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Does International Law Really Matter?
A Case Study on Compliance with or Breach of
Legal Obligations during World War I
The Functions and Purposes of International Law
What a difference a century makes? The arrival of the year 2000 brought an end to the
20th century, a century indelibly marked by two global wars that wrought death and destruction
the world had never seen and hopefully never will again. For many people today, the new
millennium is a symbol of new hope: hope for a better society, a safer world, and a brighter
tomorrow. Those hopes were surely present at the beginning of the 20th century as well, as many
people were placing their faith in the developing role of international law to create that safer
world.
Others, however, were skeptical, doubting the idealistic picture international law
portrayed. Even today, many scholars are still skeptical about the potency of international law
despite its many progressions since 1900, but these scholars have the experiences of the past
hundred years on which to base their skepticism.
In Europe, the geo-political center of the world at the time, the year 1900 began with
aspirations for self-imposed civility and harmony among nation-states. But those ideals of peace
and amicable inter-state relations were a pacifist reaction to the numerous signs that continental
Europe was a short-fused bomb waiting to go off. The late 1800s and early 1900s were a period
of competing nationalistic ambitions between the major European powers, both on the continent
and particularly in other hemispheres of colonial imperialism. Each state was trying to increase
its power and potential at the expense of others, and these self-interested drives frequently led to
tensions between the powers. Throughout the previous centuries since the rise of the idea of the
nation-state, those tensions led to frequent occurrences of war between the competing states, and
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this phenomenon was threatening to recur in the early 1900s unless something could be done to
defuse the situation. Furthermore, the presence of an interlocking system of military alliances
between states brought the disturbing likelihood that any localized dispute would be broadened
into a widespread continental war.
As a result, attempts at conciliation and self-restraint were made to reduce the prospects
of war, most prominently at the assembly of the great powers in the Hague for a series of
negotiations in 1899 and again in 1907. The numerous resulting agreements evidenced the
states’ desire, in their interaction with one another, to bind themselves to certain obligations
through the use of international law. This practice of turning to a multi-lateral treaty to resolve
an international crisis was a growing trend at the turn of the century, as humanitarian statesmen
were horrified by the tendency of governments to engage in war and to employ barbaric means
of destruction in the battle against the enemy. Since the 1600s, there had been appeals to provide
a legal structure to the otherwise anarchical system of inter-state politics, to provide a sense of
order and the rule of law despite the absence of a higher power to enforce the law against the
sovereign states. These appeals eventually led to the creation of international law, whose main
objectives (which remain true today) were to protect oneself against the unbridled aggression of
others, and to protect humanity as a whole from the outrageous acts of war. To achieve this,
states sacrificed some of their sovereignty as a nation-state in consenting to be bound by legal
rules, which proscribed certain behavior and imposed obligations on future action. Thus, each
state would benefit from the civility of its neighbor, and the world would be a safer and more
humane place for everyone.
However, despite these efforts, the European continent naively plunged itself into a
disastrous war in 1914 that would last more than four years, producing devastating numbers of
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casualties and staggering examples of human barbarism. The war left the entire world in a state
of shock, and many people thought that international law’s failure to prevent or restrain such a
disaster meant that the law was useless and obsolete. One French scholar, Henri La Fontaine,
claimed that the Hague agreements were “sham legislation” and that “to prate of laws of war is a
disgusting mistake.”1 Nonetheless, others (led by U.S. President Woodrow Wilson) believed
exactly the contrary, that only a strengthened international law could effectively prevent future
war and atrocities. Valiant efforts were made to that end, but only twenty years later, Europe
was again mired in a protracted, all-out war, once again shattering faith in the efficacy of
international law. Even today, more than fifty years since the end of the last major war, and
having escaped (at least for now) the likelihood of a third world war, many politicians and
scholars are still skeptical over the practical role in international law in effectively binding states
to legal norms.
Therefore, it is useful to take a look back at the successes and failures of international
law, as well as its progression over time, to determine what role that law can and should play in
the future. This paper endeavors to present only one aspect of that task, in analyzing compliance
and/or breach with respect to two issues of international legal obligations during World War I:
the alliance system and the neutrality of Belgium. The focus will be to determine the reasons
behind the examples of compliance, that is, whether the relevant actors felt legally bound to
comply, or whether it was in their national interest to do so. Though an exhaustive look at all
the international legal issues of the war period is not possible within these parameters,2 this
study of two of the major legal issues from the war will be a start in judging the extent to which
scholars like La Fontaine during and after the war were correct to decry the futility of
international law as an effective control of international politics.
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First Case Study on Compliance: the System of Alliances and the Outbreak of War
Though concepts of international law had been in existence for centuries, they were not
well developed in practice at the outbreak of war in August 1914.
For example, no law
prohibited states from going to war for whatever purpose they wished.
At the Hague
Conferences of 1899 and 1907, the major powers had codified the Convention for the Pacific
Settlement of International Disputes, in which they had agreed to use their best efforts to
maintain peace and resolve disputes. They had established a permanent Court of Arbitration and
advocated the use of mediation, both as ways of coming to solutions short of war. However,
these goals were merely recommendations and were not binding upon the states in conflict.
Thus, the Convention had affirmed the ideals of peaceful resolution of disputes but had done
little to enforce those ideals in actual situations, and states retained their discretion to respond to
international conflicts as they wished.
With this essentially unconstrained state discretion and the great instability in Europe in
the late 1800s and early 1900s, threats of war dominated continental politics throughout the
period. The five major powers (Austria-Hungary, France, Germany, Great Britain, and Russia)
were engaged in a constant struggle for national power in what was more or less a zero-sum
game. As spheres of influence collided, resulting from colonialization efforts on other continents
as well as overlapping ambitions in Europe itself, each state had to be constantly prepared for
war. Consequently, the major powers considered it advantageous to seek allies to stand behind
their aims amidst the tensions, and, in return, agreed to return the favor when their friends
needed support. As Sir Eyre Crowe of the British Foreign Office put it in 1907, “The only check
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on the abuse of political predominance has always consisted in the opposition of an equally
formidable rival, or of a combination of several countries forming leagues of defence,” which
would tend to produce a continental equilibrium.3 Yet, as states chose partners for themselves,
even this balance of power was inherently unstable, due to the uneven number of major powers.
