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Success Factors for Public Private Partnerships for Water Supply in India
R.S. Rastogi *, O.Jensen **
* [email protected]
** [email protected]
Abstract: This paper uses a new dataset of 55 awarded and forthcoming public private partnership (PPP) water projects
in India to analyse the factors that influence the geographic location of these projects. We find that the number of PPP
projects in a state is strongly correlated with the level of industrial development of the state, measured in terms of
industrial value added. The paper also provides a preliminary examination of factors contributing to successful PPP
contract negotiation using evidence from three case study cities. Stronger administrative capabilities and experience in
PPP contracting e.g. through pilot projects appear to be important.
Keywords: India; PPP; utility management
Introduction
India’s water sector has a highly fragmented and decentralised governance structure whereby water
supply and sanitation is the responsibility of the state governments and services are provided by city
level agencies while various central government ministries are responsible for the overall
development and regulation of the country’s water resources. The federal Ministry of Urban
Development (MOUD) is responsible for urban drinking water and sanitation and it guides and
supports state governments to administer these services. Within the state, municipal corporations,
municipal councils, Urban Local Bodies (ULBs), water boards and Public Health and Engineering
Departments (PHEDs) are responsible for delivery of water and sanitation services in urban
conglomerations and Zila Parishad, blocks and ‘Gram Panchayats’ in rural areas.
India has an urban population which currently stands at 377 million (31.1%) (Census India, 2011)
and it is expected to reach 600 million by 2031 (MOUD, GoI, 2012). Rapidly increasing population
exerts immense pressure on the water and sewerage infrastructure of the cities, which is inadequate,
poor quality and requires capital investments. Access to improved water supply sources in urban
areas is around 91% and in rural areas it is 75% (GWM, 2011:903). No city in India has continuous
water supply and more than half the population does not have adequate sanitation facilities.
The causes of poor urban water service provision in India are relatively well known –
organisational, financial and managerial – leading to chronic inefficiencies, incomplete network
coverage and poor service quality and reliability (Makino, 2006).
According to a high powered expert committee report on urban infrastructure, it is estimated that
per capita investment of INR14,169 is required annually for capital infrastructure and Operations
and Maintenance (O&M) in water, sewerage and storm water sector. (MOUD, GoI, 2012)
Table 1: Urban infrastructure investment requirement- Water, sewerage, storm water
Investment Heads
Capital Infrastructure
O&M
Per capita requirement annually INR (US$)
Total requirement between 2012-2031 INR
million (US$ million)
13329 (242.3)
7,54,6270 (137,204)
840 (15.2)
8,17,6710 (148,667)
Source : MOUD GoI, 2012
Some of this investment would come from the central government grant, state government funding,
ULBs, donor institutions, and other institutions such as Asian Development Bank (ADB), Japan
International Cooperation Agency (JICA), World Bank and a part would come from the private
sector.
Both the central government and state governments recognise the need for private finance and
operations and management expertise to improve the quality of urban services.
Efforts were made to encourage private participation in the water sector as early as 1990s when
India under took policy reforms and initiated privatisation of state assets. However, only one project
from that period is operational, the Tirupur water supply project. This is a BOOT (Build-OwnOperate-Transfer) contract and involves water supply for both industrial and domestic purposes.
Other PPP projects pursued at the time, such as the Bangalore utility’s negotiations with Biwater
and the Krishna bulk water supply project in Hyderabad, were either cancelled or suspended
indefinitely.
Since 2005, strides have been made in water PPP projects contracted and there are now over 55
contracts that have been awarded or are under development (GWI project tracker database, 2012).
These contracts are spread across states and take several forms including concessions and so-called
‘24x7’ management contracts, which combine leakage reduction, billing, collection and metering
with the objective of continuous water supply to customers.
PPPs in India’s water sector have received little systematic attention in literature, in large part
because much of the PPP activity in water infrastructure is so recent. This has begun to change: in
2011, the Water and Sanitation Program of the World Bank published a thorough review of the
development of PPPs (Bhatnagar & Zeug 2011). This notes that the number of PPPs reaching
contractual close is accelerating and that contracts are being signed in a broader range of locations.
