Download The nuclear arms race

MAIN DEVELOPMENTS IN THE NUCLEAR ARMS RACE
The American nuclear program began in 1942, when President Roosevelt initiated the
Manhattan Project to build the atomic bomb. The Soviet program was initiated two years later,
although it was not until after the destruction of Hiroshima that it began in earnest. By the 1950s,
the Superpowers were locked in a deadly race for nuclear superiority – a race which continued
relatively unabated for 50 years.
The Baruch Plan
The Soviet Union employed a three pronged approach to dealing with the American nuclear
monopoly. Firstly, they pushed ahead in secret with their own nuclear weapons program;
secondly, they scoffed at the efficacy of the atomic bomb as a weapon of war; and finally, they
denounced the bomb as a weapon of terror, useable only against civilians, and urged to United
States to scrap its nuclear arsenal.
By 1946, the United States had lost any interest in disarmament, but was very concerned about
the effects of Soviet peace propaganda. The disarmament message struck a chord with many
Americans and with even more Europeans. By early 1947, it had become imperative that the US
launch a propaganda offensive of its own. Truman's solution was to propose a disarmament treaty
with the USSR. Trapped by their own propaganda, the Soviets had no option but to agree.
In March 1947, Truman appointed Bernard Baruch as his chief negotiator. Baruch was arrogant
and uninformed, and cheerfully admitted to knowing virtually nothing about the atomic bomb. As
he told an associate, "It went boom and killed millions of people." For advice, Baruch relied on
the military, who insisted that the US keep the bomb as the basis of its arsenal. Foremost among
Baruch's advisers was General Leslie Groves, the man who had convinced Truman that the United
States would retain its nuclear monopoly for 20 years. Baruch was soon convinced by Groves'
arguments.
Baruch presented his proposal in June 1947. The Baruch Plan called for the establishment of an
International Atomic Energy Authority (IAEA), which would acquire control over all atomic
materials and facilities worldwide and punish nations which violated its regulations. The Soviet
Union would be required to terminate its nuclear weapons program and open its facilities to
international inspection. The US, on the other hand, could retain its own nuclear arsenal until fully
satisfied that the clauses of the treaty had been implemented.
Of course, the plan was totally unacceptable to the Soviet Union. By the middle of 1947, Stalin
was probably convinced that the United States had no intension of relinquishing its nuclear arsenal
– a conclusion reinforced by the American decision to conduct nuclear tests during the
negotiations. Stalin believed the USSR required nuclear weapons of its own to protect its interests.
To keep abreast in the propaganda war, the Russians proposed a nuclear disarmament plan of
their own. Under this proposal, production of nuclear weapons would be banned, then all nuclear
weapons would be destroyed. However, there would be no sanctions against nations which
violated the treaty and no inspections of nuclear facilities. Nations would have to trust each other.
As expected, the Soviet plan was unacceptable to the United States. Truman and his advisers
believed - probably correctly - that the Soviet Union could not be trusted to honour the agreement.
The president rejected the proposal, and negotiations collapsed. Such an outcome was probably
inevitable, given the degree of mistrust which characterised Superpower relations in 1947.
However, had the Baruch Plan been proposed two or three years earlier, it might have had a
chance of success.
The nuclear arms race
During the late 1940s, the United States military regarded the atomic bomb as a weapon for both
deterring and winning war. The first integrated plan for use of America's nuclear arsenal was
released in 1949 and codenamed "Dropshot". The principal nuclear targets designated in the plan
were the Soviet Union's nuclear stockpile, its atomic bomb plants and its cities. By 1950, the US
arsenal consisted of 390 long range bombers, armed with 370 atomic bombs.
In August 1949, the Soviet Union exploded its first atomic bomb. At first, Truman refused to
believe it, so convinced was he that the USSR was way behind the United States in nuclear
technology. However, once the truth hit home, Truman was quick to approve a rapid build-up of
American warheads. In September, he approved the use of nuclear weapons in Europe in the event
of war. Given America's budgetary constraints, this was seen as the only cost-effective way of
matching the Soviet Union's conventional superiority. Then, in January 1950, he approved the
development of the hydrogen bomb. NSC-68 and the Korean War provided the strategic
justification for this decision.
Up until 1953, the Soviet Union lacked the capacity to hit the United States with nuclear
weapons. Its strategic planning centred around the use of its conventional superiority to attack
American bases in Europe. This called for tight control over the USSR's buffer zone in Eastern
Europe - another reason why Stalin decided to communise the nations within the Soviet sphere.
