrophic diplomatic failures, the
historiography of Taft’s administration was more favorable than many would expect.
Favorable appraisals of the Taft administrations diplomacy are in the minority
however. For Walter LaFeber there is little ambiguity regarding Taft’s dollar diplomacy. He
rejects Iriye’s assertion completely when arguing that rather than seeking to protect order
and the status quo abroad, trade and economic opportunity was the chief engine driving
U.S. policy, regardless of the chaos and revolution that may result. For him, Taft’s policies
“perfectly illustrate the quest for overseas markets that were needed to deal with the
requirements of the Second Industrial Revolution….and how that quest led to disorder and
even revolution”.60 In essence, Taft’s dollar diplomacy used dollars not as a substitute for
bullets –as he’d claimed- but as a supplement.
Like Roosevelt, the historiography on Taft’s diplomacy has been widely dominated
by the hegemonic framework favored by scholars for most of the 20th century. However,
Richard Collin argues that the failure of Dollar Diplomacy in conception and practice may
owe more to clumsiness than hegemonic expansiveness.61 This clumsiness was
demonstrated in his overpopulating of his inner circle and cabinet with lawyers who
favored active intervention and American economic primacy.62 In a damning summation,
Collin states that by replacing Roosevelt’s use of power and responsibility and his
commitment to internationalism with open American economic motives, Taft obliterated
much of their predecessors’ attempts to establish friendlier relations with Latin American
countries. Taft’s clumsy economic initiatives would only reinforce the Latin stereotypes of
materialism and insensitivity.63
More contemporary readings on Taft’s presidency have also been largely unkind.
Stephen Graubard regards Taft as having been Roosevelt’s ‘dauphin’ and remarks that the
world order he proposed to achieve through the growing economic interdependence of
59
Akira Iriye, From Nationalism to Internationalism: U.S. Foreign Policy to 1914 (London, 1977) p 231
Walter LaFeber, The Cambridge History of American Foreign Relations. Volume 2, The American Search for
Opportunity, 1865-1913 (Cambridge, 1993) p 233
61
Collin, p 491
62
David Healy, Drive to Hegemony: The United States in the Caribbean, 1898-1917 (Madison, 1988) pp. 145-163
63
Collin, p 492
60
Page | 20
nations never materialized.64 Others regard his dollar diplomacy in Central and Latin
America as a farce and an ill-fitting disguise for Yankee imperialism.65 So while there have
been notable instances of scholars re-appraising and defending Taft’s diplomatic efforts,
the broader historiographical consensus remains dominated by the hegemonic paradigm
who stress a sinister, economic driven plot as Taft’s ultimate motivation.
1.6 Research Question(s)
Before proceeding further, I will clarify precisely the research questions that the master
thesis seeks to answer. The broader, overarching research question asks whether the
foreign policy of the United States in the period 1898-1912 can be classed as being
‘imperialist’ and how this American brand of imperialism differed from the preceding
European models, namely that of Britain. In addition, a number of sub questions arise from
this. The following are the most pertinent:
-
What was the impact of Theodore Roosevelt’s presidency on the process of
foreign policy formulation in the White House? (Chapter 2)
-
Why did the USA want to develop a robust, modern navy and was it an
instrument in achieving America’s foreign policy aspirations?(Chapter 3)
-
Were the foreign policies of emerging powers such as Germany and Japan
important motivators in the strategic decision-making of Washington?
(Chapters 4 and 5)
1.7 Method & Sources
The methods of research used during this master thesis were qualitative. Both primary and
secondary sources were utilized throughout the research process, although the balance
was more in favor of secondary sources. These secondary sources included a wide array of
secondary literature such as books, review articles and electronic journals. Primary sources
were largely obtained from the Roosevelt Study Centre in Middelburg, The Netherlands.
64
Stephen Graubard, The Presidents: The Transformation of the American Presidency from Theodore Roosevelt to
Barack Obama pp. 127-147
65
Peter H. Smith, Talons of the Eagle: Dynamics of U.S.-Latin American Relations (Oxford University Press, 2000)
pp. 56-57
Page | 21
These include a collection of Theodore Roosevelt’s papers, which catalogue his personal
correspondence, speeches and diaries. A similar, albeit smaller, collection pertaining to
William Howard Taft is also housed at the study center. I also examined multiple reels of
microfilm relating to both presidents, from before, during and after their tenures. In
addition, the digitalized archives of the New York Times were a valuable tool in gauging the
media and public mood during my periodization. Finally, detailed transcripts of speeches
such as Annual Messages to Congress and State of the Union addresses were accessed
online.
1.8 Thesis Structure
Chapter 2 is entitled ‘The Role of the President in Foreign Policy Formulation’ and is an
assessment of the impact that Theodore Roosevelt had on American foreign policy
formation. It also contains a section on the domestic context, with a short analysis of the
domestic factors that most influenced the imperialist debate. The chapter then proceeds to
introduce the foreign policy doctrine of William H. Taft, dubbed as ‘Dollar Diplomacy’, a
significant deviation from his predecessor’s policies. Chapter 3 outlines how the navy was
an integral instrument of America’s strategic vision during my periodization, a pillar of
American diplomacy without which their international exploits would not have been
possible. Chapter 4 is centered on three cases that are amongst the most pivotal diplomatic
engagements of the McKinley and Roosevelt presidencies. These are the Panama Canal
acquisition, the role of the United States in Cuba and American oversight of the Philippines.
A thorough examination of these cases will help to answer the overarching research
questions, as outlined in this chapter. Chapter 5 then addresses the question of whether the
United States foreign policy endeavors throughout the period were motivated by
competition from other Great Powers and emerging powers. The chapter includes analyses
of the American relationship with Germany, Japan and Great Britain. The final two chapters
comprise a conclusion- in which I attempt to draw parallels and distinctions with the
European models of imperialism’ and a bibliography of all relevant materials utilized
throughout the research process.
Page | 22
Concluding Remarks
As I have sought to demonstrate, there still exists a debate within the historiography on
this subject. The historiography of the Roosevelt/Taft presidencies has shifted throughout
the 20th century. However, while challenges to the hegemonic paradigm emerged –most
notably Collin’s symbiosis and to a lesser extent corporatism- it remains the dominant
concept in relation to the historiography on American diplomacy. William Appleman
Williams ‘The Tragedy of American Diplomacy’ remains the most influential basis for
interpretations of the period and for much of American diplomatic history.66
There also remains a debate over whether the United States does have an imperial
past. Exceptionalist literature still regards the events and aftermath of 1898 as an
aberration, while the revisionist school remains steadfast in the belief that it was the
universal pursuit of overseas export markets for American products that was the defining
feature of U.S. global power in this era. While the area has been covered in great detail by
an abundance of articles and secondary literature, I still feel that there are aspects that are
ripe for research. There is something of a historiographical gap as to the role of Germany in
America’s path to imperial player. In addition, the Taft administration has attracted only a
fraction of the attention garnered by the Roosevelt administration, though understandably
so. In conclusion, I believe that there remains the potential for me to bring a new
understanding of the subject to this master thesis, or at least to offer a new
perspective/interpretation. As my analysis of the historiography has shown, there remains
a distinctly ‘North American’ flavor to much of the literature on the subject, with a great
deal of energy going into justifying the ideology behind the American actions. My analysis
will suffer from no such issues and will seek to offer a distinctly non-American context,
which will hopefully produce a fresh and alternative understanding to the subject.
66
Crapol, p 589
Page | 23
Chapter 2: The Role of the President in Foreign Policy Formulation
“The President is the sole organ of the nation in its external relations, and its sole
representative with foreign nations.”67
-John Marshall, March 7th, 1800
6th Congress
The primary purpose of this chapter is to examine the impact that Theodore Roosevelt had
on the office of the Presidency, and more specifically his possible impact on the formulation
and implementation of American foreign policy. Did Roosevelt’s ascension to power mark a
significant shift in America’s diplomatic conduct? The chapter will address this question
and is divided into four sections. The first section offers a concise contextualization of the
periodization being treated in this analysis. There then follows three distinct subchapters
that examine the evolution of the president’s role in foreign policy formation. The first of
these will explore the foreign policy machinery that existed during Grover Cleveland’s
second term (1893-1897) and William McKinley’s ill-fated spell in office (1897-1901). The
second subchapter will deal with Theodore Roosevelt’s two terms (1901-1909), with the
third section analyzing the presidencies of William Howard Taft (1909-1913) and
Woodrow Wilson (1913-1921). The aim is to determine whether Roosevelt’s presidency
marked a decisive shift from his predecessors as to how American diplomacy was crafted
and executed. Did the role of the Secretary of State diminish in line with an increase in the
power of the Presidency? In addition, it is intended to explore whether Roosevelt’s style of
diplomacy was carried on by his immediate successors, Taft and Wilson.
67
Louis Fisher, The Law: Presidential Inherent Power: The “Sole Organ” Doctrine. Presidential Studies Quarterly,
37: 139–152. doi: 10.1111/j.1741-5705.2007.02589.x
Page | 24
2.1 The Domestic Context
This subsection is intended to provide a brief contextualization of the most prominent
domestic developments in the United States during the parameters of this master thesis,
issues that may well have been vital in policy formation in the highest echelons of
government. It is clearly not intended to be a detailed discussion but a necessary overview
of some of the important factors that were partly attributable to the shaping of American
foreign policy during this era, factors integral to the debate on American imperialism.
Perhaps the most important such development within the United Sates was the ‘end of the
frontier’ in the west, meaning that there were no longer large tracts of land unbroken by
settlement. The existence of the frontier was supposed to relieve America of the
overcrowding, scarcity and inequality that plagued Europe. But in 1890 the Census Bureau
had declared the frontier “closed”.68 That news had immediately aroused fears that
something distinct and precious in American life had been lost. Scholars and writers
mourned the closing of the frontier by arguing that the availability of vast expanses of open
land and pioneering opportunities had been essential to the development of political
democracy and individual self-reliance.69 The need to reclaim an adventurous heritage in
the face of new industrial conditions formed the link between domestic concerns and
foreign policy issues for political leaders. For many of them, America’s greatest need was a
new frontier, which they meant in the most literal way.70 Domestic concerns over the
closing of the frontier therefore need to be considered when analyzing the engine of
American imperial history.
Another contemporary issue of broad importance to the colonial debate was that of
Social Darwinism and its offshoot theories. Efforts at applying Darwin’s theories of
biological evolution to human behavior and institutions had begun from the 1870s
onwards. The English sociologist Herbert Spencer’s writings had been particularly
influential and resonated with American society. He argued that human society had
evolved through the same processes as biological species-through a “struggle for existence”
characterized by “survival of the fittest”.71 That these ideas could potentially permeate the
68
John Milton Cooper Jr. Pivotal Decades: The United States 1900-1920 (New York, 1990) pg. 7
Ibid. pp. 7-8
70
Ibid. pg. 8
71
Ibid. pg. 15
69
Page | 25
thinking of American political leaders from the era is therefore possible. The imperialist
situation of the late 19th and early 20th centuries contained most of the ingredients likely to
appeal to a mind sympathetic with the philosophy of natural selection, based as it was on
force and involving competition in obvious form, contrasting superior and backwards
peoples, white and non-white, European and non-European, and producing what most
western observers insisted was progress for mankind.72 Like many thinkers of his day
Theodore Roosevelt imbibed Darwinian theory to demonstrate that society could—and
must—evolve.73 Some have suggested that Roosevelt’s foreign policy was in part driven by
his Social Darwinist beliefs, his firm desire to ‘civilize’ developing nations.74 Burton (1965)
writes that “in the apologia he offered for imperialism were mingled elements of the
pragmatic and the moral; of history and Darwinism…If evolution in Roosevelt’s imperialist
thought is not its sole and underlying principle, it nonetheless is a singularly valuable
guideline for understanding Roosevelt the Imperialist”.75 The prominence and widespread
acceptance of Social Darwinism in Western political circles during America’s Progressive
Era should thus be carefully considered in any analysis of U.S. foreign policy at the turn of
the 19th century and beyond. In addition, the Panic of 1893 should be noted. The
consequent social upheaval of that economic depression was a frightful specter to the
political-economic elite of the day76and prompted a heightened debate on overproduction
and the need for new markets. Together with the ‘closure’ of the frontier, these issues best
explain the context and internal discourse that existed within America before and during
the periodization of this thesis.
2.2 Pre-Roosevelt
In his first Inaugural Address77, Grover Cleveland informed the American people that there
would be no “departure from that foreign policy” which had ensured the safety and
prosperity of the nation over the previous century. “It is the policy of neutrality, rejecting
any share in foreign broils and ambitions upon other continents and repelling their
72
David H. Burton. Theodore Roosevelt's Social Darwinism and Views on Imperialism Journal of the History of
Ideas, Vol. 26, No. 1 (Jan. - Mar., 1965), pp. 103-118
73
Jeffrey A. Engel (2008): The Democratic Language of American Imperialism: Race, Order, and Theodore
Roosevelt's Personifications of Foreign Policy Evil, Diplomacy & Statecraft, 19:4, 671-689
74
See Burton (1965), above.
75
Ibid. pp. 105-106
76
McCormick, pp. 24-25
77
To date, Cleveland is the only President to serve non-consecutive terms: (1885-1889, 1893-1897)
Page | 26
intrusion here. It is the policy of Monroe and of Washington and Jefferson—‘Peace,
commerce, and honest friendship with all nations; entangling alliance with none.’”78
These remarks are indicative of the relative unimportance of foreign policy to the
White House administrations that existed up to and including Cleveland’s. Indeed,
Cleveland gave only limited time to matters of foreign policy throughout his time in office,
with his major interests being administrative reform, Indian and land policy, the currency
and the tariff.79 It was Cleveland’s wish that America pursue a conservative, old-fashioned
foreign policy, a foreign policy marked by a respect for tradition. This tradition had its
roots in the perceived anti-expansionism laid down by George Washington and the later
doctrine of President James Monroe. It was a tradition which provided for a qualified
isolationism and anti-imperialism, a policy rooted in a conviction that U.S. diplomatic
traditions required that the United States shun overseas territorial expansion.80
When analyzing the formulation of foreign policy, a key indicator lies in the
relationship between the President and his Secretary of State. This was as revealing in
America’s ‘Gilded Age’ as it is today. During his second term, Cleveland had two secretaries
of state. The first was Walter Q. Gresham (1893-1895) who died in office two years into the
administration. Richard Olney (1895-1897) was then promoted and inhabited the office for
the remainder of Cleveland’s stint in power. While Cleveland valued the advice of both men,
he never permitted them to usurp his presidential prerogatives, and he took an active role
in all important questions of foreign policy. If his secretaries were often the initiators of
particular policy positions, it was Cleveland who gave or with-held approval for their
implementation and who had the final word on all major diplomatic appointments.81
One of the oldest conflicts in the American system of government is that between
Congress and the President over the right to formulate and implement foreign policy. Is the
President solely responsible for the conduct of external relations? Is the Congress an equal
partner? Or does Congress have the right to shape U.S. policy by enacting legislation which
proscribes a President’s flexibility?82 In analyzing the foreign policy processes of these
78
Grover Cleveland’s inaugural address of March 4th 1885; Accessed online via:
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=25824#ixzz1u0qAmSrg
79
Richard E. Welch Jr., The Presidencies of Grover Cleveland pg. 158
80
Welch Jr., pg. 158.
81
Ibid, pg. 160.
82
John G. Tower. Congress versus the president: The formulation and implementation of American foreign policy
Foreign Affairs (pre-1986); Winter 1981/1982; 60, 002; ProQuest pg. 229.
Page | 27
various administrations, it is thus important to highlight the state of play on Capitol Hill
that accompanied their terms in office.
Grover Cleveland was the only Democratic President elected in the period between
Lincoln’s 1861 triumph and Woodrow Wilson’s rise to power in 1913. In the 53rd Congress
(1893-1895), both chambers had a Democratic majority, with the Republicans having
seven fewer senators and ninety-four fewer members of the House of Representatives.