As Bismarck, the wily German diplomat, had said, “All politics reduces itself to this formula:
Try to be à trois as long as the world is governed by the unstable equilibrium of five Great
Powers.”4
However, given the propensity for tension in European politics, merely having an
understanding of common interests with another state was no guarantee of effective support
against other states. Thus, to cement the balance of power, states bound themselves to support
and defend each other through treaties of military alliance, the first of which arose in 1882
between Austria-Hungary, Germany and Italy. In their Triple Alliance treaty, the three powers
codified without specific provision the general objectives of mutual peace and friendship, no
contrary alliances, exchange of political and economic ideas, mutual diplomatic support (within
the limits of national interest), and common counsel to respond to threats to the peace. But as for
the military provisions, the treaty only obligated the signatories to intervene on behalf of an ally
if that ally was attacked without direct provocation by another great power (i.e., France or
Russia). On the other hand, if an ally found itself forced to make war against another great
power due to a threat to its security, the only duty of the other signatories was to observe
benevolent neutrality towards that ally. Thus, the conditions binding the signatories to make war
on another country were limited to defensive situations.
A decade later, when France and Russia signed the Franco-Russian alliance to
counteract the military threat posed by the Triple Alliance, the European powers were effectively
5
divided into two camps, and for the next two decades, all political and military calculations were
made on the basis of this division.5 Yet as in the Triple Alliance treaty, the Franco-Russian
alliance was purely defensive, as each state bound itself to attack Germany or her allies in the
event that the other state was itself attacked. Article 2 also obligated each state to mobilize fully
and immediately if any of the Triple Alliance states mobilized. The objective was clearly to
deter Germany from attacking either state because of the threat of an all-out war coming from
both sides. The preamble clearly stated that the signatories had “no other object than to meet the
necessities of a defensive war, provoked by an attack of the forces of the Triple Alliance against
either of them.”
The treaty also called for military cooperation in planning and in
communicating information relative to the enemies’ forces; however, unlike the Triple Alliance,
there was no requirement of diplomatic support.
Despite the narrow terms of the treaties forming them, the alliances played an even larger
role in European affairs at the end of the 19th century and beginning of the 20th, extending
beyond the original purpose of military defense. First, the alliance treaties strengthened the
political ties between the signatories, which came to implicate diplomatic support from one’s
partners for the objectives one was pursuing. That diplomatic support was a critical element in
pre-1914 relations, in that it often emboldened a state to pursue objectives that another state
would resent, since the aggressor state could fall back on its partners’ support to dissuade the
opposing state from taking hostile steps in response. However, Bismarck, the consummate
politician, used his alliance to do the opposite as well, gaining Austro-Hungarian support for his
objectives while at the same time attempting to restrain his ally’s policy in the Balkans to avoid
being dragged into war there.6 Second, public knowledge of the military alliance and the
strengthening of diplomatic relations led to increased economic and even emotional ties between
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allies. For example, in the 1890s, Russia desperately needed foreign capital for investments in
industry and transport, and French bankers saw an opportunity to expand their share of the
Russian money market.7 Thanks in part to the known military alliance, the French public
responded favorably in buying Russian bonds issued by the French bankers, which further
reinforced the positive sentiments between the two allies.8
And in Germany and Austria-
Hungary, the knowledge of the alliance created an emotional feeling that the two countries were
bound together to the same fate,9 a feeling that would be enormously important at the outbreak of
war in 1914. Thus, the military alliances played a much greater role leading up to World War I
than the mere terms of the treaties would indicate.10
The only other treaty of significance at the time was the 1904 Entente Cordiale between
Britain and France that had seemed rather inconsequential to the balance of power politics in the
early 1900s, yet became the basis for fundamental understandings between the two states that
extended far beyond the terms of the original treaty. French and British colonial tensions in
North Africa had come to a head, and in a desire to avoid open hostilities, the two sides came to
an agreement settling those colonial differences.11 But by that time, Britain, who had only a few
years earlier maintained its isolationist policy and resisted German appeals to join the Triple
Alliance, began to see Germany’s attempt at building a large navy as a threat to its traditional
naval superiority.12 Thus, in the spring of 1905, during an acute French crisis with Germany in
which there was talk of war, the British and French governments (as well as their military staffs)
consulted on how to respond to the German threat.13 Thus, within two years of the settlement of
colonial issues, Britain and France had begun plans for common military action against
Germany, and this rapprochement between the two states led some British officials to believe
they had created a moral obligation to support France in the event war broke out.14
7
Thus, in 1914, the relevant treaties imposed clear but narrow legal obligations on the
major powers, binding only in defensive situations, outside of which the states remained free to
choose the course of action they would pursue. In fact, there had been several instances in which
the alliances seemed tenuous,15 and some observers wondered whether a declaration of war
between two belligerent powers would necessarily involve the whole continent. Nonetheless,
when the alliances were formally tested, the great powers generally complied with their legal
obligations under the treaties, and, more importantly, went far beyond those narrow obligations
in supporting their respective alliances, based on the political, economic, and emotional
importance the alliances came to embody.
The clearest example of state action exceeding legal obligations came from Germany.
After the June 28th assassination of Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo, even the Entente powers
thought that Austria-Hungary had the legitimate right to take action against Serbia for its alleged
involvement in the hostile act. However, Germany had already decided prior to 1914 that
maintenance of the Austro-Hungarian empire was vital to its own interests on the strongly
divided continent, because Germany was surrounded by the Entente allies whose primary goal
was to contain German power.16 Thus, fearing the internal collapse of her only real ally’s empire
(Germany had never really considered Italy a significant ally), Germany pushed Austria-Hungary
to take drastic action against Serbia to crush the growing rebellion, and the Kaiser gave his
Austro-Hungarian allies his full support (carte blanche) for whatever measures they might deem
necessary.17 But Wilhelm’s desire to bully his enemies resulted in an unforeseen consequence:
it put Germany in Austria-Hungary’s pocket, pre-committing Germany to support the potential
escalation to war, even though Wilhelm may have wanted to prevent that end result near the end
of July.18 Clearly, though, this critical German decision, perhaps the most critical in the events
8
leading up to the war, was not motivated by a sense of legal obligation, but rather by a nationalist
desire to maintain and expand German dominance on the continent. However, Germany’s
aggressive actions, including the first declaration of war (against Russia on August 1st), put it in
the position of the instigator, a result the Germans had wanted to avoid both to rally public
opinion behind the theory of self-defense, as well as to keep Italy tied to her obligations under
the alliance treaty.19
On the other side, the Russians were committed to maintaining their prestige in the
Balkans, and having backed down to German threats the previous year, they decided this time
they would stand up to Germany and Austria-Hungary in defense of Serbia.20 As the timeline
illustrates, the same day Austria-Hungary informed Russia of its ultimatum on Serbia, the
Russian government began preparations for mobilization against Austria-Hungary. Then, after
an unsuccessful request that Germany restrain the irrational actions of her ally, Russia ordered
mobilization as soon as it received word of Austria-Hungary’s declaration of war against Serbia.