As most PPPs are still in their early stages, it is not yet possible to conduct an analysis of their
operational or contractual performance. This paper therefore seeks to contribute to our
understanding of PPPs in India by providing an analysis of the geographical location of these
projects and makes a preliminary review of factors contributing to successful contract signing based
on three case studies of projects contracted since 2010.
1. Factors influencing the geographic location of PPP projects in the water sector
We would expect state-level characteristics to have a strong influence on the location of PPP
projects because states have primary responsibility for formulating, executing and implementing
water policy and regulation, within the context of federal policies. States have different levels of
access to water resources and different water requirements, which leads to a non-uniform push for
PPPs. This section considers which characteristics of states are related to higher numbers of
contracted PPP projects.
Figure 1 shows the number of active water PPP projects by state. Maharashtra has the highest
number of ongoing projects, at 14, followed by Rajasthan, Gujarat and Andhra Pradesh, each of
which have 9. 15 states have no ongoing PPP projects at all in the water sector.
A first look at the data suggests that PPP projects are concentrated in states which have large urban
populations and are centres for trade and industrial activity. States such as Maharashtra, Gujarat,
Tamil Nadu, Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, Kerala (MGTAKK) are coastal states that have
historically been centres for trade and business activity.
Figure 1: State-wise active PPP Projects
Maharashtra
Rajasthan
Gujarat
Andhra Pradesh
Karnataka
Tamil Nadu
Madhya Pradesh
Delhi
Orissa
Kerala
Assam
West Bengal
Uttar Pradesh
Punjab
Himachal Pradesh
Bihar
Andaman and Nicobar Islands
Other
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
Source: GWI project tracker database, 2012. PPP in India, MoF, GoI (2012)
1.1 Industrialisation & Urbanisation
We would expect industrialisation and urbanisation to create greater demand for water and
sanitation infrastructure in the country and therefore to drive PPP projects in the water sector.
High levels of commercial and industrial activity require reliable water infrastructure. Businesses
have a higher willingness to pay for water services than households, especially when water is a
critical element in the production process. For example, the Federation of Kutch Industries
Association (FOKIA), an umbrella organisation of industries in the Kutch region of Gujarat planned
to let a PPP desalination plant contract provide water to industries suffering from water shortages in
the region. The plan was overtaken by a project announced in Q2 2012 by the state government for
a 336,000m3/day PPP desalination plant in Dahej, Gujarat. This contract is currently under
negotiation. (GWI project tracker database, 2012) The Gujarat government wanted to set up one
large desalination plant instead of multiple small capacity plants which would require more
resources to develop and operate.
On the other hand, we would expect inland, agriculture-based states to have a lower demand for
high-quality water infrastructure and therefore to have weaker incentives to let PPP projects.
Landlocked states of India – Rajasthan, Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, Haryana, Punjab, Himachal Pradesh,
Madhya Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, J&K, and Uttarakhand - have traditionally been agrarian
and continue to have a majority of their population engaged in agriculture so we would expect to
see fewer PPPs in those states.
The dominance of agriculture in the landlocked states creates demand for bulk water for irrigation
and creates a requirement of management of water resources on a much larger scale with demand
for projects such as building of canals, dams and other water transfer projects.
It is important to point out here that policy led support for PPP projects has shown increase in the
number of PPP projects in some parts of the landlocked states of Rajasthan, Madhya Pradesh,
Haryana and Uttar Pradesh. (Discussed under DMIC)
We test the relationship between industrialisation and PPP using figures for annual value added by
industry at the state level.
Figure 2: Industrial output and number of PPP projects per state
14
Number of PPP projects per state
12
10
8
6
4
2
0
0
5
10
15
20
State-level annual industrial value added (2010) US$bn
25
Source: GWI project tracker database, 2012, Annual Survey of Industries, 2009-2010
The chart shows a very strong relationship between the two variables, providing support for our
hypothesis.
Rapid growth in the urban population would also be expected to increase demand for municipal
drinking water supply and sanitation services and might also put pressure on local governments to
extend both networks and treatment infrastructure. From the point of view of the private sector,
large cities offer economies of scale in supply and potential for market growth.
We test the relationship between urbanization and PPP using the state-level urbanization rate.