The Hydrogen bomb and the thermonuclear arms race
The US tested its first H-bomb in 1952. The Soviets exploded theirs in 1955. As the weapons
got more and more powerful, an atmosphere of fear and panic pervaded Washington and Moscow,
precluding any serious analysis of the other side's behaviour and motivations. American leaders
assumed that the USSR was intending to attack the United States simply because it possessed the
weapons to do so. The Soviets assumed likewise with regard to the United States. Both nations
had good reason to fear a "sneak attack", since both had been victims of such aggression during
the Second World War.
For the remainder of the 1950s and the first part of the '60s, US policy was one of staying ahead
in the nuclear arms race. The United States continued the quest for a winning weapon which
would preserve American military superiority. Little thought was given to alternative, less
confrontationist approaches to relations with the USSR. The Soviet Union's policy was to catch up
with the United States as quickly as it could.
Massive retaliation
The policy of massive retaliation was announced by the Eisenhower administration in January
1954. It called for an overwhelming nuclear response to Soviet aggression, whatever the level or
location of that aggression. The policy was made possible by the rapid expansion of the American
nuclear arsenal, which passed the 1,000 bomb mark in 1952. By the end of the 1950s, the US had
1,900 intercontinental bombers, capable of dropping 5,000 nuclear warheads on the Soviet Union
and China.
Ballistic missiles
Throughout the 1950s, both Superpowers were striving to develop intercontinental ballistic
missiles (ICBMs). ICBMs travelled through space for most of their journey, so were invulnerable
to attack. Such technology was particularly vital to the USSR, which lacked the numbers and
distribution of bombers enjoyed by the United States. Unfortunately for the Soviets, the US was
also ahead in the missile race.
A breakthrough for the Russians came in 1957, with the successful launch of the world's first
satellite – Sputnik. The Soviet premier, Nikita Khrushchev, used this achievement as proof that
Soviet Union was ahead of the United States in rocket technology. His logic was that if he could
persuade American leaders that Russia had a viable nuclear deterrent, then it didn't matter that this
wasn't true. American nuclear superiority would be neutralised by a cheap ruse; Russia could save
money by adopting a strategy of minimum deterrence. As such, Khrushchev boasted that Russia
had hundreds of rockets targeted at America, some so accurate they could hit a fly on the moon.
As word of the so-called "missile gap" spread, the United States went into a frenzy of panic. In
1960, John Kennedy campaigned on a promise of rebuilding America's nuclear arsenal, and
approved the construction of 1,000 ICBMs soon after he assumed office. Khrushchev's bluff had
backfired. Within a few years, the real missile gap grew dramatically. (Ironically, American spy
planes and satellites gave the US detailed information about the size and location of the Soviet
missile force. The US discovered that in 1961, the Soviet Union had only four ICBMs deployed.
The US at that time had 40.)
Assured Destruction
Despite maintaining its lead in the nuclear arms race, the United States found itself facing an
increasing Soviet stockpile throughout the 1950s. As such, the policy of massive retaliation began
to lose credibility. This was brought home during the Cuban Missile Crisis, when President
Kennedy was faced with a confrontation which could easily have escalated to nuclear war.
Although he did manage to force the Soviets to remove their missiles from Cuba, the impotence of
nuclear "superiority" in the face of assured retaliation was evident. Even the most optimistic
estimates by the US military suggested that millions of Americans would die as a result of Soviet
retaliation. America could not afford to risk annihilation in pursuit of relatively unimportant
foreign policy objectives. A more flexible policy was needed.
An easing of tensions was also needed, if further crises were to be avoided. Kennedy and
Khrushchev decided the time was right to put an end to atmospheric nuclear testing. In 1963, the
Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT) was signed. It was hoped this would be the first of many such
agreements to limit the nuclear arms race. Unfortunately, however, events took an unexpected
turn, and nuclear arms control was delayed for another decade.
In 1964, Khrushchev was replaced as Communist Party leader by Leonid Brezhnev - partly as a
result of the Cuban fiasco. Khrushchev was blamed for allowing the USSR to fall behind in the
nuclear arms race. His enemies argued that the Soviet Union would not have needed to back down
during the crisis, if nuclear parity (equality) had existed. As such, the USSR now embarked on a
massive military build-up of its own. As far as conventional forces were concerned, its aim was to
develop the capacity to defend its allies in distant parts of the world. As far as nuclear forces went,
its objective was to match the United States in missile numbers by the end of the decade, thereby
ensuring that the Soviet nuclear strike force could survive an attack by the United States.
Ironically, the US was moving in the very same direction during the 1960s. By 1967, it had
settled on a policy known as "Assured Destruction". Under this strategy, the US deployed its
strategic nuclear forces in a so-called "triad" - by land (ICBMs), sea (SLBMs) and air (bombers).
