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Chapter 33 Answers
Chapter 31
Multiple-Choice Questions
1a. No. The concept of nation building did not envision a collective effort by the industrialized nations
of the world to aid the Third World. See page 550.
1b. Correct. Nation building was undertaken with the belief that American capitalism and democracy
could be transferred to the Third World. As this was done, it was believed, Third World countries would
be brought into the American orbit. Presidential adviser Arthur Schlesinger later called this notion “a
ghastly illusion.” See page 550.
1c. No. The concept of nation building did not insist on decolonization by European countries. See page
550.
1d. No. Nation building did not pay much attention to the unique historical experiences of other nations.
See page 550.
2a. No. The policy of flexible response is not associated with the decision-making process in the
executive branch of the government. See page 551.
2b. No. The Kennedy administration did not “track” the mood of the electorate with the frequency and
sophistication of modern tracking (frequent scientific polling of the electorate’s stand on particular
issues), and “flexible response” was not an electioneering tool. See page 551.
2c. Correct. In rejecting Eisenhower’s policy of massive retaliation, Kennedy oversaw a military buildup based on the policy of flexible response. This policy held that the United States should be able to meet
the threat of guerrilla warfare and the threat of a nuclear confrontation. See page 551.
2d. No. Although Kennedy disagreed with the Eisenhower administration’s emphasis on nuclear
weapons, he did not envision and did not achieve a reduction of the nation’s nuclear arsenal. In fact, from
1961 to mid-1964 there was a 150 percent increase in the nation’s nuclear arsenal. See page 551.
3a. Correct. After the failure of the Bay of Pigs invasion, the Kennedy administration authorized
Operation Mongoose. Through this project, as well as programs of diplomatic and economic isolation,
the United States government worked to overthrow the government of Fidel Castro. See page 551.
3b. No. Kennedy recognized the Bay of Pigs invasion as a mistake because it was a defeat, not because it
infringed on Cuban sovereignty. The president never apologized to the Cuban people. See page 551.
3c. No. The United States continued its attempt to isolate Cuba economically. See page 551.
3d. No. The United States continued its attempt to isolate Cuba diplomatically and did not restore
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Chapter 33 Answers
diplomatic relations. See page 551.
4a. No. The Soviet Union made demands concerning Berlin in the summer of 1961. The Cuban missile
crisis occurred in the fall of 1962. See page 552.
4b. No. Although Kennedy informally agreed to withdraw outdated missiles from Turkey at a future
date, he did not agree to dismantle missiles in Western Europe. See page 552.
4c. Correct. The Soviets decided that they would never again allow themselves to be humiliated because
of military and nuclear weakness. Therefore, they embarked on a military build-up program and by the
late 1960s achieved nuclear parity with the United States. See page 552.
4d. No. Suggestions that the United States destroy the Cuban missiles through a surprise air attack were
rejected. See page 552.
5a. No. Congress did not question Johnson’s escalation of the Vietnam War through the Tonkin Gulf
Resolution. See page 553.
5b. Correct. With only two dissenting votes, Congress authorized the president to “take all necessary
measures” to defend American forces and “prevent further aggression.” In accepting the resolution,
Congress, in effect, surrendered its foreign policy powers. See page 553.
5c. No. The Gulf of Tonkin resolution was passed in 1964; the My Lai massacre occurred in March 1968
and was not made public until twenty months later. See page 553.
5d. No. The Tonkin Gulf Resolution was not an official declaration of war. See page 553.
6a. No. Although the People’s Republic of China joined the nuclear club in 1964, it was generally
understood that it did not have the launchers (missiles) necessary to wage nuclear war. Furthermore,
China was preoccupied with the internal disorder caused by the Cultural Revolution in the late 1960s.
See page 555.
6b. No. The Republican Party stood staunchly behind the government of South Vietnam. See page 555.
6c. No. Ho Chi Minh’s regime in North Vietnam was a totalitarian regime and was not democratic in
nature. See page 555.
6d. Correct. As many Americans watched the horrors of the Vietnam War each evening on the nightly
news, they began to question the United States involvement in the conflict. See page 555.
7a. No. There was no massacre of Vietnamese civilians by American soldiers in Hanoi, which was the
capital of North Vietnam. See page 555.
7b. Correct. On March 16, 1968, a United States Army unit killed more than three hundred unarmed
Vietnamese civilians. An interplay of several factors is seen as an explanation for My Lai and other acts
of atrocities on the part of American soldiers in Vietnam. One of those factors was that the Vietnamese
had been dehumanized in the eyes of these soldiers and were seen as little more than animals. See page
555.
7c. No. There was no massacre of Vietnamese civilians by American soldiers at Danang. See page 555.
7d. No. There was no massacre of Vietnamese civilians by American soldiers at Pleiku. See page 555.
8a. No. The Soviet Union did not send troops to Vietnam as a result of the Tet offensive. See page 557.
8b. No. The chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Earle Wheeler, persuaded General
Westmoreland to request an additional 206,000 soldiers. Furthermore, he favored calling the army and
marine reserves to active duty. See page 557.
8c. No. Although the Vietcong and North Vietnamese suffered heavy losses in the Tet offensive, they
still had not been defeated and did not retreat to North Vietnam. See page 557.