Figure 3: Urbanisation and number of PPP projects per state
14
Number of PPP projects per state
12
10
8
6
4
2
0
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
State-level urbanisation rate
80%
90%
100%
Source: GWI project tracker database, 2012, Census India, 2011
The chart shows a weak positive relationship between urbanisation and PPPs. One of the reasons
that the relationship is not stronger may be that PPPs are unevenly distributed within states: they are
found in select pockets such as the state capitals, cities of tourist and religious importance, and
cities which are centres for business. Taking the example of the state of Maharashtra, only the cities
of Pune, Nagpur, Aurangabad and Mumbai have PPP projects while the rest of the state has not
seen much activity.
Table 2 shows that all of India’s largest cities by population have water PPPs.
Table 2: Top 10 Million+ Cities and PPP Projects Pipeline, 2012
City
State/
Territory
Population
(2011) (m)
State
Capital
JNNURM
Funding
City Characteristics
Number of
Pipeline
Projects*
Mumbai
Maharashtra
12.48
Y
Y
Financial nerve centre
4
Delhi
Delhi
11.01
Y
Y
National capital
4
Jaipur
Rajasthan
3.07
Y
Y
Cultural centre widely
visited by tourists
3
Bangalore
Karnataka
8.43
Y
Y
1
Hyderabad
Andhra
Pradesh
6.81
Y
Y
Centre for Information
Technology (IT)
services
Centre for IT services
1
Ahmedabad
Gujarat
5.57
N
Y
Textile industry hub and
fastest growing city in
India and third fastest
around the world
1
Chennai
(preexpansion)
Tamil Nadu
4.68
Y
Y
1
Kolkata
West Bengal
4.49
Y
Y
Second largest exporter
of IT and BPO services
and centre for
automobile
manufacturing
Main commercial and
financial hub of the
eastern and north
eastern states of India
Surat
Gujarat
4.46
N
Y
1
Pune
Maharashtra
3.12
N
Y
Centre for diamond
cutting and polishing.
90%of world’s
diamonds are cut and
polished in Surat
Centre for IT services
and automotive
manufacturing
1
1
Source: GWI project tracker database, 2012
1.2 Future Directions
The strong relationship between industrial output and number of PPP projects that we see in the
historical data may change as a result of central government policy to promote urban infrastructure
development across India.
Since 2005, the central government is providing funds and support for urban infrastructure project
development through two programmes - Jawaharlal Nehru Urban Renewal Mission (JNNURM) and
Urban Infrastructure Development Scheme for Small and Medium Towns (UIDSSMT). These
funding programmes also encourage municipal governments to engage in PPPs.
JNNURM
JNNURM is a reform based program where central government provides financial and technical
assistance to states to improve urban infrastructure. The central government made available $5.4
billion funds for water, sanitation and transport projects in 63 cities identified by the government
(JNNURM, MOUD, 2005). The quid pro quo for the scheme was that the states and cities
incorporate mandatory reforms such as establishing a double entry system of accounting, introduce
e-governance using Geographic Information Systems (GIS) and Management Information System
(MIS), gradually increase user charges for municipal services to cover operations cost, and certain
optional reforms such as revision of byelaws for reuse of recycled water, rain water harvesting,
administrative reforms to bring down the cost of establishment, structural reforms and to
encourage PPP projects. The states and cities are to commit some of their own funds to the projects,
and push through governance, financial and administrative reforms.
The selection of cities eligible for JNNURM funding was done based on 3 criteria – million plus
cities, state capitals and cities of religious and tourist importance. As JNNURM and UIDSSMT
funding is rolled out, we would expect to see state-level characteristics decline in importance as
determinants of PPPs compared to city-level characteristics.
Delhi Mumbai Industrial Corridor (DMIC)
Another central government initiative that may weaken the relationship that we found above is the
development of infrastructure in key industrial corridors.
For example, the DMIC which was initiated in 2006 is an infrastructure project aimed at developing
investment regions and industrial areas along 1483kms area between the national capital Delhi and
the financial capital of India, Mumbai.
The states of Gujarat, Rajasthan, Maharashtra, Haryana, Delhi, Uttar Pradesh, and Madhya Pradesh
form a part of the DMIC and thus it is expected that the government would be making adequate
arrangement for providing water, power and other infrastructure required to promote industrial
activity and trade. These states are expected to generate pipeline for PPP projects for water
infrastructure. The Dahej SEZ desalination project (discussed above) was executed under DMIC
plan.