However, the midterm elections of 1895 witnessed a seismic shift, with the Republican
Party reversing the trend and taking healthy majorities in both chambers.83 It is
unsurprising therefore that Cleveland’s second term was not without difficulties when it
came to convincing Congress on diplomatic matters. The issue of the annexation of Hawaii
was a notable example. Unsure of his position on the matter but inclined to ignore the calls
for annexation of the island, Cleveland submitted the Hawaiian problem to Congress. In
effect, Congress advised Cleveland’s administration to recognize the white minority
government there and Cleveland reluctantly obeyed their advice.84 Towards the
denouement of his second term, Cleveland also encountered fierce resistance from Capitol
Hill over the sensitive issue of Cuba’s desire for independence from Spain. Some have even
suggested that Cleveland “found Congress more troublesome than the Cuban junta.”85
While he was determined to keep Cuban policy in his own hands, Congress was equally
determined to participate in its formulation. While Cleveland was content to remain
isolated from the growing strife in Cuba, senators and congressmen from both parties saw
the Cuban insurrection as a battle against monarchical tyranny and as a sturdy stick with
which to beat the unpopular Cleveland administration. They sought to force Cleveland to
abandon his pro-Spanish neutrality policy in favor of a policy of open support for the
insurgents by adopting a resolution in the Senate in February 1896. 86 Such a flagrant
rebuttal of the President’s position would become uncommon in the future decades with
the escalation of Presidential power.
83
Figures obtained from website of the Office of the Clerk of the U.S. House of Representatives via;
http://artandhistory.house.gov/house_history/
84
Welch Jr., pg. 174.
85
Ibid, pg. 196.
86
Ibid, 196.
Page | 28
While Grover Cleveland was undoubtedly driven by his own beliefs and was not a man to
blindly accept unthinkingly the advice of his close colleagues, his relative submissions to
Congress on matters of foreign policy demonstrate that the stature of the presidency was
not ultimately comparable to what it would become in the decades to follow. It also
highlights the relative unimportance of the foreign policy brief at this juncture in American
history. Cleveland displayed only sporadic interest in foreign policy and his chief concerns
were domestic.87 He pursued no grand geopolitical strategy.88 His was in essence a premodern Presidency in the diplomatic sense, a time when the role of president was to be an
administrator and clerk as much as a commander-in-chief.
“It has been the policy of the United States since the foundation of the Government to
cultivate relations of peace and amity with all the nations of the world, and this accords
with my conception of our duty now. We have cherished the policy of non-interference
with affairs of foreign governments wisely inaugurated by Washington, keeping ourselves
free from entanglement, either as allies or foes, content to leave undisturbed with them the
settlement of their own domestic concerns. It will be our aim to pursue a firm and dignified
foreign policy, which shall be just, impartial, ever watchful of our national honor, and
always insisting upon the enforcement of the lawful rights of American citizens
everywhere. Our diplomacy should seek nothing more and accept nothing less than is due
us. We want no wars of conquest; we must avoid the temptation of territorial aggression.
War should never be entered upon until every agency of peace has failed; peace is
preferable to war in almost every contingency.”89
It seems astonishing that only a year after uttering these words- spoken at his
inaugural address of 1897- William McKinley would lead the United States into war with
Spain. Though McKinley’s tenure as President was cut short by an assassin’s bullet in
September 1901, he had already served his first term in full and is therefore worthy of
inclusion in an analysis of the evolution of Presidential power and foreign policy formation,
all the more so in light of the fact that his intervention against Spain in Cuba has been
87
Ibid, 198.
Ibid, 160.
89
First Inaugural Address of William McKinley, March 4th 1897; Accessed online via:
http://www.bartleby.com/124/pres40.html
88
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highlighted by some as the genesis of American imperialism.90 McKinley’s term in office is
of particular relevance to this chapter because of the historiographical tug-of-war over his
relationship with Congress and the role of this relationship in the eventual decision to go to
war with Spain. The elections of 1897 had confirmed the Republicans as the dominant
party in Congress, with 206 members to the Democrats 124, ensuring a majority in both
chambers.91 However, those expecting a tranquil, harmonious relationship between the
White House and Congress on matters of foreign policy would be gravely mistaken.
There is little consensus among the historical community as to the precise dynamic
between McKinley and Congress and whether it was the President or Capitol Hill that
ultimately navigated the United States towards war in 1898. This is perhaps partly
attributable to the fact that McKinley kept no memoirs and thus his papers of
correspondence are minimal. There has been a general interpretation amongst historians
that McKinley was a pragmatic, if morally weak, politician who eventually deferred to an
increasingly warlike Congress on the issue of Cuban intervention.92 However, a closer
examination of McKinley’s dealing with Congress in the crucial period in the run up to the
declaration of war in the spring of 1898 reveals a more nuanced picture. Following the
sinking of the USS Maine in Havana Harbor on February 15th, McKinley asked for, and
received, a suspension of judgment pending the report on how the vessel was destroyed.
Following McKinley's transmission of the report to Congress on March 23, McKinley
informally requested that Congress forbear from making any warlike resolutions until he
had adequate time to formulate an appropriate response to Spain. This request was
granted. McKinley led Congress to believe that it could expect a message from him on April
4. He then twice requested, and was granted, extensions—first until April 6 to complete his
draft, and then once more until April 11, supposedly so that American citizens in Cuba
would have adequate time to leave safely. Congress only moved toward war after
McKinley's April 11 message explicitly granted it leave to do so, and even then, McKinley
90
See for example H. Wayne Morgan’s America's Road to Empire: The War with Spain and Overseas Expansion
(1965); Julius Pratt’s Expansionists of 1898: The Acquisition of Hawaii and the Spanish Islands (1936)
91
Figures obtained from website of the Office of the Clerk of the U.S. House of Representatives via;
http://artandhistory.house.gov/house_history/
92
See H. Wayne Morgan's William McKinley and His America (1963), Gerald F. Linderman's The Mirror of War
(1974), Lewis Gould's The Presidency of William McKinley (1980), John L. Offner's The Unwanted War (1992).
Page | 30
and his allies in Congress were able to squelch the Turpie-Foraker amendment that would
have forced Spain into war by recognizing Cuban belligerency.93
There can be little doubt that McKinley was under considerable pressure during
these two months. However the fact that Congress moved so rapidly to make war on Spain,
but only after it had secured McKinley's stamp of approval, and after acceding to all of his
stated wishes, illustrates that McKinley maintained a strong personal control over not just
his administration, but the entire U.S. government during that time.94 The actions of the
government during these weeks flowed from decisions made by McKinley, which
demonstrate that the general perception of a president being totally steered by a dominant
Congress is misleading. An earlier instance of Congressional defiance does however
highlight the prominent role enjoyed by Congress in this period. In January 1897,
Cleveland's secretary of state, Richard Olney, and British Ambassador Sir Julian Pauncefote
signed a treaty committing the United States and Great Britain to arbitrate all of their
disputes for the next five years. As a passionate arbitrationist, McKinley urged Congress to
approve the treaty upon his entry to the Presidency. To his dismay, the 1897 arbitration
treaty was rejected by conservatives from his own party in the Senate, who would not
accept any limitations on what they saw as a national right to force of arms.95
While William McKinley made a radical departure from the traditions of American
foreign policy in initiating the war with Spain in 1898 and laying some of the groundwork
for the long-term U.S. engagement with European and world affairs, it is difficult to detect
from his tenure an overarching idea or vision for the diplomatic sphere. The fact that his
foreign policy was almost totally reactive in nature, and was of course cut short by his
assassination, means that while he was undoubtedly a transitional figure, his tenure was
not seminal.96 Like his predecessor, foreign policy was not at the forefront of McKinley’s
agenda, given that he made the economy the central platform of his election campaigns. Yet
while the manner of his foreign policy formulation was ‘traditional’ and essentially didn’t
93
Nick Kapur; William McKinley's Values and the Origins of the Spanish-American War: A Reinterpretation.
Presidential Studies Quarterly, 41: 18–38. doi: 10.1111/j.1741-5705.2010.03829.x
94
Ibid
95
Ibid
96
See Lewis L. Gould, “The First Modern President,” in The Presidency of William McKinley (Lawrence: University of
Kansas Press, 1980), 231-253. John M. Dobson, Reticent Expansionism: The Foreign Policy of William McKinley
(Pittsburgh, PA: Duquesne University Press, 1988)
Page | 31
deviate from that of his immediate predecessors, his passion for arbitration was certainly a
modern trait in the office, a trait not entirely shared by his successor.
2.3 Rooseveltian Statecraft
Catapulted into highest office at the age of just forty-two by the act of an assassin, few
might have predicted the impact Theodore Roosevelt would have and the legacy he would
leave, especially in diplomatic affairs. Yet, when his background is considered, it is perhaps
less of a surprise. For Theodore Roosevelt was probably the first truly cosmopolitan
president, his childhood having imbued him with cultural links to, and appreciation for, and
an understanding of Europe that few other Presidents have had, more so than his
immediate predecessors and successors. This is of course partly attributable to the fact that
he travelled extensively throughout Europe in his formative years, where he laid the
foundations for an impressive network of diplomatic contacts. Unlike his immediate
predecessors, Roosevelt had a passion for global affairs, his interests and background
making him much more equipped for robust diplomacy than Cleveland or McKinley.
The tenure of Theodore Roosevelt undeniably appears to mark a turning point in
the evolution of the powers of the presidency, in particular in the workings of foreign
policy. Indeed, some suggest that “the roots of twentieth-century US foreign relations, and
particularly US foreign relations as of 1939, lie firmly in the century’s opening decade, in
the diplomacy of President Theodore Roosevelt.”97 Both before and after his time in office,
few chief executives have consistently been their own secretaries of state. Theodore
Roosevelt was one of them. Notwithstanding John Hay’s and Elihu Root’s invaluable
assistance, the twenty-sixth president shaped and managed foreign policy almost singlehandedly.98 His secretaries of state were longtime friends whom Roosevelt trusted but who
knew when to yield to his leadership in foreign affairs.99 Together with Secretary of War
William H. Taft, they provided a restraining influence on the often impetuous president,
offering invaluable expertise and assistance in foreign affairs. These trusted friends saw to
the details of major negotiations and efficiently took care of “minor” ones, such as the
97
William N. Tilchin. For the Present and the Future: The Well-Conceived, Successful, and Farsighted Statecraft of
President Theodore Roosevelt Diplomacy & Statecraft, Vol. 19: pp. 658–670, 2008
98
Hay served as Roosevelt’s Secretary of State from 1901-1905, Root from1905-1909.
99
Serge Ricard, “Foreign Policy Making in the White House: Rooseveltian Style Personal Diplomacy”, in Artists of
Power; edited by William N. Tilchin and Charles E. Neu (Connecticut, 2006), 3-31.
Page | 32
Alaskan boundary dispute with Canada. However, there is no doubt that Theodore
Roosevelt was the one meticulously shaping and directing foreign policy at large.
The relationship between Roosevelt and Congress offers a further glimpse of his
effect on foreign policy formulation. Though his Republican Party controlled both
chambers of the House during all four sessions of his presidencies, Roosevelt never came to
rely on their blind support. To him, the chief executive of the nation ran the show. His postpresidency autobiography was revealing for his castigation of former President Buchanan’s
“narrowly legalistic view that the President is the servant of Congress rather than of the
people”.100 Contrast this with his own stated position that the president has a “duty to do
anything that the needs of the nation demanded unless such action was forbidden by the
Constitution or by the laws”.101
Given that he is on record as regarding Congress to be “indecisive and irresolute as
an institution”, it is not at all surprising that Roosevelt chose on occasion to bypass Capitol
Hill.102 The dramatic increase in executive orders during his administrations is
symptomatic of his ratcheting up of presidential power. The device to which Roosevelt
gave particular new force was the international compact entered into by the president of
his own motion and authority- the executive agreement. These were essentially
agreements made by presidents in areas where they possessed constitutional authority to
act without consent of Congress. Thus the president as organ of foreign relations could
recognize foreign governments and settle foreign claims without congressional
intervention; as Commander-in-chief he could arrange cease-fire or armistice agreements.
He could in addition make what were not quite agreements but rather unilateral
commitments on the order of the Monroe Doctrine.103 Though these conditions existed for
Roosevelt’s predecessors, he would undoubtedly interpret them as a template for sole
control of foreign policy. His presidency saw the executive agreement rushed into its own.
Thus, in 1905, when the Senate declined to ratify a treaty with Santa Domingo placing its
customhouses under American control, Roosevelt, as he himself described it, “put the
agreement into effect, and I continued its execution for two years before the Senate acted;
100
Theodore Roosevelt, The Autobiography of Theodore Roosevelt, pg. 198
Ibid, pg. 197
102
Lewis Gould, The Presidency of Theodore Roosevelt, pg. 11.
103
Arthur M. Schlesinger, The Imperial Presidency, pg. 86
101
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and I would have continued it until the end of my term, if necessary, without any action by
Congress.”104
Roosevelt’s own words, written after his time in office, are a neat summation of his
attitude to Congress and his unshakeable belief in the power of the chief executive; “I did
not usurp power, but I did greatly broaden the use of executive power. In other words, I
acted for the public welfare; I acted for the common well-being of all our people, whenever
and in whatever manner was necessary, unless prevented by direct constitutional or
legislative prohibition . . .”105 In addition, he wrote a few days before he left the White
House in 1909 what was a ringing statement of his executive outlook, “The biggest matters,
such as the Portsmouth peace, the acquisition of Panama, and sending the fleet around the
world, I managed in consultation without anyone, for when a matter is of capital
importance, it is well to have it handled by one man only.”106
2.4 Post-Roosevelt
Given that his presidency was lodged between the momentous Roosevelt and Wilson
administrations, William Howard Taft’s impact upon foreign affairs is often regarded as
minimal. In truth however, his style may have been precisely what America craved after the
frenetic diplomatic sparring of the Roosevelt years. The New York Times editorial that
followed his election triumph of 1908 indicates weariness with the Rooseveltian style of
diplomacy, stating that “The patient needs now, not more dosing, but the ministrations of a
careful nurse. The advent of Mr. Taft will be opportune…We may confidently look forward
then to a quiet administration. We shall not live in the midst of alarms; we shall not read
quite so many proclamations and pronunciations from the White House; politics and
business will not be quite so embarrassingly intermingled.”107 Broadly speaking, Taft’s
administration would prove to be a quiet one, at least in the area of grand diplomatic
engagements, the type that Roosevelt had relished. A study of the same newspaper’s
editorial on Taft’s presidency in the aftermath of him leaving office is notable for its almost
complete lack of mention for diplomatic affairs. Instead, it commends him for the more
104
Roosevelt, An Autobiography, pg. 510
Roosevelt, pg. 198
106
(T.R. to H.C. Lodge, January 28, 1909, Roosevelt, Letters, Elting Morison, ed. (Cambridge, 1951-1956), Vol. 1,
1497-1498
107
“Mr. Taft in the White House”, New York Times (1857-1922); Nov 5, 1908; ProQuest Historical Newspapers, pg.
8
105
Page | 34
withdrawn style he brought to the role of president- “he has been a Constitutional
President. He has not undertaken to make laws by Executive acts, he has sought faithfully
to enforce those he found upon the statute books, and that is the truest conception of the
Executive…….history will be just to Mr. Taft.”108
Though William H. Taft came to the highest office in the land promising “a
progressive development of that which has been performed by President Roosevelt” it
would soon become apparent that he had a fundamentally different understanding of what
his role-as president- would be in policy formulation and promotion.109 Taft was troubled
by what he viewed as Roosevelt’s aggressive use of the presidency, but he did not see his
role as being simply an administrator or a constitutional clerk. To be sure, in Taft’s view,
the presidency should not be the driving force in the political system. However, Taft’s
actions as president and his writings after leaving the office suggest that he did believe a
president had an important role to play in the system, a role that fell somewhere between
that of a mere administrator or constitutional clerk and a modern, rhetorical leader.110
There is little doubting that it was Roosevelt who stoked the public demand for dramatic
leadership of Congress by the president. But Taft would have none of it: it conflicted deeply
with his faith in constitutional and, particularly, party government. A president should be
an important figure within the party but should not sacrifice party unity and strength to
excessive ambition and demands.111
Given his legalistic background, it is not surprising that Taft proved to be such a
judicial president with a keen emphasis on upholding the constitution. This stance, coupled
with the fact that a splintered Republican Party lost control of the House of Representatives
in the mid-term elections of 1909, would ensure that Taft’s administration was not ripe
with complex diplomatic struggles or proclamations. While he discreetly continued the
Roosevelt foreign policy of expanding American influence in the world and added a special
twist by pushing commercial expansion through what came to be termed “Dollar
Diplomacy”, his impact on the evolution of foreign policy formulation was limited.112 For
108
“William H. Taft”, New York Times (1857-1922); Mar 4, 1913: pg. 12
Ibid.