But this action was taken for political, not military reasons.21 Russia displayed her willingness to
defend Serbia, though under no obligation to do so, primarily hoping to pressure AustriaHungary to back down and seek a negotiated settlement of her dispute with Serbia. 22 Nor was
Russian mobilization required by Article 2 of the military alliance with France, which only
mandated mobilization as soon as a Triple Alliance state mobilized against either France or
Russia. Thus, Russia took action entirely within its discretion, unconstrained by the terms of any
alliance treaty.
French compliance with its obligations under the military alliance with Russia was never
effectively tested, since as soon as Germany had declared war on Russia, she was also
threatening France and preparing for the western sweep called for by the Schlieffen Plan. Thus,
9
the French were forced to prepare for war to defend themselves and never had to face the
decision of whether to mobilize against Germany if Germany had only attacked Russia.
Nonetheless, when Austria-Hungary mobilized on July 31st, France ordered mobilization for the
following day, complying with Article 2 of the Franco-Russian military alliance, which
required immediate and full mobilization as soon as one of the Triple Alliance states mobilized.
Moreover, France took an extraordinary step to make it clear that she was the victim of German
aggression, pulling her troops back ten kilometers from the entire German border, but this
measure was designed primarily to convince Great Britain to enter the war against Germany. 23
The Italian alliance with Germany and Austria-Hungary had always been a self-interested
attempt to give the recently united Italian kingdom the status and prestige of a great power.24
However, the alliance had been somewhat troublesome from the beginning, given the conflicting
Italian and Austro-Hungarian territorial claims and the popular sentiment in Italy against its
neighboring empire.25 In fact, Germany and Austria-Hungary had never been confident of
Italian support of the alliance (the Austrian Chief of Staff calling the alliance “a burden and a
fetter which [Italy] would cast off at the first opportunity”),26 and their doubts were substantiated
on August 3rd, when Italy declared her neutrality in the war. To defend its action, Italy stood
on the letter of the Triple Alliance treaty, which required intervention on behalf of the allies
only if they were attacked without provocation.27 The German and Austro-Hungarian ultimata
technically made them the aggressors and absolved Italy from any obligation to join them. 28
However, Article 1 of the treaty obligated Italy to enter into “no alliance or engagement directed
against” its allies, and Article 4 bound the signatories to observe benevolent neutrality towards
an ally at war with another great power that did not fit the terms of the defensive alliance. Italy
breached their obligations under these articles in April of 1915, when she joined the Entente
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allies after they had promised the territorial spoils from Austria she had been seeking. 29 Thus,
Italy steadfastly followed her national interest, declining to support her allies beyond the terms of
the Triple Alliance treaty in 1914 and even breaching that treaty in 1915.
Romania had also sided with the Triple Alliance camp after its treaty with AustriaHungary first signed in July of 1892 and then renewed in the treaty of February 5th, 1913. But
despite the pleadings of its pro-German king (King Carol I), the Romanian government followed
Italy’s lead in maintaining neutrality in August 1914, using the defensive nature of its alliance
treaty as grounds to stay out of the conflict.30 Romanian nationalists had begun to clash with
Austria-Hungary since the second Balkan War and were now dreaming of incorporating areas
occupied by Romanian minorities within the Austro-Hungarian empire into a Greater Romania.31
Then when the Entente allies promised those territories to Romania at the conclusion of the war,
Romania joined forces with the Entente countries and declared war on Austria-Hungary in
August 1916.32 Thus, remarkably similar to Italy, Romania asserted a legal defense that allowed
it to get out of an alliance treaty it no longer felt to be in its best interests, and instead, the
country ended up fighting against its former allies.33 And just as Italy had done, Romania
breached its obligation (in Article I of its treaty) not to enter into any alliance directed against its
allies.
As for Britain, the rapprochement embodied in the Entente with France had by April of
1912 grown into an informal naval agreement, by which the French fleet would concentrate in
the Mediterranean and the British would defend the English Channel and France’s northern
coastline.34 This naval agreement resulted from Britain’s increasing awareness of the threat
Germany posed both to her naval supremacy as well as to her interests generally in a stable
continental balance of power.
In the end, though, Great Britain (according to its official
11
statements) did not enter the war against the Triple Alliance powers primarily to uphold their
naval agreement with France, nor to defend its own interests on the continent, but rather on the
moral grounds that it had to defend neutral Belgium from the German invasion. Discussion of
the British debate over intervention follows in the second section of this paper. The important
point, though, for purposes of this section is that Britain was under no treaty obligation to enter
the war; rather, it too made the discretionary choice to fight.
Europe had been ripe for war for many years, and several events prior to August 1914
had almost pushed the world past the breaking point. What made the events of 1914 different is
not the focus of this paper. The key point is that the system of alliances and the comprehensive
meaning those alliances took on over time, in all facets of society, provided a volatile structure
for international politics.35
The two-camp structure of European relations conditioned
expectations about the battle lines to be drawn between friends and enemies in the increasingly
likely outbreak of war.36 Nonetheless, if the great powers had merely complied with their legal
obligations under the alliance treaties, the great war would have never occurred, because of the
defensive nature of those obligations. In a world divided by defensive alliances, neither side
could be certain of the support of its allies on offensive measures. However, states chose to
exceed their obligations in support of their allies to achieve the greater objectives that the
alliances had been formed to promote and to show that their alliances were strong and
unwavering.
An interesting and undeniable footnote to the alliance system is how much each side tried
to avoid appearing to be the aggressor in the outbreak of the war. It is not implausible to think
that some of this posturing may have resulted from an attempt to arrange the circumstances in
12
such a way as to bind one’s allies to the defensive terms of intervention under the alliance
treaties. Germany was cognizant of the reality that Italy would likely try to back out of its
obligations under the Triple Alliance anyway, and the Germans knew they did not need to give
the Italians just cause to do that. Also, as mentioned briefly in the other issues page, some
German officials wanted to avoid formal declarations of war in order not to appear as the
aggressor. However, some of these attempts to induce one’s enemies to take the first steps of
aggression clearly stemmed from the political gaming with regard to Britain. France pulled her
troops ten kilometers off the eastern border with Germany, to demonstrate that it was the
Germans who were out to dominate the continent, and to convince Great Britain that it could not
simply stand by and allow them to succeed. On the other hand, Germany wanted to cast Russia
as the aggressor,37 hoping to convince the British not to intervene on the side of Russia, a state
with which Britain had consistently had a strained relationship. Finally, characterizing the
enemy as the aggressor satisfied the need to justify the war to one’s own citizens and to unite
them against that enemy in this patriotic war.