The impact of policy in driving PPP projects within these states will be uneven. Despite general
policy being in place some states will be on an accelerated path of development facilitating more
PPP in projects than others and factors such as industrialisation and urbanisation would be driving
the PPPs.
2. Determinants of Successful Contract Close
Different PPP contract models are being explored in India. It is too early to conduct a
comprehensive study of the performance of PPP contracts as many of them have only been awarded
recently and are just moving into the operational phase. Instead, we focus on the project award
process, using a case study approach to examine the features of three projects that have been
successfully contracted since 2010 – the ‘new breed’ of water PPPs in India.
The case studies are based on seven interviews conducted in 2011-2012 with companies, advisors
and government officials at the state and local level as well as a review of company documents and
secondary sources.
For all three contracts, the time from project initiation to contract award varied. Nemmeli took only
about 10 months to close and we expect that is because the Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply and
Sewerage Board had an experience in tendering out Minjur desalination plant of the same capacity
prior to Nemmeli. Aurangabad project was initiated in July 2010 and it took 18months to close. The
Nagpur contract took over 2.5 years to close, probably because the contract is breaking new ground
in terms of the allocation of risks and responsibilities between the private parties, and in combining
central, local and private finance. This compares to an average of 4 years to reach contract award in
projects that were signed before 2000 (Bhatnagar & Zeug 2011: 8), demonstrating a relatively
successful contracting process in these later contracts.
2.1 Case studies
Table 3: Water PPP Case Studies: Contractual Features
State
Maharashtra
Maharashtra
Project
Name
Nagpur
NRW
reduction
Contract
signed
2011
Client
Aurangabad
2011
Aurangabad
Municipal
Corporation
Nagpur
Municipal
Corporation
City
pop (m)
2.4
Capex
(US$)
Total:
$88m
Private:
$26.5m
Project
structure
25-year
lease-type
contract
1.2
Total:
$182m
Private
$109m
20-year
DBFO
Operator
Veolia
Water,
Vishwaraj
Infrastructur
e
SPML Infra,
VA Tech
Wabag,
NWSC
(Uganda)
Tamil Nadu
Nemmeli
Desalinati
on
2010
Chennai
Metropolitan
Water Supply
and Sewerage
Board
4.7
Total:
$254 m
Private:
$0
7-year
DBO
VA Tech
Wabag, IDE
Technologies.
Source: GWI project tracker database, 2012.
The Nagpur contract is part of the city’s strategy to move towards continuous (24/7) water supply.
It is a 25 year performance-based contract that was awarded to a consortium of Veolia and
Vishwaraj Infrastructure, a PPP developer based in Nagpur. It was preceded by a pilot project in the
city which was also implemented by Veolia. The financing costs are shared between central
governments from the JNNURM, the municipality and the private consortium (30%). In this
contract, the local government has retained risks relating to input supply and cost (raw water and
electricity) and has also retained the right to set consumer tariffs and to connect and disconnect
customers. The consortium will receive a charge of INR7.90 ($0.14) for each cubic metre of water
billed and paid for, which compares to the average tariff paid in the city of around INR14.00/m3
($0.25/m3). (GWI, 2012).
The Aurangabad water supply concession was awarded to a consortium of SPML Infra (80%), VA
Tech Wabag (10%) along with the National Water and Sewage Corporation (NWSC) (10%) of
Uganda, which is bringing in operating expertise. The project includes construction and operation
of a water treatment plant, pipe networks, NRW reduction, metering, billing and O&M. The private
parties are responsible for 60% of the total capex of the project. The remainder of the project cost is
being funded by central government development scheme UIDSSMT.
The Chennai Nemmeli 100,000m3/day desalination plant is a standard BOT contract which was
awarded to local publicly-listed company VA Tech Wabag and IDE technologies. The project does
not have any private investment component. The Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply and
Sewerage Board (CMWSSB) is funding the project with its own resources and with grants from the
central government.