110
Michael J. Korzi; Our Chief Magistrate and His Powers: A Reconsideration of William Howard Taft's "Whig"
Theory of Presidential Leadership; Presidential Studies Quarterly , Vol. 33, No. 2 (Jun., 2003), pp. 305-324
111
Ibid
112
Donald F. Anderson, The Legacy of William Howard Taft; Presidential Studies Quarterly, Vol. 12, No. 1, (Winter,
1982), pp. 26-33
109
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Taft wholeheartedly believed in “the rule of law” rather than the rule of man, his emphasis
on constitutional democracy and passion for the tripartite system of government radically
different to his predecessor, who had so heightened the power of the presidency.
Taft’s successor, Woodrow Wilson, understood-as Taft did not-that the president
must necessarily take the lead on some important matters, that there are times when
deference to Congress and one’s political party could spell disaster for the party and the
nation. Still, Wilson was probably closer to Taft than Roosevelt in his conception of
presidential leadership because Wilson recoiled at the excessive popular leadership of
Roosevelt.113 Wilson had his suspicions of Roosevelt’s style of popular leadership, writing
in 1907 that presidents should stay in their constitutional place and let the courts and
Congress exercise their rightful powers (Wilson was, like Taft, an expert on international
law and law professor before he became President).114
In a rapidly changing geopolitical landscape, Wilson saw no need for a foreign policy
apparatus that would provide information about other governments and their objectives
and that would include mechanisms for the execution of his policies.115 Like Roosevelt,
Wilson expected to dominate foreign policy but given the complex range of international
issues that would confront his administration, he would have no choice but to share the
burdens of diplomacy with others. His dynamic with his Secretaries of State reveals much
about the hands-on role that Wilson sought in the diplomatic arena. His first Secretary of
State was in fact a political adversary- William Jennings Bryan- whom Wilson had been
forced to court in order to win the nomination in 1912. Their working relationship was
subsequently unproductive, with Bryan resigning in June 1915. The process for choosing
his replacement further enhances the idea of Wilson as the chief architect of his
administration’s diplomatic affairs. In contemplating Bryan’s successor, Wilson initially
rejected the man who would later fill the post-Robert Lansing, believing that he “would not
do, that he was not a big enough man, did not have enough imagination, and would not
sufficiently vigorously combat or question [the president’s] views, and that he was lacking
113
Korzi, pg. 322
Terri Bimes and Stephen Skowronek. Woodrow Wilson’s critique of popular leadership: Reassessing the
modern-traditional divide in presidential history. In Speaking to the people: The rhetorical presidency in historical
perspective, edited by Richard J. Ellis. (University of Massachusetts Press, 1998)
115
Charles E. Neu, “Woodrow Wilson and His Foreign Policy Advisors”, in Artists of Power (Connecticut, 2006), 7794
114
Page | 36
in initiative.”116 After consulting with his closest diplomatic adviser (Colonel Edward M.
House, a Texan political operator) and pondering the alternatives however, Wilson
dramatically altered his opinion. Lansing, House advised, “could be used to better
advantage than a stronger man…..I think the most important thing,” House continued, “is to
get a man with not too many ideas of his own and one that will be entirely guided by you
without unnecessary argument…”117 With Lansing’s appointment, Wilson’s inner circle of
foreign policy advisers had essentially narrowed to House, an unelected individual who
enjoyed much greater sway than cabinet members. Lansing’s limited access to the
president saw him abandoned to the margins of diplomacy, leaving no-one in any doubt as
to who was formulating foreign policy.
Wilson’s difficulties with Congress have been well documented and the fallout from
his eventual inability to find consensus with Capitol Hill would have lasting ramifications
for the wider world. During the war he neglected to cultivate support in Congress and had
failed to draw prominent Republicans onto his side. Having come to power at a time of
Democratic control over both chambers, by the elections of 1917 the Republicans had more
Representatives, leaving the Democrats to rely on the Progressive Party for support. After
grueling negotiations at Versailles, an ailing Wilson would pay the price for the absence of
an inner network of foreign policy advisers and for failing to cultivate relations with
Congress. He could not understand the concerns of the opposition in the Senate and make
reasonable compromises leaving his vision for a more stable, arbitrationist world order in
tatters.118
2.5 Taft’s Dollar Diplomacy
“The diplomacy of the present administration has sought to respond to modern ideas of
commercial intercourse. This policy has been characterized as substituting dollars for
bullets.”119
William Howard Taft, State of the Union Address
116
Ibid, pg.81
Ibid.
118
Ibid, pg. 91
119
Taft’s 1912 State of the Union Address; Accessed online via
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=29553#axzz1vdTjylxB
117
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December 3, 1912
In theory, William Howard Taft was impeccably qualified to continue the Rooseveltian style
diplomacy of his predecessor. Having served as Governor-General of the Philippines for
almost three years, Secretary of War for over four years and a spell as Governor of Cuba
during Roosevelt’s administrations, Taft seemed an ideal fit to provide leadership in
foreign affairs. However, as demonstrated in chapter two, he was a rather strict
constitutionalist who liked to maintain a sense of institutional regularity and integrity,
letting various organs of the Executive branch handle their affairs in an orderly fashion
without interference by the White House.120 And despite Taft’s keen interest in foreign
affairs, they would occupy a minor part of his tenure in comparison to his predecessor.
Domestic affairs such as the control over the trusts, conservation and the Negro question
became more prominent during the Taft years.121 Indeed, his acceptance speech of 1908 is
notable for its distinct lack of onus on foreign policy matters, with only casual sections
pertaining to diplomatic questions, though importantly he did state his predecessor’s
support for “the policy of maintaining a strong navy as the best conservator of our peace
with other nations.”122 In a further warning against a reduction in armaments he declared:
“In the international controversies that are likely to arise in the Orient growing out
of the question of the open door and other issues the United States can maintain her
interests intact and can secure respect for her just demands. She will not be able to
do so, however, if it is understood that she never intends to back up her assertion of
right and her defense of her interest by anything but mere verbal protest and
diplomatic note.”123
This declaration of intentions was the first avowal of the policy which, under the Taft
administration, would earn the title of ‘Dollar Diplomacy’. Taft’s policy would result in a
significant deviation from his predecessor’s diplomatic style, with the emphasis now
shifting towards the State Department assisting American investors overseas, essentially
120
Iriye, From Nationalism to Internationalism, pg. 213
Ibid, pg. 214
122
Inaugural address of William H. Taft; retrieved from http://www.bartleby.com/124/pres43.html
123
Ibid.
121
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employing them as intermediary instruments in achieving foreign policy goals. Shortly
after his inauguration, an opportunity to test the policy arose.
In May, 1909, the Chinese government made an agreement with German, British and
French bankers for a loan to construct the Hukuang railways. Immediately a group of
American bankers was organized to finance any concessions for railroads which American
capitalists might obtain from the Chinese government. At once however, they began to
struggle for admission into the international group of bankers which was to float the
Hukuang loan.124 Their difficulties led Taft and his Secretary of State Knox to aid them in
seeking American entrée to the British, French, and German consortium negotiating the
loan.125 Knox brought diplomatic pressure to bear upon China, with stern demands to the
American Chargé d’Affaires to issue warnings to China.126 Such diplomatic efforts appeared
to be futile, with the Chinese government hoping that the Powers would quarrel amongst
themselves. 127 It was at this point that Taft intervened. Breaking all diplomatic precedent,
he sent a personal message to Prince Chun, regent of the Chinese Empire, in which he
stated: “I am disturbed at the reports that there is certain prejudiced opposition to your
Government’s arranging for equal participation by American capital in the present railway
loan…I have resorted to this somewhat unusually direct communication with your Imperial
Highness, because of the high importance that I attach to the successful result of our
present negotiations.”128 Partly as a result of this pressure, a quadruple agreement was
signed in November 1910 to expand the consortium to include the American bankers, with
the loan eventually floated the following June.129
Simultaneously, the State Department would help American financiers to entrench
themselves in Nicaragua, Honduras and elsewhere in Latin America. Taft declared that “the
Monroe Doctrine is more vital in the neighborhood of the Panama Canal and the zone of the
Caribbean than anywhere else…It is therefore essential that the countries within that
sphere shall be removed from the jeopardy involved by heavy foreign debt and chaotic
national finances and from the ever present danger of international complications due to
disorder at home. Hence the United States has been glad to encourage and support
124
Scott Nearing & Joseph Freeman. Dollar Diplomacy; a study in American imperialism (London, 1926) pg. 43
Paterson, American Foreign Policy, pg. 242
126
Nearing & Freeman, pg. 44
127
Ibid.
128
Ibid.
129
Paterson, pg. 242
125
Page | 39
American bankers who were willing to lend a helping hand to the financial rehabilitation of
such countries….”130
However, the failings of this policy were cruelly exposed in Nicaragua. The
Nicaraguan President Zelaya had persistently challenged U.S. policy in the region, with
concerns in Washington growing that he was going to give a non-American power the right
to build an isthmian canal through Nicaraguan territory, thus challenging American
hegemony on the isthmus. Before long, a revolutionary movement appeared on Nicaragua’s
east coast, helped along by U.S. diplomatic officials and Marines, who landed to protect the
rebels.131 The ensuing conflict saw Zelaya’s forces execute two Americans who had been
captured aiding the rebel effort. Under intense diplomatic and domestic pressure, he
resigned and was succeeded by José Madriz. Farce and chaos ensued with Washington
refusing to recognize Madriz, considering him as no less responsible than Zelaya. The
presidency would change hands frequently in the turbulent months following Zelaya’s
overthrow, with Washington recognizing Estrada when he agreed to certain conditions
such as the holding of free elections and the reconstruction of Nicaraguan finances on the
basis of American loans to be secured on customs revenues. However, Estrada was soon
succeeded by Adolfo Diaz, once an employee of an American firm doing business in
Nicaragua. An agreement was then signed between the new government and the United
States for adjudicating all existing loan claims held by Americans, and for establishing a
customs receivership.132 When revolt threatened, American troops were sent to control
Nicaraguan railroads, allowing only Diaz’s troops to use them.
American military intervention in Nicaragua went a step beyond Rooseveltian policy
in that neither the security of the Canal Zone nor alleged intervention by European powers
was involved. Rather, Taft took action in order to restore political and financial stability in a
country that was apparently falling into the control of reckless and irresponsible men.133 So
U.S. intervention was very far from the transforming force that its exponents had claimed.
Rather, it meant a symbiosis of local politics with American finance, which was always
likely to bring out the worst attributes of both. More grossly perhaps than any of its
neighbors, Guatemala exhibited the blighting effects of the protectorate system. After a
130
Nearing & Freeman, pg. 265
LaFeber, pg. 246
132
Iriye, pg. 221
133
Ibid.
131
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hopeful era of liberalism and progress the country fell under the regime of Manuel Estrada
Cabrera, who ruled from 1898 to 1920. Not fortuitously, it was in these years that the
United Fruit Company got its stranglehold on Guatemala and turned it into the ‘Banana
Republic’, with control of all railways and ownership of half a million fertile acres.134
A critique of ‘dollar diplomacy’, written in 1912 as a publication addressed to the
U.S. Senate, members of the House of Representatives and the American public, exhibits the
brutal reputation that the policy earned itself, at the very time it was being carried out. The
writer- Juan Leets- makes a number of damning assertions against the policy, most notably
that:
“Recently, under the Taft administration, the Secretary of State, Mr. Knox, has seen
fit to add to the supposed right of tutelage over the Latin-American Republics, an
assumption even more pernicious and objectionable, that of policing these
countries, and further, has sought to impose, especially on Central America, a
financial protectorate which would deprive these countries of the administration of
their own fiscal affairs.”135
He further excoriates the policy by stating that “under the pretext of giving aid to the small
Central American republics, the State Department has used ‘Dollar Diplomacy’ to force
upon these peoples loan contracts which would give to a coterie of Wall Street bankers not
only millions of dollars tainted with illegitimacy, opportunity for immense graft, but an
absolute license to exploit the vast resources of the countries and even administer their
governmental affairs.”136 Lees then describes the terms of the loan contracts which
Secretary Knox has so assiduously sought to fasten upon Nicaragua and Honduras as
“vicious” before accusing Mr. Knox as having “adjudged Zelaya a dictator in Nicaragua and
drove him from power, setting up a government which has brought poverty instead of
prosperity…despotism instead of liberty”137
Concluding Remarks
134
A. Bauer Paiz, ‘Imperialism in Guatemala’, Science and Society, Vol. XXXIV, No. 2 (1970), pp. 146-147 in V.G.
Kiernan’s America: The New Imperialism pg. 130
135
Juan Leets, United States and Latin America; dollar diplomacy (1912) pg.13; accessed via
http://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?view=image;size=100;id=loc.ark%3A%2F13960%2Ft4bp0w737;page=root;seq=9
136
Ibid, pg.4
137
Ibid, pp. 4-5
Page | 41
As I believe my analysis in this chapter has shown, Theodore Roosevelt had an undisputed
effect on the evolution of foreign policy formulation in the United States, his tenure
heralding a seismic shift in the power struggle between Congress and the White House. As
episodes like the acquisition of the Panama Canal (treated in depth in chapter 4) would
demonstrate, Roosevelt oversaw a diminution of Congressional authority and influence
throughout his period in office, in the process fundamentally changing the institution of the
office. In stark contrast to Taft and Wilson in particular, Roosevelt regarded Congress as a
foe to be vanquished rather than a partner to be treated respectfully.138 Comparisons with
his immediate predecessors are complicated by the fact that diplomatic matters were much
less of a priority during the administrations of Cleveland, in particular, and McKinley,
neither of whom had the sort of overarching foreign policy visions of Roosevelt. As we have
seen, William Taft chose to abandon the favored methods of his predecessor for a more
judicial, legalized framework of policy formation and execution. And though Woodrow
Wilson has been labeled an “idealist” on account of his Fourteen Points, an analysis of his
foreign policy techniques demonstrates him to resemble his great rival Roosevelt in more
ways than either man would care to acknowledge. Wilson’s tenure was perhaps the first
during which Americans began to consider the possibility of long-term engagement with
international politics, particularly with Europe, and Europeans came to expect such
involvement from the United States. This would likely not have been possible were it not
for Roosevelt’s trailblazing diplomacy which, rightly or wrongly, ushered America onto the
world stage as a confident, leading actor.
In respect of Taft, his outlook undoubtedly placed less emphasis on geopolitics and more
on universalistic concepts. It upheld an image of the world that was not divided
geopolitically in terms of power but was integrated through the unifying forces of economic
interests. In stark contrast to his predecessor, national interests were linked more to
economic expansion than to power politics. By advocating a style of free trade, his
institutional-liberalism thus marked a sharp distinction from the realist lens through which
Roosevelt had conducted his diplomacy. To Taft, peace and stability in the world would
depend less on a temporary balance of power than on the nations’ pursuing economic goals
and opening up further opportunities for expansion. Thus compared with Roosevelt’s
138
Korzi, pg. 323
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world policy, the Taft administration was far more interested in universalizing American
foreign relations. The United States would be less a great military power than a leader in
promoting world order and unity through prosperity and interdependence.139 What it
meant during the administration of President Taft was, in his own words, “that while our
foreign policy should not be turned a hairs-breadth from the straight path of justice, it may
well be made to include active intervention to secure for our merchandise and our
capitalists opportunities for profitable investment which shall inure to the benefit of both
countries concerned.” If the lesser country in the bargain could not see the benefit then
Washington sometimes sent the fleet down and landed Marines as an extra argument.