Second Case Study on Compliance: the Obligations of Belgian Neutrality
One of the few clear-cut legal obligations in 1914 transcending the divided alliance
system was respect for the neutrality and inviolability of Belgium. The Belgian territory had
been the terrible battleground of numerous wars,38 and in 1831, the European powers were still
eyeing it with envy. Consequently, the great powers got together that year and came up with the
solution of making the disputed territory a neutral state. Among other rationales for neutralizing
Belgium were Britain’s interest in ensuring that France would not annex Belgium and France’s
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desire to keep Holland from doing the same, as well as to create a neutral neighbor for itself as a
sort of buffer from Germany.39 The other states were just as happy to make the small state offlimits for everyone. The concept of neutrality was not a novel one, and the experiment in
Switzerland had been working well for years, though there were still disputes over the precise
obligations neutrality imposed on all sides.
Nonetheless, Austria, France, Great Britain,
Germany and Russia established the new state of Belgium and bound its government to respect
neutrality toward other states,40 a status to which the Belgian people strongly objected but finally
were willing to accept in order to obtain recognition as an independent state.41
In 1839, the European powers affirmed the earlier treaty and committed themselves to
guarantee the neutrality and territorial inviolability of Belgium.42 However, the guaranteeing
powers intentionally adopted a vague guarantee, in part because they did not want to bind
themselves to action under all future circumstances.43 Decisions on the future enforcement of
the guarantee would have to be reached when the need arose, and the great powers certainly did
not foresee the great debate over the nature of the obligations the guarantee imposed. 44 In 1870,
three of the major powers affirmed the continuing force of the 1839 treaty in the context of the
Franco-Prussian War. Great Britain requested and obtained statements by France and by
Germany that they would not violate the permanent neutrality of Belgium, and in response, the
British bound themselves to intervene in the war against whichever belligerent would violate that
principle.45
However, beginning in 1905, the German Schlieffen plan (the war strategy named after
the Chief of the Great General Staff who devised it) called for a quick push through southern
Belgium to avoid the heavily fortified French defenses on the eastern border with Germany.
Speed was of primary importance to the Germans in the event of a major war, because having
14
created enemies for itself to the east and west, they knew they could not sustain a protracted
campaign with divided forces. Thus, the objective was to advance quickly through France,
capture Paris, thereby cutting off the French juggernaut at its source, and then concentrate all the
German forces against Russia in the east before Russia could fully mobilize its endless supply of
troops.46 Schlieffen, sensitive to the international condemnation that would likely result from a
violation of Belgian neutrality, had intended to induce France to commit that violation first, as
the Germans would deploy on the Belgian border, fully expecting France to move into Belgium
at Meuse to try to halt the impending German attack. 47 However, General Moltke (the head of
the German command in 1914) decided that time would not allow for such legal posturings, and
he convinced the rest of the German government of the need to move through Belgium first to
avoid being encircled by Russia and France.
Thus, on August 2nd, at the doorstep of war, Germany delivered a note to the Belgian
government requesting free passage through Belgium.
In the note, the Germans claimed
discovery of French plans to invade the neutral territory against Germany, and that since
Belgium would be unable to resist the French advance, Germany had to protect itself by
anticipating the hostile attack. The note then promised no hostilities against Belgium itself if it
would maintain friendly neutrality towards Germany, reassuring the Belgian government that
Germany would evacuate the neutral territory and restore its full independence at the conclusion
of the war. In Belgium’s August 3rd response, though, the Belgian government denied both the
premise and conclusion of the German request, stating first that no evidence suggested that
France was preparing an attack on Belgium, and that to the contrary, France had formally
declared on August 1st its intention to respect Belgian neutrality.48 Having denied the evidence
of French mal-intent, the Belgian government concluded that the German request constituted a
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threat in clear violation of international law, which no strategic interest could justify. Were the
Belgians to accede to the request, they would sacrifice their honor and betray their obligations as
a neutral, obligations to which they had been dutifully faithful, the note stated. Thus, Belgium
would employ all means necessary to repel the attack on their rights, regardless of the
perpetrator.
Nonetheless, Germany attacked Belgium on August 4th and within a few weeks
overwhelmed the spirited opposition of the small Belgian army.
Although the German
government clearly acknowledged that the invasion was in violation of the 1839 treaty,49 the
German jurists of the time were almost completely united in justifying their government’s action
on grounds of military necessity in this proclaimed “life or death” decision. 50 In his famous
August 4th speech to the Reichstag, Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg presented the German case:
We are in a state of legitimate defense. Necessity knows no law. Our troops have
occupied Luxembourg and have perhaps already penetrated into Belgium. This is against
the law of nations. France, it is true, has declared to Brussels that it is determined to
respect the neutrality of Belgium as long as its adversary respects it, but we know that
France was ready to invade Belgium. France can afford to wait; we cannot. A French
attack on our flank in the region of the lower Rhine might have been fatal. It is for that
reason that we have been compelled to ignore the just protests of the governments of
Luxembourg and Belgium. The injustice which we thus commit we will repair as soon as
our military object has been attained. Anybody who is threatened as we are threatened
and is fighting for its highest possessions can have only one thought—how he is to hack
his way through.51
Or as a German professor put it in 1915, as much for France as for Germany, invading Belgium
in order to attack the enemy was “necessarium ad finem belli”, and trying to decide who first
broke the neutrality is a meaningless exercise.52
Although the proposition remained controversial in 1914, some international legal
scholars agreed on the existence of the right of self-preservation, even where that right would
infringe upon a state’s legal obligations.53 As one prominent scholar put it, “In certain cases, it is
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a fact that violations committed in self-preservation are not prohibited by the law of nations; they
are justified in cases of necessity and of this, every State must be the judge.” 54 In this case,
Germany’s claim of necessity was based on the notion that she would have faced an attack at her
most vulnerable spot, along the unprotected German-Belgian border, and if the alleged French
invasion had been successful, Germany would have lost her most valuable coal and iron mines
and industrial centers in the Rhine.55 Thus, it was alleged, for Germany not to anticipate the
attack in order to defend itself would have been nothing short of suicide.
But there were distinct problems with Germany’s claim to necessity in 1914. First,
Germany had merely declared that “reliable information” indicated that France was about to
move into Belgium; it gave no evidence of the source or the nature of that information to support
its allegation, nor was it ever able to produce compelling proof. 56 Second, Germany completely
disregarded evidence contrary to that reliable information, namely France’s unequivocal pledge
to respect Belgian neutrality, a pledge which Germany had refused to reciprocate. 57 Third, the
German doctrine of kriegsraison was much broader than the legal defense of military necessity,
so much so that German jurists would have allowed acts of mere military interest or convenience
to trump otherwise sacred legal obligations.58 The consequence of this view is to make the
exception swallow the rule, since any strategic interest would be able to override international
law.59 At a minimum, this doctrine of kriegsraison clearly violates the spirit of the Hague
Conventions, which declared that belligerents were not unconstrained in their choices.60
Germany’s decision to pass through Belgium to attack France was in reality a decision of
strategic convenience, designed a decade earlier to save time, effort and lives in moving through
the weakly defended Belgium, rather than moving through the heavily armed French borders.