2.2 Discussion
The case studies show that a wide range of project types and structures can now be developed
successfully in India. These cover bulk water treatment, high-end water treatment technology (e.g.
seawater reverse osmosis desalination in the case of Nemmeli) and the transfer of operations and
management to the private sector, as well as combined supply and distribution. This is strikingly
different from the projects that were developed in the 1990s, which were confined to bulk supply
and it demonstrates that local governments are now willing to transfer considerable responsibilities
to the private sector.
The case studies include projects that involve private financing as well as those in which the private
sector is not taking financing risk. For example, 60% of investment costs in the Aurangabad project
are coming from the private parties. On the other hand, financing risk was not transferred in the
Nemmeli project which involves more costly and sophisticated treatment technology.
None of the projects for water supply to households involves the transfer of price risk to the private
sector. In general, domestic water tariffs in India are too low to allow for a private operator to earn a
reasonable return on investment. Municipal governments, on the other hand, appear to find it
politically unfeasible to raise tariffs. It is likely that this separation between the tariff paid by the
consumer and the water charge received by the developer or operator will be a key feature of water
PPPs in India.
None of these cases involves the transfer of ownership of municipal water infrastructure to the
private sector which can be a difficult issue both administratively and politically.
One of the key factors for successful PPP contract close appears to be the capability of institutions
involved in the project to plan, structure and execute contracts which are of interest and benefit to
all stakeholders including the contracting authorities, regulators, private party and the end
customers. In all three cases, the contracting agency was part of a large and comparatively well
resourced local government.
Large cities in India have a stronger institutional set-up for water and wastewater supply, e.g. under
a municipal corporation, while smaller cities face significant human resource constraints when
letting a PPP. In general, the understanding of the PPP projects is low and there is little or no
experience in drafting PPP contracts. There are multiple drafts and redrafts of documents and often
the interests of stakeholders are overlooked. This leads to massive delays in PPP contracting and
projects being abandoned.
Transaction advisors that help the utilities in structuring and executing PPP deals are also known to
take cues from PPP projects executed around the world in the past due to lack of sufficient water
PPP examples in the country. The force fitting of terms and conditions applicable in contracts
elsewhere in the world has led to disagreements and multiple redraft of the contracts. For example,
the PPP project for urban water supply in Ranchi was delayed. PricewaterhouseCoopers (PWC),
third party process monitoring agency hired by the Government of India under JNNURM Scheme
had reported that the evaluation process and the Request for Proposal (RFP) for the project was not
structured properly. Ranchi Municipal Corporation (RMC) was to restructure the RFP documents
and realign other tendering processes. Eventually it was suggested that the project responsibility be
takeover by state PHED department from RMC.
Both ADB and World Bank have been funding projects aimed at institutional capability building
and resolving institutional inefficiency. The central government’s PPP cell which is part of
Department of Economic Affairs, Ministry of Finance has taken up the role of capacitating utilities
across India by way of best practice sharing, technical and financial guidance etc. This may
gradually reduce the gap between the contracting capabilities of large and small cities.
There has been a trend of cities gaining experience in working with the private sector through pilot
projects before venturing into full-fledged PPP deals. In addition to the Nagpur project, other pilot
projects include the Hubli Dharwad Gulbarga pilot project in Karnataka which was funded by the
World Bank.
Having pilot projects as initial testing projects has worked well for utilities which are inexperienced
in dealing with PPP projects and also are not convinced about what value the private sector may
bring to the utility and people. From the private party’s perspective too the pilots work well. They
familiarise the private party with the environment, the utility staff and customers. The risk is low for
the private vendor who does not invest any money in these projects. These projects also put the
private vendor in an advantageous position in comparison to other bidders when the actual tender
for long term concession is floated by the utility for pilot tested zones.
Finally, we note that the all projects involve local companies, in consortium with each other or with
international companies. The entry of local business houses venturing into the water sector in India
has been a striking development of the market in the last five years. The involvement of local
companies may contribute to successful contracting for a number of reasons: they have knowledge
of local contracting and business practices that allow them to interact more successfully with the
contracting authority; local companies may have a long history of engagement with local
government instilling a degree of mutual trust between the parties; their operating and financing
costs are likely to be lower than those of international companies. One further possibility, less
positive but nevertheless worthy of investigation, is that local companies are more willing to engage
in corrupt practices to close deals than their international counterparts.