The idea that American goods and capital could create happier, more stable societies
in the Caribbean and Central America- even in distant Asia- was undeniably naïve and
largely impractical. By clinging to certain principles- the open door in China, order in Latin
America, and the belief that enough money could secure both- he ensured near catastrophe
for broader U.S. strategic interests. As the diplomat E.T. Williams wrote to Knox in 1910,
‘Our policy in Manchuria has won us the ill will of Russia, irritated Japan, and failed of
support in France and Great Britain…’140 This contrasts starkly with Roosevelt who was
largely the model diplomat when it came to dealing with fellow global powers. It was Taft’s
belief that more constructive foreign affairs could be achieved by using the nation’s rapidly
growing capital resources and downplaying Roosevelt’s emphasis on military force.
The goal was the establishment of workable arrangements to provide a framework
for economic and political stability. This deviation from Roosevelt’s realistic policy to a
policy of peace through strength to protect the nation's economic interests may have been
admirable when taken at face value. However, while Taft’s tenure may have seen the United
States temporarily return to a tradition of geopolitical isolation which had been largely
abandoned by Roosevelt and McKinley, it was also an administration that oversaw the
economic penetration of Latin America in a much cruder form than previous
administrations had allowed. While Taft may have taken a backseat in diplomatic
engagements and did not pursue territorial aggrandizement for his country, his brand of
diplomacy was inherently imperialistic. It remains an irony that Taft, a close disciple of
139
Iriye, pg. 216
Michael Hunt, ‘Frontier Defence and the Open Door’, in Akira Iriye, Nationalism and Internationalism: US
Foreign Policy to 1914, pg. 225
140
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Roosevelt for a considerable period, should abandon his master’s foreign policy doctrine
when many later 20th century chief executives treated it as a diplomatic template.
Chapter 3: The navy- an instrument of America’s strategic vision
When focusing on American diplomatic engagements at the dawn of the twentieth century,
one should not neglect to analyze the role and importance of naval matters. For the navy
had an unmistakable effect on Theodore Roosevelt’s strategic thinking and foreign policy
decision-making. Scholars have suggested that “the precept of US power is anchored to the
recognition of the reality that power is the single most significant factor determining the
course of international relations… a nation needs to be strong militarily in
order to defend its inhabitants and uphold its interests.”141 The remarkable naval buildup
by the United States during my periodization is thus essential to my analysis. In this
chapter, I seek to explore the backdrop to Roosevelt’s naval passion, and the navy’s
prominence in the military affairs of the era. I have also chosen to include a section on the
deployment of the U.S. naval squadron –later branded “The Great White Fleet”- and discuss
the strategic factors behind the ambitious decision. This chapter will also analyze the
motivations behind the decision, and include a section on the state of other metropoles
navies, with a comparison of spending figures from the period.
3.1 T.R.’s Motivations
It is little secret that the writings of Alfred T. Mahan had a seismic impact in making the
case for increased American involvement in world affairs, and in particular in calling for a
modernized and robust Navy. His 1890 work, The Influence of Sea Power upon History,
which linked the power of nations to their ability to control the sea, became an immediate
classic. The timing of the publication was even more significant given that it occurred in a
period when modern technologies had essentially shrank the oceans and leveled the
141
William N.Tilchin. For the Present and the Future: The Well-Conceived, Successful, and Farsighted Statecraft of
President Theodore Roosevelt Diplomacy & Statecraft, Vol. 19, 2008, pg. 659
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playing field between traditional naval super weights, such as Great Britain, and ambitious
aspiring powers, such as Germany and Japan. No one before Mahan had explicitly made the
link between naval strategy, military strategy, and national greatness.142 Indeed, such was
its effect that the German Kaiser required every German ship to carry a copy of the text.143
Unsurprisingly, Mahan’s work had a significant impact on Theodore Roosevelt’s world
view. The relationship was also symbiotic however, with young Roosevelt’s writings also
influencing Mahan. Theodore Roosevelt’s study, written mostly while he was an
undergraduate student at Harvard, caught Mahan’s eye because it propounded a thesis that
coincided with and perhaps even influenced Mahan’s own thinking. Mahan, like Roosevelt,
was critical of the decisions made by the U.S. in the aftermath of the War of 1812, primarily
the decision to build “a navy of cruisers, and small cruisers at that; no battle-ships nor
fleets….We wanted a navy for coast defense only, no aggressive action in our pious
souls.”144 Just as Mahan and Roosevelt agreed with this analysis of American error, they
also agreed on what had to be done: The United States needed a big navy with large ships
and a global reach. They established not only a friendship but an alliance. Mahan would
supply the brain and Roosevelt the brawn, and together they would set out to reform the
U.S. Navy and, with it, American foreign policy in general.145
A study of Theodore Roosevelt’s First Annual Message to Congress in December
1901 is perhaps most revealing for its remarkable onus on naval matters and the
fundamental importance he placed on strengthening America’s navy:
“The work of upbuilding the Navy must be steadily continued. No one point of our
policy, foreign or domestic, is more important than this to the honor and material
welfare, and above all to the peace, of our nation in the future. Whether we desire it
or not, we must henceforth recognize that we have international duties no less than
international rights. Even if our flag were hauled down in the Philippines and Puerto
Rico, even if we decided not to build the Isthmian Canal, we should need a
thoroughly trained Navy of adequate size, or else be prepared definitely and for all
142
Paul T. McCartney, Power and Progress; American National Identity, the War of 1898 and the Rise of American
Imperialism, pg. 177-178
143
Zimmerman, pg. 117
144
Ibid, pg. 92
145
Ibid
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time to abandon the idea that our nation is among those whose sons go down to the
sea in ships.”146
And in what could be construed as a telling reminder to the metropoles of Europe,
Roosevelt added- “The Navy offers us the only means of making our insistence upon the
Monroe Doctrine anything but a subject of derision to whatever nation chooses to
disregard it…..There should be no cessation in the work of completing our Navy”. Further
dissection of the speech indicates that Roosevelt was aware of the shifting geopolitical
situation of the period and possibly foresaw tumultuous times ahead. Take, for example, his
quite dramatic call for an establishment of a National Naval Reserve, which almost suggests
he was readying America for a war footing- “In addition we should at once provide for a
National Naval Reserve, organized and trained under the direction of the Navy Department,
and subject to the call of the Chief Executive whenever war becomes imminent.”147
A section from his closing remarks highlights the supreme importance the Navy would play
in Roosevelt’s strategic maneuvers and foreign policy, and the tactics he would use to sell
that policy to the wider public: “The American people must either build and maintain an
adequate navy or else make up their minds definitely to accept a secondary position in
international affairs, not merely in political, but in commercial, matters.”148
3.2 State of the Navies/Spending Figures
A study of the naval expenditures and policies of both the traditional metropoles, such as
Great Britain and France, and up-and-coming powers like Germany and Japan in the period
leading up to Roosevelt’s presidency and beyond reveal why his focus on naval might was
unsurprising. In a sign of their increased ambition on the world stage, the Japanese
government had authorized the doubling of its army and navy in 1896. Unsurprisingly, this
precipitated a series of responses from the European powers, with Russia commencing an
extraordinary naval program in 1898 and Britain compelled to match this buildup despite
pressing commitments in waters nearer home. Simultaneously, there was a rapid growth of
the other European navies, including those of France and Germany.149
146
Theodore Roosevelt’s First Annual Message to Congress, December 3rd 1901; Accessed via
http://millercenter.org/president/speeches/detail/3773
147
Ibid
148
Ibid
149
James R. Reckner, Teddy Roosevelt’s Great White Fleet, pg. 1
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Germany’s program of rapid naval development had particularly alarmed the United
States. It also highlighted the need for increased investment. Admiral Tirpitz had urged
Kaiser Wilhelm to build a big navy so that Germany would be one of the “four World
Powers: Russia, England, America and Germany.”150 The 1898 Flottengesetz, or naval law,
saw a commitment to the construction of a first class navy and German naval aims
expanded significantly on June 14th 1900 when the Reichstag approved a second
Flottengesetz that doubled the size of the authorized fleet.151 The German Navy Bill of that
year involved an additional expenditure during twenty years of nearly $460,000,000. 152
These systematic outlines for naval expansion would be extended and enlarged by further
resolutions in 1906, 1908 and 1912, boosting Germany to second place, after Britain, in the
naval competition. German development was all the more remarkable for its precision and
efficiency. Every detail of the expansion, repair and replacement of ships, men and
dockyards, was thought out in advance for each year with due regard to the capacity of the
country to bear the expenditure.153 This efficiency- reflecting that of Germany’s
industrialization- was in marked contrast to Great Britain and would allow Germany to
rapidly narrow the naval gap that existed between the two nations. The rapid buildup
overseen by Tirpitz would transform the German navy from having the sixth-largest fleet in
the world to being second only to the Royal Navy.154
Britain’s situation was more perilous than that of an emerging and ambitious
Germany. Having enjoyed naval supremacy for most of the 19th century, Britain would
soon have to accept that her command of the seas was no longer undisputed. When
Gladstone declared in 1878 that “the strength of England is not to be found in alliances with
great military Powers, but is to be found henceforth in the efficiency and supremacy of her
navy- a navy as powerful now as the navies of all Europe.”, he spoke in the realization that
naval supremacy is based on economic supremacy. At the time, Britain’s economic
dominance was uncontested. However, at the turn of the century this was no longer the
case. By 1904 Britain’s total naval expenditure had risen to over $200,000,000 a year and
150
Cited in P. Kennedy, Strategy and Diplomacy 1860-1935: Eight Essays (London, 1983), pp. 157-158
Holger H. Herwig, ‘Luxury’ Fleet, The Imperial German Navy, 1888-1918, pg.42
152
Carlyon Bellairs, “British and American Naval Expenditure”, The North American Review, Vol. 179, No. 577 (Dec.,
1904), pg.889 (accessed via http://www.unz.org/Pub/NorthAmericanRev-1904dec-00887)
153
Ibid.
154
Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers (New York, 1987) pg. 214
151
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the admiralty were informed that the limit had been reached.155 With her colonies capable
of accounting for only one percent of her naval outlay, Britain would be forced to scale back
her investments in the sector and ultimately accept the end of her dominance. That the
total number of British military and naval personnel fell by fifty-three thousand between
1900 and 1910 (the comparative figures for Germany and the United States saw a rise of
170,000 and 31,000 respectively) and her growth figures in warship tonnage for the same
period were considerably lower than her rival powers demonstrate that Great Britain was
beginning to lag in the arms race and her strategic influence was waning.156
So it was against the backdrop of dramatically heightened naval spending programs in the
‘traditional’ metropoles and emerging powers that the United States belatedly chose to take
her place amongst the finest navies of the world. The outbreak of hostilities with Spain in
May 1898 resulted in congressional authorization for ambitious shipbuilding programs
(1898-1900) that included eight new battleships. Although the naval expansion program
was initiated before Roosevelt’s ascension to power, his administration would oversee a
second burst of authorizations. Pursuing his desired aims with determination and vigor, he
would achieve significant results in his drive for expansion, gaining congressional
authorization for ten additional battleships in his first term.157 By March of 1905, he had
apparently decided that further growth was not necessary. He made the decision public in
his fifth annual address to Congress in December 1905. Such had been the staggering
proliferation of new naval technologies in the intervening four years since he boldly
announced his quest for programs of expansion, he announced that from that time
onwards, it would be necessary to only add one battleship per year to replace superseded
or outworn vessels.158 The years 1906 and 1907 had seen the fruition of the battleship
authorizations made in the early years of Roosevelt’s first term. Between 19 February 1906
and 1 July 1907 ten battleships joined the fleet, while three others were nearing
completion.159 However, by the time of his annual address to Congress in 1907, Roosevelt
had dramatically altered his view that further development was unnecessary and again
sought approval to further build up the nation’s navy. In an address dominated by the topic
155
Ibid, pg. 894
Ibid, pg. 203
157
Harold Sprout & Margaret Sprout, The Rise of American Naval Power, 1776-1918, pp.259-261
158
Theodore Roosevelt’s Fifth Annual Message to Congress, Dec 5th 1905; accessed online via
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=29546
159
Recker, pg. 1
156
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of the navy, Roosevelt declared that “it would be most unwise for us to stop the upbuilding
of our Navy. To build one battleship of the best and most advanced type a year would
barely keep our fleet up to its present force. This is not enough. In my judgment, we should
this year provide for four battleships.”160 So Roosevelt’s zeal for increased naval investment
and development remained steadfast. And precisely two weeks after his address to
Congress came an action that would demonstrate America’s increased assertiveness on the
global stage under Roosevelt’s stewardship.
3.3 The Great White Fleet
Perhaps the most celebrated and enduring manifestation of Roosevelt’s naval policy was
his decision to dispatch a fleet of U.S. battleships on a global voyage, an action that would
become known as “The Great White Fleet”. In truth, a study of Roosevelt’s letters from the
period in question makes it difficult to interpret the precise motivations that lay behind the
decision. His Autobiography leaves little room for conjecture however, with Roosevelt
stating that the major purpose of sending the battleships on the world cruise was to
impress the American people (presumably to obtain more funds more the navy) and to
afford practice for the fleet maneuvers. “Practice” was also the explanation he gave to naval
officers and to Congress in his annual address.161 Yet in a letter written two years after
vacating the White House, he explained his motivation in very different terms, outlining
that while doing his best to be polite and courteous to Japan, he had begun to detect a “very
very slight undertone of veiled truculence in their communications in connection with
things that happened on the Pacific slope…It was time for a show down. I had great
confidence in the fleet.”162
Given the difficulties experienced with Japan that year over the supposed
mistreatment of Japanese immigrants in California, there had been an undoubted increase
in tensions between Washington and Tokyo. 1907 had seen an outbreak of serious antiJapanese discrimination on America’s west coast, with Californians venting their anger at
the increasing influx of oriental labor by requiring Japanese students to attend segregated
160
TR’s Seventh Annual Message (December 3, 1907); accessed online via
http://millercenter.org/president/speeches/detail/3779,
161
Ibid; http://millercenter.org/president/speeches/detail/3779
162
(Morison) Roosevelt to Trevelyan, 1 October 1911, Letters, Vol. 7: 393
Page | 49
schools. There were also mob assaults on Japanese persons and property163, attributing
further to the heightening of tensions between Tokyo and Washington. It thus seems most
likely that Roosevelt’s primary aim in sending sixteen frontline battleships on a
circumnavigation of the globe was to impress upon the Japanese that the United States
would not be dictated to and that she was ready to defend her vital interests and safeguard
national honor. He was also sending a direct message to the Japanese that the U.S. battle
fleet, entirely concentrated in the Atlantic, could be transferred intact as a fighting force
from one ocean to the other if the need arose, something Roosevelt knew the British and
Germans (and presumably the Japanese as well) did not believe possible. Roosevelt was
convinced of the fleet’s almost immediate success, later writing that “every particle of
trouble with the Japanese government and the Japanese press stopped like magic.”164 And
the diplomatic concessions from Japan that arose in the months following the fleet’s
journey there certainly indicate that the endeavor was a strategic triumph. Such
concessions included an arbitration agreement (May 1908), full compliance with the
previously established Gentlemen’s Agreement, and, in November, the Root-Takahira
Agreement, which confirmed America’s position in the Philippines.165
The triumph of the fleet did not just lie in the diplomatic concessions that it helped
to wrestle from Japan however. By docking in locations as diverse as Sydney, Naples and
Suez amongst others the tour indisputably impressed upon the world America’s ascendant
naval power. Unprecedented in many respects, including distance steamed and number of
ships participating, the cruise commanded the world’s attention.166 The tour also focused
domestic attention on the country’s expanded foreign interests and the need for additional
battleships, which Roosevelt had championed almost ceaselessly. In addition, the cruise
was a highly successful exercise in national public awareness, greatly expanding popular
understanding of American foreign relations and defense considerations, particularly in
regard to the Pacific Basin.167 Indeed the impact of the fleet exceeded even the President’s
expectations, by helping to liquidate the crisis that had brought the two countries to the
163
Frederick Marks, Velvet on Iron, (London, 1979) pp. 55-56.