The false allegation of French intention to march through Belgium was a pretext to justify the
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implementation of this long-standing German plan.61 Any argument that the European powers
were tightening the noose around Germany’s neck and that it had no choice but to violate
Belgian neutrality to liberate itself is disingenuous. The Germans had been the instigators of the
crisis in giving carte blanche to the Austro-Hungarian government to crush Serbia, and they
were the first to declare war on the Entente powers. Furthermore, General Moltke first drafted
the ultimatum to Belgium on July 26, two days before Austria-Hungary declared war on Serbia,
and on the same day that Germany rejected a British proposal for a five-power conference to
negotiate a diplomatic solution to the crisis.62 Though the sealed document was not delivered
until August 2 (to give the impression that Germany had just discovered France’s intentions and
had to respond quickly),63 the early drafting of the ultimatum provides solid evidence that
Germany was creating the urgency and pushing for war.
It did not take long for Germany to realize that the rest of the world condemned its
military necessity defense of the violation of Belgian neutrality, and thus, Germany proceeded to
advance a myriad of other justifications for its action. 64 One claim was that Belgium had
become a belligerent by refusing a right of passage to Germany to ward off the alleged French
attack on Belgium, and that therefore, Belgium was implicitly agreeing to the violation of its
neutrality and assisting the French in their effort against Germany.65 But the law of neutrality in
1914 did not permit a neutral state to provide a right of passage to belligerent troops.66 Although
international law had previously allowed such a right of passage, the right was almost
unanimously rejected from the middle of the nineteenth century on.67 Furthermore, the 1907
Hague convention respecting the rights and duties of neutral powers and persons in war on land
cleared up any remaining ambiguities. Article 2 prohibited belligerents from moving troops,
munitions, or war supplies across the territory of a neutral power, and article 5 prohibited
18
neutrals from allowing these acts to occur in their territory.68 Though the German government
argued that these articles were not legally binding since Great Britain and other belligerents had
not ratified them, they were in fact binding on all the belligerents because these articles merely
codified the long-established and universally accepted principles contained therein.69 Allowing
Germany to pass through neutral Belgium in an offensive attack on France then would have
made Belgium a co-belligerent with Germany in violation of her neutrality. Furthermore, she
would have opened herself up to German occupation, since the Germans, had they won, may
have conveniently forgotten their promise to withdraw at the end of the war.70 Thus, Belgium
made the only legal and moral choice available to them in refusing the German demand.
Next, the Germans claimed that the French had intended to violate Belgian neutrality,
such that they could not criticize Germany for doing so. This German allegation was true: the
French military staff had proposed to violate Belgian neutrality to move against Germany, but
the government had rejected the plan and Britain opposed the idea because the world would have
condemned the Entente for the violation.71 However, the mere fact that France had considered
an illegal action did not justify Germany’s actual commission of the violation. No legal system
equates an actor who considered unlawful action but decided against it with another actor who
committed the illegality.72 Therefore, Germany alleged that France had actually violated Belgian
neutrality prior to the German invasion. They charged that French planes had flown over
Belgian airspace and into parts of Germany and that some French patrols had been seen in
Belgium in late July or the first few days of August prior to the outbreak of hostilities. 73 But the
Germans quickly abandoned these charges of a French violation, certainly because they knew the
charges were false.74 The Germans also alleged that French inspection of Belgian fortifications
constituted a consensual violation of neutrality, placing Belgium in the camp of the Entente
19
powers and making it a legitimate target for German attack.75 However, Germany had benefited
from similar inspections when France was the suspected violator, and German jurists certainly
did not think those inspections violated the neutrality status at that point.76
The most serious charges levied against Belgium came in October 1914 after Germany
had captured Brussels and found in the government archives copies of the Conventions AngloBelges.77 For the Germans, this was proof of their prior suspicion that Belgium had allied itself
with Great Britain, thereby becoming a belligerent and forfeiting any claim to neutrality.
Germany had made this allegation around the time of its ultimatum on Belgium but curiously
omitted any mention of it in the text of the ultimatum, and since Germany had no proof, the
allegations were ignored. However, the archive documents proved that Belgium had consulted
Great Britain regarding the entry of British troops into Belgium against Germany. The German
government then turned these documents into a propaganda machine, claiming that Belgium had
predetermined to join Germany’s allies as a “vassal state of England.”78 Furthermore, since
Britain itself had plotted to send troops into Belgium, the very reason it cited for declaring war
on Germany, the Germans claimed that British rhetoric about Germany’s violation of Belgium
was utterly meaningless.79 And indeed, had there been an actual Belgian alliance with Britain
against Germany, Germany would have been correct in considering Belgium a belligerent rather
than a neutral on August 3, for the letter and the spirit of the Treaty of 1839 would have been
violated as much by Belgium as by Great Britain.80
However, this German propaganda campaign misrepresented the tone of the military
conversations and omitted the key feature of the discussions. The documents contained merely
informal, non-binding discussions between Belgium and one of her guarantors, designed to
enforce respect for the obligations of the 1839 treaty and insert British troops into Belgium only
20
if Germany decided to disregard them, which she eventually did.81 The fact that Germany did
not disclose the defensive character of the conversations proves that Germany was not engaged
in legal argument, but merely a slanted propaganda campaign to deceive public opinion. In fact,
the German Secretary of State and Minister of War had even reaffirmed the neutral status of
Belgium, as well as Germany’s duties to respect that status, in the German Reichstag on April
29, 1913, and as late as July 31, 1914, Herr von Below-Saleske stated to the Belgian Minister of
Foreign Affairs that the German view had not changed.82 Though the Germans had not yet
discovered the military conversations, the fact that they, who claimed to have been convinced
that Belgian neutrality had been forfeited long ago, did not make the allegation at the outbreak of
war (and indeed made official statements to the contrary) greatly undermines the persuasiveness
of their claim.83
In 1914, it was controversial whether defensive alliances violated neutral status,84 but
many scholars thought it was legal for a neutral state to take steps to protect its neutrality. There
had been frequent perceived threats from one side or the other throughout much of Belgium’s
history of neutrality.85 Despite these tensions, Belgium had relied on the good will of its
neighbors and guarantors to the point that it maintained very low levels of armed forces, and
upon attack from either side, it would struggle to defend itself.86 In fact, the Belgians took their
guarantee so seriously that they also neglected frontier defenses, fortresses, and anything else
that implied lack of confidence in the treaty.87 And therein lies the reason the Schlieffen Plan
called for a move through Belgium, to overwhelm quickly and easily the tiny Belgian army and
encircle the French fortresses along the Franco-German border.88 However, since the Belgian
government could not gain the support for legislation to increase the size of the military to repel
21
an attack, the military leaders resolved to seek out an agreement for military cooperation with
friendly neighbors in order to resist the threats coming from both sides.89
More importantly, Germany’s charge that Britain had made plans to violate Belgian
neutrality herself does not somehow make Germany’s actual violation any less flagrant, because
Germany did not invade Belgium to protect its neutrality (witness the atrocities committed by the
Germans en route). Britain, on the other hand, was preparing to send troops to Belgium for the
sole purpose of carrying out her role as a guarantor of the 1839 Treaty, and comparing the two
actions is grossly to distort reality. Even the German military historian commissioned in 1916 to
oversee the archives of the Anglo-Belgian conversations insisted that Belgium had not departed
from the requirements of neutrality.90 Thus, even the most vigorous German attempts to justify
the invasion of Belgium failed to present a convincing legal argument.
