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American Decision To Use The Atomic Bomb
The American President Franklin Delano Roosevelt had just passed away from a stroke during WWII. Harry
Truman would assume the office of the Presidency. Upon entering the office he was confronted with national
defense secrets of the Manhattan Project where America had been secretly developing the Atomic bomb. When
Truman came into office, the European war was coming to an end, and he was left to concentrate his power on the
war in the Pacific. The only obstacle that the United States needed to overcome was Japanese expansion. However,
this was not easy. Although much of the Japanese naval fleet and air force had been destroyed by Allied raids, their
ancient Bushido (Way of the [Samurai] Warrior code) tradition prevented a surrender. Therefore, an Allied victory
would create extremely high casualties. This fact put Truman in a very difficult position. He had to choose between
the massive destruction the bomb would cause Japan, and saving the lives of his American soldiers. After being
consulted by his military advisors that an invasion of Japan would cost over 1 million American lives, he decided to
drop the bomb on Japan.
The reason it would cost so many American lives was due to the difficulty in eliminating all of the Japanese
presence in the pacific, island to island, town to town.
Although Truman had discussed the idea of dropping the atomic bomb with Churchill and Stalin, the decision to
drop the bomb was made entirely by Truman.
Truman always staunchly defended the atomic bombings. Shortening the war, saving American lives, and revenge
are the main reasons he gave for using them. In his first public explanation (Aug. 6, 1945, just after Hiroshima was
a-bombed), he said:
"The Japanese began the war from the air at Pearl Harbor. They have been repaid many fold."
On Aug. 9, after Nagasaki was a-bombed, Truman made another public statement on why the atomic bombs were
used:
"Having found the bomb we have used it. We have used it against those who attacked us without warning at Pearl
Harbor, against those who have starved and beaten and executed American prisoners of war, against those who
have abandoned all pretense of obeying international laws of warfare. We have used it in order to shorten the agony
of war, in order to save the lives of thousands and thousands of young Americans."
Japan
After the attack on Pearl Harbor, the war in the Pacific was fully underway. An aggressive expansion policy forced
United States invasion. However, this invasion would mean severe casualties of tens of thousands of U.S. soldiers
alone, possibly as high as one million, taking an elongated period of 6 months.
After 40,000 American casualties in the Battle of Okinawa, the U.S. could not afford to lose more lives. It seemed as
if the only solution to save American lives and stop further Japanese expansion was to drop an atomic bomb. After
the Big Three conference at Potsdam on July 16, 1945, a warning was issued to Japan in the form of the Potsdam
Declaration: to surrender unconditionally of face "prompt and utter destruction".
An unconditional surrender, to Japan, meant humiliation to the ancient warrior tradition and the Emperor. Therefore,
on July 29, 1945, the Japanese rejected the Potsdam Declaration and every man, woman, and child prepared to fight
to death - if that is what it would take...and it did.
Why The Bomb Was Not Needed, or Unjustified
Japan was ready to call it quits anyway. More than 60 of its cities had been destroyed by
conventional bombing, the home islands were being blockaded by the American Navy, and the
Soviet Union entered the war by attacking Japanese troops in Manchuria.
American refusal to modify its "unconditional surrender" demand to allow the Japanese to keep
their emperor needlessly prolonged Japan's resistance.
A demonstration explosion over Tokyo harbor would have convinced Japan's leaders to quit
without killing many people.
Even if Hiroshima was necessary, the U.S. did not give enough time for word to filter out of its
devastation before bombing Nagasaki.
The bomb was used partly to justify the $2 billion spent on its development.
The two cities were of limited military value. Civilians outnumbered troops in Hiroshima five or
six to one.
Unanimous resolution of the League of Nations Assembly, Protection of Civilian Populations
Against Bombing From the Air in Case of War, League of Nations, September 30, 1938
1) The intentional bombing of civilian populations is illegal;
2) Objectives aimed at from the air must be legitimate military objectives and must be
identifiable;
3) Any attack on legitimate military objectives must be carried out in such a way that civilian
populations in the neighborhood are not bombed through negligence.