Ibid.
165
Marks, Velvet on Iron, pp. 57-58
166
Reckner, pg. 1
167
Ibid.
164
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verge of war.168 It was also something of a public relations triumph for Rooseveltian
diplomacy. So it is a mistake to examine the tour solely within the context of U.S-Japanese
relations of the era and America’s defense strategy in the Pacific, even if that appears to
have been Roosevelt’s most likely motivation.
Concluding Remarks
As I have sought to demonstrate, the American navy was the fulcrum on which Theodore
Roosevelt’s strategic vision turned. Roosevelt believed in the modern battle fleet not only
as the cornerstone of military capability but also as a visible manifestation of power vital to
national unity and international diplomacy.169 The importance of increasing the rate of
development and modernization of the U.S. Navy and subsequently using that robust navy
as an instrument to achieve his wider diplomatic and geopolitical objectives is undeniable.
In many ways, the Great White Fleet was the perfect symbol of Roosevelt’s pioneering style
of diplomacy. With their white painted hulls displaying the nations supposedly pacifist
intentions, the convoy of battleships advertised the big stick which Roosevelt’s diplomacy
would later be caricatured as.
A consideration of the dramatic strides taken by the American navy during my
periodization demonstrates how important naval matters were in the emergence of the
United States as a credible world power. Arrogance had underlain America’s humanitarian
interest in the prewar Cuban crisis. Since Americans defined themselves as the champions
of civilized humanity, they felt that sitting idly by as the Cubans suffered reflected poorly
on them and implied that their country was too weak to alter events. This thought rankled
them. In terms of military strength, however, this was not entirely inaccurate. The U.S.
Navy was ranked twelfth in the world, beneath those of Turkey, China (a partitioned victim
of other countries), and land-locked Austria Hungary. Even Chile, a nation that no one at
the time would have confused with being a great power, paid no respect to the U.S. military,
as a well-publicized diplomatic scuffle in 1891 had shown Chile to possess a superior
168
Sprout, pg. 284
Carl Cavanagh Hodge (2008): A Whiff of Cordite: Theodore Roosevelt and the Transoceanic Naval Arms Race,
1897–1909, Diplomacy & Statecraft, 19:4, pg. 728
169
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navy.170 So in less than a decade, the United States went from bowing down to Chilean
demands to routing the remnants of the Spanish Empire and forging an important place in
world affairs.
In previous years, foreign relations and international crises had frequently
influenced naval development. Under Theodore Roosevelt’s stewardship however, naval
policy began to influence the spirit and direction of American foreign relations. And so
completely did he dominate both foreign relations and naval development in the opening
years of the twentieth century that the naval policy of the United States was, in large
degree, the naval policy of Theodore Roosevelt.171 His naval policy was the primary
instrument with which he executed his strategic vision. His landmark foreign policy legacythe acquisition and fortification of a canal zone through the isthmus- would not have been
possible without the naval might to discourage other powers from competing and
interfering. Without an adequate navy, the isthmian canal would merely have been a
hostage to a stronger power.172 Roosevelt’s vigorous naval policy ensured that such a
showdown never arose. It was the “big stick” that undergirded Rooseveltian statecraft
throughout TR’s years in the presidency.173
170
McCartney, pg. 176
Ibid, pg. 250
172
Bellairs, pg. 892
173
Tinchin (2008), pg. 661
171
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Chapter 4: Case Studies
In 1823, with fledgling republics across the Americas looking to blossom after achieving
independence from the Spanish Empire, the President of the United States made what
would become a landmark speech to Congress. When James Monroe declared to the Old
World powers that “we should consider any attempt on their part to extend their system to
any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety” it sounded like a bold
endeavor.174 Furthermore, by acknowledging the independence of these newborn nations,
the United States would no longer view any “oppressing” or “controlling” of these nations
destiny as anything less than “the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition toward the
United States.”175
In reality however, the Monroe Doctrine had little practical effect in the nineteenth
century and had no standing in international law.176 The focus throughout this period was
still on continental expansion rather than the wider issue of hemispheric relations. As a
result, the Monroe Doctrine receded into the background for most Americans during the
remainder of the nineteenth century.177 And as chapter three has shown, America lacked
the military and naval muscle to robustly enforce Monroe’s policy in this period. It was
essentially an impractical statement of power without a strong military to enforce it. Only
in the 1890s did U.S. officials adopt a consistently forceful line based on the principle of
nonintervention by European powers in the affairs of the Western Hemisphere. Secretary
of State Richard Olney's 1895 claim of U.S. supremacy in the Americas marked the new
174
James Monroe’s Seventh Annual Message, December 2, 1823; Accessed online via
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=29465#axzz1v7vKSm17
175
Ibid.
176
Mark T.Gilderhus, The Monroe Doctrine: Meanings and Implications. Presidential Studies Quarterly, Vol. 36, No.
1, Presidential Doctrines (Mar., 2006) pg. 8
177
Ibid.
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attitude most clearly; the Spanish-American War of 1898 indicated that the U.S. claim could
and would be backed by arms. 178
Theodore Roosevelt’s presidency would witness an even more aggressive
interpretation of the doctrine of 1823. It is one of the aims of this chapter to examine
whether the landmark ‘Roosevelt Corollary’ to the Monroe Doctrine was indeed a break
with the tradition of the doctrine. Did Roosevelt simply amend Monroe’s policy or form an
entirely new principle? The chapter also examines the cases of the Panama Canal
acquisition, the Venezuela Crisis and Cuba- namely the Platt Amendment. These cases will
be examined within the broader thesis question of whether the United States conduct in
this period can be classified as being of an imperialist nature. The cases were selected
partly because Roosevelt saw the Western Hemisphere and the Western Pacific as the two
areas of the world most vital to the United States. In particular, he perceived U.S. hegemony
in the Caribbean as a self-evident strategic imperative.179 The selected cases reflect this.
4.1 The Panama Canal
There is perhaps no single greater defining episode of Theodore Roosevelt’s presidency
than his handling of the Panama Canal situation. Indeed, in certain regards, it was of equal
importance to him as the enhancement of the nation’s navy, and he would pursue it with
equal vigor and determination. In his first address to Congress as president, he would
declare that “No single great material work which remains to be undertaken on this
continent is of such consequence to the American people as the building of a canal across
the Isthmus connecting North and South America”.180
Comprehensive victory over Spain in 1898 had brought the United States spoils in
both the Caribbean and Pacific, making the desire for a canal in Central America all the
more intense. And the eventual acquisition of the isthmian canal perfectly encapsulated
America’s increased stature on the global stage. In 1850 Britain concluded the ClaytonBulwer Treaty with Washington, by which the nations agreed to jointly build a canal in
Central America. They also pledged that neither would seek exclusive military control over
178
Serge Ricard, The Roosevelt Corollary. Presidential Studies Quarterly, Vol. 36, No. 1, Presidential Doctrines
(Mar., 2006), pp. 17-18
179
Tilchin (2008) pg. 660
180
TR’s First Annual Message (December 3, 1901) Accessed online via;
http://millercenter.org/president/speeches/detail/3773
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the canal and that both would safeguard the canal’s neutrality.181 By the dawn of the
twentieth century however, Britain would make concessions that would have been
unthinkable in previous decades. The 1901 Hay-Pauncefote Treaty (the second treaty of
this name, guided through the Senate by Roosevelt) effectively revoked the claims agreed
upon over fifty years earlier.182 In essence, the British conceded that the United States
could exclusively build and operate a canal and defend it with military force.183 For the
once mighty British Empire to make what would previously have been regarded as a
humiliating climb-down encapsulates the giant strides in development that the United
States had taken in the intervening fifty years. And in Theodore Roosevelt, they had a chief
executive who was intent on capitalizing on the heightened status of the nation.
Despite securing Britain’s withdrawal of claims to a canal, America’s acquisition of the
Canal Zone would be a complex affair. With the Spooner Amendment passing through
Congress in June 1902, Roosevelt was given the right to pay $40 million to an intermediary
company to purchase a six-mile zone in Panama from Colombia.184 Roosevelt’s secretary of
state subsequently negotiated the Hay-Herrán Treaty that gave Colombia $10 million plus
$250,000 annually for the six-mile zone. 185 Anyone expecting that the negotiation of treaty
terms would ensure a calm resolution to the issue of an isthmian canal would be sorely
mistaken however. The treaty still required ratification. When the Colombian Senate
refused to ratify the canal treaty, considering its provisions an infringement on national
sovereignty and an inadequate compensation in financial terms, the United States had a
choice of either approaching Nicaragua for similar rights or going ahead with canal
construction regardless of Colombia’s opposition.186 As it happened, they would be spared
making a decision due to the Panamanian uprising against Colombian rule on November
3rd. In the aftermath of the uprising, there were rapid developments. Having prevented
Colombian troops from landing in Panama to quell the revolt, Washington then swiftly and
unequivocally recognized the newborn Republic of Panama. Roosevelt would sign a treaty
giving Panama the same amount of funds as agreed with Colombia, but for a ten-mile-wide
181
Robert Holden and Eric Zolov, Latin America and the United States: A Documentary History, pp. 34-35
Thomas G Paterson, J. Garry Clifford, Kenneth J. Hagan. American Foreign Policy; A History/to 1914, pg. 229
183
Ibid, pp. 83-84
184
LaFeber, The American Age, pg. 227
185
Ibid.
186
Iriye, From Nationalism to Internationalism, pp. 176-177
182
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strip rather than the six-mile strip agreed with Bogota and gave the U.S. the right to
intervene at the two terminal cities of Panama and Colón.187
Reaction in the press to the Roosevelt administration’s handling of the uprising was
largely negative. Public Opinion claimed that the “Panama foray is nefarious. Besides being
a rough-riding assault upon another republic over the shattered wreckage of international
law and diplomatic usage, it is a quite unexampled instance of foul play in American
politics.”188 The New York Times echoed these views. Modern interpretations of the episode
have almost been largely condemnatory towards Roosevelt. Almost every account of the
incident stresses his “Big Stick” philosophy and maintains that the Colombian’s had every
right to disapprove their treaty with the United States; that they were at a distinct
disadvantage in a contest of strength with their northern neighbor; and that Roosevelt’s
personal prestige as well as the national interest was tied to the speedy acquisition of a
canal zone at Panama.189 Indeed, Roosevelt’s boast in April 1911 that “I took the Canal
Zone” certainly add weight to the idea.190 There are reasons to find this narrative
somewhat unsatisfactory however.
An analysis of Roosevelt’s letters and correspondence surrounding the Panamanian
Uprising reveal a more nuanced picture. In a personal letter written on October 10th,
scarcely three weeks before the revolt, Roosevelt stated that, in relation to Panama,
“whatever other governments can do, the United States cannot go into the securing by such
underhand means, the secession.”191 It is also by no means conclusive that the United States
discreetly facilitated the uprising. As Roosevelt would later assert, “There was no need of
any outsider to excite revolution in Panama. There were dozens of leaders on the Isthmus
already doing their best to excite revolution. It was not a case of lighting a fuse that would
fire a mine- there were dozens of such fuses being lit all the time...”192 Such was the
splintered nature of the Panamanian independence movements that it would have been
almost impossible to covertly back such a group given the lack of unity and the diversity
amongst the revolutionary leaders. Indeed the very fact that four hundred Colombian
troops managed to land at Colón before Roosevelt acted would certainly suggest that he
187
Ibid.
Public Opinion 35 (19 November 1903): 645
189
Marks, Velvet on Iron, pp.96-97
190
‘Congress may look into Roosevelt’s Panama Action’, pg. SM6, New York Times, April 23, 1911
191
TR to Albert Shaw. Morison, Letters, Vol. 3; pg.628
192
New York Times, Oct 6th, 1911, pg.12: Roosevelt Defends his Panama Action; ProQuest Historical Newspapers
188
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had no concrete involvement in the revolt or advance knowledge of when it would take
place.193 In fact, the presence of the U.S.S. Nashville, which dropped anchor at Colón in the
days after the uprising, would spare the lives of the outnumbered Colombian army
members 194 The Colombian government proceeded to plea for American aid in putting
down the revolt and offered, in return, to approve the ill-fated Hay-Herrán Treaty either by
presidential decree or by summoning an extra session of congress with new and friendly
members.195 In the face of such an outrageous reversal of its stated position, it is little
surprise that Roosevelt supported Panamanian independence. As he wrote on November
6th, Colombia “signed their death warrant when they acted in such infamous bad faith about
the signing of the treaty. Unless Congress overrides me, which I do not think probable,
Colombia’s grip on Panama is gone forever.”196
It is also worth noting that, despite the criticisms from sections of the press, most
American’s overwhelmingly approved of Roosevelt’s actions. They cared about the canal,
not about the means he used to acquire it.197 And the new treaty required ratification by
both nations. The Panamanian government ratified it on November 18th with the U.S.
Senate voting in February 1904 to endorse the treaty by sixty-six votes to fourteen. This
certainly runs counter to the claim that Roosevelt’s handling of the uprising and its fallout
was ‘embarrassing’.198
It is not difficult to see why Roosevelt chose to place such an emphasis on the
acquisition of a canal in the isthmus. In fact, it can be linked to his passion for naval
expansion. During the War of 1898, the battleship USS Oregon, stationed in the Pacific,
embarked upon a hard 14,000-mile voyage, lasting more than two months, before it could
engage the Spanish fleet off the coast of Cuba. The importance of an isthmian canal in the
grander strategic picture was therefore paramount. An inter-oceanic canal would confer
diplomatic, military and strategic power on the United States, tighten its hold on the sphere
of influence in the Western Hemisphere, and exclude European influence.199
193
Marks, pg. 102
Paterson, pg. 222
195
Marks, pg. 102
196
Letters, Vol. 3; Nov 6th, 1903; TR to Albert Shaw,
197
LaFeber, pg. 230
198
Iriye, pg. 177
199
Stephen G. Rabe. Theodore Roosevelt, the Panama Canal, and the Roosevelt Corollary: Sphere of Influence
Diplomacy pp. 274-292 of A Companion to Theodore Roosevelt; edited by Serge Ricard. (Chichester, 2011)
194
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4.2 Cuba
Cuba is another essential case to consider when analyzing whether the United States acted
in an imperial manner between the turn of the 19th century and the first decade of the
following century. No longer ruled by the Spanish empire following America’s crushing
victory in 1898, Cuba would become a topic of intense internal debate in America as to how
Washington should treat the newly independent island. Indeed, the Cuban question had
divided America since before the first shot had been fired. When McKinley had sought
authority from Congress to use armed force against Spain in April 1898, he found that
lawmakers were unwilling to grant him free reign in the conflict. An amendment by a
Colorado senator- Henry M. Teller- disclaimed any United States intention to “exercise
sovereignty, jurisdiction, or control” over the island and to” leave the government and
control of the Island to its people.”200 The resolution was passed resoundingly in the House
and by sixty-seven votes to twenty-one in the Senate.201 This is partly attributable to the
fact that some supported the amendment for fear that annexation would commit the United
States to assume Cuba’s large bond debt.202 McKinley’s acceptance of the Teller
Amendment showed that he did not regard explicit territorial expansion to be a necessary
part of the United States mission in Cuba. On the other hand however, his refusal to fully
acknowledge Cuba’s independence demonstrated clearly that he did consider the
expansion of U.S. international power to be a logical pre-requisite to the realization of
America’s broader aims.203
In the aftermath of America’s emphatic triumph over Spain, during his annual
message to Congress, McKinley pledged to assist Cubans in forming “a government which
shall be free and independent, thus realizing the best aspirations of the Cuban people.”204
However, moments later he added: “Until there is complete tranquility in the island and a
stable government inaugurated military occupation will be continued.”205 Some continued
to argue for keeping Cuba indefinitely. Leonard Wood, for instance, who in 1900 was to
replace General John R. Brooke as commander of the American occupation force in Cuba,
200
Extracts of the Teller Amendment; Accessed via http://www.historyofcuba.com/history/teller.htm
Paul T. McCartney, pg. 142
202
Paterson, pg. 201
203
McCartney, pg. 142
204
William McKinley’s Second Annual Message, December 5, 1898; Accessed online via
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=29539#axzz1vKnQo1RD
205
Ibid.