In the end, history has clearly judged the German invasion as a violation of international
law.
Indeed, the numerous German justifications all seem disingenuous in that they were
presented only after the military necessity defense had failed to convince the world that their
move into Belgium was not unlawful. Moreover, they seem primarily to be desperate attempts to
convince the German people that their cause was just and that they were not the aggressors, but
rather the victims of their enemies’ aggression.91 Excellent proof of this proposition comes from
the fact the German government never published the Belgian refusal to accept the German
ultimatum, wanting to give the impression that Belgium had acquiesced and that her armed
resistance was therefore illegal (possibly to justify the atrocities committed on Belgian soil).92
Since Germany was obligated not to violate Belgian neutrality, but did anyway, the
remaining issue was whether Great Britain, as a guarantor of the 1839 Treaty, had a legal right or
duty individually to intervene in order to prevent the violation of the treaty by a signatory. 93 The
22
text of the treaty did not expressly state whether the guarantee was individual or collective in
nature; nor did it state what the guarantors were bound to do in order to protect Belgian
neutrality. The treaty merely stated that the five powers guaranteed the perpetual neutrality of
Belgium. Given the lack of precision as to the nature of the guarantee, interpretations of the
obligations it imposed varied widely during the years of Belgian neutrality leading up to 1914.
Most interpreters considered the guarantee to be collective, not individual upon each
guaranteeing state, such that there was no individual obligation to guarantee neutrality against
any and all violators.94 Thus, at the most, the guarantors were bound to consider collectively a
response to the violation, but if no course of action were agreed upon, each guarantor would be
authorized to interpret the guarantee as it saw fit.95 However, it would seem incorrect as a matter
of interpretation to deny the right to intervene individually under the guarantee, because when
Germany (one of the guarantors) violated the guarantee, a consensus among the five powers on
how to respond naturally would have been impossible.96 Thus, the guarantee would have been
illusory if the only right to intervene was a collective right, and indeed, scholars in 1914 were
clear that there was an individual right for a guarantor to prevent the violation of the treaty.97
Whether Great Britain’s right to intervene was also a duty is much less clear. Some
thought the treaty of 1839 bound the British to protect Belgium, and in 1870, the British
government had acted as though it was obligated to take any necessary measures to prevent a
violation of Belgian neutrality.98 However, the bottom line of much of the rhetoric from the
1870 parliamentary debates over the nature of the guarantee and its obligations focused on
Britain’s moral obligation in favor of Belgium. For example, Lord John Russell declared that his
country had “only one path of honor,” and even Mr. Gladstone, who had argued against a strict
treaty obligation that would force Britain to intervene against her wishes, stated that Britain had
23
“an interest in the independence of Belgium which is wider than that which we may have in the
literal operation of the guarantee.”99
Gladstone’s answer in 1870 became the solution for
Foreign Minister Grey and his cabinet in 1914. On July 29, the cabinet examined its treaty
obligations and concluded: “It is a doubtful point how far a single guaranteeing State is bound
under the Treaty of 1839 to maintain Belgian neutrality if the remained abstain or refuse” and
that “The Cabinet consider that the matter if it arises will be rather one of policy than legal
obligation.”100 Of course, the cabinet’s decision in 1914 to be guided by policy rather than legal
obligation did not mean that Great Britain was under no obligation to protect the neutrality and
independence of Belgium under the 1839 Treaty.101
Rather, it is insightful to show the
assumptions under which the British government was operating and the degree to which it felt
constrained in deciding how to react to the downward spiral of European relations.
At the beginning of August, the British government was sharply divided on whether the
escalating tensions in Europe should draw the island country into the continental war. Some
cabinet members, led by Grey, thought that Britain’s national interest required the preservation
of France in a war with Germany, because otherwise Germany would dominate the continent and
likely try to overrun Britain itself.102 However, Grey could not get a majority of his cabinet to
agree with that argument. In fact, it was anticipated that if the British government declared war
on Germany, possibly half of the cabinet would resign in protest.103 Even the naval plan by
which France had left the defense of her northern coast to the British was not enough to unite the
cabinet in support for intervention, leading the French ambassador Cambon to state that if the
British did not join the war effort, France would never forgive her.104 Thus, Grey shifted his
push for intervention to the question of a possible German violation of Belgian neutrality, rightly
believing that the defense of Belgium was an issue that could unite his divided cabinet, as well as
24
public opinion.105 Indeed, upon hearing the news of the German ultimatum to Belgium, the
cabinet members who had fought for non-intervention saw the potential violation of Belgian
neutrality as an infringement of British interests substantial enough to merit British involvement
in the war, and voted (although still not unanimously) in favor of a British ultimatum to
Germany.
Thus, when Grey went to Parliament on August 3 to ask its support for the war, he
successfully appealed to British honor in defending Belgium, without hiding the fact that
Britain’s interest in maintaining France was also at stake. After first describing the nature of the
naval agreement with France, he stated that “if the German fleet came down the Channel and
bombarded and battered the undefended coasts of France, we could not stand aside and see this
going on practically within sight of our eyes, with our arms folded, looking on dispassionately,
doing nothing!”106 And again drawing out the notion of British honor, he borrowed a line from
Gladstone from 1870 in referring to the question of Belgian neutrality, saying, “Could this
country stand by and witness the direst crime that ever stained the pages of history and thus
become participators in the sin?”107 Yet even in Grey’s impassioned speech, he referred to the
Belgian Treaty only in terms of “the obligations of honor and interest,” never claiming that
Britain was bound to intervene.
Few politicians or commentators, if any, insisted that Britain had no choice but to fight to
defend Belgian neutrality, and in fact, many notable British emphasized that their country’s
intervention in the war was to protect its interests on the continent, not because of Germany’s
invasion of Belgium. Mr. Ramsay MacDonald, leader of the Labor Party, called it a “pretty little
game of hypocrisy” for his government to pretend that England was going to war to protect the
sanctity of treaties and “little” Belgium.108 Germany also tried to convince its own people and
25
the world that Belgian neutrality was the British pretext to claim its intervention in the war was
just.109 Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg made the now infamous speech in which he bitterly
criticized Britain for “striking a man from behind while he was fighting for his life against two
assailants … all for just a word—‘neutrality’—just for a scrap of paper….”110 He was adamant
that Britain was not going to war just to defend Belgium, but rather because that was a moral
excuse to protect its other interests involved in 1914.