3 Conclusions
The analysis of the data supports the hypothesis that PPPs are concentrated in states that have high
industrial output. However, the relationship between PPPs and the level of urbanisation in states is
weak. This is probably due to the fact that PPPs are concentrated in a handful of large urban centres
within each state, rather than being spread evenly across the state territory, which means that the
average level of urbanisation in the state does not have a strong bearing on the number of PPPs
signed. It is important to note that although we do find a strong relationship between industrial
development and number of PPPs for historic data, this relationship may weaken in the future as the
impact of central government policy and financing, in particular through the JNNURM, is felt
across the country.
These preliminary results based on descriptive statistics suggest that it would be worthwhile
conducting a more systematic statistical analysis of the factors influencing the geographic location
of projects. In particular, regression analysis would allow us to confirm the significance of these
results and to confirm the direction of causality. In addition to re-testing the relationship with
industrial development, we would want to include a range of possible economic and political
determinants in the analysis including the political party in power, state-level financing capacity,
access to central government funds etc.
The case studies suggest that projects which do not transfer pricing risk to the private sector are
likely to be contracted quickly and successfully. Although projects involving private sector
financing can be contracted in India, the combination of central government financing and local
government funds with private funds may be most appropriate for municipal projects.
In order to test these hypotheses, it would be useful to develop a new dataset including all projects
that have been initiated, including those that have been suspended, abandoned or are still in the
contracting process. It would then be possible to examine the features of these planned projects to
test whether the structural characteristics of the projects reaching contractual close are significantly
different from those that do not, or whether the identity of the players is significant.
All types of PPP contracts in India are receiving considerable interest from both foreign and local
companies. However, the extent of experience and capacity of tendering organisations and the
overall level of institutional development in the state, economic freedom, political will and
regulatory framework has affected the success of the tendering process. We expect that in the
future, many more projects will be signed allowing us to extend our dataset and improve this study.
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Annexure-1
Table 1-Economic Indicators
State\UT
GDP per
capita
(US$)
2011
Maharashtra
1,669
Uttar Pradesh
Net Value
Added by
Industrial
Enterprises
(US$
million)
2009-2010
Population
(million)
2011
Urban
Population
(%)
2011
Economic
Freedom
Ranking
2009
Coastline
2012
23,574
112
45
11
Y
527
6,195
200
22
14
N
Andhra Pradesh
1,258
7,842
85
33
3
Y
Tamil Nadu
1,460
11,829
72
48
1
Y
Gujarat
1,502
18,006
60
43
2
Y
West Bengal
971
3,864
91
32
15
Y
Karnataka
1,219
7,340
61
39
13
Y
Rajasthan
849
4,056
69
25
7
N
Kerala
1,429
1,439
33
48
10
Y
Delhi
3,013
752
17
98
NA
N
Haryana
1,894
5,595
26
24
4
N
Madhya Pradesh
644
3,072
73
28
6
N
Punjab
1,395
2,947
28
37
12
N
Bihar
414
464
104
11
20
N
Orissa
808
2,960
42
17
17
Y
Chhattisgarh
823
2,656
26
23
16
N
Jharkhand
596
3,021
33
24
8
N
Assam
611
1,012
31
14
18
N
Uttarakhand
1,327
3,544
10
31
19
N
Jammu and Kashmir
750
526
13
27
9
N
Himachal Pradesh
1,311
2,751
7
10
5
N
Goa
3,371
1,128
1
62
NA
Y
Chandigarh
2,573
104
1
97
NA
N
Tripura
899
45
4
26
NA
N
Meghalaya
1,009
99
3
20
NA
N
Pondicherry
1,974
769
1
68
NA
Y
Nagaland
1,053
27
2
29
NA
N
Manipur
594
3
3
20
NA
N
Arunachal Pradesh
1,116
NA
1
23
NA
N
Mizoram
972
NA
1
52
NA
N
Sikkim
Andaman and Nicobar
Islands
1,623
339
1
25
NA
N
1,538
2
0
36
NA
Y
Source: Directorate of Economics & Statistics of respective State Governments, and for All-India -- Central Statistics Office, Ministry of Statistics
and Program Implementation, Government of India