201
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believed that the nation should not be bound by the Congressional pledge.206 To McKinley’s
credit, he would honor Teller’s amendment. However he saw no hope of complete Cuban
independence without a period of American involvement to reform Cuban politics and
develop its economy.207 The official military occupation would therefore last until 1901, by
which time Roosevelt had ascended to the presidency.
Senator Orville Platt attached an important amendment to the Cuban appropriation
bill of 1901. Accordingly, the United States was to relinquish political control over Cuba and
end its military presence. However, America would retain the right to ‘guarantee’ Cuban
‘independence’. More specifically, the United States would have the right to intervene in
Cuba should its independence be threatened by internal turmoil or foreign invasion.208
Furthermore, the island republic would pledge not to cede part of its territory to a third
power, while leasing to the United States some naval bases in perpetuity. The United States
navy was particularly interested in using Guantanamo Bay as a key naval base for its
Caribbean strategy, and its lease to the United States would be a vital condition for ending
their military presence. These terms were duly accepted by the provisional Cuban
government, and the brief period of American suzerainty over Cuba came to an end in
1901.209
Cuba was also the scene of one of the most bitter and protracted struggles of
Theodore Roosevelt’s political career. His fight for congressional enactment of a tariff that
would place the Cuban and Philippine economies on a more prosperous footing
encountered virulent opposition.210 When the six-month-old Cuban republic approved its
first treaty- a reciprocal trade agreement with the U.S. - in December 1902, formidable
sugar interests mobilized in Washington to oppose the agreement. The matter required
Roosevelt’s personal intervention, with him reminding Congress of his predecessor’s
commitment to a trade reciprocity agreement with Cuba. Invoking the responsibilities
attending the growing American presence in the Caribbean region, he stressed the “special”
nature of Cuban-American relations, before adding that “We expect Cuba to treat us on an
206
Iriye, pg. 162
Ibid, pg. 163
208
Text of the Platt Amendment accessed via: http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/mod/1901platt.asp [Quoting "The
Platt Amendment," in Treaties and Other International Agreements of the United States of America, 1776-1949,
vol. 8, ed. C.I. Bevans (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 197 1), pp. 1116-17.]
209
Ibid.
210
Marks, pg. 94
207
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exceptional footing politically, and we should put her in the same exceptional position
economically.”211 Following interminable wrangling on Capitol Hill, Roosevelt convened a
special session of Congress in November 1903 and exhorted legislators to ratify the treaty.
A year after completion of negotiations for the treaty, and a year after extraordinary
pressure from the White House, the Senate approved the convention on December 16th.212
The pact thoroughly integrated the U.S. and Cuban economies. Cuba’s sugar and mineral
wealth moved north, as American farm and industrial products moved south. U.S.-Cuban
trade skyrocketed from $27 million in 1897 to over $300 million in 1917.213
The United States restored order to Cuba in the aftermath of Spanish rule but
ultimately assumed few direct responsibilities. The divisive nature of the Platt Amendment
ensured that nationalist opponents to American influence would direct their anger towards
the United States when poverty or difficult economic times hit the island. As early as 1906,
U.S. officials had to land troops in order to maintain order.214 Yet the decision to never
formally annex the island reflects America’s uneasiness to accrue significant colonial prizes,
unlike the classical European metropoles. As a confidential memorandum to the Secretary
of the Navy in 1901 had stated: “Nothing so much astonishes the Europeans as the fact that
Cuba has not been annexed.”215
4.3 The Philippines
The third case that I have chosen to examine in this chapter is that of the Philippines. Like
Cuba, the United States would essentially acquire the islands as a result of the emphatic
victory achieved over the Spanish in 1898, with Admiral Dewey inflicting a catastrophic
defeat on the Spanish fleet at Manila Bay. Though Spanish diplomats were aghast at
American claims on the Philippine islands, the United States offer of $20 million would see
them acquiesce. Unlike Cuba however, Washington ultimately chose to formally govern
over the Philippines in the aftermath of the war. The decision was largely a pragmatic
response to the situation brought about by the war. McKinley reasoned that having fought
211
Louis A.. Pérez Jr. Cuba Between Empires, 1878-1902; (Pittsburgh, 1982) pg. 362
Ibid. pp.364-365
213
LaFeber, The American Age, pp. 197-198
214
Ibid, 198.
215
Confidential memorandum for the Secretary of the Navy from Captain Sigsbee, Nov. 16, 1901; in Alfred Vagts,
Hopes and Fears of an American-German War, 1870-1915 Political Science Quarterly , Vol. 54, No. 4 (Dec., 1939),
212
pg. 526
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battles and expelled Spanish forces from various islands, the United States could not simply
leave them once the fighting was over.216 Nobody seriously supposed that an independent
Philippine government could survive by itself in that age of high imperialism. In both
Washington and London, it was widely held that if the United States should leave, Japan or
Germany would move in; and the British, who would have found German control of the
island a serious threat to their own position in East Asia, informally urged the United States
to keep the Philippines for itself.217 McKinley himself wrote that “we could not turn them
over to France or Germany- our commercial rivals in the Orient- that would be bad
business and discreditable…”218
The mishandling of the aftermath of the war was perhaps America’s gravest
misstep. The war had ended in conditions of extreme uncertainty. The Spanish were no
longer a major factor there, but the Philippine rebels who had done so much to assure the
American victory were seething with discontent.219 Having fought for two years to capture
Manila, they saw it turned over to a foreign power and were not even allowed to attend the
surrender ceremony. They would swiftly transform from being allies of the Americans to
adversaries.220 In an atmosphere where the rebel leader Aguinaldo and his men were
ordered to stay out of Manila, gradually isolated from decisions, and insulted by racial
slurs, an insurrection was again inevitable.221 In open defiance of Washington, Aguinaldo
and other prominent Filipinos organized a government at Malolos, wrote a constitution,
and proclaimed the Philippine Republic in late January, 1899.222 The resulting fallout was
bloody and placed huge doubt on the idea that the American mission in the Philippines was
a moral, civilizing one. Before the insurrection collapsed in 1902, over 5,000 Americans and
200,000 Filipinos had died. One hundred and twenty-five thousand American troops had to
be used to quell the insurrection, which cost the United States at least $160 million.223
Before the end of 1900 a civil commission was set up in the Philippines alongside
the military authority, with powers enlarged a year later. Its head, and then first governor216
Iriye, pg. 148
James C. Thomson Jr., Peter W. Stanley & John Curtis Perry. Sentimental Imperialists, (New York, 1981) pg. 112
218
Charles S. Olcott, The Life of William McKinley (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1916) 2:109-111; in Paul T.
McCartney, Power and Progress, pg. 200
219
Zimmermann. First Great Triumph, pg. 308
220
Ibid.
221
Paterson, pg. 208
222
Ibid.
223
Ibid.
217
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general, was William H. Taft.224 A telegram sent by Taft to the recently elected Roosevelt in
response to the offer of a return to domestic politics is revealing. Taft writes that while
honored to be offered the position, he must decline for the situation is “most critical” and
that from an economic standpoint the change proposed “would create much
disappointment and lack of confidence among people; two years now to follow of greater
importance in development of islands than previous two years.”225 So there was an
undoubted will on the part of the administrative hierarchy within the Philippines, led by
Taft, to stay the course and institute meaningful reform on the islands. His championing of
the Philippines Tariff Bill was further evidence of this. The measure, which proposed to
remove or reduce the rates of duty between the Philippines and the United States passed
the House in 1902 but was held up for months in the Senate despite Taft’s urgings. 226
The bill also enjoyed the support of Roosevelt’s administration but would prove to
be an occasion where the Senate was not overridden by the chief executive. A cable
received by Roosevelt from Governor Taft outlined his fears that starvation will result from
the delays in the passing of the Bill and that “We have assumed great responsibility toward
the Philippine Islands which we are in honor bound to fulfill. We have the specific duty of
taking every measure in our power to see to their prosperity. The first and most important
step in this direction has been the accomplished by the joint action of the military and civil
authorities in securing peace and civil government” before adding that if the Bill does not
pass “it is feared that outbreaks will occur in consequence of the idleness that prevails
among the industrial classes.”227 This was a sentiment echoed by General Wood in a letter
from the headquarters of the Philippines Division in Manila to Roosevelt in the summer of
1906. Though he declares that the civil government and the military authorities are
cooperating “very harmoniously” and that the “general conditions of the Islands are quiet”,
he echoes Taft’s earlier concerns, stating that “Idleness, due to discouraged agriculture,
which, in turn, is directly due to the absence of reciprocity arrangements with the United
States, is at the root of all the trouble. These people are not a warlike or troublesome
people naturally, but there is so little doing in the country agriculturally that idleness is
224
Kiernan, pg. 119
Taft to Roosevelt 28/10/1902 (Microfilm retrieved from Theodore Roosevelt Papers, Series 1: October 4thNovember 7th 1902, Reel 30; Roosevelt Study Center Middelburg)
226
‘Mr. Roosevelt Urges Relief for Filipinos’, New York Times (1857-1922);Feb 28th, 1903 ProQuest Historical
Newspapers: The New York Times (1851-2008) pg.1
227
Ibid.
225
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very general, and out of idleness grows ladronism. I fully believe that, when reciprocity is
established and agriculture takes the start which it then will, you will find that conditions
of ladronism will disappear.”228
The congressional impasse over the Philippines Tariff Bill was not resolved and the
issue festered into Roosevelt’s second term. Late 1905 saw proposals for a new bill,
providing for free entry into the United States of Philippine products and also opening up
the islands to investment, with the existing restrictions to be swept away. It would mark a
shift from the previous policy aimed at excluding outside capital and keeping “The
Philippines for the Filipinos”, a policy that had singularly failed. Taft, by then Secretary of
War, was again in favor of free trade. This was impossible however until the expiration of
the ten years’ provision in the peace treaty with Spain, by which her ships and commerce
enjoyed the same privileges as those of the United States.229 The treaty did not expire until
April, 1909 and it was not until then- under Taft’s presidency- that Congress would act on a
tariff bill that provided for free trade with the Philippines.
By 1907 the Philippines could safely be granted a National Assembly, as well as local
government councils; though behind this façade all key administrative posts were kept
firmly in American hands.230 Compared to the bloody heights of the Filipino-American
conflict, namely events before 1902, Roosevelt’s presidency did not witness wide scale
rebellion on the islands that had occurred in earlier years. Accusations that the decision to
retain control of the Philippines was fuelled by a desire for commercial conquest are
difficult to support. A 1901 report quoted in the New York Times is revealing. The report is
declared to show “that the United States shared in the Philippines trade last year to the
extent of $5,427,506, representing profits of about $1,085,541. This paltry sum,” says the
report,” is insignificant when we consider the other side of the account. It has cost us more
than $85,000,000 to maintain our army in the Philippines for the past year. Other nations,
without incurring the expense of a dollar towards that end, are getting $48,000,000 worth
of the Philippine trade. We will have expended, when the next year closes, at the very
lowest estimate for the maintenance of our army in the Philippines and our operations in
228
General L. Wood to Theodore Roosevelt, 26/6/1906 (Microfilm retrieved from Theodore Roosevelt Papers,
Series 1 May 19th-July 8th, 1906 ,Reel 65; Roosevelt Study Center Middelburg)
229
‘Will Open Philippines to the Big Investors’, New York Times (1857-1922); Oct 22, 1905; ProQuest Historical
Newspapers: The New York Times (1851-2008) pg. 14
230
V.G. Kiernan, America: The New Imperialism pg. 119
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the Orient not less than $450,000,000. And this does not include the immense increase in
naval expenditures and the $20,000,000 paid to Spain under the treaty of 1899.”231 So if the
fruits of economic imperialism were the immediate goal, the United States conduct in the
Philippines must be classed as a miserable failure.
Concluding Remarks
The three cases in this chapter were chosen because of their importance in the wider
strategic climate of the period of my study and because I feel that the diversity of the
selected regions provides a rounded analysis of American diplomatic conduct at this
juncture. The Panama Canal, Cuba and the Philippines represented distinct theatres: the
Caribbean, Central America and the Pacific, each of which would become integral to the
United States security strategy and hemispheric sphere of influence. Though Cuba and the
Panama Canal lie on the United States relative doorstep, their incorporation into America’s
sphere of influence should not be taken for granted given the scramble for their acquisition
at various junctures throughout history. The proximity of Panama to the U.S. had not
stopped French efforts at building an isthmian canal in the 1880s. Victory over Spain in
1898 brought America spoils in both the Caribbean and the Pacific. With the establishment
of a quasi-protectorate over Cuba with the Platt Amendment and the more straightforward
incorporation of Puerto Rico under the terms of the Treaty of Paris in the aftermath of the
Spanish-American War, the United States established a firm foothold in the Caribbean.
These new Caribbean possessions greatly enhanced the U.S. ability to patrol sea lanes to a
potential isthmian canal, the strategic importance of which was undisputed. And the
somewhat muddled decision to govern the Philippines was driven by a similar motive- a
strategic desire to halt the advance of competing Powers and heighten American influence
in the Pacific theatre. Three distinct but pivotal cases, all linked by a common goal- to
establish the United States as the eminent power in the Caribbean, the Isthmus and the
Pacific.
231
‘PHILIPPINE TARIFF BILL IS REPORTED’, New York Times (14/12/1901) PG.8
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Chapter 5: Influence of the European and Pacific Powers
“We do not wish to see any Old World military power grow up on this continent, or to be
compelled to become a military power ourselves.”232
Theodore Roosevelt, First Annual Message to Congress
December 3, 1901
It is the intention of this chapter to explore further the motivations behind the events
analyzed in the preceding chapters. It will therefore study the relations between the United
States and three countries- Germany, Japan and Britain- and ask whether rivalries of power
politics and global influence were motivations for the American conduct in the Caribbean
and Pacific as earlier outlined. The chapter primarily relates to the parameters of Theodore
Roosevelt’s presidency, although not exclusively.