Nonetheless, the debate over intervention was couched in such terms, and though the
British clearly had varied over time in their interpretations of the guarantee of Belgian neutrality,
in 1914 they made a perfectly valid interpretation which allowed them the right to intervene to
preserve Belgian neutrality. British intervention was clearly motivated by Britain’s interests in
restraining German aggrandizement of power as well as preserving France as a continental
power to counteract Germany, but the issue of Belgian neutrality was the only means to unite
British public opinion in support of the war effort. In the end, it seems most probable that even
without the German violation of Belgian neutrality, Britain likely would have intervened on
behalf of France in order to restore the equilibrium of power the alliance system had tried to
create. Thus, the German Chancellor was probably correct in his belief that Britain was not
really fighting for Belgium, but rather for itself; however, his characterization of the treaty of
1839 as a “scrap of paper” has gone down in history as compelling evidence of Germany’s utter
disregard for international legal obligations.
Conclusion
The status of international law at the end of World War I was in critical condition, the
most striking example of which was the “scrap of paper” statement that echoed around the world.
26
This paper has only presented the legal analysis of two major issues from the war, and a look at
all the issues would be necessary before making any sweeping conclusions about the
effectiveness of international law to restrain countries from pursuing courses of action in their
national interest.
However, examination of the other issues would confirm that Germany
violated many of the international legal obligations which bound it, including gross violations of
the laws of war, indiscriminate sinking of ships on the high seas through submarine warfare, and
the failure to respect the rights of neutral states throughout the war. But the Germans were not
the only ones to violate international law.
The starkest example (among several arguable
violations) was the British blockade of the Central powers which clearly exceeded the scope of a
blockade permitted under the law at the time, violating both the rights of belligerents and
neutrals. However, as is customary at the end of a war, the world focused on the violations
committed by the vanquished, and the victors for the first time in history even resolved to hold
some German officials criminally responsible for violations of the laws of war (see Articles 227230 of the Treaty of Versailles).
From the analysis of the two issues studied in this paper, the consistent theme is that
states followed their national interest during World War I. The alliance treaties generally were
aligned with each states’ national interest (with the exception of Italy and Romania), which made
it fairly easy to comply with the obligations flowing from the treaties.
That branch of
international law (obligations mutually consented to by treaty) is usually only compromised
when a state’s national interest changes, leading the state to renege on its prior obligations.
Furthermore, where the alliance treaties did not mandate any specific course of action, the major
powers chose to honor the expectations surrounding the alliances, and in doing so, they brought
the two camps into an unavoidable conflict that devastated the continent. However, in the case
27
of Belgian neutrality, Germany’s legal obligation clashed with its national interest in conducting
the war effort, and Germany chose to follow its national interest instead of its legal obligation. A
study of the other legal issues from the war would also show that states often followed their
national interest when that interest collided with a legal duty, which is troublesome conclusion
for international law. To be effective, international law must constrain states’ behavior and
prohibit them from taking actions that would otherwise be in their best interest but are contrary
to legal norms. Otherwise there is no rule of law, and the effectiveness of legal norms depends
on the voluntary cooperation of states. This is the persistent weakness international law faces, a
weakness cited by many commentators even today.
There may be many reasons why states follow their national interest rather than their
legal obligations. First and foremost, states naturally pursue policies that they deem to be in their
best interest, and there will always be the temptation to shirk one’s legal duties. That temptation
can only be minimized where the rule of law plays a strong role in international relations,
imposing penalties (both actual sanctions as well as effects on the reputation and credibility) on
those who breach their duties. Without such penalties, there is no reason to forgo one’s temporal
interests to comply with larger and more long-term objectives of restraint, when other states are
not likely to reciprocate one’s commendable behavior. At the time of World War I, the penalties
imposed on breaching states were not well-defined, because international law was much less
developed than it is today. There were few enforcement regimes in force then (query whether
there are a substantial number today), and as the major powers had allies to support their actions
and prevent the enemy powers from taking serious responsive measures, one can assume that
there was little to counterbalance the temptation to renege on international obligations.
28
Add to this decisional process the fact that World War I was an absolute war of
nationalistic honor: to lose was simply out of the question. Thus, each side would stop at
nothing in order to win, and in that context, it is not hard to understand why legal obligations
during World War I were not always followed. International obligations could simply not
constrain states in their efforts to preserve their very existence, and the German doctrine of
kriegsraison was the clearest attempt to explain the necessity of ignoring those obligations.
Consequently, immediately following the conclusion of the war in 1918, there was great concern
about the efficacy of international law. In particular, kriegsraison was a severe threat to the
viability of international law, because though the legal norms had been created to forbid certain
actions even in the ultimate struggles of war, the German doctrine would have permitted
Germany to ignore a legal obligation if it clashed with any military interest. Clearly this
situation had to be dealt with if the law was to be resurrected as an effective constraint.
Nonetheless, though international law was not always effective during the war, it played
an important role in several contexts. It served as the framework for the debate about the war
and helped separate the good actors from the bad. Nations do care that their governments are
complying with international law (with the possible exception that in extreme circumstances,
people will believe a course of action justified no matter what the law says about it). However,
to the German government and its people, the invasion of Belgium cannot fall into that
exception, given the dozens of attempted justifications advanced on behalf of their actions.
Germany clearly wanted to escape the stigma of being in violation of international law, both in
terms of the internal and external consequences that such a violation would present. Moreover,
many of the legal norms in place at the time were respected. Most notably, France decided not to
violate Belgian neutrality, even though it may have provided a considerable military advantage
29
that could have dramatically changed the length of the war. Other examples would certainly be
found in a study of some of the issues not discussed in this paper.
Finally, despite the fact that international law did not prevent violations of legal norms,
this did not mean that the law was useless, since no municipal law can prevent people from
violating it, even with strong mechanisms for enforcement of the law. Thus, many lawyers and
politicians were not dissuaded from its potential and resolved to strengthen it through the further
development of legal norms as well as the creation of sanctions for violations (including personal
sanctions). This trend, which began at the peace conference in Paris in 1919, has continued
throughout the rest of the century to the present day. But as Hitler, Hussein and Milosevic have
all shown us, there is still no effective way to bind rogue leaders to the dictates of international
law, and as long as there is no more sovereign power than the states themselves, international
law will be forced to react to flagrant violations of its norms. Nevertheless, though not 100%
effective, international law plays an important role in society, and nations must work together to
strengthen it, not scrap it altogether, when violations occur.