World War II and “Total War”
Defending American Values
• Pearl Harbor losses in less than 2 hours: – 18 warships sunk or seriously damaged, 188 planes destroyed, 159
planes damaged, – 2,403 military personnel killed, 1,178 wounded
• Reaffirm Ideals in FDR’s Message to Congress, 1-6-41 – We look forward to a world founded upon four essential
human freedoms. • The first is freedom of speech and expression - everywhere in the world
• The second is freedom of every person to workshop God in his own way - everywhere in the world
• The third is freedom from want…everywhere in the world
• The fourth is freedom from fear…anywhere in the world • Norman Rockwell’s paintings in the Saturday Evening
Post & war bond drive
Clips from “The Century: America’s Time”
• The destruction of the concept of a “Fortress America” – Fear, anger, patriotism
• FDR’s leadership in unifying the country • Mobilization of the military and homefront population – Arsenal of
democracy – Changing view of women’s work
War Mobilization
• Civilian Employment – From 1 to almost 4 million jobs
• 17 million jobs created
• Government Spending – From 9 to 98+ billion
Military Strategy & European Theater
• 1942 ABC-1 Agreement – “Europe First” official policy
• actually by Oct. 1942 America had more forces deployed against Japan than Germany
• debate about a cross-channel invasion – June 1941 German invasion of the Soviet Union – US: head on
confrontation with Germans – British: attack periphery in the Mediterranean before the invasion
• build up sufficient supplies & manpower – 1942 North Africa Invasion
• protected British oil interests & reflected desire to fight the Germans somewhere – 1943 Invasion of Sicily
• weaken Germany by running Italy out of the war
• cross-channel invasion postponed for another year
Pacific Battles
• 2 Pronged Approach – advance through the central & southwest Pacific and converge on the Philippines
• May 1942 Coral Sea – US prevented Japan from landing in SE New Guinea – Japan turned back
• June 1942 Midway – knew positions because of intelligence – turning point
Technology and the War
• Radar
• Codebreaking & computers – Enigma - German mechanical encryption devices – Colossus – a tape reader that ran
at 30 mph – ENIAC – to compute the paths of artillery shells
• Designers went on to develop programmable electronic digital computers
• Manhattan Project – Cost of 2 billion – industrial structure as large as the entire auto industry – 7-16-45 first
explosion
• 15-20,000 tons of TNT equivalent
The Enemy
• Official Office of War Information Policy – Properly directed hatred – Differences between German & Japanese
enemies – Sexual Conquest
• Chinese friends – Life Magazines’ “How to Tell Japs from the Chinese” – 1943 Repeal of Chinese Exclusion
Clips from “The Century: America’s Time”
• Impact of newsreels on perceptions of the war
• War in the Pacific as a “race war”
• Japanese American internment
Preparing for Combat
•Images for the home front
•paper delivery 1943
•Making death bearable
•displaying Chinese bodies
•pictures of Chungking dead
•hiding American bodies
•noble sacrifice of the Sullivan brothers
•Images for the front line
•“Kill or Be Killed”
•Surprise attacks
Changing Views of Dead Soldiers
• Maintaining commitment as the tide turns in the Pacific – war production & labor unrest
• Censoring unseemly displays of trophies of dead Japanese – Burma trophy
• Popular acceptance of skull souvenirs – Life photo May 22, 1944
Clips from “The Century: America’s Time”
• Homefront letters (compare with Reading the American Past letters) • Mobilization for D-Day • Views of the use
of the atomic bomb and the end of the war
The Use of the Atomic Bomb
• Changing Views of Civilian Deaths – Blockades, starvation – From outrage at bombing Shanghai, Guernica, and
the Blitz to major strategy
• Military “precision” bombing – 1200 yard range • incendiary bombs – Dresden, Hamburg, Tokyo – Targeting
“urban industrial areas” – 1 million civilian casualties in Germany and Japan
Fighting the Japanese near the end
• 15 1/2 million Americans served – 325,000 Americans died
• POWs – 1/3 Americans died
• Iwo Jima 2-45 – 20,000 Americans wounded, 7,000 killed – only 1,000 of 21,000 Japanese defenders survived
• Okinawa 4-45 – kamikaze planes – 80,000 US casualties – 120,000 Japanese casualties
Dropping the Bombs
• 8-6-45 Hiroshima, a city of 340,000 – Enola Gay drops the “little boy” uranium bomb – killed immediately at least
80,000, possibly more than 100,000
• including 10,000 Koreans
• 8-9-45 Nagasaki, a city of 250,000 – Bockscar drops the “fat man” plutonium bomb – killed immediately at least
35,000, possibly more than 60,000
• 8-10-45 Japan offers to surrender if the imperial system is maintained
Alternatives and/or Missed Opportunities?