5.1 Britain
Having opted for a policy of neutrality, that was in essence a pro-American stance, Britain
entered the 20th century on amicable terms with Washington. This would soon be tested by
opposition to the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty of February 1900, which prohibited U.S.
fortification of a future canal through the Americas. One of the chief opponents of the treaty
was Vice President Roosevelt. McKinley’s assassination in 1901 however would give
Roosevelt the platform to renegotiate the treaty and craft something that was more in line
with his vision. A revised second Hay-Pauncefote Treaty was agreed and Roosevelt
subsequently took an active part in the effort to secure Senate ratification, which succeeded
in a lopsided vote in December.233 However, the cordial relations between the nations
would face a stern challenge in the form of the Venezuela Crisis of 1902-03. The
Venezuelan government had floated large loans to London and Berlin, which went into
complete default in 1901.234 Interestingly, when the German government was considering
232
Theodore Roosevelt, First Annual Message to Congress, December 3, 1901; Accessed online via
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29542#axzz1vWT4kd6T
233
William N. Tilchin, Anglo American Partnership: The Foundation of Theodore Roosevelt’s Foreign Policy (Ricard:
A Companion to Theodore Roosevelt) pg. 316
234
David Healy, Drive to Hegemony, pp. 100-101
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forcible measures in response, they sought clearance from Roosevelt. While Roosevelt
would warn against any attempt at territorial aggrandizement, he offered no objection to
punishment of the Venezuelan government’s actions. Writing to Hermann Speck von
Sternburg of the Kaiser’s diplomatic service, he wrote: “If any South American State
misbehaves towards any European country, let the European country spank it; but I do not
wish the United States or any other country to get additional territory in South America.”235
In the summer of 1902, London agreed to a joint naval intervention that had been
proposed by Germany. On December 20 the powers implemented a full coastal blockade,
while the government of Italy presented its own demands and withdrew its diplomats from
Caracas. Roosevelt would soon regret giving prior approval to the intervention and would
push for arbitration, as requested by the Venezuelan leader Castro.236 Quickly realizing its
error and facing serious criticism at home to boot, the British government moved swiftly to
find an honorable way out, and would readily accept the American recommendation to
submit its claims against Venezuela to arbitration.237 By the following February, the
protocols were signed and the blockade lifted. When Roosevelt formally issued his
corollary to the Monroe Doctrine in June of 1904 the British government would actually
become an early advocate of it. Their acceptance of America’s assertion of its right to police
the Western hemisphere was a remarkable reversal from its bold blockade in Venezuela
scarcely eighteen months before. The genuineness of Britain’s acquiescence in and even
encouragement of American hegemony in the Caribbean was demonstrated when Sir John
Fisher, upon becoming Britain’s first sea lord in 1904, moved promptly toward a near total
withdrawal of British naval power from the region, leaving the protection of British
colonial and other interests there in American hands.238
5.2 Germany
While Britain increasingly came to be seen as an ally to Washington in this period, the same
cannot be said of Germany. American suspicions of Germany’s expansionist impulses were
longstanding. Bismarck had identified the south-western Pacific as a potential theater for
German imperialism, with Samoa one of its chief interests. Despite the United States
235
Morison, Letters. Roosevelt to Sternberg, July 12, 1901; Vol. 3, Pg. 116
Healy, pp. 102-103
237
Tilchin, pg. 317
238
Ibid.
236
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negotiating a treaty for the rights to a naval station on the island of Tutuila in 1878,
German influence in the area soon gained ascendancy, with Great Britain supporting its
ambitions there in return for German recognition of British interests in Africa and the
Middle East.239 In addition, 1888 saw Germany oppose the reigning rulers in Samoa and
establish a government under its control.240 At this juncture however, America lacked the
military power or a world policy outlook to curb German ambitions.
The words of former Chancellor Bismarck in 1898 underlined the general German
derision towards the Monroe Doctrine and displayed the ambitions that the nation held.
Describing the Spanish-American War as “indefensible”, Bismarck attacked the Monroe
Doctrine as an “insolent dogma, which no single European power has ever sanctioned”
before continuing to accuse America of possessing a “pigmy navy” that was incapable of
enforcing the doctrine.241 The Junkers were not the only group in Germany contemptuous
of, or hostile to, the United States at this time. The rising tide of German nationalism at the
close of the century had been typified by the movement for a more powerful navy; the
future of Germany, the Emperor proclaimed, was on the water; and the leaders of the bignavy movement naturally echoed this view.242 As chapter 3 of this thesis demonstrated, the
German navy saw a rapid buildup in the concluding decades of the 19th century. Between
1880 and 1900 alone, German warship tonnage grew by 197,000. The first decade of the
20th century saw an even more astonishing acceleration, with an increase of close to
700,000 tons.243 It is significant that the German decision to launch an ambitious naval
program came the very same year that the United States acquired Pacific and Caribbean
colonies for the peripheral defense of an isthmian canal. The two countries were thus
placed on a collision course, for Germany was as anxious to establish a commanding
position within range of the new canal as she was to join the worldwide race for
colonies.244
Those championing an increased navy had their eyes on a variety of interesting
points which might serve as bases for the increasing forces of Imperial Germany. One of
239
Iriye, pp. 80-81
Ibid
241
Wolf von Schierbrand, Germany. The Welding of a World Power (New York, 1902) pg. 352 [downloaded online
via http://archive.org/details/germanyweldingof00schi]
242
Perkins, A History of the Monroe Doctrine, pg. 208
243
Kennedy, pg. 203
244
Marks, Velvet on Iron, pp. 5-6
240
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those points, for example, was the Danish West Indies.245 Their strategic position near the
approach to the proposed isthmian canal explains the German interest. It would be a
mistake to assume that they were the only location of interest to Germany in the region
however. In 1899 they also had designs on the Galapagos, also of importance if Germany
were to influence the passage of the projected canal. Curacao also attracted the eye of
Admiral von Tirpitz, with further suggestions for acquiring Dutch possessions in the West
Indies.246 The possibility of a naval station on the coast of southern Brazil was also floated,
a suggestion made even more authentic by the presence of an estimated 300,000 German
expatriates living there by the century’s end.247
The discourse within Germany in this period is also worth noting. Professor von
Schulze-Gaevernitz, writing in Die Nation in March 1898, asserted that “the most pressing
need for Germany is new markets, new land for capital and endeavor. South America lies
before them. They have growing and prosperous colonies there…”248 He continues: “The
more Germany is condemned to an attitude of passive resistance to the United States, the
more emphatically must she defend her interests in Central and South America, where she
to-day occupies an authoritative position…For this purpose we need a fleet capable not
only of coping with the miserable forces of South American States, but powerful enough, if
the need should arise, to cause Americans to think twice before making any attempt to
apply the Monroe Doctrine in South America.”249
Germany’s renewed assertiveness on the global stage was highlighted in the
aftermath of American victory in 1898. With the American Admiral Dewey having
blockaded Manila Bay in the aftermath of routing the Spanish fleet there, warships from
Britain, France, Japan and Germany had moved toward the harbor, interested in the newly
vulnerable strategic archipelago. While most of the ships observed the protocol of a
blockade, reporting to Dewey and anchoring where they would not impede his blockade
operations against the Spanish, the Germans brought in five ships comparable in power to
the American squadron and became irritated by Dewey’s position.250 They often failed to
245
Perkins, pp.208-209
Ibid, pg. 210
247
Ibid, pp.210-211
248
Quoted in Austin Harrison’s The Pan-Germanic Doctrine (1904) pp.232-233; Retrieved from
http://www.archive.org/stream/pangermanicdoct00harrgoog#page/n253/mode/2up
249
Ibid.
250
Zimmermann, First Great Triumph, pg. 301
246
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report, anchored where they chose, and displayed ostentatious chumminess with Spanish
officials in Manila, even exchanging visits with the Spanish captain general. The situation
became even tenser when a German warship interfered with the Filipino rebels’ operation
against the Spanish, a move that enraged Dewey.251 Though the unrest was defused, the
skirmishing in Manila Bay had demonstrated Germany’s predatory interests in the
Philippines and beyond its supposed natural sphere of influence.
So belief in a German threat to American interests was growing rapidly even before
Roosevelt became president. As early as 1898, Roosevelt himself believed that “of all the
nations in Europe it seems to me that Germany is by far the most hostile to us.”252
Correspondence between the United States Naval Attaché in Berlin-Lt. Commander Barberand the Navy Department in the aftermath of conflict with Spain reveals the suspicions that
Washington held: “Considering that the Germans are likely to be our next antagonists and
that ‘imitation is the sincerest form of flattery’, we cannot do better than imitating their
very thorough system so that they can see what they will have to encounter on our coast
when they attempt to attack it.”253 By 1901, Roosevelt was certain that only a major naval
building program could deter the Kaiser’s ambitions. “I find that the Germans regard our
failure to go forward in building up the navy this year as a sign that our spasm of
preparation, as they think it, has come to an end, that we shall sink back so that in a few
years they will be in a position to take up some step in the West Indies or South America
which will make us either put up or shut up on the Monroe Doctrine…”254
Germany’s increasingly daring imperialist mindset at this time is reflected in the
existence of a contingency war plan to invade the United States around the turn of the
century. The development of Operationsplan Drei demonstrates that Germany’s increased
ambitions on the world stage were not only mere rhetoric. German naval documents show
that as early as March 1889, studies existed which dealt with the possibility of a GermanAmerican war.255 Their original concept of a direct descent upon New York, Norfolk,
Boston, or elsewhere was eventually modified to include the prior seizure of an advanced
251
Ibid.
Morison, Letters, Vol. 1:pp. 768-769
253
Barber to the Navy Department, no. 130, Oct. 1, 1898, Natl. Archives in Alfred Vagts, Hopes and Fears of an
American-German War, 1870-1915 Political Science Quarterly , Vol. 54, No. 4 (Dec., 1939) pg. 527
254
David Healy, Drive to Hegemony, pg. 72
255
H. Herwig and D.F. Trask, “Naval Operations Plans between Germany and the USA, 1898-1913. A Study of
Strategic Planning in the Age of Imperialism” pp. 39-74 in The War Plans of the Great Powers 1880-1914, ed. Paul
Kennedy (1979)
252
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base in Puerto Rico or Cuba. By 1901 the Army General Staff had joined the Admiralty Staff
in joint planning, General Alfred von Schlieffen originally estimating that fifty thousand
men would be required to take and hold Cuba. A later version of the plan substituted
Puerto Rico for Cuba, and reduced the troop strength for its seizure to something over
twelve thousand men. Finally, in 1906, the war operations plan was reduced to a mere
theoretical exercise, as rising tensions in Europe made it too dangerous to consider
committing Germany’s entire naval strength to operations in another part of the world. The
continued increase in United States naval strength also acted to discourage German
planners, and in 1909 the German navy’s Caribbean-South Atlantic squadron was
discontinued.256
It was little secret that the ambitious Wilhelm II was exploring the possibility of further
acquisitions in the imperial sweepstakes and harbored ambitions of gains in the Caribbean.
A 1902 letter addressed to the Department of State from the Dutch Consulate in Curacao
reflects this. The letter states that “there has been much activity of late in this vicinity
among German war ships. At this moment four are lying in the inner bay…” with the
expected arrival of “one or two more”257. Tellingly the message concludes with the
assertion that the ships are “ostensibly here for coal…It is generally thought that it
portends an enforcement of claims against Venezuela.”258 Wilhelm’s aggression during the
subsequent Venezuela Crisis underlined his unpredictability and underlines why
Washington could never fully discount his motives or ambitions, whatever the region. His
correspondence with Roosevelt from the months before that crisis saw him seek to
cultivate friendly relations between the two nations. Having sent his brother, Prince Henry
of Prussia, on a successful good-will tour to America and been deeply impressed by “the
splendid and cordial reception” afforded to him, Wilhelm offers a bronze statue of his
ancestor Frederick the Great to the United States as a token of his gratitude. It is his hope
that the gift will be “looked upon as a lasting sign of the intimate relations which have been
successfully fostered and developed between our two great nations.”259 A telegram sent to
Roosevelt the following month saw him accept praise for his help in “the development of
256
Ibid.
Dutch Consulate in Curacao to the Department of State, 29/11/1902; Dispatches from United States Consuls in
Curacao, Netherlands and West Indies T197 Roll 12, No.49 (Retrieved from Roosevelt Study Center, Middelburg)
258
Ibid.
259
Telegram from Wilhelm II to Theodore Roosevelt, 14/05/1902; Theodore Roosevelt Papers Series 1: April 9thMay 15th 1902, Reel 26 (Retrieved from Roosevelt Study Center, Middelburg)
257
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the great Harvard University”, in particular his role in the “creation of the German
Museum.” The telegram ends with Wilhelm stating that “You may be assured that as I tried
to do in the past, I shall never cease to endeavor also in future to bring our two nations
closer together by fostering mutual good feeling and understanding….I hope that we both
shall be allowed to pursue the happy task of consolidating the growing friendship between
our two nations which as I fully agree with you shall be advantageous for the future welfare
of mankind.”260 Yet within months, Wilhelm would demonstrate his lack of tact with his
stubborn aggression towards Venezuela. Such wild unpredictability made his intentions
difficult to predict and largely accounts for American suspicions towards Germany
5.3 Japan
If Germany was the big worry in the Atlantic, Japan was the strategic threat in the Pacific.
Though the United States rapidly increased its global sway and influence in the late 19th
century, in many respects Japan’s rise was even more dramatic. The figures relating to its
military and naval buildup are particularly striking. Determined to avoid being dominated
and colonized by the West, as seemed to be happening elsewhere in Asia, the Japanese elite
would initiate programs that saw military and naval personnel increase from 84,000 in
1890 to 234,000 by the end of that century.261 Even more significant was the increase in
warship tonnage from 41,000 in 1890 to an estimated 496,000 by 1910. To put this in
perspective, this twelvefold increase compares to a tripling of the U.S. navy in the same
period, though admittedly Japan were starting from a lower base.262 These increases
unsurprisingly led to a rise in status and prestige. It is also worth noting that Japan’s
victory over China in 1894-1895 resulted in large reparations of China to Japan that were
mostly channeled towards Japan’s naval and army budgets. 1902 saw a historic alliance
between Japan and Britain, which further isolated Russia in the Far East. With tensions
simmering over Manchuria, Japan launched a surprise attack against Russia in 1904 that
destroyed most of the Russian Pacific fleet.263 With its victory over a traditional ‘Great
260
Telegram from Wilhelm II to TR, 29/06/1902; Theodore Roosevelt Papers Series 1: June 27th- August 11th 1902,
Reel 28 (Retrieved from Roosevelt Study Center, Middelburg)
261
Kennedy, Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, pp. 202-203
262
Ibid.
263
LaFeber, The American Age, pg. 237
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Power’, and increasingly thought of as a European power, Japan had come of age. No one
could do anything significant in the Far East without first considering its response.264 Like
the United States, Japan felt ready to stride on the world stage.
As chapter 3 has shown, it is my belief that Roosevelt regarded Japan as a legitimate
strategic adversary in the Pacific region, during the second term of his presidency in
particular.265 The dispatch of sixteen American battleships to Japan’s supposed sphere of
influence was an important ploy in the geopolitical mind games. This was not simply an
imagined rivalry conjured up by Roosevelt however. It also registered on the consciousness
of the wider public, the press and senior military personnel. A New York Times article in the
months before the fleet’s departure captures the mood of the time. In the article, a “wellknown navy officer” offers his views on the likely fallout from the forthcoming operation.
“The chances are,” he said “that Japan will seize the Philippines and declare war before the
fleet has been one week at sea.”266 The article continues by stating that “the vast majority of
those in the naval service have long been of the opinion that sooner or later the Japanese
situation would reach a crisis” before continuing to ponder the implications if “in the event
of war Japan intends to carry it to the American continent.”267 There then follows a forensic
breakdown of the respective naval fleets of both countries, the conclusion being that the
tables of data “will be a bit reassuring to Americans”.268
So there can be little doubt that the United States was wary of the emerging Pacific
power in Tokyo. This perceived security threat was further outlined by a bizarre episode
involving Nicaragua, shunned in favor of Panama for the Isthmian Canal Zone. In the
aftermath of Roosevelt’s agreement with Panama for a canal route, the Nicaraguan
administration realized that if they were to benefit from the enormous wealth linked to a
transit route, they would have to find an alternative to U.S. financing and technical
planning.269 This led the Nicaraguan leader Zelaya to make overtures to foreign
governments and entrepreneurs, including consultations with officials in Tokyo. There is
no indication how seriously the Japanese took the proposal, but U.S. officials suspected that
Japan was looking for an opportunity to establish a foothold on the isthmus near a canal
264
Kennedy, pg. 209
For more see Walter LaFeber, The Clash: U.S.-Japanese Relations Throughout History (New York, 1997)
266
America Ahead in Fighting Strength. New York Times, 7/7/1907, pg. SM7
267
Ibid.
268
Ibid.
269
Thomas D. Schoonover, The United States in Central America 1860-1911; pg. 136
265
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site.270 Washington was therefore acutely aware of the ambitions harbored by the Japanese
hierarchy and is likely to have stiffened their resolve to strengthening its position in the
Pacific realm, to avoid potential gains and challenges to American hegemony on the
isthmus.