1
H. La Fontaine, International Law and War, 3 A.B.A.J. 165 (1917).
For an excellent comprehensive survey of legal issues from World War I, see James Garner’s two-volume
International Law and the World War, published in 1920.
3
Joll, Origins of the First World War (2d ed.), ch. 3, page 5.
4
Joll at id.
5
Joll at 7.
6
Joll at p. 7.
7
Joll at 9.
8
Id.
9
Joll at 7.
10
Joll at 7.
11
Joll at 13.
12
Joll at 13.
13
Joll at 15-16.
14
Joll at 16.
15
See, for example, the Russian ambitions at Constantinople in 1908 and the unsuccessful German demands on
France in 1912, which left both Russia and Germany wondering whether they could count on the support of their
allies if they were attacked without their allies’ interests being affected. Joll at 20-21. See also Tuchman, The Guns
of August, early Ch. 7, regarding Russia’s fear that the French Parliament would fail to ratify the terms of the
military alliance when the time came.
16
Joll at 18.
2
30
17
Stokesbury at 26.
Stokesbury at 26-27.
19
Tuchman, end of Ch. 6.
20
Joll at 31.
21
Mark Trachtenberg, “The Meaning of Mobilization in 1914,” in …, at 205.
22
Trachtenberg at 205, citing Bernadotte Schmitt, Coming of the War, Vol. 2, p. 94.
23
Tuchman, beginning of Ch. 7.
24
Joll, at 24.
25
Joll, at 24.
26
Joll, at 25.
27
Stokesbury, at 105.
28
Stokesbury at 105. Germany had foreseen the such reliance on the defensive nature of the treaty, realizing that if
it pushed Austria-Hungary to reject Serbian concessions, it would lose Italy as an ally. But the knowledge did not
change the course of German action. Tuchman, end of Ch. 6.
29
Stokesbury at 106.
30
The World in the Crucible, p. 13.
31
The World in the Crucible, p. 12-13.
32
Stokesbury, A Short History of World War I, 1981, p. 165.
33
See Joll at 30.
34
Joll at 22.
35
Jack Levy, “Preferences, Constraints, and Choices in July 1914,” in …, at 259.
36
Joll at 31.
37
Trachtenberg at 217.
38
Tuchman, The Guns of August … Setear p.32
39
Alexander Fuehr, The Neutrality of Belgium, 1915.
40
Garner, Vol. II at 186.
41
Fuehr, Ch. 2. http://raven.cc.ukans.edu/~libsite/wwi-www/belgneut/BelgC02.htm
42
Id.
43
Thomas at 575.
44
Thomas at 575.
45
Id. at 187,
46
“Belgian neutrality before the Great War,” wysiwyg://271/http://belgianarmy.freeservers.com/neutrality.htm
47
“World War I, The Schlieffen Plan,” http://www.lib.byu.edu/~rdh/wwi/1914m/schlieffen.html
48
See also, Thomas at 497, quoting a Belgian minister’s personal reaction to the ultimatum.
49
Garner, Vol. II at 191.
50
For a spirited defense of Germany’s actions, see Alexander Fuehr, The Neutrality of Belgium, 1915. Fuehr
strongly criticizes both the Treaty of 1839, impugning the motives behind the treaty and suggesting that no one
trusted the guarantee, as well as the British claim to have intervened because of the violation of Belgian neutrality.
Fuehr provides basically every argument imaginable as to why Germany was acting in accord with international law
in 1914.
18
51
Dr. Th. Niemeyer, “International Law in War,” 13 Michigan Law Review 178, 1915.
Garner.
54
Oppenheim, International Law, p. 178, quoted in, Garner, Vol II at 193.
55
Fuehr, Ch. 5.
56
Garner, at 195.
57
Garner at 195.
58
Jesse S. Reeves, “The Neutralization of Belgium and the Doctrine of Kriegsraison,” 13 Michigan Law Review
180, 1915.
59
Garner at 197.
60
Id.
61
Garner at 202.
62
Tuchman, beginning Ch. 8.
63
Tuchman, Ch. 8.
64
Garner at 198.
52
53
31
65
See, e.g., Joseph Kohler, Notwehr und Neutralitat, Zeitschrift fur Volkerrecht, Bd. VIII (1914), pp. 576 ff, cited
in, Garner at 199.
66
Garner, Vol. II at 191.
67
Garner at 223.
68
Garner at 224.
69
Garner at 23.
70
Tuchman, Ch. 8.
71
Thomas at 532.
72
Thomas at 577.
73
Garner at 204.
74
Thomas at 500.
75
Garner at 205.
76
Thomas at 583. In fact, one of the greatest ironies of the war was that Germany in 1887 had access to detailed
Belgian military information in its efforts to aid in the fortification of the Meuse, fortifications from which Belgium
would valiantly resist the German advance in 1914. Thomas at 400.
77
For a sample of the detailed conversations, see Fuehr, Ch. 4.
78
North German Gazette, December 2, 1914, quoted in Fuehr, Appendix G.
79
North German Gazette, Dec. 2, 1914.
80
Reeves at 183.
81
Garner 205-207-ish.
82
Reeves at 182.
83
In Ch. 5 of his book, Fuehr claims the reason Germany did not mention in the ultimatum what it knew to be true
was that she wanted to make the terms of the note acceptable to Belgium, in order to “spare” Belgium from being
drawn into the conflict. However, the notion that Germany was looking out for the best interests of Belgium is
hardly credible, given that Germany instigated the war and proceeded to burn Belgium to the ground.
84
See statement of French Professor de Lapradelle, cited in Fuehr, Ch. 4, “The perpetually neutral State renounces
the right to make war, and, in consequence, the right to contract alliances, even purely defensive ones….”
85
See, e.g., Thomas at 397.
86
Thomas at 408.
87
Tuchmann ch. 8.
88
Thomas at 420.
89
Thomas at 422-423.
90
Thomas at 531.
91
Tuchman, end of Ch 9.
92
Tuchman, end of Ch. 9.
93
Garner at 227.
94
Garner at 227.
95
Id.
96
Garner at 228.
97
Garner at 228.
98
Garner at 229.
99
Garner at 229-230.
100
Thomas at 511.
101
Thomas at 511.
102
Tuchman, early Ch. 7.
103
Tuchman, ch. 9.
104
Tuchman, near end of Ch. 7.
105
Thomas at 509.
106
Tuchman, Ch. 9.
107
Id.
108
Fuehr, Ch. 5.
109
See, e.g., Bethmann-Hollweg’s speech in the Reichstag on Dec. 2, 1914, quoted in Fuehr at Appendix I.
110
Tuchman, end of Ch. 9.
32