• continuing the blockade/conventional bombing
• invading Japan - Kyushu, Honshu – planned for November 1
• pursuing Japanese “peace feelers” to the Soviets
• modifying unconditional surrender terms – Guaranteeing the emperor
• awaiting Soviet entry into the war
• using atomic weapons
• demonstration, warning, use on a city
• Potsdam Proclamation – unconditional surrender or “prompt and utter destruction” – order to the Air Force to drop
atomic bombs “as made ready
Decision or Assumption?
• FDR, inherited assumptions and Truman – no moral dilemma
• history of bombing cities-Hamburg, Dresden, Tokyo – lack of certainty about the impact of Soviet entry into the
war and Japanese surrender • Martin Sherwin’s A World Destroyed, 1975 – assumption bomb would be used – used
primarily to end the war quickly and save American lives – hostility to Soviets confirmed the assumption the bomb
would be used – no inclination to consider alternatives – Hiroshima may have been unnecessary and Nagasaki was
definitely unnecessary
Assessing the Impact
• controlling news accounts of the bombs – escorting news crews – censoring pictures of radiation sickness
The Mushroom of Interpretation
One of the greatest arguments against the use of the atomic bombs is the one of race.
Race is said to have pervaded the Pacific Theater, factored into every major decision
unlike in the European Theater. Brutality, incomprhensibility, pure evil: these are
some of the characteristics which, in the mind of many Americans, typified the
Japanese fighting against the U.S. In the mind of Ronald Takaki, they are also the
factors which led to the dropping of the atomic bombs.
Takaki begins with the global context of the war. It is of little doubt, and of less
debate, that post-war concerns factored into many of the actions of WWII--especially
with regards to America and the Soviet Union. This has been amply documented; and
this Takaki discusses in some detail. Most WWII historians will agree that Truman
"was thinking more of Russia that Japan" at the time of the bombings. But that is not
the true benenfit of Takaki's work. This benenfit lay in his argument of race, and in
the undeniability of his claim of unnecessity. "Rooted in the nineteenth century, antiAsian prejudice contributed to the way Americans quickly racialized the Pacific war,"
states Takaki (7). Laced through the conflict were tendencies to stereotype, demonize,
and wish to repay the Japanese for what they had done in December 1941, Takaki
paints a war of racist revenge in which the bomb simply plays the logical out- come.
Regret, Takaki seemingly argues--along with the majority of writers on the topic-seems to be what is missing. He speaks of the scientists who looked to their
Frakenstein and felt a sense of dred. The depth of this is somewhat questionable. The
politicians, Takaki seems to be saying, simply looked at the bomb as a diplomatic
trump card. Military advisors saw it as the end of the conflict--although some, but by
all means a negligable few, decried its use. Stimson claimed that it would be uncool
to rejoice too much, and Lehy had to face, in Takaki's words' "his own humanity"
(123). Riddled with guilt, the men in this scenario ought to feel the guilt of the
innocent slain. Or at least that is what Takaki wants to claim. I am not so sure. When
near the end he states that Truman refuses to allow himself feel a sense of regret, and
does so in a somewhat sarcastic manor, I retort that maybe the question Takaki is
demanding an answer to is the wrong one. Maybe history cannot--or possibly should
not--be applied to vendicate an ethnic sense of identity. Maybe when Truman states
he had no reservations, he had no reservations. And maybe in the face of WWII and
all the horror tht it produced this is not an unusual thing.
My response to Takaki is this: history cannot answer the morality of the question.
Right or wrong, moral, immoral, or amoral, justified or unjustified, motive be
damned: the use of the atomic bombs remains a stain on the American conscience for
one reason only: because as a nation we are willing to accept the idea that we did it,
that we did employ them. We can accept responsibility. We can handle the question.
Some people simply cannot handle the answers, or the lack thereof