Concluding Remarks
Justified or not, fear of Germany played a significant part in American thinking about the
Caribbean and South America as a vital security zone. Concern for the national security
blended in turn with economic objectives, status ambition, and even reforming zeal to
motivate a quest for United States hegemony in the area.271 A fear that European rivals, in
particular Germany, and Japan, might challenge American power and policies in the region
encouraged the U.S. to play a leading role in the area and seek to establish the Caribbean as
their sphere of influence. The Platt Amendment in Cuba can ultimately be construed as a
safeguard against intervention by the European metropoles, a prospect that was
unthinkable to the U.S. given its proximity to the strategically invaluable Canal Zone at
Panama. So while Britain willingly acknowledged America’s arrival as a credible world
power in this period and resultantly became an ally of sorts for Washington, the same
cannot be said for Germany and Japan. Indeed, such was the level of distrust and
competition between these two nations and Washington that they would inadvertently fuel
U.S. resolve to develop and solidify their spheres of influence. Germany’s posturing in the
Caribbean and at Manila Bay, coupled with Japan’s heightened assertiveness in the Pacific,
ultimately led to the United States strengthening its hold in both theatres.
270
271
Ibid, pg. 141
Healy, pg. 76
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Chapter 6: Conclusions
Before I make my concluding remarks on the broader research question of the master
thesis, I will address some of the sub questions pinpointed at the outset of this paper.
Firstly, my studies have demonstrated that Theodore Roosevelt’s tenure precipitated a
definite escalation in the power of the presidency, in particular in the area of foreign policy
formulation. In this respect there can be little doubting his transforming legacy, as his
diplomatic zeal would provide a blueprint for a number of his successors, though pointedly
not William H. Taft. Indeed Taft’s policy is further proof that Roosevelt’s impact on the
office was not just a product of fortunate timing. If some suggest that Roosevelt’s
diplomatic standing was a result of him being commander-in-chief at a time when America
was a fledgling superpower, Taft’s reversal of Roosevelt’s position demonstrate that
America’s increased standing and global reputation alone did not make for robust
presidential diplomacy.
My studies have also sought to highlight the degree to which Germany -and Japanconstituted a significant factor in the strategic deliberations of the U.S. government and
navy. As this thesis has shown, the U.S. was keenly aware of the increased ambitions and
strategic goals that both Berlin and Tokyo held. The challenge posed by these ambitious
new powers led to Theodore Roosevelt’s more aggressive interpretation of the Monroe
Doctrine and his ruthless stance towards the acquisition of the Canal Zone at Panama. The
transformation of Cuba into a form of U.S. protectorate as authorized by the Platt
Amendment was further evidence of Washington’s unwillingness to countenance European
interference in their sphere of influence and in the general region of the prized isthmian
canal. The acquisition of Puerto Rico augmented this policy, providing another invaluable
strategic hub near the Canal Zone. I would therefore class the United States as an ‘empire
without colonies’ in the Caribbean at this time. It can be said that America bought territory
rather than stole it. And unlike European metropoles, the United States did not seek
commerce –until Taft’s radical though short-lived policy swing- or simple conquest. The
figures show that America’s presence in the Philippines led to substantial financial losses.
And apart from the brief Philippines experiment, which was prompted by security and
moral concerns as we have seen, the United States did not govern an overseas territory
Page | 74
directly throughout this period. And unlike other traditional forms of imperialism, the
acquisition of Philippines was from another Empire- the Spanish.
This master thesis has also demonstrated the integral importance of a strong navy as the
primary instrument that Theodore Roosevelt would use to achieve his broader strategic
objectives. It would be impossible to attempt an analysis of U.S. foreign policy at the dawn
of the 20th century without highlighting the essential importance of the American navy. The
research also concludes that Theodore Roosevelt was a curious mix of realist and idealist.
His realistic traits are obvious and undeniable- his dramatic escalation of American naval
power, his energy for strategic matters and his drive to expand America’s spheres of
influence. Yet in addition, there are idealistic elements to his record. His passion to
establish reciprocal trade agreements with Cuba and the Philippines so that their
economies may flourish was certainly not the actions of a cold-hearted imperialist but of a
man intent on having the U.S. play a paternalist role in those regions. There can be no
denying however that realism defined his diplomacy. Summing up Rooseveltian foreign
policy, then, it may be said that it was derived from a view of the world as made up of great
powers which would be perpetual competitors but which would also co-operate to
maintain stability and equilibrium in various regions of the globe. In terms of power, such
an approach produced a geopolitical outlook which defined America’s spheres of influence
in the Western Hemisphere and parts of the Pacific Ocean.272.
Turning to the overarching research question, I believe it is apparent that the United States
behaved in an imperialistic manner during my periodization. However, I have also
concluded that it was in many respects a distinctive imperialism, indeed a more prudent
model than the earlier European metropoles. The Philippines ‘experiment’ of formal rule
remains something of an aberration but a closer analysis shows that it was by no means a
glaring imperial misstep. An examination of the center-periphery dynamic provides an
insight into this.
The 1902 Organic Act instituted Philippine citizenship under the protection of the
United States, whose President appointed a Civil Governor as head of the islands’ executive
branch and provided for the establishment of an insular form of representative
272
Akira Iriye, pg. 212
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government (with the first Philippine Assembly being elected in 1907).273 This can be
construed as an acknowledgment from Washington that, in light of the violent uprisings
that had greeted American occupation of the islands post 1898, attempts at rigidly
controlling the Filipino people would be doomed to failure. Contrast this with the British
response to the Indian Rebellion of 1857. The suppression of the revolt was swiftly
followed by a formal transfer of rule from the British East India Company to the British
Crown, who would directly govern the region from that point onward. While 17th century
overseas expansion had been driven by explorers, settlers, or merchants –with the Crown
sanctioning the initiatives but not playing an active role- as the 18th century progressed,
"government rather than the subject was responsible for extending the empire. “274 So
rather than transfer power and decision-making from the center to the periphery, Britain
tightened her grip on its colonial prizes, in marked contrast to American conduct in the
Philippines. Even the best known instances of British indirect rule (as in Nigeria and latterly
India) were ultimately subordinated to an overarching colonial state. Indirect rulers-chiefs,
headmen, captains, or princes in the nominally independent "princely states" of the British
Raj-were approved, supervised, tolerated, and sometimes appointed by their colonial
overlords. The colonial state claimed ultimate authority and legal jurisdiction over the
putative subjects of indigenous indirect rulers.275 And there are further indications that
TR’s claim that “the people of the islands ... never developed so rapidly, from every
standpoint, as during the years of American occupation”276 are not as exaggerated as one
might initially suspect. While in British Burma 3.3 percent of the population were enrolled
in schools in 1900 and 1 percent in Netherlands India in 1907, the Philippines could boast
about 7 percent in 1907 and close to 94 percent of the children were attending primary
school by 1913.277 TR could boast half a million pupils and primary school attendance
273
Annick Cizel (2008): Nation-Building in the Philippines: Rooseveltian Statecraft for Imperial Modernization in an
Emergent Transatlantic World Order, Diplomacy & Statecraft, 19:4, 690-711
274
Julian Go, Patterns of empire : the British and American empires, 1688 to the present (New York 2011) pg. 32
275
George Steinmetz. Return to Empire: The New U.S. Imperialism in Comparative Historical Perspective;
Sociological Theory, Vol. 23, No. 4 (Dec., 2005), pp. 339-367
276
Theodore Roosevelt, An Autobiography (New York, 1913), p. 544.
277
Cizel, pp. 693-694
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averaging 70 percent before Congress in 1905.278 In addition, by 1913, 71 percent of all
government positions were in Filipino hands.279
It is also worth noting that while America’s presence in the Philippines brought
extolled considerable financial losses, many of Britain’s colonial endeavors yielded
significant economic reward. One need only examine the figures for sugar exports to the
colonial heartland from the British West Indies in the period 1820-1899 for evidence of the
bounty that British presence reaped.280 And the jewel of Britain’s empire-India- was even
more profitable. Between 1870 and 1913 India rose from third to first place among
Britain’s export markets, as she doubled her share from 8 to 16 percent of the whole.281
Some 60 percent of India’s imports came from Britain in 1913.282 Britain’s favorable
balance of trade with India was highly important, for India sustained a trading surplus with
countries in Asia and Europe that enjoyed surpluses with Britain.283
That United States U.S. policymakers were cognizant of imperial precedents is
undoubted. Indeed, it may well have shaped their decision-making. The British school
system implemented in Egypt was claimed as a reference for the aforementioned
American-Filipino model.284 Roosevelt’s declaration that America’s dependencies enjoyed a
democratic comparative advantage over Europe’s, since “more distinctly than any of these
powers we are endeavoring to develop the natives themselves so that they shall take an
ever-increasing share in their own government”285 supplements this view. His belief in the
superiority of America’s civilizing of the Philippines was again apparent in 1913 when he
stated that “With the possible exception of the Sudan, and not even excepting Algiers, I
know of no country ruled and administered by men of the white race where that rule and
that administration have been exercised so emphatically with an eye single to the welfare
278
Theodore Roosevelt Papers, The Library of Congress President’s Papers Microfilm Series (Washington, DC,
1969), reel 426, in Annick Cizel (2008) Nation-Building in the Philippines: Rooseveltian Statecraft for Imperial
Modernization in an Emergent Transatlantic World Order, Diplomacy & Statecraft, 19:4, pg. 694
279
Cizel, pg. 694
280
See Gad Heuman “The British West Indies”, pp. 470-493 of The Oxford History of the British Empire: Vol. 3 The
Nineteenth Century [ed. Andrew Porter] (Oxford, 1999)
281
See Robin J. Moore “Imperial India 1858-1914”, pp. 422-446 of The Oxford History of the British Empire: Vol. 3
The Nineteenth Century [ed. Andrew Porter] (Oxford, 1999)
282
Ibid, pg. 441
Ibid.
284
Ibid. pg. 704
285
Theodore Roosevelt, Fourth Annual Message, December 6, 1904. Accessed via
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=29545
283
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of the natives themselves.”286 Another striking aspect of America’s foray into imperialism is
that the new overseas territories were not accompanied by the arrival of white settlers.
Except for Hawaii, white settlement was minimal. Instead, the U.S. military first occupied
the territories and were then replaced by civilian administrators from the mainland. This
was a form of administrative colonialism rather than settler colonialism.287 Contrast this
with Germany’s attempts to create a settler economy by violent force in Southwest Africa.
In respect of America’s other acquisitions, Guam was important for its location,
about two-thirds of the way from Hawaii to the Philippines and within easy sailing distance
of Shanghai, Canton, Hong Kong and Yokohama.288 It was therefore a vital refueling depot
for Washington’s favored instrument of influence- the navy. The same is also true of Wake
Island in the North Pacific Ocean. In the way of imperial powers of the past, naval bases and
coaling stations were necessary to “exercise [an] influence in foreign affairs.”289 These were
not egotistical prizes of Empire like the British had accrued but necessary coaling stations
for the security challenges that the 20th century was certain to throw at Washington. The
Philippines would become an unexpected cog in Washington’s Pacific network. Roosevelt’s
first annual message to Congress is further evidence that the U.S. had a conscious security
strategy in the Pacific theatre: “I call your attention most earnestly to the crying need of a
cable to Hawaii and the Philippines, to be continued from the Philippines to points in Asia.
We should not defer a day longer than necessary the construction of such a cable. It is
demanded not merely for commercial but for political and military considerations.” So the
importance of these acquisitions as hubs in America’s broader strategic quest for influence
should not be mistaken. This thesis echoes the later words of US War Secretary Stimson’s
description of the bases America accumulated in the Pacific in the 1940s: ‘these are not
colonies; they are outposts’.290
The presidency of William Taft is further evidence of an ‘informal imperialism’,
albeit of a different kind to his predecessors. His administration oversaw an economic
penetration that while not specifically trampling on the sovereignty of developing nations,
often ensured that officials that were conducive to the interests of the United States held
286
Roosevelt, An Autobiography, p. 544.
Go, pg. 55
288
Zimmermann, pg. 301
289
TR to Theodore Elijah Burton, February 23, 1904, Morison, The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt, vol. IV: The
Square Deal 1903–1905 (Cambridge, MA, 1951), p. 737.
290
http://hnn.us/articles/27021.html
287
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power. This was a more subtle, yet deeply insidious method of enhancing American
interests that had no broader strategic engines behind the policy. It was an inescapable
mutation of economic imperialism, the kind of which his predecessors had largely shunned.
Roosevelt was hostile to the idea of economic imperialism and never engaged in it.291 Taft’s
policies were a drastic shift from this and make the charge of blatant economic imperialism
irrefutable.
To conclude, the United States imperialism at the turn of the 19th century into the
dawn of the 20th century was distinct from Britain’s classical style, as practiced primarily
throughout the 19th century. Go (2011) encapsulates this with his expert distinction
between ‘formal’ and ‘informal’ models of empire. For him, formal empires involve direct
political control over territory and the subjugation of inhabitants of that territory into a
status that is lesser, inferior, or dependent. By this measure of colonial rule, colonized
peoples are treated as inferior to citizens in the metropole both in practice and in juridical
theory or official doctrine.292 By contrast, informal empire “refers to the exercise of power
over the internal or external affairs of nominally independent states through a variety of
methods falling shy of annexation.293 Where Britain operated wide scale direct governance
over distant territories and sought both commerce and conquest, the United States
oversaw a limited suzerainty in the Philippines, which was short lived, unprofitable and
dictated by security and strategic interests. Whatever critics of American foreign policy at
the dawn of the 20th century may argue, it remains the case that no American president
ruled without consent over vast conquered territories and their populations. For Britain,
an extensive trade network and empire went hand in hand. They possessed both a
constitutional empire (as evidenced in Canada, Australia, New Zealand, India and Africa) as
well as areas of informal influence, in South America, the Ottoman Empire and China.294 In
such stark contrast, the United States can be judged to have engaged in a distinct form of
imperialism from 1898 through to 1912- ‘an informal imperialism’.
291
Tilchin (2008) pg. 667
Go. pp. 9-10.
293
Ibid. pp. 10-11
294
See P.J. Cain & A.G. Hopkins British Imperialism: Innovation and Expansion, 1688-1914 (London, 1993)
292
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Online Resources:
→ Richard Lowry & Ramesh Ponnuru, “An Exceptional Debate: The Obama administration’s
assault on American identity,” National Review Online (March 8th 2010) URL:
http://www.nationalreview.com/nrd/article/?q=M2FhMTg4Njk0NTQwMmFlMmYzZDg2YzgyYjd
mYjhhMzU=
→Modern Imperial Formations and the End of American Exceptionalism. Clara Altman (Brandeis
University); Published on H-Empire (May, 2012) Retrieved on 7/7/12 from http://www.hnet.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=35292
Page | 83
Online Resources: (continued)
→Text of the Platt Amendment accessed via:
http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/mod/1901platt.asp
→ Wolf von Schierbrand, Germany. The Welding of a World Power (New York, 1902) pg. 352
[downloaded online via http://archive.org/details/germanyweldingof00schi]
→ Austin Harrison’s The Pan-Germanic Doctrine (1904) pp.232-233; Retrieved from
http://www.archive.org/stream/pangermanicdoct00harrgoog#page/n253/mode/2up
→ Juan Leets, United States and Latin America; dollar diplomacy (1912) pg.13; accessed via
http://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?view=image;size=100;id=loc.ark%3A%2F13960%2Ft4bp0w73
7;page=root;seq=9
→ http://hnn.us/articles/27021.html
→ Presidential speeches also accessed via:
-
http://www.bartleby.com/
-
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/
-
http://millercenter.org/
Archival Material:
→ Theodore Roosevelt Papers; Series 1, Reels 28/ 30/ 65; Roosevelt Study Centre, Middleburg ,
The Netherlands
→ Dispatches from United States Consuls in Curacao, Netherlands and West Indies T197 Roll 12,
No.49; Roosevelt Study Centre, Middleburg , The Netherlands
Page | 84