8d. Correct. The Tet offensive demonstrated that three years of search-and-destroy tactics had not
destroyed the power of the Vietcong and North Vietnamese. As a result, Johnson announced an end to
the bombing of most of the North and requested that Hanoi open peace negotiations. See page 557.
9a. No. Nixon’s policy of Vietnamization was accompanied by other policies that further destabilized
Indochina. See page 557.
9b. Correct. The policy of Vietnamization brought, among other things, a widening of the war into
Cambodia, increased bombing of North Vietnam, and the mining of Haiphong harbor. See page 557.
9c. No. The South Vietnamese army proved itself a rather ineffective fighting force, incapable of
defending the South. See page 557.
9d. No. Vietnamization did not bring about a coalition government, and the war did not quickly draw to a
close. See page 557.
10a. Correct. Some Americans pointed to the war as an example of the softening of American resolve
against communism; others questioned, among other things, the containment doctrine. See pages 558559.
10b. No. The United States did not withdraw from the United Nations in the aftermath of the Vietnam
War. See pages 558-559.
10c. No. In fact, many leaders talked of a Vietnam syndrome—a mood that would prevent the United
States from becoming involved in any foreign entanglements. See pages 558-559.
10d. No. Some Americans blamed the Vietnam experience on the “imperial presidency” and insisted
that Congress retake the foreign policy power it had relinquished to the executive branch. See pages 558559.
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Chapter 33 Answers
11a. No. Although the Soviets had more launchers (missiles), the United States had more deliverable
nuclear warheads. See page 559.
11b. No. Limits were placed on the construction of ABM systems. Each side could build only two—one
to protect the capital and one to protect an ICBM field. See page 559.
11c. Correct. Each launcher (missile) could be MIRVed; and, since no restriction was placed on
MIRVs, the nuclear build-up continued. See page 559.
11d. No. The treaties placed only a five-year freeze on the number of offensive nuclear missiles that
each side could have. See page 559.
12a. No. Kissinger’s “shuttle diplomacy” did not lead to the creation of a Palestinian state. See page
561.
12b. No. In spite of Kissinger’s “shuttle diplomacy,” the PLO continued to refuse to recognize Israel’s
right to exist. See page 561.
12c. No. Although Kissinger’s diplomatic missions brought an end to the OPEC oil embargo, they did
not lead to an OPEC agreement to reduce oil prices. See page 561.
12d. Correct. Kissinger, acting as mediator by shuttling back and forth between Egyptian and Israeli
officials, obtained an agreement between the two nations establishing a United Nations peacekeeping
force in the Sinai. See page 561.
13a. No. Although the Reagan administration warned that Nicaragua was supplying the El Salvadoran
rebels with Soviet-made weapons, it did not warn that the Soviets were installing nuclear missiles in El
Salvador. See page 566.
13b. No. Although the Reagan administration at times demonstrated some concern for the impoverished
conditions in El Salvador, its policies in the region relied on military solutions. Therefore, it did not
defend its policies by emphasizing the relationship between the insurgency and impoverished conditions.
See page 566.
13c. Correct. By and large, the Reagan administration relied on military solutions to the problems in El
Salvador. Therefore, to defend those policies, it relied on the old and discredited domino theory. See
page 566.
13d. No. The Reagan administration, in keeping with the policies of previous administrations, viewed
right-wing governments in Latin America as better than governments with leftist leanings. Therefore, the
administration supported right-wing governments even if they did not have mass popular support. See
page 566.
14a. No. Although the administration criticized the Sandinistas for not holding elections, when elections
were held in November 1984, the administration called them a “sham.” See page 566.
14b. Correct. The economic embargo against Nicaragua, covert activities by the CIA, and United States
aid to the contras all indicate that the administration wanted to topple the Nicaraguan government. See
page 566.
14c. No. Although the Reagan administration criticized the presence of Cuban advisers and Soviet arms
in Nicaragua, it wanted more than simply a reduction of foreign military bases and advisers. In fact, it
rejected the Contadora peace plan which would have reduced foreign bases and advisers in Nicaragua.
See page 566.
14d. No. The Reagan administration’s actions toward Nicaragua do not indicate a desire for a negotiated
settlement. In fact, two peace plans were put forward during the 1980s by representatives of Latin
American countries. The administration’s out-of-hand rejection of both the Contadora peace plan and the
Arias peace plan is further indication that a negotiated settlement was not Reagan’s goal in Nicaragua.
See page 566.
15a. No. Reagan never apologized for his statement that the Soviet Union was the source of evil in the
world. See page 567.
15b. No. The Reagan administration did not agree to limit research on the Strategic Defense Initiative.
See page 567.
15c. No. There were no obvious signs of cooperation between the United States and the Soviet Union to
combat international terrorism. See page 567.
15d. Correct. When Gorbachev assumed power and embarked on a reform program in the Soviet Union
in 1985, he reduced military expenditures and expenditures on foreign aid. Therefore, he reduced the
Soviet Union’s armed forces and withdrew Soviet troops from Afghanistan. Largely because of these
policies, Soviet-American relations improved. See page 567.