Download Study Questions, TJ, sections 5-9

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Discussion Questions: Theory of Justice, sections 5-9
5. Classical Utilitarianism
(1) why does classical utilitarianism initially seem attractive: “social justice is the principle of rational
prudence applied to an aggregative conception of the welfare of the group”?
(2) explain the contrast between the right and the good.
(3) how does utilitarianism relate the right and the good? how will justice as fairness?
(4) is it “natural to think of rationality as maximizing something”?
(5) Aristotle’s is a teleological view. does he think of rationality as maximization?
(6) how do utilitarians attempt to accommodate our intuitive views about rights?
(7) why is it natural for utilitarian views to rely on the device of an impartial spectator?
(8) what does Rawls mean by saying that “utilitarianism does not take seriously the distinction between
persons”?
6. Some Related Contrasts
(1) explain the three contrasts between contractualism and utilitarianism.
(2) if parties in the original position were to adopt the principle of utility, would justice as fairness be a
utilitarian view? why or why not?
(3) what does Rawls mean by saying that “in justice as fairness the concept of right is prior to that of the
good”? could one hold this view if she thought some ways of life were inherently choice-worthy?
(4) how exactly does the utilitarian rely “very heavily upon the natural facts and contingencies of human
life in determining what forms of moral character are to be encouraged in a just society”?
(5) explain the different ways in which Rawls says the contractualist and the utilitarian think of society.
7. Intuitionism
(1) what are the two characteristics of intuitionism as Rawls understands it?
(2) explain the two graphs on p. 33 and their bearing on intuitionism.
(3) consider the theory that says disputes over the priority of, say, equality and wealth-accumulation, are
to be settled by majority vote. is this theory a form of intuitionism? Or does it have a single first
principle? Or is it a theory of a kind Rawls does not consider?
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8. The Priority Problem
(1) what is the priority problem?
(2) how does utilitarianism attempt to avoid the priority problem?
(3) how is the appeal to intuition limited in justice as fairness?
(4) explain what a “lexical ordering” is.
(5) at the bottom of p. 39, Rawls mentions “the practical aim” of justice as fairness. To what extent, if at
all, should political philosophy have a “practical aim”? what idealizing assumptions about actual
practice may it make without ceasing to be practical -- perfect compliance, limitless plenty, others?
(6) what does Rawls mean by saying “On a contract doctrine the moral facts are determined by principles
which would be chosen in the original position” (40)? How does this contrast with the utilitarian’s view
of moral facts? Can you give an example of a “moral fact” on each view?
(7) there are a number of places in this section where Rawls suggests that his object is to formulate a
conception of justice that can serve as the basis of consensus: he says that parties in the OP “wish to
establish agreed standards” (37), that his practical aim is “to provide a common conception of justice”
(39) and he speaks of “the desired agreement in judgment” (40). Political scientists disagree about
whether or how much moral consensus is necessary or sufficient (a) to generate citizens’ confidence in
and support for social institutions, and (b) to secure a more just society. Some think confidence and
support are generated by economic well-being and the habit of obedience, say, and that political
outcomes, whether just or not, are the outcomes of political contest. Is Rawls taking a stand on these
questions? If so, what stand is he taking?
9. Some Remarks about Moral Theory
(1) what is a sense of justice and when can a conception of justice be said to characterize it?
(2) what is a considered judgment?
(3) what does Rawls mean by describing moral philosophy as Socratic?
(4) does the Socratic character of reflective equilibrium make Rawls’s an intuitionist theory after all?
(5) Rawls says on p. 44 that “moral philosophy must be free to use contingent assumptions and general
facts as it pleases”. Is he thereby taking back on p. 28? (see section 6, question 4 above)
(6) why is Rawls at pains to “stress the central place of the study of our substantive moral conceptions”?
(HINT: think of what was going on in moral philosophy during the 1960’s)
(7) why does Rawls think that “intuitionism is not constructive, perfectionism is unacceptable”? Is he
right about this?
(8) why should we think that a moral theory is justified if it “seems on reflection to clarify and to order
our thoughts, and if it tends to reduce disagreements and to bring divergent convictions more in line”? is
anything more required of a moral theory? of a political theory? of a political theory with a practical
aim?
(9) Note the occurrence of the (subsequently) important phrase “basic intuitive ideas” at the end of §9!