In this way, enough warheads would survive to ensure massive retaliation. Cities became the
principle targets, since this would have the best deterrent effect. Because the United States was
traditionally a naval power, most of its nuclear warheads were deployed at sea. The bulk of
Russia's warheads were deployed on land, reflecting Russia's lack of warm water ports.
Once the USSR had acquired an invulnerable strike force, the policy of Assured Destruction
became known as "Mutual Assured Destruction" (MAD). MAD provided some stability to the
arms race, and allowed the Superpowers to begin the process of nuclear arms limitation.
Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT)
With Cold War tensions fading in the early 1970s, the Superpowers sat down to negotiate an
arms limitation treaty. SALT I, signed in 1972, limited the growth of nuclear missiles on both
sides. The treaty was only partly successful in slowing the nuclear arms race, since the
Superpowers now concentrated on deploying multiple warheads (MIRVs) on each missile. This
was a particularly dangerous move, since it rendered land-based missiles more vulnerable to
nuclear attack. SALT II was designed to deal with this problem. Under this treaty, warhead
numbers were limited, as were the number of cruise missiles deployable on bombers.
Unfortunately, SALT II was never ratified by the US Congress, largely as a result of the advent of
Ronald Reagan as US president.
Another important agreement reached at this time was the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
(NPT), signed in 1968. Under the NPT, the nuclear powers (America, Russia, Britain, France and
China) agreed not to provide other countries with atomic weapons, while the non-nuclear nations
agreed not to develop nuclear arsenals of their own. Unfortunately, the treaty was not signed by
India, Israel and Pakistan, all of which went on to develop the atomic bomb.
Flexible response
Despite the arms control treaties signed in the 1970s, military planning was moving in the
opposite direction. As nuclear weapons became increasingly accurate during the 1970s, military
planners on both sides began to dream once more of achieving nuclear superiority. In 1974, the
United States introduced a policy of "Flexible Response", under which the US would respond in
kind to a limited Soviet nuclear attack. In other words, if the Soviet Union started using battlefield
nuclear weapons in Germany, the United States would limit its response to this type of weapon. It
was still believed that escalation to MAD was inevitable, but it was hoped that planning to fight
limited nuclear wars would deter aggression at this level.
Flexible response remained US policy until the 1980s, when Cold War tensions increased once
more.
The Reagan Doctrine
Ronald Reagan came to office in 1981 determined to restore America's nuclear superiority. Like
the Kennedy administration 20 years before, Reagan and his advisers believed that the United
States had fallen behind the USSR in the nuclear arms race. The Reagan camp also believed that a
limited nuclear war was not only fightable, but also winnable. This is not to say they were
planning to launch a nuclear war; merely that they planned to win one, if it should break out.
The first step was to scrap SALT II, which limited their proposed build-up. Next, they ordered a
series of new nuclear missiles - the MX, Trident II and Pershing II - with significantly improved
accuracy. These could be used to knock out the Soviet strike force in a pre-emptive attack. Finally,
they launched the Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI) – commonly known as "Star Wars” – to
develop space-based weapons which could destroy Soviet missiles before they reached their
targets.
The Soviets responded with a nuclear build-up of their own. However, they re-emphasised
nuclear deterrence instead of moving to a strategy of war-fighting. They also refused to sanction a
SDI of their own. One reason was strategic: they did not believe SDI would work (and a lot of
American scientists agreed with them). Another was economic. The USSR was facing major
internal problems by this time. The centralised economy was collapsing, and the government was
having difficulty financing its proposed build-up. When Mikhail Gorbachev came to power in
1985, he offered a return to arms control, and Ronald Reagan accepted it.
Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties and the return to MAD
By the mid 1980s, the Superpowers' combined nuclear arsenals had reached 50,000 warheads,
50 times what was needed for deterrent purposes. Fortunately, the new atmosphere of cooperation
made it relatively easy to negotiate nuclear disarmament treaties.
The first such agreement was the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), signed in
1987. This agreement eliminated all medium and short range nuclear missiles from Europe.
Specifically, this meant the US Cruise and Pershing missiles, and the Soviet SS20s.
In 1991, the Superpowers signed the first Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START). Under this
agreement, the Superpowers agreed to reduce their strategic nuclear arsenals by 30 percent. Under
START II (signed in 1993, but still not ratified by the Russian parliament as of mid 1998), both
the United States and Russia agreed to reduce their strategic nuclear arsenals to 3,500 by 2003.
However, given their growing financial difficulties, the Russians planned to deploy only 2,500.
Some analysts believed the number could be closer to 1,500.